It seems there is a key capabilities gap in long range low grade air defense of destroyers, highlighted by the fight with the Houthis, where million dollar missiles are getting expended on low tech drones. Because distances are long, I understand that a category 1 or 2 drone wouldn't have a role in naval combat, but I'm curious if longer range drones that are still cheaper and more compact then a standard missile (like an altius 600) could be a key capability contribution to the US Navy. #1, they could be used to exhaust an enemy ships supply of expensive defense missiles, #2 they could be used synchronously to penetrate a layered air defense, #3 they could target sensitive tracking systems to soften an enemy up,#4 they could be used in concert with more advanced systems like a standard missile, #5. They could be used on their own to go after low value targets, like speedboats in the littorals, #6 they could be used in counter drone warfare.

How many javelin missiles are usually carried by a team of 2 soldiers if they are attached to a dismounted light infantry platoon? Does each soldier in a team only carry 1 missile or do they each lug at least 2 missiles around (not including the CLU)?

I gather body bags were a fairly new development compared to the mass graves of WW1 and WW2.

Let's say a Ukrainian soldier was to die from a drone attack within the Ukrainian line. His friends have access to his body. What is done with it?

Is it buried in the trench? Is it put in the bag and taken out of the trench entirely to the rearward zone and lined up in a designate body bag field with the other casualties? I suppose we prioritize getting the dead back to their families as soon as possible in modern times. How long does it take to get the dead back home and what is the step by step process?

From a layperson's view, it seems like heavily forested areas might be problematic for operating armor. Does this impression come from attempts to do so in the past failing miserably, or is there more to the story? Thanks!!

Hey, y'all never posted before here. I'm doing some research and was wondering if anyone could point me. tion Desert Storm and pre-Russian Ukraine War 2022. If you know of any credible good ones,in the right direction to find books discussing what, if any, known intelligence operations went please let me know.

Now that cell phones are so common who have the burden of proof if someone without uniform is killed? Is it the prosecutor that have to prove that the victim wasn't a spy/forward observer sending intelligence or the soldier that have to be prove the victim where sending intelligence?

Did the French army as a whole (and not just the leaders) feel that it was completely beaten? Or was the army disappointed in the decision to seek an armistice?

Looking at ww2 and before there were light tanks, heavy tanks, tanketts and medium tanks. Nowadays one hears only about MBT's (which I understand are closest to medium tanks). Why is that?

Fire and maneuver is the foundation for all infantry tactics in the US military. It involves a forward element (as small as a fire team, as large as a company) taking contact, fanning out, and returning accurate, suppressive fire on the suspected enemy position. Then a rear element of comparable size maneuvers in a semi circle to strike the enemy position from the side. It was standard practice by WW2. Maj Winters describes the tactic repeatedly in his interviews for Band of Brothers.

I always assumed it was developed in WW1 to overcome the deadlock of trench warfare. However, I recently read of the Prussians using it at the company level in the Franco-Prussian War of 1871-71. They describe a lead element of skirmishers initiating context, while a rifle company advances up to the skirmish line and established a base of fire. A second company would then move left or right and assault through the enemy flank. This is in contrast with the French tactics of preferring to have their assaulting element charge up through their base of fire for a direct assault.

So my question is, who invented fire and maneuver as an infantry tactic? When did it become a standard battle drill that infantry leaders would execute automatically, as opposed to a few volleys followed by a bayonet charge?

I want to emphasize that I'm asking about the "tactic," of fire and maneuver, a thing that infantry is taught and drilled on to execute automatically. Not the "strategy," of envelopment, which would be a troop movement ordered by a higher field commander.

As a prior active duty infantryman turned guardsman I’m curious to see if there’s any difference in the role the NG would serve opposed to their AD brethren. It seems to me that the NG isn’t bad at let’s say the platoon/company level in some cases but anything past that I believe would have serious growing pains in getting up to speed. Which begs the question, would NG units just be glorified EA dev assets in a large conventional war?

Very illiterate person here. I've been looking at clips of the Ukraine war and the trench warfare being used there.

So when a trench is captured, I understand it is because the opposing force has either been killed, captured, or has retreated, after which fortifications will be set up again.

This I don't understand. After you capture a trench, it must be defended from a counterattack?

