I really enjoy international relations and international law. Been doing Model UN for a few years and I was curious if there were any books I should read about International Law. I don’t have a law or pre-law background but I pick up info pretty quick.

Any reading recommendations would be greatly appreciated.

I am planning to do my Phd in the Netherlands. I looked into several universities and saw that there are 2 tracks: one which is connected with a research center funded by the Uni and one external one, in which you are responsible for the funding of the Phd and you also pay money if you use the premises of the Uni

1. Is it difficult to be an external Phd student?

2. Am only 23/24 years old and am afraid if i do apply for a Phd connected with a research Uni center i wont be accepted due to lack of work experience or because am too young.

I would appreciate any responses.

It doesn't seem to be legal and there doesn't seem to be a hint of it In the charter due to article 2(4) and article 2(7). Both sections when combined seem to be a much stronger protection against it. Bruno Simma does state in his commentary on the charter that a customary rule may develop on humanitarian intervention but would such a rule really be able to supersede these two sections ?

Israel has asked for permission to appeal two decisions by PTC. They've also asked to suspend arrest warrants until the appeal is decided.

Request to appeal decision on jurisdiction challenge

Request to appeal notification ruling

First notice of appeal - challenge

Second notice of appeal - notification

These are very procedural matters of which I know very little, so what do people here think are their chances for success? I'm sure the request for new notification will be ultimately rejected, it doesn't have much logic to it, but with jurisdiction there could reasonably be multiple different outcomes. If Appeals Chamber disagrees with the notion challenge has been made too early, will it decide on the merits of challenge, or invalidate the decision and sent it back to PTC to decide again?

This question is prompted by among others this report and some of my own thinking. I have to say I disagree with the report, not because it may not ultimately be correct on the classification but because, in my view, it presented insufficient evidence to warrant its conclusion.

The commission examined 44 concrete cases of police shootings which happened over the course of almost 20 years across US, along with expert testimony. Considering the population they deem to be attacked (African Americans in US, this demographic numbered 41 million in 2020), this can hardly be considered widespread or systematic. Note the report focused on unlawful killings. If one considered others acts which can constitute CAH, the argument would certainly be stronger, but other acts don't appear to be studied in such detail in the report. According to IRMCT case law database (which I personally find easier to use as a lay person than ICC database), "widespread" refers to number of victims, "systematic" refers to organized and non-random repetition of conduct and both are relative with respect to the civilian population in question. None of those seem to be correct ways to describe such a limited number of events and the explanation provided seems far too general and non-specific. Cases of CAH that were brought before courts were characterized by at least dozens or hundreds of victims in the same city or region over usually a much shorter period of time, several years at most, but often crimes would be committed in the space of days, weeks or months. There is also a problem with "organization policy" requirement from Rome Statute as the high level of decentralization in organization of police in US makes it difficult to talk about policy of one organization. One would need to consider each police department or state separately.

Now, setting aside this report, I want to get to my main question.

Consider the following thought experiment. Let's assume there is a country X. In a country X, let's say that e.g. 5-10% of the persons interrogated by the police suffer what can be described torture or inhumane or degrading treatment. This percentage may vary from one location to another but it is roughly correct for basically the entire country. The police has a unitary organizational structure i.e. all police officers are part of same hierarchy in the same organization. Assume there is no order (or no evidence of such an order has been found) from the very top to commit these crimes, but they are committed on a regular basis on personal volition of perpetrators. This phenomenon is known to the superiors but not much is done to stop them and crimes are covered up as they are viewed as acceptable. For purposes of this question, exclude any discriminatory intent, so there is no persecution involved. The main motive for these crimes is improving "efficiency" of investigations by compelling confessions or punishing individuals who e.g. resisted arrest.

