According to some old treaties, it seems that previously to the Vienna Conference of 1814-1815, sovereignty over rivers used to be determined by the possession of its mouth’s banks, meaning the exclusive right of navigation belongs to the state(s) that control(s) the river’s mouth. For example, if a lower riparian state controls both banks of the river's mouth, it would have exclusive navigation rights over the river regardless of the interests of upper riparians. If two lower riparian states each control one bank of the river’s mouth, both would have exclusive navigation rights, or the river would be subject to freedom of navigation for all riparians, both lower and upper. This doctrine was at the core of the numerous wars and treaties between Portugal and Spain over the territory of present-day Uruguay and the navigation rights of the Río de la Plata, for example.

However, I can't find the exact name for this doctrine or a way to convey this idea in brief, nor can I find books or articles about it. All I can find are articles about some doctrines about the use of hydric resources of international rivers (such as the Harmon Doctrine etc.) So, what's the name of this doctrine or how could I name it in English?

Cuba claims it's illegal and considers it as an occupation of their territory.

US argues it's legal because Cuba signed the lease and a change of goverment can't change that (pacta sunt servanda - treaties between countries must be respected)

now the major contention is that the lease doesn't have an end date, so US could indefenitely keep the lease as long as they want.

There never has been an ICJ ruling on this so I'm curious what int. lawyers think of this.

Hi everyone. This question doesn't relate to any specific events but is more to educate myself about the convention and its interpretation by the relevant courts.

I have a few questions as to what "in part" refers to in the convention. Does it need to be a specific part of a protected group that is targeted? Eg a specific part, but the whole of this specific part? Or would it be the whole group or a vast proportion of the group targetted with prohibited acts, but with the intention to only destroy a part of that group? Eg a proportion or percentage of the protected group. Or would both be considered genocide?

Whilst reading I found some references to this in the UN IRMCT Case Law Database. I see as well that the ICTY applied a substantiality requirement for this.

In the database there is this quote: "The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is not just any impact on a protected group that supports a finding of genocidal intent; rather, it is the impact that the destruction of the targeted part will have on the overall survival of that group which indicates whether there is intent to destroy a substantial part thereof"

Doesn't this set the bar very high? Or is this the purpose? Or am I misinterpreting? It seems that dolus specialis combined with this reading, would result in very few things being considered genocide. As the substantial part required to be destroyed would need to be vast in order for it to impact on the overall survival of the protected group.

I see in the database another quote: "The Appeals Chamber recalls that a substantiality assessment considers the impact that the destruction of the targeted part will have on the overall survival of that group. Noting that the Count 1 Communities collectively comprised approximately 6.7 per cent of the Bosnian Muslim group, the Appeals Chamber considers that a reasonable trier of fact could reasonably have concluded that the Count 1 Communities, individually as well as cumulatively, formed “a relatively small part” thereof. The Appeals Chamber therefore concludes that a reasonable trier of fact could also have found that the destruction of the Count 1 Communities, individually as well as cumulatively, was not sufficiently substantial to have an impact on the group’s overall survival at the relevant time."

If the court makes this assessment, why were some convictions for genocide upheld?

I apologise if I've misinterpreted anything or got my timelines wrong. And to be clear, I'm not denying any atrocities or acts of genocide. I would just like to have an accurate academic understanding of the convention and how it is applied by the relevant competent courts. And I would be very grateful to anyone who could provide an answer. As a non-lawyer, it can be very difficult to navigate the specific details.

Thanks in advance.

As you all probably know, Rome Statute specifies that CAH can be committed as part of "widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population", "pursuant to a State or organizational policy" and do not need to have any relation to armed conflict. The incredible breadth of this definition means many types of crimes that we don't normally view as CAH could potentially meet the requirements as long as they are a part of systematic or widespread commission of serious criminal acts against persons and are result of an organizational policy.

I've seen articles alleging this could be applicable to e.g. abuse by Roman Catholic Church clergy and some other instances of institutionalized systemic abuse. But it also occurred to me it may also apply to another type of crimes, so called obstetric violence.

Some of such actions can probably fit under the other inhumane acts (article 7(1)(k)), as they are evidently inhumane, can cause great suffering or endanger health and commonly leave victims traumatized. Additionally one can feasibly argue that any invasive gynecological examinations for which informed consent was not given and that lack of informed consent isn't justified by emergency circumstances may fall under 7(1)(g).

