I understand balloons aren’t very useful for bombing in the same way aircraft are, but they’re still the bleeding edge of reconnaissance in the 1800s. You would think every military in the world would want some to act as a force multiplier for their scouts. Set up a picket line of balloons and you can dispatch scouts to anything that looks funny.

Instead the US is disbanding their balloon corps in the middle of the Civil War in 1863. The biggest conflict in its history so far and yet nobody can muster enough interest to keep them around. What gives?

In the contemporary era it would seem that what makes a good "fighter" is a platform that can see airborne targets at very long range, quickly fly towards them, shoot long range missiles at them, and ideally do all of this without being detected or engaged in return. Quite probably this may include controlling friendly drones and utilizing their weapons and sensors to engage the enemy instead of organic weapons systems. One can still easily imagine dogfights and guns in this environment but primarily between small friendly and enemy drones that engage in close.

This then implies a much larger aircraft than a traditional manned fighter with much larger fuel tanks, a 2nd seat for a dedicated drone and sensors operator, aerodynamically compromising all aspect stealth, powerful sensor arrays and the cooling required, and for good measure maybe some next Gen survivability capabilities like electronic warfare emitters to disable drones/missiles or a laser.

If it is not fully committed to being a drone mothership, then presumably it would want missiles. A lot of missiles. A lot of really big missiles. In a bay. A really big internal weapons bay.

This screams more F15EX with a UFO form factor to me and less F35/F22. Maneuverability would be desired to enable missile evasion but the primary survivability is to not be detected and the secondary is to not be targeted. Which brings me to my question: whats the overlap between this thing and a strike platform?

When imagining a next generation strike platform, a few different concepts come to mind

1. A highly stealthy missile truck that can carry even bigger missiles. It would still need large fuel tanks, even better stealth and survivability characteristics as it's getting in closer, and then there's a question of sensors. Does it need it's own detection and targeting sensors or does it rely on a something like the NGAD I just described?

2. Swarms of stealthyish cheap drones carrying short to medium range air to ground missiles relying on the smart plane for targeting. Or bombs.

3. A small highly stealthy strike aircraft designed for deep penetration. It would need to be small, fast, need detection and targeting sensors to accomplish precision strikes and evade hostiles but not control the battlespace. Given the specialized mission it could probably sacrifice fuel and rely on enablers. The capability to control a small amount of tiny escort drones would probably be a nice to have.

4. A B52 or C130 that drops AGMs out the back by the pallet

Aside, of that, does that apply in any measure to rear services like artillery, air defences, electronic warfare, logistics, command and control? Are there also minority does majority of work? And as other question do crews of tanks,IFVs, APCs, , assault helis , multirole jets, artillery , air defences etc, break from mental stress like infantry, perform worse, refuse to follow orders? Did that happen in history & does it happen today?

I am curious about how they were trained and fought, if it was so different from the rest. If there are any good firsthand accounts from men serving in the stormtroopers of ww1 that survived. And also if they had a political element.

From wikipedia:

According to Vanguard of Nazism by Robert G. L. Waite and Male Fantasies by Klaus Theweleit, some of the psychological and social aspects of the Stormtrooper experience found their way into the paramilitary wings of every political party during the Weimar Republic, which were largely made up of World War I veterans and younger recruits whom they trained. For example, the formal barrier between officers and enlisted men was largely broken down and replaced by a fierce loyalty. There was also a "brutalization" process owing to the uniquely violent conditions of trench warfare. Such units included the monarchist Stahlhelm, the paramilitary Roter Frontkämpferbund wing of the Communist Party of Germany, and the Sturmabteilung, the name of which was commandeered by the Nazi Party for its own paramilitary wing.

...

What brutalization process are they talking about ? How did they generate fierce loyalty?

Did ww1 assault infantry consider their role a death sentence? What motivated them? Was indoctrination part of their training? It mentioned taking men off the line to retrain as stormtroopers. How? What would go into training like that? I cant even imagine.

What were the "psychological and social aspects of rhe stormtrooper experience" that was coming back to Weimar Germany ?