I see a very obvious argument that this does indeed qualify as CAH, but there are still some points I'm not sure about. First, do "persons detained by police" qualify as "any civilian population" from CAH definition? In practice of international courts, population tended to be either the entire population of an area or population of an area of particular (persecuted) religion/ethnicity/political affiliation. If not, and one considers the entire population of the country, can the phenomenon described above be described as "widespread"? Widespread could be very problematic as those detained are a very small part of overall population. There is a much better argument that conduct is "systematic".

But the "policy of a state or organization" is where it gets confusing. In the scenario I described, crimes may be frequent, but they are not ordered by the state/organization, instead they are regularly committed by lowest-level subordinates. Role of state is "limited" to tolerating such behavior, considering it acceptable and deliberately failing to prevent or repress it. But this is quite different from cases that were prosecuted in practice, where the states or organizations very actively promote, plan, organize, order or instigate commission of crimes by direct perpetrators. Policy could be very well be the dictionary word used to describe situation from my thought experiment, but does it make sense legally?

▪︎ Nov 26, 2024: Italy questions feasibility of ICC arrest warrant for Netanyahu

Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, who tried to forge a common G7 position on the issue, said Rome had many doubts on the legality of the mandates and clarity was needed on whether high state officials had immunity from the arrest.

https://www.reuters.com/world/g7-statement-will-not-mention-icc-warrant-netanyahu-2024-11-26/

• Nov 27, 2024: French foreign minister claims some leaders can have immunity from ICC warrants

French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said on Wednesday that certain leaders could have immunity under the Rome Statute, the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC).
When asked in a Franceinfo radio interview whether France would arrest Netanyahu if he entered the French territory, Barrot did not provide a definitive answer.

He affirmed France's commitment to international justice, stating that the country "will apply international law based on its obligations to cooperate with the ICC.”

However, he highlighted that the Rome Statute “deals with questions of immunity for certain leaders,” adding that such matters ultimately rest with judicial authorities.

Barrot's remarks mark the first acknowledgment by a senior French official of possible immunity considerations.

Under Article 27 of the Rome Statute, immunity does not exempt individuals from the court’s jurisdiction, while Article 98 emphasizes that states must respect international obligations related to diplomatic immunity.

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/french-foreign-minister-claims-some-leaders-can-have-immunity-from-icc-warrants/3406340#

EDIT: In addition:

• UK would respect domestic legal process on Netanyahu ICC arrest warrant

Sir Keir Starmer’s official spokesman said: “When it comes to the ICC judgment, as we’ve said previously, we’re not going to comment on specific cases, but we have a domestic legal process in the UK that follows the ICC Act of 2001 that includes various considerations as part of that process, including immunities.

https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/benjamin-netanyahu-icc-france-david-lammy-michel-barnier-b1196648.html

• France says Netanyahu has 'immunity' from ICC arrest warrants https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241127-france-says-netanyahu-has-immunity-from-icc-warrants

• France says Netanyahu is immune from ICC warrant as Israel is not member of court https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/27/france-says-netanyahu-is-immune-from-icc-warrant-as-israel-is-not-member-of-court

• The Foreign Ministry of France released following statement in English on its website.: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/israel-palestinian-territories/news/2024/article/israel-international-criminal-court-27-11-24

• France said Netanyahu is “immune” to the ICC's arrest warrant. We did a legal deep dive (video) https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/truth-or-fake/20241127-france-said-netanyahu-is-immune-to-the-icc-arrest-warrant-we-did-a-legal-deep-dive

• Press Release: International Federation for Human Rights: ICC arrest warrants: France is lying about Benjamin Netanyahu’s immunity
https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/france/icc-arrest-warrants-france-is-lying-about-benjamin-netanyahu-s

• Italy: In-depth analysis with EU countries on ICC immunity https://www.ansa.it/english/news/2024/11/27/in-depth-analysis-with-eu-countries-on-icc-immunity-tajani_4a46d1af-7ca8-4c59-a7e6-25451e6c7507.html

• Dutch PM sees options for Netanyahu to visit despite ICC arrest warrant

Last week he said it might be possible for Netanyahu to visit an international organization located in the Netherlands, such as the U.N. watchdog for chemical weapons OPCW, without being arrested.

