From what I understand, the T-90 is basically an upgraded T-72B with a different name designation, to improve sales in the export market after the first Chechen War.

I can't think of a WW2 general as controversial as MacArthur (aside from maybe Manstein). In WW2 and up until the seventies he was generally regarded by his contemporaries and writers as a brilliant strategist, though he made some serious blunders in his career and was notoriously arrogant and aloof. Now he's regarded as either a military genius or the most overrated commander in American history? How did this heated debate come about?

The West German F-4s were either the recon version of the E variant or the F which was only capable of using Sidewinders.

The E version with Sparrow capability was very widely available with even the Spanish fielding them in the early 1970s.

Since the end of last year, the US army had started to acquire the laser variant of Stryker M-SHORAD into service with 50kW laser module.

Laser variant Stryker M-SHORAD with 50kW laser module.

However, roughly a few years ago, US army also acquired the kinetic variant of Stryker M-SHORAD into service with 30mm auto-cannon.

Kinetic variant Stryker M-SHORAD with 30mm auto-cannon.

So, why did the US army acquired two different variants of Stryker M-SHORAD to fulfill the same role (i.e. short range mobile air defense)?

In terms of air defense, laser has significantly more advantages over kinetic in terms of:

1. Cost: The interception cost of laser per air target is around $5 worth of electricity; The interception cost of kinetic per air target will be in thousands of dollars since one round may costs hundreds of dollars and auto-cannon needs to shoot tens, if not hundreds of rounds to hit an air target even with proximity fuse.

2. Efficiency: Laser weapon has the flexibility of adjusting the duration of its laser to deliver just the right amount of energy to melt / vaporize an air target, therefore each type of air target will have different cost of interception, preventing overkill; Kinetic weapon doesn't have this type of flexibility since it's not possible to adjust the lethality of each round fired, therefore shooting down a DJI drone will have the same interception cost as shooting down a missile.

3. Accuracy: Laser is unaffected by crosswind and gravity, and it travels at literal speed of light, therefore a laser weapon will always hits an air target almost instantly without the need to lead the air target since it's physically impossible for an air target to dodge laser; A round's trajectory is affected by crosswind and gravity, and it travels significantly slower than light, therefore a kinetic weapon needs to constantly adjust its lead on an air target to maximize the hit probability of its round. However, a sudden change in the speed or direction of crosswind, or randomized evasion by the air target, will cause the round to miss the air target, forcing the kinetic weapon to repeat the process, increasing the interception cost.

4. Logistic: Ammunition for laser weapon doesn't need to be manufactured or transported since laser only need electricity to be generated, and electricity can be acquired from multiple different sources such as battery, generator, grid, and even solar panel; Ammunition for kinetic weapon needs to be manufactured and transported, which is why one round costs hundreds of dollars in the first place.

The acquisition of kinetic variant Stryker M-SHORAD was done before the war in Ukraine (before Amazon drones dropping grenades on conscripts become famous enough to be considered a legitimate threat). Back then, the US army had no reason to believe its ground force can be threatened by weaponized Amazon drones since the go-to strategy of US military is "erasing 99% of all threats with preemptive air strikes".

So in hindsight, the acquisition of kinetic variant Stryker M-SHORAD looked like a knee-jerk reaction to ... nothing, right?

In fact, skipping the kinetic variant and wait for the trial and development of laser variant Stryker M-SHORAD to be completed before acquiring it for service is a more economical and reliable move given the blatant advantages of laser over kinetic, isn't it?

Also, how likely will the US army buy more laser variant Stryker M-SHORADs to replace its existing kinetic variants in the future?

It seems that militaries and forces without access to thermal/IR imaging and optics are at a massive disadvantage in the modern battlespace, especially when operating in low-light/low-visibility conditions or in medium-to-long range engagements.

Given the massive force multiplier and advantage that thermal/IR imaging brings to modern warfare and the fact that the underlying technology is actually quite old at this point, having first been developed during WW2 and fielded on a limited scale in WW2 and the Korean War, why haven't there been any reliable, proven countermeasures developed against thermal/IR imaging to camouflage or obscure men, material and vehicles from detection via thermal/IR imaging?

And will it ever be possible in the near-future?

I know there's been R&D done on the "Active Camouflage" concept, which is essentially a digital mirror made up of phased array optics, stuck onto clothing or a vehicle's exterior, which reflects an altered image of the object back to the viewer but obviously that's not going to fool an observer with a thermal/IR optic from seeing that a tree-and-bush-texture-wrapped tank is actually a very warm, very large tank with an obvious tank-like silhouette.

