I am looking for a book on the medical service for the Pacific Theatre operations in World War II. I have a great book called The Medical Department Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations. I’m looking for an equivalent for the Pacific. I appreciate any recommendations.

Example: General Hap Arnold (WW2 USAAF) had a number of heart attacks (I think it was 4 or 5) during WW2 and was only relieved near the end of the conflict. I'm just surprised that it took so long - The guy worked himself to death.

Not meant to be trivia but just a discussion point.

It is said that there was a separate organization for each constituent country, but it is too difficult to find the data......

GSFG didn't start getting theirs untill 1976 and the CIA states the Soviets had 1800 "M-1970s" (which was CIA speak for T-64s since they thought the T-64 and 72 were the same vehicle during the early 1970s) by 1973.

"Soviet Medium Tank Programs, 1975"

The CIA speculated that the Soviets weren't in as much of a hurry because the MBT-70 program was cancelled but the T-62 doesn't offer enough of an advantage over the M-60A1 to justify pushing back fielding the T-64/72.

The Soviets of all people should known since Soviet advisors were embedded in both the Egyptain and Syrian mechanized forces during the 1973 October War where they went up against Israeli M-60A1s and Magachs.

I‘m interested in knowing more on how an average barbarian army operated in operational scale, particularly the Cantabri, but it doesn‘t need to be them. How they split their armies, how they supplied them, how they conducted assaults, how they proceeded with guerilla warfare and so on. There are lots of such sources for the Romans, but I haven‘t been able to find much on the various barbarian tribes. Thanks a lot in advance!

Lets say I'm an officer in command of Infantry Batalion. What do I do when I'm commanding this formation? How my orders can look like and how much freedom do I have to execute them? How much initiative can I have while I'm in command?

What would be the best book to learn about what a brigade commander would do in a day? I'm assuming some memoirs, or doctrinal books (I'd be happy to learn recommandations here and where to find them).

Inspired by this question, I know that a lot of the issues with physical fitness and capabilities facing people today into middle age is due in part to the fairly sedentary lifestyles people live. Now obviously the rigours of war will take a toll on the human body, but would a 35 or even 40 year old soldier in these historical armies actually be majorly hindered in their ability to fight, or just a little bit less energetic and full of youthful exuberance? I'm particularly interested if anyone has primary (or well sourced secondary) sources that look at the issue.

I know that pitched battles, as often depicted in media, were quite rare historically. Even when we're talking about 2 well organized and capable state level militaries going at each other, before the advent of industrialized warfare around 1900, most engagements would be small skirmishes or raids. Light cavalry forces like the Venetian Stradioti or the Austrian "Croats" (who weren't all from Croatia) were often deployed for this purpose.

This made me wonder about how well infantry could hold up against such light cavalry in these small scale engagements to disrupt enemy supply lines and communications.

Do we even have records of such campaigns? Small war wasn't the most glamorous thing to write about for most of history.

Are there any cases of a pure infantry force with no cavalry at all fighting against a force with very good light cavalry. How did they do outside of pitched battles? How did they protect their supply lines and communications? Did they manage to strike back at enemy logistics? How did they do it? How did it go?

Why didn’t the US replace the M72 LAW with a similar weapon? I know the AT4 replaced it in combat, but this is a 15-18 pound weapon, whereas the M72 weighed 5.5 pounds. A soldier could effectively carry three M72’s for every one AT4.

The AT4 just seems to be incredibly heavy for its role and limits flexibility and maneuverability of a soldier with the weapon.

Hi, Wondering if you guys are familiar with any sources about Japan/South Korea/Tiawan's military doctrines similar to the non-classified documents you can find for the U.S Army/Marine/Canada/Australian doctrines.

Even if they are in native language (but preferably in English).

Thanks.

I can´t really find a lot of info on that topic except for that it was one of the most capable ground armies in Europe, could someone maybe elaborate on that?

So it is rather widely understood that the German economy in the 1930s was completely untenable, and needed to basically loot its neighbors to survive.

That said, in 1938 Germany annexed both Austria and Czechoslovakia - the latter of which had a powerful, developed economy that was immediately latched onto by the Germans.

When 1939 rolls around irl, there were many German officers who seemed to believe that the army was not in the state that it should be, and that more time was needed to prepare for how. If Hitler, hypothetically, listened to these men and delayed his demand for Danzig, how long could he have gone before economic conditions deteriorated to the point were he absolutely had to wage war, given the boost they received from their '38 takeovers?

I clarify that I mean translated or written in English, I'm sure those books exist in Japanese

I ask because I am a layman in terms of the American Revolution.

What are the rules for using these terms when are they used and why

Why are some called recon platoons or scout platoons

What the difference between scouts and recon snipers and other units etc

How are different units organized

Hi, maybe this question has been answered before, but is ambushing an enemy on a road or column from both sides tactically viable? I have learned about L-shaped ambushes and flanking maneuvers since otherwise, you risk having friendly fire or crossfire. Would this not also be a concern when flanking an enemy position, requiring the flanking element to coordinate the attack to avoid a position with "friendly crossfire"?

I have seen this on several occasions, but the one I am thinking of in particular is the ambush on LZ Albany in Vietnam, where NVA troops ambushed from both sides of the road/US column. This would achieve what I believe is called "crossfire," which is desirable, but how did they avoid hitting their own forces in the crossfire? Is this an example of old tactics falling short where the answer is that L-shaped flanks and ambushes are always better, and this particular ambush is an instance where an L-shape would have been better?

However, I don't recall reading in "We Were Soldiers" about any reports of the NVA suffering from friendly fire in this instance, but it feels like they should have. Sorry if I messed up any terminology, English is not the language I used when I was taught military tactics.

