#Affairs of State -- Pt.2

December 15th, 1973 -- Belgrade

Hotel Moskva

The cold winter had begun to set in.

With temperatures as low as -10, the people of Belgrade were certainly getting ready for the winter ahead. Many stores around the city had just begun offering special sales before the 31st, and restaurants had just started working on their New Year's specials.

Leb i Sol started their tour through Yugoslavia, and Smak just had their first performance after a month-long hiatus—all was well, in a more non-important sense.

Politically, turbulent times were ahead. Since the repeated arrest of Comrade Djilas, circles closely associated with the more moderate faction within the Party became far more restrained and tactical in how they act; biding their time and searching for allies, rather than acting prematurely for a cause that may be sabotaged from the start. When discussing Yugoslav politics, one must understand that three main actors are less powerful than the Marshal but can whisper into his ear: the Army, the Central Committee, and the Republican governments.

Džemil Šarac, a 52-year-old Yugoslav People’s Army officer, sat alone in the café of the famous Hotel Moskva, slowly sipping on a hot coffee and enjoying a portion of Šampita. The relative bustle of the Hotel did dissipate with the rumbling of an engine from the outside. A tall, assertive figure entered the hotel, marched towards Šarac and handed him a crumpled-up note - the officer opened it.

” Mr. Šarac, he’s here - nod if you are sure.”

Šarac would nod.

As the tall figure left the building, two men entered; one was visibility shorter than the previous, but still had an imposing attitude and an impeccable posture. The other man appeared distraught as if he had been running for hours out of fear. His eyes were sunk, and his cheekbones were far more visible when compared to any man who had been eating properly. As they moved closer and closer to the table, Šarac would motion for the two men to sit, soon after which he would motion for the waiter.

“Two portions of chicken breasts, and some salad, please. And for these gentlemen, two glasses of water, and a glass of whiskey for me.”

“Right away, sir.”

The waiter would leave the men.

“So, Comrade Djilas - how have our friends from UDBA been treating you? I hope Dimitrievski has not been too harsh -”

“What do you want, Šarac? Have learned from my mistakes? Yes. Do I ask for forgiveness? Yes. Do I want to join the Party? Only if it’s the only way to get my freedom -”

“Slow your roll. You’re not with UDBA anymore, the Army is taking over - you’ll be assigned as a ‘Special Consultant to the Party Committee for the YPA - this is your only ticket out, on the condition that you give me your unwavering loyalty.”

“Loyalty? When have I not been loyal to the Army, if anything, the Army has more balls than the entire Party ever will. What do you…want me to do?”

“For now, nothing - just promise me that you’ll stay out of trouble.”

The bustle would return once more. With the food being served, the three men would continue their conversation. Discussing matters perhaps best saved for later.

##Albanian Army Stands Down

RTSH- Albanian State Media Bulletin, November 12, 1973

First Secretary and Chairman, Mehmet Shehu has issued an order declaring an end to the State of National Emergency. All units of the Albanian People's Armed Forces have been issued orders to stand-down and demobilize. Chairman Shehu thanked them for their readiness in the time of national upheaval, and stated that their speed and strength had shocked the world and thwarted the potentially imminent Western invasion.

##The Show Trials

November 1973 - Tirana

The following suspects have been brought before the People of Albania to stand for their various crimes, as enumerated:

• Xhelil Gjoni - Treason, Conspiracy to Overthrow the State
• Pirro Dodbiba - Treason, Conspiracy to Overthrow the State
• Foto Cami - Treason, Conspiracy to Overthrow the State
• Ramiz Alia - Treason, Conspiracy to Overthrow the State
• Prokop Murra - Treason, Conspiracy to Overthrow the State
• Hajredin Çeliku - Treason, Conspiracy to Overthrow the State
• Lenka Cuko - Treason, Conspiracy to Overthrow the State
• Qirjako Mihali - Treason, Conspiracy to Overthrow the State

These suspects will be tried in front of a jury of members of the Albanian Worker's Party. Each has been accused of two crimes, Treason, and Conspiracy to Overthrow the Albanian State. The maximum sentence both crimes carry is death. The minimum sentence is 40 years of hard labor for treason and 100 years of hard labor for the conspiracy charges. Given the severity of the crimes, the suspects will bear the evidentiary burden to prove their innocence. Evidence of their crimes, provided by the prosecution has already been entered into the court record, and copies of such evidence provided to the suspect defendants. Each defendant will proceed with their defense, the prosecution will rebut the defense, then closing statements will be given. Sentencing will be completed summarily at the conclusion of the proceedings. The cases will proceed, defendant by defendant, claim by claim.