Now let's assume there is systematic perpetration of acts from article 7(1) against large number of victims and it is the result of an organizational (hospital, medical association,....) policy that views such behavior as acceptable and normal, tolerates it and covers it up, so overall, CAH are being committed.

1. Superior responsibility

My first question is how far would responsibility of civilian superiors go in that scenario? Evidently, anyone who is hierarchically above the direct perpetrator and has knowledge of crimes and fails to take measures to prevent or repress those crimes would be criminally responsible. This would implicate for instance certain hospital officials who fail to discipline employees. Same would be true for certain individuals in medical associations who fail to take disciplinary actions against offenders, when they have the ability to do so and are supposed to by their own regulations.

But what about more unusual scenario where one may not be a formal subordinate, but owing to the circumstances and position would in normal course of events follow instructions of the "superior"? Essentially, does the ability of person A to issue instruction to person B to stop commission of an unlawful act in a situation where B would probably comply due to A's official position, indicate A can be viewed as a superior who is required to attempt to stop criminal acts of subordinate B if possible?

Concretely, imagine a scenario where A is an doctor visiting patients at a maternity ward. B is nurse/midwife/something "below" a doctor, present in the same room, and engages in what can be qualified as other inhumane act against another patient, which A can observe. If A instructs and insists B should stop, it is reasonable to believe B will comply. Does that make A a de facto superior while they are present, and therefore responsible for failure to issue that instruction?

This sounds like it embodies the point of superior responsibility, that superiors should be punished for not repressing and stopping crimes by those they can control. But it also seems to me this micro-level superior responsibility is very different from situations when superior responsibility was actually used to convicted people. On the other hand, I think most would agree presence of a corporal in the same room as a private who e.g. abuses a prisoner of war would make said corporal responsible for attempting to stop the abuse, unless a higher ranking officer was also there. So maybe the same logic should extend to example with doctor from previous paragraph, despite different professional context.

2. Instigation

The other questions concerns instigation as a mode of liability. It's different from incitement, as incitement does not require any action to be taken, whereas instigation is committed by someone who prompted another person to commit a crime and the instigator's actions must play a role in perpetrator's decision to commit a crime, though they don't need to be decisive. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think this is case law of ad hoc tribunals. I think Rome Statute labels this differently but I would presume underlying logic is the same.

How does one prove instigative act actually influence the perpetrators? In Prosecutor v Šešelj, that was rather straightforward - if an influential politician comes holds a rally in one village and incites persecution, and persecution follows and it has not happened prior to the rally, the link is obvious. But in other cases this logic may not be applicable, as in a situation where crimes are committed both before and after the alleged instigatory act.

Can one be deemed to be an instigator on the basis that their official position ensures their words had to have an effect on person(s) who committed crimes and played a role in their decision making? Since we are talking about obstetric violence, imagine a scenario where high ranking member of a medical association publicly justifies the inhumane act or denies or minimizes the inhumane character of an inhumane act. Such speech most certainly convinces perpetrators and would be perpetrators that said inhumane acts are acceptable and can be engaged in without consequences. A possible defense against said charges could be that instigator sincerely believed in the opinion they expressed and from their subjective point of view acted in good faith? Is this a valid defense?

Does instigation also apply on a "micro-level", between persons who are hierarchically equal? Imagine e.g. a pair of doctors, or nurses, where one of them repeatedly commits an inhumane act, while the other tells them the same thing as "high ranking member of medical association" from the previous paragraph. There is no "vertical relationship", but it is also evident that people do in fact react to criticism of their coworkers. A doctor whose behavior is strongly criticized by colleagues is less likely to engaged in said behavior than one who is not, and much less likely than the one who receives "moral support". Is this sufficient basis to show someone has instigated a crime?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJTUEJxDmcc&t=499s

Does that break international law? Is that different from Israeli soldiers shooting palestinians?

Following article is paywalled, but on linkedin it is availabe without paywall.:

Sanctioning the ICC Could Put Most Travel Off-Limits for Trump | If the U.S. president is charged with impeding an investigation, it could make nearly all international visits a headache and a risk.

Article 70 of the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the ICC, criminalizes “impeding” or “intimidating” any court official to influence their official duties. Americans typically call this crime “obstruction of justice.” Even though the United States never joined the court, Trump would be vulnerable to this charge because his actions would be directed at reversing the charges against Netanyahu and Gallant, over which the court has jurisdiction.