Here is a great video that visualises what started this train of thought:

https://youtu.be/1dn8YAJtLLg?si=yquqGqpH6x1CJEws&t=332

(I’m on mobile so I hope the format comes out ok.)

Most know that when tanks or other tracked vehicles loose their track, they become fixed in place. Whether it be a mine, drone, or whatever, when a track is gone so is the tank(not entirely but you catch my drift).

Alternatively, a multi-wheeled vehicle like a btr can loose several wheels and rely on the remaining wheels to push it along.

This got be thinking, and it maybe a dumb thought but what are the limitation of replacing the non powered road wheels on a tank with powered ones? So when a tank does loose it’s tracks, it can rely on some of the wheels to bring it back for repair.

Has there been any documented research on this concept or other track alternatives/improvements?

Right...there's work being done in my house right now to fix the basement ceiling, and since I don't think I'm getting much else done, I figured I'd share some thoughts on Napoleon.

I've noticed something of an anti-Napoleon bias in World War I scholarship - the argument tends to run something like, "the technology since the Napoleonic wars has advanced so far that studying him is living in the past and ignoring the realities of modern warfare." (EDIT: I should specify that much of this is coming from the "Lions led by donkeys" school.) Having now read several books on Napoleon and his campaigns to research the fiction book that I'll be writing in earnest once my basement ceiling is fixed, I'm inclined to disagree. Studying Napoleon is absolutely worthwhile when it comes to modern warfare, and here's why:

• He fought dozens of battles, and he won most of them. A number of these battles were ones he should not have been able to win. That's better than most ever accomplish, and it means that he was doing something very right. The technology may have advanced, but the nature of the tactical decisions (concentration of firepower, use of combined arms, etc.) are still much the same - and Napoleon had an ability to understand a battlefield in an instinctive way beyond the ability of most. Understanding why he made the decisions he made at the time that he made them in the battles he won can be very useful, particularly if you can figure out what he had picked up on before changing a tactical design.

• He was very good at streamlining his process. As F.N. Maude points out in his study of the Jena campaign, by removing inefficiencies in communications he made his army more responsive and agile than his opponents. The problem of inefficiency still dogs armies today - looking at how Napoleon cut the cruft out of his own military apparatus can help us figure out how to do the same in ours.

• He managed to inspire the loyalty of his men and get them to do the impossible. Napoleon's men were willing to, and did, follow him into hell. Even when they had reservations about his conduct and concerns that he was going off the rails with his policy, most of them still followed him. In 1813, 14, and 15 he took fresh conscripts, put them up against veteran armies, and got them to win more often than not. Figuring out what he was doing in regards to how he related to his men has a lot of lessons in how to inspire and maintain morale.

• His mistakes can teach us volumes. This was a man who brought the whole of Europe under his power, and then lost it. The Napoleon of 1812-1814 may the best example of winning battles but losing the war. Why he lost, and the lessons one can gain, is important.

So, as I've discovered, we have a lot to learn from Napoleon. If all you focus on is the muskets and the formations, you miss the forest for the trees.

What situation was napalm useful in which an ordinary bomb wouldn’t be? They both kill men and damage equipment however napalm lacks the adequate structure destruction bombs do so in my mind it was ineffective.

Was the US forest clearance via napalm an efficient use of resources? Did it have a tangible effect on exposing VC or minimising the US soldiers ability to be ambushed?

Many western armies face manpower shortages, so I wonder if some of them (particularly France and Germany with their MGCS) are planning (or at least thinking about) using autoloaders in their tanks to at least ease their manpower problems.

Or is that already planned anyway (due to larger guns, for example), making this question redundant?

Here's what I know (or, at least, I believe I know):

• The rifle is sturdy but heavy and overlong. Lack of carbines, which would be lighter, more compact and suitable for jungle-island combat environments.
• Complete lack of SMGs (except parachute units).
• Except for the Type 11, I appreciate their LMG designs. However, many good aviation machine gun designs are not used in the infantry branch - such a waste.
• HMGs are largely based on the Hotchkiss design. Reliable, but cumbersome and has problems with firing rate and outdated feeding mechanism (though I'm not sure if they consider that a weakness?)

Nowadays, intercepting cruise and ballistic missiles is a common occurrence playing in Ukraine and the Middle East. But during the Cold War when all-out war between superpowers was a concern involving a continental if not worldwide battlespace, what was the plan or idea regarding conventional missile defense at the time? How did NATO believe it would fare against conventional Scuds, Tochkas, and other Soviet non-nuclear missiles and vice versa?

Hello all,

I found a claim regarding Japanese manufacturing precision capabilities in World War II that looks somewhat right but have no way to substantiate and also don't know how to begin looking/researching to see if it adds up to reality.

The claim was that in the Yanagi missions between Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany where Japan submarines went to Germany and were able to return with resources and German technology with blueprints. However the blueprints couldn't be used to the fullest extent because the German manufacturing precision could be done all the way down to 1/10,000 mm. Meanwhile, Imperial Japan was only able to maintain precision of 1/100 mm and so was not able to copy the German blueprints.

It's one of those claims that just sounds like it is plausibly true, but I didn't want to take it at face value, especially since Japan's own industry was still able to make aircraft like Kikka and J8M that appears pretty legit.

So my question is as follow:

1. Do we know if this claim about the differences in Germany and Japan manufacturing precision is true?
2. If true, did this actually impact how Japan could make use of technology and blueprints provided by Germany? (aside from the whole Allied sinking Yanagi submarine business)
3. What else is there to read up about these fine manufacturing details and comparison with Japan or other nations?

Appreciate any sources to help out!

Like the title says. I'm more interested in a strategic overview than a brigade by brigade narrative of what happened. Thanks!

Why did the libyans fire? Didn't they know that they would lose? What political tensions had to be going on to have that happen?