So i was reading over wikipedia about the SVT-40, and i know that the SVT-40 had a specialized sniper variant that stopped production in 1942 due to many issues, but when reading Wikipedia i encountered this

"... production of the specialized sniper variant was terminated in 1942. Milling scope rails in the receivers of standard SVT rifles was also discontinued."

This confuses me, as originally i thought only sniper SVT-40 variants had the Scope rails milled, if this isn't the case what is the difference between the regular SVT-40's and the sniper variant of the SVT-40?

I know that Wikipedia isn't that reliable but i thought i should ask here

I want to understand the military doctrine of Germany (from Prussia to current Germany) I can't grasp it and when I search about it I find alot of contradictions

Hey!

I’m English and live in Brighton UK, so given the IRA bombing of the Grand Hotel targeting Margaret Thatcher I’ve always had an intrigue into the IRA. Recently, working with Irish people I had Patrick O Keefe’s ‘Say Nothing’ recommended to me, and have read that plus several other books such as Killing Rage.

One thing I just can’t quite understand is how did the IRA last so long and was hoping to get some input from this group having seen quite interesting discussion on similar subjects.

The population of Belfast in 1970’s was 400K, estimates put around 1500 people as IRA members during this time. Given the size and power of the UK army + other apparatus of state applied (PSNI etc) they seem to have lasted an incredibly long time.

Were the English intelligence services rubbish at the time? Were the IRA exceptionally strong at guerrilla/asymmetric and irregular warfare?

What was the point of the German invasion of Yugoslavia? It seems like it was a huge drain on German resources for no gain (that I can see)

In two parts:

1. Training and experience of Ukraine Reserve Officers

Ukraine seem to use the old Soviet Method of having a "Military Department" (военна катедра) in universities as a way to train Reserve Officers. According to and article from Kiev University from 2013 the duration of training is two and a half years.

The curriculum (in varied part) contains discipline "Military training of the amount of 675 hours (including 450 - - 225 independent work). At The end of the 4th year (July) - training sessions (30 days) [which is the last year of a bachelor]. At The end of training the order of the Minister of defence awarded the title “reserve Lieutenant Junior”. (link to read it yourselves: https://knute.edu.ua/blog/read/?pid=1984&en)

And article from 2021 writes that the Military Training Department of Vinnytsia National Technical University will train 25 boys and girls for Reserve Officers in a UAV specialists (link to read it yourselves: https://gur.gov.ua/en/content/u-vinnytsi-hotuvatymut-ofitseriv-zapasu-za-profilem-boiovoho-zastosuvannia-bezpilotnykiv)

"Junior Lieutenant" is an "ensign" or a "3rd Lieutenant" for those who are wondering. It is from the Soviet Union's system for training the Reserve Officers.

- The question - What is your experience and do you think this amount of training is enough to prepare future leader? Is the information old? How does that compare to other Reserve Officer programs?

2. Having in mind the attrition rate of industrial war on junior officers I wonder where does Ukraine get so many officers to staff the new brigades? I assume Terriorial Brigades don't need so many officers because they are planned to be relatively stationary on operation level meaning they are for defense only.

- The question - Is there a policy or tradition in place in Ukraine where people from the general population are recruited directly (or almost directly) into command and staff positions? As a historical example during the American Civil War, World War 1 and World War 2 some nations conscripted/drafted Phds and other professionals after a quick basic training and officer courses because there was a lack of people for those positions. Has something similar happened in Ukraine?

Please follow the One Year Rule of r/WarCollege when answering this post.

I’ve always been curious if at any point the USSR would have been militarily, logistically, and politically capable of launching a large, protracted military operation overseas (South America, Africa, etc). I’m aware the Soviet-Afghan War featured a relatively minimal Soviet ground contingent of ~100,000 troops in a neighboring country. The Cuban intervention in Angola saw some 60,000 troops in the country by 1988. So, my question is would the Soviets have been capable at any point during the Cold War of launching a large scale operation overseas, involving hundreds of thousands of troops?