Additionally, what are the situations in which AC - 130 is the best possible weapon to use, as opposed to ground attack jets or helicopters?

Good evening,

Apologies if this is the wrong subreddit, but I am looking for books on Combat Engineers, or military engineers in general. Time-period completely flexible. I would like to read up on the profession and I prefer non-fiction. Any books with some good accounts? Thanks

I’ve seen and read a lot about sub operations in the region, but I’m curious how serious the threat of the Japanese army and navy were, despite their own internal conflicts.

In 1991, the Iraqi Army was completely defeated by the coalition. Were there any real systematic attempts within the Iraqi government to analyze and learn from their mistakes in the Gulf War?

Sorry is this is a better question for r/canada but what’s the story behind how the “Royal” applies to the CAN navy and Air Force but somehow the Army is not “Royal”?

It is interesting to me that the F-14 seemingly had its RADAR designated as a Fire Control Computer and not Piloted Aircraft Fire Con. RADAR. I heard from this video that it was something to do with the control of the selection of weapons being integrated to the RADAR? But even then the F-4 still had the FCS with the AWG designation and the actual RADAR with the APG one. So why the AWG for the Tomcat?

Is it simply because Spanish economy was weakened by constant wars, and overflow of silver and gold from America?

Not a military expert here but take a lot of interest in WW2. Primarily learned through Indy Nidels WW2 week by week and some supplemental research,

One of the most fascinating things I’ve learned is the contribution level of minor powers on the axis side during WW2. I have always known Italy was a disaster in WW2 but the contributions in troops from minor, “ineffective” countries was pretty massive between Italy, Romania, Hungary, etc.

Most sources on this topic will talk about these minor countries military disasters. The collapsing flanks at Stalingrad, Italys ineptitude in Africa and Greece, and so on.

While a lot of these countries definitely performed poorly due to leadership, training, equipment and so on, I am really curious if despite these failures they are actually a net negative for a strong modern fighting force like Germany in WW2.

While the collapse at the flanks happened due to Germans poor allies getting steamrolled, the alternative is pulling German divisions from somewhere to man this front. Is this really a better situation for Germany? Is Germany better off replacing substandard Italian units in Africa with German ones?

Really bad militaries historically have been crushed by smaller numbers but I can’t shake the idea that hundreds of thousands of troops no matter the quality can still point a rifle and kill you all the same. This is very apparent on DDay where substandard units racked up plenty of casualties at Omaha beach with MG 42s. It made no difference to the soldiers on that beach that these were not top German units. On some level having these militaries manning quieter fronts should free up German units to be concentrated more where they are needed. One of the biggest disasters for Germany imo was also Romania leaving the war which just disintegrated the Southern front.

So the politics aside like Italy pulling Germany into Greece, were having these poor units useful to them from a pure warfare standpoint? What about other conflicts? North Korean troops in Ukraine come to mind in a modern example and question relevant to how useful smaller worse equipped countries are to the US in a conflict.

What is specifically meant when people talk about degraded avionics in soviet export planes? is it a slower processor, removed bombing modes, lack of a specific radio or datalink?

The F35B is routinely criticized as having insufficient fuel, reduced takeoff weight, and a complicated mechanical complexity. All of that is very true.

But from the perspective of the US Navy and Marine Corps, don't they now have a 5th generation VTOL fighter? And because logistics and cash are a specialty of the United States, couldn't we say that it's benefits and limitations are in that context? "Just" throw more tankers and mechanics at the problem.

Wouldn't I rather have an F35 and all the headaches it entails than 2 F18s? Probably not for my whole air fleet but as part of a hi-low I would think it greatly enhances the capability of my fleet than just more hornets

So I know the French and Belgians deployed troops after the terrorist attacks a decade ago. But for them and other European armies, how easy legally is that to do? Wouldn't such a rope be allocated to law enforcement already?

I recently watched a documentay on the Battle of Toutoberg Forrest and the subsequent roman campaigns into Germania, and a few times the romans deployed into a hollow square, in which they would advance while in melee with the germans. How does that work?