How can the enemy counterattack if they have just been weakened to the point of needing to retreat?

Also what is physically even behind a modern Ukraine War forest trench? More trenches? Are there more people in there or have the people in those trenches already moved to the frontline trench and been compromised by the time retreat becomes necessary?

Thank you. Really.

Is there any standard methodology to score a certain threat in a battlefield given certain (noisy) measurements like e.g. radar tracks, uncertain intelligence, …? I understand it can be a complex topic as it depends on the mission, counter-measures the kind of threat, … so my question is more: do you know of any resources (books, article, …) that discuss this topic?

In Syria and Iraq, one common thing that was done was smearing technicals with mud as some sort of improvised camouflage. But is it actually effective at all? When it comes to improvisation of camouflage, is there any method that is actually worthwhile?

Enlisted Infantry in the Canadian military here.

What is the point of an Officer Corp? I understand the roles they play and what they actually do, but I fail to understand why we don't just have more SNCOs do that?

Like a Platoon Commander, afaik almost any Pl WO I've ever met could competently command the platoon. Why not just have Pl IC and Pl 2IC be 2 different ranks of NCO?

As well, at least in the Canadian military we seem to suffer from a degree of Officer bloat. I've heard statistics that we have way more generals than allied militaries, as well as from personal experience (on air forces bases specifically) Seeing every other guy being an officer seemed so wasteful and unnecessary.

Especially when they were less than adequate at their job (and fat) but still demanded your respect, this was aggravating (at least from the perspective of an Infantryman with his head screwed on right).

I will say though, I have never had negative experiences with Infantry Officers, as in situations where they were incompetent, egregiously unfit or were acting "holier than thou" or frowning upon the lower enlisted (except in situations where such an action is the correct response).

But yeah to sum it up, my experience with (non Inf) Officers is that they are bloated (no pun intended) and overly payed and utilized where a senior NCO or even specialized branch JNCO could fulfill that role. What gives?

My main hypothesis is just due to how long it takes a Pl WO to get into that position, they'd all be aged out by the time they reached battalion command level (in our hypothetical Enlisted world).

Are there any public criticisms of H.R. McMaster's Dereliction of Duty?

In Dereliction of Duty, H.R. McMaster wrote:

The war in Vietnam was not lost in the field, nor was it lost on the front pages of the New York Times or on the college campuses.  I was lost in Washington DC.  

It hit on the major right winger tropes about the American experience in Vietnam.

• We didn't lose the war on the ground.
• The politicians back home lost it.
• It was all the Democrats' fault, specifically LBJ and McNamara.  

It's the same story you hear from some random old dude wearing one of those "Vietnam Veteran" black baseball hats hanging outside the PX.  If you served in the military, you know the type.  The guy who likes telling his entire life story to some 18 year old kid with a fresh buzz cut  waiting for a shuttle bus.  

I've never read any serious criticism of his book.  Why not?  I'm not claiming the book wasn't well researched, but there were so many things that happened in Vietnam outside the scope of his analysis that undermine his conclusions. 

Example.  I scanned his bibliography.  I didn't see a single Vietnamese source.  Not in his interviews.  Not in his listing of authors and oral histories.  Not one. 

I guess the academic community doesn't want to take on the hero of 73 Easting.  Or maybe that debate doesn't take place on the shelves of Barnes & Noble.  Until then, I will remain the one crazy person who thinks that the War in Vietnam was lost in Vietnam.  

Was there any occurrences of local Guanche kingdoms raiding their rivals, and selling the captives they took to the Castilians similar to how West African kingdoms raided and sold their captives to European merchants? Or did the Castilians just snatch the slaves entirely by themselves?

I have been trying to research this topic, but unfortunately sources have been extremely spotty. I searched for several hours on the internet, but I couldn’t find anything that addressed my question one way or the other.

From what very little information I could gather, the Castilians utilized hundreds of allied Guanches in the conquest. Apparently, the southern Guanche kingdoms had some sort of vendetta with the more wealthy northern kingdoms. Which the Castilians promptly took advantage of, and allied themselves with the Southern Guanches. Although a number of the Guanche collaborators were assimilated into Castilian culture, others were double crossed and sold into slavery.