Overall, I would expect not successful because it is really really difficult. But there are 2 notable exceptions:

• Operation Wikinger - Heinkel He111s unwittingly attacked German destroyers at night in a storied friendly fire incident and a Heinkel was able to sink one of the destroyers with a bomb hit at midships.
• Battle of Midway - B-17s from Midway attacked the IJN carrier group. While not causing at direct damage, the B-17s were a part of the USN mini attacks that kept the IJN and their CAP off balance which finally collapsed when the major US carrier attack came.

I used to believe it was a mistake that Hitler and the German generals to not try and push the Germany army to capture the BEF, but after thinking it over and talking with other people, I now think it was a pretty low chance. Germany units were exhausted after their mad dash across France and needed rest, refueling, and rearming. The infamous Halt Order by Hitler was cut from 3 days into 2 days anyway. British planes stationed across the English channel could linger over Dunkirk longer than German planes still stationed in Germany. The Germans still had to fight through the fierce French and Belgium rearguard defense (which isn't talked about enough and something I wished we saw in the movie Dunkirk). And British battleships would pound any German unit that got near the beach. Given these factors, should the idea that the Germans could have captured the BEF be put aside the idea that the Germans could have successfully pulled of Operation Sealion? I frequently hear both ideas as a way to knock the UK out of the war and I view Operation Sealion as having a zero chance of success.

I loved reading Xenephon's Anabasis. I've read a few accounts of WWI. I read the Sorrow of War by Bao Ninh.

Loved them all.

What are some of your favorite war journals / accounts?

Did people want to be the drummer? Or was that sort of thing considered a bad assignment?

I understand that thrust vectoring would make a significant difference in a dogfight/merge over an opponent without it, but it seems that nearly all modern air combat will be done at long distances enabled by sensor networks.

So with that said, does thrust vectoring still provide value on modern military aircraft?

Inspired in part by this question, I wanted to know what naval tube artillery is used for, and how that compares with land based artillery.

Land based tube artillery can be used to suppress positions, grant room to maneuver via smoke, deny positions via harassing fire, and reduce positions through fire. While naval tube artillery is probably capable of delivering these effects, I imagine that this is an inefficient use of a large, expensive asset, and is this used for this infrequently. Under what circumstances, then, is the gun used against land based targets, and does its usage differ from land based tube artillery?

Lets ay I'm a napoleonic era artillery man, I've got a decent line of sight on a target, maybe i've got a raised position for my battery and/or the target is on a raised position. Maybe infantry from my army are advancing to attempt to drive the enemy off the top of a ridge or perhaps infantry are trying to storm the breach of an enemy fortress. I want to attempt to keep my artillery firing on that target for as long as possible as my infantry advance. Assuming I've had the chance to take ranging shot pretty decent idea of how best to bounce my shot or the like what would be the equivalent or a Danger Close distance and Minimum Safe Distance for different common artillery and shell types? Whether that be fairly standard field guns with ball shot or a howitzer or mortar with something like shrapnel or the like.

I've read that immediately after Sixth Army was surrounded commander of LI Corps Walter von Seydlitz urged Paulus to defy Hitler's orders and stage an immediate breakout. I know that once surrounded the Sixth Army rapidly became too weakened by hunger and a lack of fuel or ammunition to break out or even really aid any relief forces, but if Paulus had attempted to breakout immediately after Operation Uranus could he have succeeded in saving at least some of his army? Or was the Sixth Army already doomed by that point? Other German armies were able to successfully break out of encirclements on the Eastern Front, so I guess what I'm interested in discussing is what allowed some encircled armies to break out and others to not.

If you were to ask me the strongest two armies of the ancient world, I would guess, as a Mike Duncan educated casual pop historian, it would be Alexander the Greats army and the Roman Legions of the 5 good emperors. That might be wrong but that's just my guess. I'm just curious, in those 4-500 years, would have there been technological advances that would make a 2nd century AD army inherently dominate over a 4 century BC army?

I am looking to find the composition & armament of regular Soviet Army units in Hungary 1956. I am looking for information from section up to battalion level, specifically disposition of weapons. Does anybody have any decent sources of info? Thanks in advance.

Specifically in US sanctions, how do they work when it comes to rebel held territory of a sanctioned state? For example, Kurdistan in Iraq in the 90s, or more recently, rebel held areas of Syria prior to collapse of the Assad regime.