THE HONORABLE AZIM LATIFI WRITES THE OPINION FOR THE ALBANIAN PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL

In the name of the People and the Workers' Party of Albania, the Tribunal convened to examine the actions of the accused—Xhelil Gjoni, Pirro Dodbiba, Foto Cami, Ramiz Alia, Prokop Murra, Hajredin Çeliku, Lenka Cuko, and Qirjako Mihali—who stand before us charged with treason and conspiracy to overthrow the People’s State. These charges, stemming from a clear and nefarious plot to subvert the socialist order, attack the revolutionary principles upon which our great People’s Republic was founded, and destabilize the achievements of the Albanian working class, are of the most heinous nature.

We, the tribunal, are not simply the voice of the Party but the embodiment of the will of the People. It is our solemn duty to protect the socialist revolution, which has lifted Albania from the shadows of capitalist oppression into the bright light of proletarian rule. Those who seek to destroy this paradise of workers’ unity and progress, who conspire in the dark to bring about its ruin, shall be exposed for their treachery.

The evidence against the accused is overwhelming. They stand indicted for their roles in a grand conspiracy aimed at undermining the socialist state, making a mockery of the selfless sacrifices of the Albanian people. These individuals, who once held positions of influence and trust, have turned against the very ideals they swore to uphold. Their machinations were not the actions of patriots seeking reform, but of traitors in league with foreign enemies, who sought to restore the capitalist order and destroy the noble revolution.

Xhelil Gjoni, once a trusted figure, has been revealed as a principal architect of the conspiracy. His actions, driven by personal ambition and bourgeois tendencies, sought to exploit the weaknesses of our great People’s State and create a path for foreign imperialists to infiltrate our borders. Gjoni’s attempts to sow discord within the Party are nothing less than a betrayal of our revolutionary ideals.

Pirro Dodbiba, in his reckless pursuit of reactionary goals, acted as a willing accomplice to the forces of counter-revolution. His complicity in these traitorous activities proves his disloyalty not only to the Party but to the working people of Albania. Dodbiba’s deceitful machinations endangered the integrity of our socialist government and destabilized the progress we have made.

Foto Cami, through his misguided actions and unpatriotic behavior, sought to undermine the revolutionary efforts of the Party. Cami’s support for anti-socialist factions and his refusal to uphold the duties entrusted to him by the People’s State demonstrate a lack of principle and a willingness to betray the workers and peasants who entrusted him with power.

Ramiz Alia, a once-prominent member of the Party, betrayed his comrades and the People’s cause. In his arrogance and pursuit of personal power, he collaborated with reactionary forces to destabilize the government. Alia’s actions were not just a personal betrayal, but a threat to the collective well-being of the Albanian proletariat, and they are unforgivable.

Prokop Murra, likewise, sought to serve foreign imperialist interests at the expense of the People’s Republic. Through clandestine meetings and subversive activities, Murra plotted to overthrow the State and replace it with a system that would return Albania to the grip of capitalist exploitation. His betrayal is a stain on his record, and his actions will not be forgiven.

Hajredin Çeliku, with his connections to foreign agents, worked behind the scenes to create an environment where the State’s unity could be shattered. He played a crucial role in the conspiracy to subvert the revolution and hand over the keys of power to foreign exploiters. His betrayal of the Party is an unforgivable act of treason.

Lenka Cuko, under the guise of a loyal Party member, engaged in activities that threatened the security and stability of the socialist state. Her conspiring with counter-revolutionary elements demonstrates her deepening disillusionment with the Party and its principles. Cuko’s actions were an affront to the hard-working people of Albania, and she is guilty of betrayal.

Qirjako Mihali, in his plotting and secretive dealings with reactionary forces, sought to destroy the unity of the Albanian people. His treacherous actions have harmed the cause of socialism, undermined our efforts for self-reliance, and jeopardized the collective security of the Albanian working class. Mihali’s conspiracy to overthrow the government is not only a crime against the state, but a crime against the very people who believed in him.

These individuals, by their actions, have placed themselves outside the ranks of the Albanian people. They have turned their backs on the revolution, betrayed the trust of the Party, and sought to bring about a return to the capitalist past. Such crimes cannot be tolerated. The People’s State will not allow these enemies of socialism to destroy the progress we have made.

The Party stands united in the defense of the Albanian People’s Republic. There can be no compromise with traitors. The actions of these individuals have left no doubt as to their intent: they are enemies of the revolution, and their attempts to overthrow the People’s State must be met with the full force of justice.

We hereby declare the defendants guilty of treason and conspiracy to overthrow the State. Let their punishments serve as a clear warning to all those who might consider turning against the People’s Republic. The integrity of the Albanian socialist state must be protected, and these conspirators will pay the price for their crimes against the people.

