WDMMA (World Dictionary of Modern Military Aircraft Network) is an organization dedicated to the study of modern military aviation, and publishes a highly influential annual list of global air force rankings. The list's assessment methodology includes a variety of factors such as level of modernization, logistical support, attack and defense capabilities, and even aviation industry capabilities and combat experience are included in the assessment.

They release the latest Global Air Power Ranking:

1. U.S Air Force

2.U.S Navy

3.Russian Air Force

4.U.S. Army

5.U.S Marine Corps

6.Indian Air Force

7.Chinese Air Force

8.Japanese Air Force

9. Israeli Air Force

10.French Air Force

From my limited understanding, American methods of proxy warfare can be described as an extreme form of an investment firm. Contrary to notions popularized by conspiracy theories (often encouraged by regimes desperate to deflect all of their "good kings'" failings from their populaces), the CIA does not have the capabilities to weave discontent in a targeted country out of thin air. To expand or defend an American sphere of influence, the CIA has to establish itself with a preexisting disenfranchised element, such as a disgruntled and marginalized minority group or a rouge and ambitious military faction.

Like any investment firm, the CIA funnels weapons and money to their allied proxies in hopes of achieving gains. The allied proxies act as clients that are independent on a micro level, but do have to pay heed to their benefactors' wishes. In other words, CIA officials and other American military officers are generally not commanding their proxies' rank and files troops on the ground beyond some training, but they share intelligence and advise the top leadership in hopes of influencing the course of their combat operations.

With Iran's IRCG on the other hand embrace their proxies more closely. Although many still have a strong degree of independence, a good number of IRCG proxy militias are essentially branches of Iranian armed forces from reports I've read. For example, the Liwa Fatemiyoun were Shia Hazara refugees that fled to Iran from the wars in Afghanistan, and then were organized by IRCG officials into militias for the sake of supporting the Assad government in Syria.

In the past few years, most of Iran's allies and have been collapsing left and right, with the toppling of Assad's government from the rebel offensives, and Hamas and Hezebollah's decimation from IDF bombing campaigns. Nearly every report available to me has stated that all signs point to Iran's ability to project power externally has been significantly degraded by the weakening or loss of such vital allies.

Going into my own fallible personal speculation, it seems to me that the problem with Iran's form of proxy warfare is their proxies are more or less direct extensions of themselves, and thus are hit by shrapnel when they implode. With the United States on the other hand, an imploding proxy is simply a lost investment.

What are the main differences and similarities to American and Iranian proxy warfare, and why is Iran faltering so much in that department if recent reports are to be believed?

https://www.twz.com/air/f-35-ai-enabled-drone-controller-capability-successfully-demonstrated

Multiple warheads have always been considered the best way to overwhelm a system. If nearly most of the 100s of ballistic missiles launched were intercepted it would show there is a significant threat to a nation's nuclear arsenal.

Or maybe there's more to the story. Perhaps, Iran foolishly didn't use multiple warheads (eg. MIRVs) or decoys to penetrate their defenses overwhelmingly?

It is possible, they weren't launched simultaneously and were launched over longer periods of time. This may have allowed defenses an easier time shooting down such a large quantity.

Consider if they used three warheads per missile (for 200) that would be 600 targets that must be engaged. There just has to be more to the story.

It seems that it is likely Iran didn't use sufficient penetration aids. Remember dozens still hit the area of the Nevatim Airbase.

What were the reasons for the supposed high interception rates?

Edit: ICBMs aren't the only ballistic missiles that could use countermeasures.

So I’ve seen people say that it’s a new age of imperialism, and the great powers will go on a spree to consolidate their holdings and establish their spheres of influence.

With Trump going for Greenland, the Panama Canal, and Canada, Putin for Ukraine, and China for Taiwan.

Of course, I think that this is an exaggeration, and that the international order will hold in some way, but will become much looser and much weaker by 2028.

So I know that my question is pure conjecture, but if Trump decides to go for Greenland (I’m taking this prospect much more seriously after that reported phone call between Trump and the danish PM), could China make a move towards Mongolia?

I say Mongolia instead of Taiwan because logistically, it’s much easier and also more comparable in size. Mongolia only has 3 million people, mostly located in one city, it’s huge, it was once part of China, and most importantly, it has the second biggest reserve of rare earth minerals in the world. Compared to Taiwan, China could just roll in with a few divisions from the Northern Theater Command and take in probably less than a week.

Con: Russia may be pissed off at losing a buffer state.

For one, I'm not saying the missile has to be connected to Starlink. It knows that Starlink is sending out signals and it can use it for guidance.

Since Starlink is civilian infrastructure, the politics of the situation complicates the matter of just "shooting them down", so that is an advantage.

If Starlink is able to resist jamming efforts from countries like Russia especially in Ukraine that could prove useful. Perhaps countries could adopt this type of guidance for their ASBMs to harden their kill chain?

Jam-resistant GPS of some sorts.

Edit: If a country can hack into it they can use live-feed internet to guide a missile by giving it live updates even in critical phases of flight.