Within the Soviet military, what role did the Yak-38 and its would-be successors would have played? Compared to Western jets like the Harrier, how did Soviet doctrine regarding VTOL aircraft differ? Beyond the Yak-38, how would the Soviets further develop their future VTOL aircraft as the technology matured by the late Cold War according to their own evaluations of the technology and doctrine?

Taiwan is obviously very geopolitically significant. Often mentioned are its semi conductors, proximity to China, defensibility, etc. But almost always in the same paragraph, discussion will include the term “first island chain”.

I understand what it literally is. The loose set of countries/ islands that surround China in the pacific. What I don’t understand is why China controlling one island in this chain is such a massive advantage for them.

What is it specifically about naval warfare that makes it so advantageous for the U.S. and allies to control all the islands in the first island chain? Is it submarine warfare? Blockading ability? Something else?

How did the allies use the yakuza after August 1945? What did they do?

Where is all the earth sourced from? How is that earth moved from its source to the inside of the basket? Are they at all practical to fill by hand?

I was wondering small arms companies that supply to the nation do to stay afloat after reading that GIAT/Nexter dropped small arms manufacturing due to it not being financially sustainable.

Nature of service rifle/small arms production is that it needs to stay afloat, keep the machines running not only to keep the cash flowing, but to retain the skilled MFG. workers

For example, S&T Motiv (formerly Daewoo precision, supplier of K2 service rifle to South Korea)

is primarily a automotive component manufacturer. So while they do take .gov contracts, their bread and butter is components mentioned earlier. After all, machines used to manufacture them are same.

(MIM, CNC milling, forging etc.)

Smith and Wesson in past have manufactured parts for Harley Davidson and I got wondering.

(Not that surprising given that Harley is in CT and S&W is in MA)

I know a lot of it is classified. However, I can only find info that amounts to a "more powerful signal".

Can anyone explain it a bit more?

What was the reason the Marine Corps went with a tracked assault gun versus a wheeled assault gun?

The M1128 Mobile Gun System (built off a LAV III chassis) had a M68A2 105 mm cannon. This was used on early M1 Abrams as well as M48 and M60 tanks. It also had a mix of heavy and general purpose machine guns as well as the ability to resist up to a 14.5 mm round.

It weighed just under 19 short tons and was wheeled. So overall it seems pretty compact and light. The Army dropped the vehicle because the autoloader was expensive and it didn’t have a double v-hull.

Meanwhile the M10 Booker has the M35 105 mm cannon, which seems to be a modernized and lightened version of the M68 gun. It also has one heavy and one general purpose machine gun.

It weighs around 42 short ton.

Both have around the same range but the M1128 has a top speed 15 MPH quicker than the M10.

It seems like if the Marine Corps was looking to be a quick reaction force and amphibious, an updated M1128 would be a better option.

I read that the vehicle had issues where the autoloader would jam and a soldier would need to exit to fix this and it lacked air conditioning, causing the vehicle to overheat. Obviously the first one is a huge problem.

If they were designing a new vehicle from scratch, why didn’t they just redesign the M1128 to address the problems?

With hard kill I mean significant measurable damage like removing more than 20% GDP or ability to conduct war.

The black death is the last time I think it happend. Smallpox and other infective bio weapon would count AFAIK it haven't been used. Why haven't ISIS managed to get their hand on something like that? You could find Ebola blood in ISIS controlled areas.

I read about the dangers of Asian giant hornet and how they could kill bees and lead to agricultureral collapse. Have any hostile organisation actually tried to just smuggle and release hornet colonies?

Many countries electrical grid are vulnerable and a easily target. Why haven't terrorists or spies tried to destroy the power grid? A few charges of termite should do it and you probably wouldn't even get caught if it's done in the forrest.

Edit: talking about destroying a handful of these towers on different lines. https://www.internationales-verkehrswesen.de/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/sv_kraftnet_sweco-1140x722.jpg

Hey there, just interested in adding some tools to my tactical tool box for an upcoming paintball match. We've had a lot of success studying military history, small unit tactics and such. Our Lieutenant leads from the front and has frequently gone down, leaving me responsible for a platoon of guys. It can get chaotic when a leader falls. Even though these men all had training, they all don't have experience. Mix a downed leader, with paintballs whizzing over your heads, excited kids clogging up radio traffic and you'll start to notice a lack in morale, discipline and effectiveness. So a new leader has to act quick, because if the men don't have somebody to tell them what to do, they start to think and act for themselves instead of thinking about the unit. So I fall back on my training! I start delegating all of the authority I could, but sometimes I'm still left with micro managing upwards of 20 guys. And while I go putting fires out on the right flank, our left flank is falling. So, I feel sometimes, there's just no time for a leader to micromanage. I guess, I'd like to know how I could better handle myself, leading these guys. I'd love to start anywhere you gentlemen would suggest, as I have no formal or official training.