The sentences have been issued as follows:

• Xhelil Gjoni - Death by firing squad
• Pirro Dodbiba - Death by firing squad
• Foto Cami - Death by firing squad
• Ramiz Alia - Death by firing squad
• Prokop Murra - Death by firing squad
• Hajredin Çeliku - Death by firing squad
• Lenka Cuko - Death by firing squad
• Qirjako Mihali - Death by firing squad

Thus, justice has been served, and the revolutionary spirit of Albania will continue to flourish, free from the poisons of betrayal.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Raise revolutionary vigilance, oppose slackers, resolutely eliminate all counterrevolutionary elements, protect socialist construction!

提高革命警惕，反对麻痹思想，坚决肃清一切反革命分子，保卫社会主义建设！
NOVEMBER 1973

Campaign to Wholeheartedly Serve the People (Cont.)

Nine months had passed since the Campaign to Wholeheartedly Serve the People was declared. China, after more than a decade of violent political upheaval under the Cultural Revolution, was beginning to settle into a new order. Yet to outside observers, this "normalcy" was difficult to define. The legacy of ideological fanaticism, political purges, and factional warfare still lingered in the bureaucracy and the provinces. Though stability was returning, it came at the cost of another round of purges—this time directed against the excesses of the radical left.

Chairman Mao Zedong, now in declining health, had grown increasingly disillusioned with the political climate in Beijing. Provincial committees, many of which had been staffed by hardline leftists during the Cultural Revolution, remained defiant, continuing the radical agitation encouraged by the Gang of Four. The Red Guards, though diminished in influence, still posed a security risk, particularly in cities like Shanghai, where factional battles erupted sporadically.

As Hua Guofeng’s investigations deepened, Mao was forced to confront the true scale of Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng’s abuses. The Cultural Revolution Working Group and the Central Social Affairs Department had orchestrated a reign of terror under the guise of ideological purification. What had once been dismissed as isolated excesses were now revealed to be a system of organized brutality. The Ministry of Public Security had since become the central force in addressing these crimes, launching widespread investigations into tens of thousands of Party members accused of corruption, capitalist tendencies, and deviationist activities. Officially, these purges were based on evidence uncovered in the investigations of Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng, but in reality, they marked the beginning of a broader campaign to dismantle the radical left’s grip on the Party.

Bureaucratic Reorganization and Party Restructuring

Recognizing the need to reassert central control, Hua Guofeng initiated a sweeping restructuring of the Party and government institutions. The Ministry of State Security (MSS) already established established to consolidate intelligence, counter-subversion, and political investigations under a single, centralized body, officially replaced the ad-hoc revolutionary committees that had operated during the Cultural Revolution. The MSS absorbed the remnants of the Central Social Affairs Department and elements of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) political departments, effectively sidelining radical leftist influence in China’s security apparatus.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) was granted expanded authority, focusing on internal security, suppression of factional elements, and enforcement of the new Party line. To ensure ideological discipline, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) was restructured and granted new powers to investigate and remove Party officials suspected of corruption or deviation from Mao Zedong Thought.

At the provincial level, revolutionary committees—once the primary governing bodies during the Cultural Revolution—were systematically dismantled and replaced with Provincial Party Committees directly loyal to Beijing. Many former Red Guard leaders who had been promoted into provincial positions found themselves purged, replaced by rehabilitated cadres who had been sidelined during the Cultural Revolution.

To further consolidate control over China’s economy, Yu Qiuli took advantage of the power struggles and restructured the State Planning Commission, removing radical leftists and appointing rehabilitated technocrats aligned with Premier Zhou Enlai. This marked a slow but deliberate shift toward economic pragmatism, laying the groundwork for national reconstruction.

The Campaign to Criticize Excess and Chaos

Amid these sweeping changes, Premier Zhou Enlai launched the Campaign to Criticize Excess and Chaos, a political and intellectual offensive aimed at discrediting the most extreme elements of the Cultural Revolution. The campaign depicted Jiang Qing as the architect of mass purges, ideological puritanism, and systemic violence. Propaganda denounced her as a self-serving opportunist who had manipulated Mao’s vision for her own gain, orchestrating the persecution of intellectuals and fostering a climate of fear.

Her closest allies, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, faced similar denunciations. They were accused of spreading extremist rhetoric, fueling factional violence, and undermining Party unity. Their policies, once heralded as revolutionary, were now reinterpreted as reckless and destructive. Plays, films, and political essays reframed their actions as a betrayal of the Chinese people, reinforcing the shift in the Party’s ideological stance.

Parallel to these denunciations, Zhou Enlai quietly began the rehabilitation of key Party members who had been purged during the height of the Cultural Revolution. Zhang Wentian, Peng Dehuai, Yang Shangkun, Wan Li, Zhao Ziyang, Luo Ruiqing, Wang Guangmei, and Hu Yaobang were reinstated, signaling a shift towards political stabilization. Each of them were instructed to report to their local Party headquarters for assignment.