I mean as far as do I know radios were not reliable enough to provide dynamic fire support via scout planes as in WWII therefore intercepting supplies and reinforcements of enemy that way was not feasible. Intense artilllery bombardment against fortified positions could inflict casualties by destroying fortifications but that way you simply were making no man's land larger and attempting to seize that groundmeant you still had to deal with remaining defenders and then be bombarded by enemy artillery inside already demolished positions. Were defenders due to stress of long term bombardment mentally snapeed and ran away from shelters to get pulverized, were both sides employing artillery fire with irregular frequency like 30 minutes of bombardment , 15 minutes of pause, then 10 minutes of bombardment, then 3 minutes of pause hoping that enemy would either flee/retreat from the position or send there supply and reinforcments and then get unlucky get shelled by infrequent artillery fire? Were scout planes uafter locating large units of enemy in open used flares to signal their approcimate position? I mean most of dead and wounded were due to artillery and mortars.

Did Germans consider simplifying / adopting simpler half-tracks? Sdkfz 251 used Clectrac-type steering in addition of the wheel steering, it used track links with 15 different parts, and interleaved roadwheels.

Germans made an armored version of Maultier for the Neberwerfer carrier, why not use the simpler platform for armored half-track for the Panzergrenadiere?

TLDR avaliable at bottom

France was obviously a pionéering nation when it came to automobiles, but they're forgotten in that regard when it comes to lorries and especially their military potential in World War 2. The US 2.5 tonne truck gets a lot of glory rightfully, and is generally considered the most important truck of the war. But from what I understand, it wasn't entirely without it's rivals.

The french Citroën U23 for instance, was a bit lighter, but was renowned for it's reliability, while also having a rather small 2 litre engine that managed to produce 70 hp. Better than any rival in it's class afaik. Infact, my old ford from '83 has a 2 litre engine that made 88hp (in '83, supposedly). Other trucks like the Opel Blitz used different engines that all had much larger displacement and less power. I think I can skip the soviet ones.

Moving on to the heavy Citroën T45, it seems down right remarkable. Loading over 4 tonnes and well known for it's reliability (unless operated by germans, for some reason, like much french equipment) it must have been one of the sturdiest things around at the time.

To make my rambling inquiries short I will make a TLDR:

Were french trucks leading up to world war 2 awesome, or am I missing something?

There are volumes about magic being used for offensive purposes in antiquity.

And there there is also information about the CIA working with remote viewing, and astral protection, etc.

Has a modern or relatively modern state ever tried to use sorcery or magic or astral protection like the CIA was doing for military purposes?

What opinion did Israelis have after evaluating captured BMPs? Did they use or mod them like they did with captured T-series of tanks?

Let me preface this by saying I’m far from a war history/weapons expert, but it seems to me submachine guns usage was at its peak in WW2, but became a very niche weapon type afterwards that is really only used by police or some SOF guys for specific tasks. Was this by design or just what was available at the time? I just don’t see the benefit of issuing a soldier a weapon that’s really only useful to about 50-100m or so, when you could just give them a full power rifle and extend the range they can engage the enemy.

A (non-academic) book in my collection discusses branding as a military punishment in the Union and Confederate armies: "Branding [...] remained legal throughout the war. Deserters were branded, usually on the forehead, cheek, hand, or hip, with the first letter of their crime: 'D' for deserter, 'C' for cowardice, 'T' for thief, or 'W' for worthlessness. Not all branding was done with hot irons; indelible ink was often used instead" (Philip Katcher: The American Civil War Source Book. London 1993, p. 106).

What does "worthlessness" mean in this context?

A severe punishment like branding seems appropriate for a man who is deliberately being useless and is sabotaging his unit through weaponized incompetence. If you have someone whose behavior is lowly and undignified, who is an emberrassment to his commanders and who drags down the other men in his unit, then I could also see why they would perhaps punish him in such a grisly way. However, branding definitely seems excessive as a punishment for the guy who is willing but unable, the guy who is doing his best but simply doesn't hack it.

I don't have access to the Articles of War or to other relevant documents from the era so I can't look up the definition of "worthlessness" there.

Also... apologies for the shameless repost!

MODERN ERA Does infantry or tanks lead a attack on a enemy position? Are infantry only attacks still common?