If fighting in Gaza resumes after the first six-week phase of the current cease-fire, and Trump continues to provide Israel with arms and military aid as it again bombs and starves Palestinian civilians, he could also be charged with aiding and abetting Israeli war crimes.

Khan exercised restraint in not charging Biden for that alleged crime. But if Trump imposes sanctions on Khan, I suspect that the gloves would come off. (Charles Taylor, the former Liberian president, is serving a 50-year sentence in a British prison for aiding and abetting war crimes by providing arms to an abusive force.)

Foreign Policy link: https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/01/21/trump-international-criminal-court-sanctions/

Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/sanctioning-icc-could-put-most-travel-off-limits-trump-kenneth-roth-5qjae

The general assembly session of 2024 was incredibly disappointing in the sense that there were a few draft conventions for various human rights instruments but the general assembly merely took note of them and didn't open them for ratification.

Is it possible that this year will be different ?

Why did the ICC put Art.98 in the Rome Statute to begin with? If it creates a conflict with Art 89 the duty to cooperate and Art.27 that denies Immunity for State Heads when it comes to ius cogens violations?

I have an LLM in international law and would like to write articles/papers/ blog posts…etc on PIL. Any advice on how to start or anything that could help at all? Thanks

As the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is currently visiting Damascus, I wondered on the prospects of Syria engaging with the ICC. Given the context of Syria’s prolonged civil war and the widespread allegations of war crimes, I am curious about how likely it is for a potential new Syrian government to ratify the Rome Statute and join the ICC.

If Syria were to become a member, would the ICC then have the authority to prosecute individuals for crimes committed before Syria’s accession, or would its jurisdiction only apply from the date of membership onward? Furthermore, if Syria does not join the ICC, are there alternative mechanisms or pathways available under international law for the ICC to pursue accountability for alleged crimes committed by the former Syrian leadership? For instance, could the UN Security Council play a role in enabling jurisdiction, as it has attempted in the past?

Edit: my choice for the title was bad, sorry

I'm looking at the South Africa v. Israel case, and the initial order had 17 judges, with Tomka and the Russian judge present. The later provisional order in May of last year only had 15 judges, with Tomka missing, even though he should still be a sitting judge.

What's up with that? Did Tomka sit this one out, or is the court required to have an odd number of members? South Africa is one of the parties and their judge is an elected judge who now has to represent South Africa as an ad hoc judge. Was it required that some kind of balance be maintained?

How many judges are we looking at when it comes to the final ruling, and can a newly elected judge jump into an existing case?

Good Afternoon

I am the freshman and studying the Investment Law as a subject on IR faculty. I would want to ask a question about Arbitral Courts processes, here it is:

If, during the investment process to state by company the object of investments was expropriated or the National Treatment rule was abused, so the company goes to ICSID or to equal arbitral organization. However, what happens if the respondent state ignores the arbitral tribunal's proceedings and refuses to comply with the award? While the tribunal will rule (in my theoretical case) in favor of the investor and will order compensation, what mechanisms or powers do arbitral courts like ICSID have to enforce their decisions against a non-compliant state in such severe cases?

Asking specifically about this change. Does the new president have control over which way the ruling goes?

https://www.jns.org/major-shift-at-icj-as-pro-israel-judge-poised-for-presidency/

Hello, I am a freshman on the IR faculty, we have the International Law subject, and during the study of the basic principles of Investment Law I can’t understand the fundamental differences between the New York Convention 1958 and Washington Convention 1965, why was ICSID created if NY convention already was created earlier?

I'm looking at the Bonsian genocide case brought before the ICJ, and while it everyone aside from Serbia's ad hoc judge agreed it was a genocide, they largely found (except with the Jordanian judge's dissent) that Serbia does not bear responsibility for this genocide. The reason the accusation was even brought up was because of the involvement of the so-called "Scorpions" paramilitary unit that participated in the Bosnian genocide, and one or two years later be involved in the massacre of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. This was the reasoning of the large majority:

The issue also arises as to whether the Respondent might bear responsibility for the acts of the paramilitary militia known as the “Scorpions” in the Srebrenica area. Judging on the basis of materials submitted to it, the Court is unable to find that the “Scorpions” - referred to as “a unit of Ministry of Interiors of Serbia” in those documents - were, in mid-1995, de jure organs of the Respondent. Furthermore, the Court notes that in any event the act of an organ placed by a State at the disposal of another public authority shall not be considered an act of that State if the organ was acting on behalf of the public authority at whose disposal it had been placed.