Any help with sources would be appreciated.

Postwar the Royal Navy had 5 modern battleships, KGV, DOY, Anson, Howe and Vanguard. Although the first 4 had seen war service and were a bit worn out, Vanguard was actually newer than the Iowas. What stopped the Royal Navy from keeping Vanguard like the US did with the Iowas. Could Vanguard have been of use at the Falklands, considering how the Iowas were used in the Gulf War? I imagine it would be quite good, I don’t think an Exocet would get through the armour belt and the big guns would be great for artillery support.

They both rely on rapid maneuver warfare with light mechanized vehicles, but I have heard that they are very different. How so?

My question comes from reports from Force Z where I think it’s mentioned that the ships had not been issued with tracer rounds for the AA guns (because the UK was not at war with Japan yet).

Are there certain supplies that are only supplied to ships after war is formally declared?

Edit - title should be “as if war were to break out at any time”

I get that the Turks had the cavalry advantage, but the Byzantines seem so inept against them. But when they hired the Catalans, the mercenaries cut through the nomads like butter. What advantage did they have?

An article that I read years ago about the archeological findings on bodies killed in Sweden's 1361 Battle of Visby mentioned that most of them suffered both leg wounds and sometimes even dozens of trauma and stabbing related injuries on their heads. Another article on traditional battles in highland Papua New Guinea also discussed how warriors generally attacked their enemies' legs and heads.

Apparently, a common tactic in medieval and classical melee combat is to first swipe at the opponent's legs to disable them. One the opponent is crippled, their head becomes the next target, and they are then struck or stabbed repeatedly until death is ensured.

In popular media that I'm familiar with, I haven't seen this method used much. Generally, characters in those works fight by parrying each other's weapons until the victor inflicts a stab wound to the loser's chest. An early episode of the Dragon Prince cartoon even depicted it as ineffectual, with the instructor stepping on the main protagonist's sword when he aimed for his legs in a sparing match. Clearly, the intetions was showing how far he was from the kingly duties his family and society intended him for, including physical prowess and skills in combat.

Beyond some exceptions like Game of Thrones' "Oberyn vs the Mountain" duel, why is there seemingly little representation of "the legs and then the head" tactic of melee fighting in popular media?

My first post here, hi all.

I want to discuss conflict ‘time constant’ at which decision-loops operate. I should mention, that I don’t have any military background, but am well versed with game theory, and control theory, and am interested in reflexive control theory, that Russians utilise.

As I observe the conflicts evolving now, I am amazed how… slow everything is. Second World War unfolded in matter of months, with gigantic invasions left and right every campaign season. Certainly overt enough for everyone to know what’s going on. Right now, it feels like everything unfolds in slow motion. Things take so long to change, and the amount of media fuss about each mile left or right is actually a bit laughable, since even von Clausevitz, in his time, emphasised that equipment and logistics are more important than maps…

Anyway, the point I want to argue is that it seems that warfare has been severely affected by the Information Age, you know with broadband internet in their pocket, suddenly it is no longer about full scale pushes, but precise, orchestrated, advertised and hedged drone strikes aimed not at land coverage, but much more at social visibility.

Well, the counterargument could be that nobody can afford large operations anymore, but maybe we just didn’t reach this level of heat yet. Another one would be the nuclear weapons, that make everyone think twice before ascending the escalation ladder.

Which one would it be? Or am I overthinking it and it’s still more like 1933 pre WW2?

Hey yall I just wanted to ask something, I once heard that napoleonic era equipment was used by the russians during the great war, I wanted to know if that's actually true and if anyone knows of any evidence. Thanks in advance. 👍

In the early Cold War, US aviation seemed to have a love affair of FFAR air-to-air rockets as a weapon for interception. The idea being that firing a salvo of them at a bomber would allow the interceptor to put down a significantly higher weight of fire in a shorter period of time than cannons could to bring down a bomber, guided by advanced fire control systems.

But the rockets were pretty inaccurate, and when the fire control system failed to work properly it resulted in horrendous accuracy, as demonstrated in the Battle of Palmdale.

So my question is, was the idea of using volleys of rockets to bring down bombers a sound idea? Could it have worked well in practice in intercepting formations of bombers? If not, were there any viable alternatives?