https://www.reuters.com/world/dutch-see-options-netanyahu-visit-despite-icc-arrest-warrant-2024-11-29/

• Groups to ask for court ban on UK arms sales to Israel after Netanyahu arrest warrant

The government has until Friday to file a defence.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/26/groups-to-ask-for-court-ban-on-uk-arms-sales-to-israel-after-netanyahu-arrest-warrant

• Ten pro-Palestinian NGOs asked a Dutch court on Friday to stop the Netherlands exporting weapons to Israel (Nov 22, 2024)

The NGOs also cited arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court on Thursday for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his former defence chief for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity

https://www.reuters.com/world/pro-palestinian-ngos-seek-court-order-stop-dutch-arms-exports-israel-2024-11-22/

I am trying to figure out the differene between the two. Wiki implies that Extermination requires only mens rea whereas Genocide requires dolor specialis. Is this correct, or is there some other difference I am missing?

How much should I read into the fact that none of the three ICC warrants recently issued (for Netanyahu, Gallant, and Deif) use the word "genocide?" How much can be concluded from the fact that Deif is accused of Extermination whilst the Israelis are only accused of Starvation? Is this the sort of Court where they bring the accused in on lesser charges and then addon extra charges later, or does this mean the Prosecutor genuinely couldn't find evidence to support an Extermination charge for the relevant dates (10/7/23 through 5/20/24)?

What are the sorts of sentences for these charges?

As for those warrants: the best place I can find info on them seems to be the ICC press release because the actual warrants are sealed. Is there a better source on what the ICC is doing than these two press releases:

https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-issues-warrant-arrest-mohammed-diab-ibrahim

https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-rejects-state-israels-challenges

https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/crimes-against-humanity-key-un-committee-adopts-resolution-paving-way-for-first-ever-treaty/article68901276.ece

Hi all
I'm a philosopher interested in just war theory, but very much not a lawyer, so come to this without the basics.

The ICC press release about the warrants includes the following paragraph:

The Chamber also found reasonable grounds to believe that the above mentioned conduct deprived a significant portion of the civilian population in Gaza of their fundamental rights, including the rights to life and health, and that the population was targeted based on political and/or national grounds. It therefore found that the crime against humanity of persecution was committed.

(my italics)

What's the difference between the chamber finding reasonable grounds to believe P, and finding that Q. If I understand correctly, the court finding reasonable grounds that P satisfies us that issuing a warrant for some individual is appropriate. Roughly, there is a case to answer. (Right?)

But separately, they find that Q (that the crime of persecution has been committed).

What does this mean for the trial and for international politics? Is it open to Netanyahu and Gallant (were they to face trial) to argue that the conduct of the war was justified, or only that they didn't have responsibility for the excesses of the war?

What does it mean now that the court has found that the crime of persecution has been committed (even if no natural person has yet been convicted of it)? Are there legal responsibilities on other states? Would this be something that NGOs rely on when suing their domestic governments to not sell arms to Israel?

My understanding of the basis for the ICC having jurisdiction over Gaza is that Gaza is part of Palestine and Palestine is a signatory of the Rome Statute, signed by the Palestinian Authority which is supposed to have sovereignty over the Palestinian territories.

The Rome Statute says that civilian leaders can be held responsible for atrocities committed by other parties if the leaders have effective control.

In the case of Gaza, the Palestinian Authority does not have effective control over Hamas, but for 15 years has not even attempted to control Gaza.

Would this not mean that the PA is culpable for crimes committed by Hamas based on conscious disregard?

It seems as though the PA is trying to have their cake and eat it, on one hand they want Gaza to be subject to ICC jurisdiction, on the other hand they do nothing to exercise their sovereignty.

Sorry, I can’t find this answer anywhere. The arrest warrants are related to alleged crimes committed between the start of the war and the end of May 2024.