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TLDR: Please help me unlock the are age old proven methods of military leadership / morale in the form of books, videos, tedtalks, etc. Thank you all, this is my first post and I hope to be a contributing member of your guys community. Looks pretty neat!

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Pardon if this isn't the right forum but I'm not sure of a better place.

I'm working with non-military people on a project for the DoD. I'm trying to describe roles and responsibilities of the organizations we're connecting with but am having a hard time finding references that clearly lay out the Rs & Rs of the Secretary's office compared to the military HQ staff, that includes both descriptions as well as simple, clear organization charts.

I would really appreciate any ideas on good references. I have a USAF CAC so am able to get to sources that might be behind CAC walls.

Any help greatly welcomed!

I think we've all read Guy Sajer's famous account of GD training and how brutal it was. I recall Alfred Novotny gave a similiar account in his book. Yet, I've never found a comparative story about training and replacement for LAH, DR, Totenkopf, or Wiking during the actual war. Does anyone have any stories or accounts?

Can’t find any sources on the squad structures, names of the units or their equipment. Help is much appreciated!!

I've never understood the Cold War obsession with making every armoured vehicle amphibious and I can't find any example of it actually being used. Even a non-combat logistical example is fine, like if a bridge was out or something and they decided to cross a river instead of fixing it.

Hello hivemind,

Apologies for the clunky question, I'm quite sure how to phrase what I'm getting at, but here goes:

In the age-old tracked vs wheeled mechanisation debate, the British Army of the late cold war is typically chatacterised as tending to heavily favour the former approach. They used tracked SPGs, tracked recce vehicles, tracked light APCs, tracked AT platforms, tracked air defence platforms etc.

Obviously this came with the usual benefits and drawbacks of tracked platforms, but they clearly judged the trade-off worth it, especially given their expected operational environment of the North German Plain.

It's also clear that this wasn't an entirely one-sided decision. Many of their peers adopted wheeled platforms to fill some or all of those roles instead, and clearly saw situations where an all-tracked structure might prove sub-optimal. Reductively, this seems particularly true for nations like France with a greater eye to non-european LSCO engagements.

However, while the regular British army was very 'track heavy', by the late cold war its territorial forces were predominantly, and at some points entirely, wheeled with vehicles like Saxon and Fox, while retaining much the same structure as their regular counterparts.

Was any thought/consideration ever given to using these units or their equipment in favour of the more traditional tracked platforms to take advantage of their strengths should an operation that particularly suited them arise (eg a lower-intensity, long-distance pursuit à la op Serval)?

Or were the advantages of Britain's wheeled platforms ever seriously considered/taken into account in planning/wargaming different operations?

Sorry for the long-winded explanation, but hopefully you get the idea of what I'm asking :)

Thanks!

Hope you all have wonderful days

There's a scene where a Sergeant sees an Lt using poor range safety, so he throws bullets at him, curses him out, and threatens him. A moresenior officer sees that, and more or less laughs and says the sarge was right. Would that behavior really be tolerated in the USMC of the time?

For example, was there a time when gps guided bombs/missiles were protested as unethical?

Another example would be the transition to guided torpedos.

I have always been interested in the transition from the shoulder to shoulder line fighting you see in ancient times through Napoleonic warfare, to the dispersed formations you see in World War 1 and onwards.

My understanding is that during the American Civil War battles would typically start with troops fighting shoulder to shoulder in neat lines, but that typically got broken up quick. During the Franco-Prussian War everyone had breech loaders so dispersion became even more important, but because there were no radios formations still had to stay somewhat close together.

How did this work in the Russo-Japanese War? I know that firepower took a huge step up over the Franco-Prussian War, but there still weren't any radios (or at least the kind that could be used on a battle field). I think at the battle of Mukden both sides had lines that were like 50 kilometers long. How did they keep themselves organized other such a long front? Was there a lot of reliance on improvised telegram lines?

I was looking at information about Afghanistan and I came across this war, I was seeing how the British lost a huge number of soldiers in this war and had to withdraw without achieving their objectives. What were the reasons for this?

What websites, social media pages, etc do you most commonly use to deep dive into current military events, geopolitical information, Gov't released reports (DOD reports, etc), strategy & tactics of specific battles, etc.

I love drilling into the details and expanding my knowledge and every so often come across a website with a treasure of information. What is your favorite?

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