Hello everyone,

I just had a question. As part of the Carrier Emergency Program, Germany tried to use all possible suitable ships for conversion into aircraft carriers. Among them were three passenger ships: Europa, Gneisenau, and Potsdam.

However, at that time, Germany still had other similarly large ships, such as the Bremen or the later-sunk Cap Arcona and Wilhelm Gustloff.

Especially the Bremen seems to me to be a particularly suitable candidate. It has the Blue Ribbon, so it has good speed, and had to be overhauled anyway due to fire damage. So you can convert it straight away.

They were large passenger liners, and Germany was clearly in desperate need of makeshift carriers. So, what were the main reasons why they weren’t considered for this program?

I’m curious to hear your thoughts!

Ok so first off, I don't know anything about the US Navy, their doctrine, ships/boats, nothing. So I ask you give me some leniency.

Ship boarding was obviously much more common in the 16th-18th centuries and even before.

Does ship boarding still happen?

Is it a viable tactic in the modern world?

Why is it less common now?

Does the US Navy have a special unit or have an MOS that specifically fit for ship Boarding?

Are there any modern examples of ship boarding?

How did the SANDF adapt its doctrine and force structure post-1994 with the integration of MK, APLA, IFP, and Bantustan militaries into the existing SADF? From what I've read (Scholtz's history of the Border War and De Vries' book on African warfare) the SADF was an advocate of a western-style military approach which emphasised maneuver and shock action (which usually came by the means of an indirect approach and was largely based on the theories of Liddell-Hart). This is in contrast with those who served in MK who were very soviet-minded and adopted verbatim Soviet conventional doctrine when fighting in Angola and failing to implement a Castroian "Foco" type of guerilla war when in South Africa proper.

I recently finished Sean McFate’s The New Rules of War.

It’s definitely cause a shift in how I view the world and geopolitics.

Some key takeaways that I found significant.

States don’t operate by the same interpersonal morals or values that we do as individuals.

ALL conflict is an extensions of politics.

The Westphalian system isn’t how the whole world works.

Many different types of entities like states, terrorist groups, cartels equally compete in politics.

War and peace are on a spectrum and not absolutes.

Most states are fragile, some are in name only.

Mercenaries are back in style.

I thought Clausewitz was the only way to wage war until I learned about Sun Tzu and Mao.

Im not sure what this domain is even called (strategy, politics, war?), but I want to learn more about it. What would be a good follow on book to continue down this learning path?

My whole life - I can't help but think. What if they're allowed to duck? what if their officers don't make them stand during the enemy volley. They're right there- you can see them. Take prone position like modern soldiers.

But this is how riflemen or some special light infantry regiments fought. But mostly they had to stand there and eat it.

I understand that you needed a bayonet wall to protect from cavalry charges. But maybe there is a scenario where you're in a forested area or you know the enemy doesn't have cavalry or you are in a city or something where you are using the environment to nullify cavalry.

It just seems like such a good idea to me.

Just like it seems like a good idea to give someone incindiary weapons even in a light infantry style battle.

Grenadiers were called this because they had grenades, it was just phased out over time, so i heard. I know it wasn't good back then but if all your enemies are marching in lines and have smoothbore there are so many fucking weapons you couuld usee which are so much better than a smoothbore and bayonett even by period technologies. The Byzantines figured it out with greek fire - why could no one else figure out how to make bigger weapons that making their men stand up during receiving volleys was the smartest possible move?

I also don't understand why men wouldn't be armed with large numbers of pistols.

Imagine you have 100 men armed with 10 single shot pistols each, trained to take cover when receiving the enemy volley. Then they close distance and, standing 8 feet away, shoot everyone before ever getting close enough to be reached by the bayonetts.

Is it just that human meat is cheaper than weapons? But if your side dies you can lose everything. So you would think they would pay any price. The whole premise of having a single shot at melee range is fucking nuts. You'd think there would be an absolute arms race to pack someone with as many small guns as you could fit. Like the Texas Rangers would do. They were the first ones I ever read about from history who it seems they fucking understood what firepower means. why didn't anyone else figure it out in that era?