So can more evidence be added for more recent alleged crimes or will only the crimes in the prosecutors original filing be adjudicated on?

Thanks!

1. What is the principle of proportionality in international law during armed conflicts? How does it require balancing collateral damage with military advantage, as outlined by the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law?

2. How should the principle of proportionality apply in the context of Gaza? Are there examples of its application or non-application in this scenario?

3. What challenges arise in respecting proportionality in Gaza, particularly considering the use of unguided munitions and the presence of civilians in combat zones?

4. How does the increasing number of civilian casualties in Gaza affect the military justifications given by Israel?

5. Could someone provide a comparison with other military operations, such as those conducted by the United States in Iraq or Afghanistan? How did U.S. forces balance the objective of targeting terrorist leaders with minimizing collateral damage? In what ways are the rules of engagement similar or different from those employed by Israel?

Would appreciate any insights or perspectives!

With the recent news of China now having produced more CO2 than the EU, it made me think back to a discussion I remember from ~10 years ago about discriminating between products based on how dirty their production process is. In essense, the WTO doesn't allow countries to discriminate between steel from different countries betcause steel is fungible. The question at the time was whether steel made from a low-co2 production process could be differentiated from steel from a high-co2 production process, even if the final product is the same.

Does anyone know if there was ever an answer to this question? If not, is there any restrictions from the EU imposing tariffs on high-co2 production products?

In the reporatory of practice on article 62(4) of the UN charter. It seems like he UN has called conferences with a vide variety of participants but that section of the article empowers calling "international conferences". Wouldn't this mean that the conference must be of representatives of states ?

Hi, im a sophomore in high school from India whose very interested in Geopolitics and ive started to get very interested in international law. Could someone recommend some books in International Law for someone just starting? I really want to learn more about it

I'm in law school in England, and I hoping to do the Bar. Aka, become a barrister rather than a solicitor. The two areas of law I'm most interested in are public law and criminal law. I speak French, German, Irish and English (obviously). How would I actually go about accessing a career in international law?

Im hoping to do a Masters in England, and then maybe apply for the diplôme d'université llm droit français et droit européen. But I'm not 100% about how worth it that one is, other than it probably being pretty helpful with the French Bar exam.

Ideally I'd be interested in working in the ECtHR, ICC or ICJ. I was thinking about transferring to the Irish Bar after doing the English one, just to have qualifications in two jurisdictions. And then after a year of practice there, perhaps transfer to the French one (although that transfer is more difficult).

I'm kind of at a loss as to how people actually build their careers at these places.

Just to give a bit of background and context, I'm currently a First year student of International Relations at University of Glasgow and I am an Indian passport holder. I love International Relations, Geopolitics and the rule of law. I speak English, Hindi, Marathi, Konkani and Urdu and I plan to study French here in University. I currently am in a new sort of contemplation wherein I am strongly considering switching to study International Law for a couple of reasons

One main reason is that the career prospects as I have heard are a bit better and more achievable. I had the aspiration of being a diplomat as an International Relations major graduate but the problem is my passport. The UN or many other big organizations like the World Bank and whatnot (To my best knowledge) give more chances to EU passport holders or North America. Meaning that there isn't a guarantee for me to secure a job after I graduate that will a) Give me a good pay, b) be within 1-2 years. As for back home in India? To work for India I have to pass the 2nd toughest exam in the world called the UPSC which has a pass rate of 0.01% or less. Compared to what I have heard about International Law, I can join an International Law firm and work within the same field of Public International Law with the option of doing a conversion course easily to become a barrister. Essentially my options are much more open.

Another reason is because of pay. Now I am usually a person who does not care much about pay but more about my work. However, living alone on a budget and plus struggles of my parents have kind of shown me that pay does matter especially from my career. And the pay difference between Law and Diplomatic careers is quite substantially big. This is something I probably will need but more than that it allows me to sort of survive in what is already really high living costs nowadays.