Are these areas also technically prohibited from doing business with the US? Or are those areas free from the sanctions?

I have seen the name Charles C. Sharp used a bit as a source for topics such as soviet TOE's Im just wondering if there is something like a PDF or online version of these? i don't mind if i have to pay to access them i just don't want to order an entire book

In particular these two

Charles C. Sharp, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Volume 11, Soviet Militia Units, Rifle and Ski Brigades, 1941-1945, Nafziger Collection

Sharp, Charles C.: Soviet Infantry Tactics in World War II. The Rifle Units of the Red Army from Squad to Company in Combat. According to the Combat Regulations of November 1942. George Nafziger: 1998.

I mean the navy cancelled the railgun that was meant for coastline bombardment and we don't have battleships anymore and missiles are too few and too expensive for continuous bombardment that lasts for days....whats the solution

Im aware that in 1942 the Izhevsk arsenal was ordered to switch back to Mosin M1981/30 rifles from SVT-40 production, I'm also aware that the PPSh-41 was considered to be far more effective for increasing the firepower of infantry because of its low cost, and being easier to maintain by infantry but I have one question, Im also aware that the SVT-40 had some issues with shot dispersion

Why was SVT-40 production still diminishing after 1942? Was it because of the PPSh-41's effectiveness in close-quarters combat? Or to prevent excess ammo use? or a combination of these factors?

But even then why didn't they continue or at least increase production? but give them primarily to Guards rifle squads, And Senior Riflemen? I have heard that senior riflemen were given Priority for SVT-40's not sure how many Senior Riflemen got SVT-40's

For example, the M61 Vulcan is a 20x102mm autocannon, or the GAU-8 Avenger which fires a 30x173 ammunition, but what do the numbers mean?

Give the fact that US was primary protector of the free world and was responsible for protecting the most important battle field of the said free world (europe), why did it only have 2 corps (6 divisions)? This is quiet a small force considering the fact that there were 20 active corps in NATO at the time.

Secondly, what happened to the idea of "disarming" germay, give the fact that west germany accounted for 3 Corps (12 Divisions) during this time?

Meaning the Egyptians, Syrians, Saudis, etc.

On either side of Marine Central Command were Joint Force Command North and East. In my U.S. military history class, all that is mentioned of them is that they lagged behind the Marine advance, and then passed the Marines to liberate Kuwait City.

What kind of resistance did they face relative to the Marines?

the computer game “Hearts of Iron” depicts it that way.

Is the modern battlefield really structured that way?

The news footage does not give that impression.

If I am not mistaken, Western armies started using the concept of rotations during the 50s and 60s. Troops would be deployed for a set period (e.g., X months) before being sent home, unlike WW1 or WW2, where units were pulled back to the rear for rest and recovery but stayed in-theater.

This system seems to have its pros and cons, but it worked well enough in limited conflicts like Vietnam, Irak or Afghanistan

What would have been the plan for troop rotations if the Cold War turned hot? Would the same concept of sending troops home after a set time even be feasible in a large-scale, high-intensity conflict like that? Or would armies have fallen back to the older system of rotating units within the theater of operations?

Turkey has been working with them since 2017 and, given the success rates of the HTS, I was curious if Turkey had a role in organizing those groups into a professional army.

In general, large multi-ethnic multi-national armies have troubles with inter-ethnic squabbling. The Austro-Hungarian Army is immediately obvious, but you see shades of this in a lot of forces.

Paired on top of this is a certain dynamic in Islam, where only ~20% of Muslims are Arabic speakers. When you’re recruiting eg Dagestanis or Filipinos, you’re almost certainly not getting someone with whom communication is easy or cultural transmission/knowledge is seamless.

And yet, we didn’t hear stories like, “bro, don’t join ISIS. They keep all the good positions for the [insert favorite group here] and make us [disadvantaged group here] do all the dying”.

Was it just because anyone going so far as to join ISIS was inherently self selected in such a way that avoided these issues? Was there efforts within ISIS to get some sort of cultural cohesion (a la the French Foreign Legion, which faces similar challenges and arguably succeeds despite them)? Were there entire AOs that functionally just had Russian as a lingua Franca and as long as the bullets kept flying the ISIS big wigs didn’t care to micromanage much?