The Court observes that, according to its jurisprudence (notably its 1986 Judgment in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)), persons, groups of persons or entities may, for purposes of international responsibility, be equated with State organs even if that status does not follow from internal law, provided that in fact the persons, groups or entities act in “complete dependence” on the State, of which they are ultimately merely the instrument. In the present case, the Court however cannot find that the persons or entities that committed the acts of genocide at Srebrenica had such ties with the FRY that they can be deemed to have been completely dependent on it.

At the relevant time, July 1995, according to the Court, neither the Republika Srpska nor the VRS could be regarded as mere instruments through which the FRY was acting, and as lacking any real autonomy. The Court further states that it has not been presented with materials indicating that the “Scorpions” were in fact acting in complete dependence on the Respondent.

This is concerning to me, as the same reasoning could be applied to, for example, the Janjaweed in Sudan who were involved in the Darfur genocide, and it seems like their uniformed successors (the RSF) is continuing their use of less-than-ideal conduct in war. In this case of Sudan, the janjaweed are what helped achieve the Sudanese military's overall goal of suppressing opposition within the Darfur region. The jajaweed are obviously not de jure organs of the Sudanese state, they didn't even have a formal title at the time, so it fails one condition for the former Sudanese government to be found liable for genocide.

The second point the judges make is that the Scorpions unit was given command by the Republika Srpska's forces rather than the Serbian government. This also has me concerned as Republika Srpska, the fully guilty party, was funded and armed by the Serbian government. By the same logic, as a general case, if a country A knew country B was committing crimes against humanity and continued to provide military support including its own troops to help participate in the war under command of country B, then country A is given a free pass from any accusation of genocide.

To again go back to the Sudan example, the nations of Chad and the UAE provide military and financial support for the Rapid Support Forces (fancy name for janjaweed), with the family members of the RSF's leader even having financial ties set up for them. If the RSF's current crimes are considered genocide (as the US now claims), then simply because the UAE wasn't the one holding the gun it would likewise be safe from genocide claims.

My overall question here is, can only the group with the gun in their hands be found guilty of genocide? If so does that mean a country can informally set up paramilitaries composed of people with genocidal intent to help achieve overall war aims without being officially guilty of genocide?

heyy, im 16, and thinking of becoming a international lawyer. so anyone with enough expertise, please guide me on a few things.

is it a stressful job? how much you have to travel? does it leaves time for family? can i avoid travelling, and so on.

Why would the American embargo on cuba violate international law even if USA refuses trade with countries that do business with Cuba ? There doesn't seem to be a right to trade or not discriminate in trade

Hello

I'm a law student from Denmark who's planning to write my bachelor's (undergraduate) thesis in International Law soon, but I'm not sure on a subject yet. The International Law course at my uni is a veeeery small course, thus I have an extremely basic knowledge of international law, but would love to delve deeper into it during the next semester. I would therefore be really happy if anyone knows an interesting subject, I could write about:)

I'm mostly interested in international humanitarian law, international criminal law, state responsibility, climate change etc.

It's a 15 ECTS point thesis, so around 31 pages + front page, abstract, table of contents, bibliography etc. So not a very long thesis.

What I've been considering so far:

- can USA buy Greenland (from an IL perspective - maybe something about the right to self determination, but idk, I haven't looked much into it yet)

- climate refugees

- if states can be held responsible for climate change disasters

- is Denmark contributing to the genocide in Gaza by trading with Israel?

- The international community’s role under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine to protect women's rights in Afghanistan

What do you think about these? Do you have any other interesting ideas?

Does Denmark have a legal right to Greenland? Who can challenge Denmark's claim to Greenland, and how would they do that? And how can Denmark legally defend or enforce its claim?

Let's say a NIAC breaks out between a state and a well-organized rebel/terrorist group. A soldier from the official state military owes a large sum of money to someone in the region, and takes advantage of the conflict to kill the man for reasons unrelated to the conflict (namely, to avoid having to pay back the debt). Would that still qualify as a war crime under the jurisdiction of the ICC?