But I have 2 risks/ problems with this. First it means that I will have to restart my entire uni journey from Year 1 and its something I am a bit iffy on. But more than that it also means that there is no take backs, I have to let go of my aspiration of being a diplomat for stability under an International Lawyer. I'm not sure who to ask so if anyone can help me out here, I would love it because its something that will determine the next 10 years of my life for sure.

This is supposed to be one of the best short programs in IL - they do both public and private. Does anyone have any experiences to share about doing one of the courses there?

This is about a confusion I've had with the ICJ's January 26th order for quite a while. It's about what the court ruled about Israel's conduct, and so I can understand it better.

""54. In the Court’s view, the facts and circumstances mentioned above are sufficient to conclude that at least some of the rights claimed by South Africa and for which it is seeking protection are plausible. This is the case with respect to the right of the Palestinians in Gaza to be protected from acts of genocide and related prohibited acts identified in Article III, and the right of South Africa to seek Israel’s compliance with the latter’s obligations under the Convention.""

This para was widely interpreted as the court stating that Israel was plausibly committing genocide until Judge Donoghue said in BBC interview that-

""The purpose of the ruling was to declare that South Africa had a right to bring its case against Israel and that Palestinians had “plausible rights to protection from genocide” - rights which were at a real risk of irreparable damage.""

This would indicate that the court didn't rule such a thing, but what confuses me (and from what I understand even experts) is why the court analyzes Israel's military conduct and statements from senior israeli officials? The court discusses both of these from para 46 to 53, and in para 54, the first quote in this post, it says

""...the facts and circumstances mentioned above are sufficient to conclude that at least some of the rights claimed by South Africa and for which it is seeking protection are plausible.""

The facts and circumstances refer to para 46 to 53, but then it leaves me confused on why israeli military conduct and official statements have anything relation to Palestinian's right to not be genocided and why they are considered "sufficient to conclude" anything about this right because it has nothing to do with israel, it has to with whether Palestinians would be a group under the convention. I mean the court states this in para 45

""The Palestinians appear to constitute a distinct “national, ethnical, racial or religious group”, and hence a protected group within the meaning of Article II of the Genocide Convention. The Court observes that, according to United Nations sources, the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip comprises over 2 million people. Palestinians in the Gaza Strip form a substantial part of the protected group.""

I have to be misunderstanding something because if in para 54, the court only ruled that Palestinians plausibly had the right to be protected from acts of genocide, then why does it seem to discuss all of this as well which has no relation to the right? The declaration of Judge Bhandari further compounds this confusion for me-

""Judge Bhandari states that the Court, in weighing the plausibility of the rights protection of which South Africa claims, must consider such evidence as is before it at this stage. It must take into account the widespread destruction in Gaza and loss of life that the population of Gaza has thus far endured. In determining the plausibility of these rights at the provisional measures stage....the widespread nature of the military campaign in Gaza, as well as the loss of life, injury, destruction, and humanitarian needs following from it, are by themselves capable of supporting a plausibility finding with respect to rights under Article II.""

Why would any of this support a plausibility finding of the right of Palestinians to be protected from genocide?

That is my first query, my second query is does the Court, not essentially state that there is a real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the plausible rights invoked by South Africa in para 74, meaning that the court thought that acts susceptible of causing irreparable prejudice to the rights can “occur at any moment”. The reason I ask is that isn't this the court basically stating that there is a possibility that Palestinians' right to not be genocided might be violated, or am I heavily misunderstanding what this means? I understand it's not the plausibility standard, but if and only if this is what it actually means, then why do people say The court ruled nothing about Israel's supposed genocide?

Also as a side note, why does the court have to rule on whether palestinians are a group protected by the genocide convention, is that not obvious and something even israel would have to agree to because it recognized palestinians as a national group when it recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

I'd like to say I'm no legal expert so I might have made a major error in my understanding of in this long post, but it would be greatly appreciated if someone could clear this up for me.