However, the crackdown was far from bloodless. Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao were arrested, charged with counter-revolutionary agitation, and held responsible for the violence of the January Storm in Beijing. Their detention marked the beginning of the formal dismantling of the Gang of Four’s influence.

The Lujiabang Incident: A Clash in Shanghai

Despite the fall of his closest allies, Wang Hongwen remained a notable exception. Having successfully secured Chairman Mao’s personal trust, he distanced himself from the ongoing purges, penning a political essay in which he framed his role in the Cultural Revolution as reluctant and emphasized his unwavering loyalty to Mao Zedong Thought. This maneuver earned him a reprieve, but it did little to save his associates.

As the crackdown on radical elements intensified, tensions between the Ministry of State Security and the Red Guards reached a breaking point. The most significant confrontation erupted in Shanghai during what would become known as the Lujiabang Incident.

Seeking to neutralize a group of radical Red Guards entrenched in the Shanghai branch of the People’s Bank of China, elements of the 117th Armed Police Division were deployed to arrest them. However, the operation did not go as planned. The Red Guards, armed with makeshift weapons and an unshaken revolutionary zeal, repelled the first three attempts to storm the building, injuring several Armed Police officers in the process.

It was only on the fourth assault—after reinforcements arrived and tear gas was deployed—that the security forces managed to overrun the Red Guards and secure the building. The majority of the insurgents were arrested, with their leaders facing immediate trial for counter-revolutionary activities.

The Lujiabang Incident served as a stark warning to the remaining leftist factions: resistance to the Party’s new direction would not be tolerated. Far from discouraging the government, the violent confrontation only emboldened the CCP to accelerate its efforts to stamp out radical leftist influences.

A New Chapter for China

By the end of the year, the power of the Gang of Four had been decisively broken. The Party begun significant restructuring, and the bureaucracy had been reshaped to eliminate radical elements while reasserting central control. The Campaign to Criticize Excess and Chaos had effectively reframed the Cultural Revolution’s most extreme policies as disastrous deviations from the Party’s true mission.

Yet, beneath the surface, deeper questions loomed. The rehabilitation of pragmatic leaders and the slow pivot toward economic reconstruction hinted at a future beyond rigid Maoist orthodoxy. While Mao remained at the helm, his influence was beginning to wane. The ideological battles of the past decade had left the Party weary, and among its senior leadership, a realization was quietly taking root—China could not remain in a permanent state of revolution.

Hua Guofeng, Zhou Enlai, and their allies had won the struggle against the radical left, but the path forward was still uncertain. The Party had restored order, yet it now faced a new, more difficult challenge: who picks up the torch?

TL;DR

• Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan are subjected to three struggle sessions each (with dunce caps and signs) and sent to re-education in Xinjiang.
• Zhang Wentian, Peng Dehuai, Yang Shangkun, Wan Li, Zhao Ziyang, Luo Ruiqing, Wang Guangmei, and Hu Yaobang are rehabilitated.
• Political power centralized in the MSS, MPS, and CCDI.
• The Lujiabang Incident; MSS and Red guards clash for control of the Shanghai Branch of the People's Bank of China
• Yu Qiuli reshuffes the State Planning Commission.

##The Humanitarian Front

The Republic of Zaire is disturbed by the actions that have transpired in the United Republic of Tanzania and in Mozambique. With the recent attack on Tanzania by the Portuguese Republic, Zaire has pledged to send humanitarian aid to assist in alleviating the plight of those affected by the war. Zaire's aid has been accepted by the Tanzanian government after emergency contacts had been established. In doing this, Zaire will be sending 350 humanitarian aid workers, including medical staff with the coordination of the Tanzanian government so that they may be most useful. Among this aid, Zaire will commit amounts of cassava, rice and maize to the relief effort. Zaire will commit an initial 500 metric tons of cassava, 200 metric tons of rice and 200 tons of maize. The amount of these staple foods given in aid will be adjusted after more data is collected. The largest set of the humanitarian workers will be sent to the area closest to the front that the Tanzanian government will allow for, the other smaller group shall be set 150 kilometers away. The larger of the two groups will amount to some 250 workers.

##The Other Help

Along with the aid workers, two light infantry companies of the FAZ from the 4th and 5th Groupements will be sent into Tanzania. These forces will be attached to the humanitarian workers in order to ensure safety, maintain order and deter potential attack.

Members of the Socialist Federal Women's Conference (SBFK) were gathered around a fire outside the Nationalrat (Austrian Parliament Lower House) in a Tent. They were freezing out here as the Snow fell and Temperatures dropped below zero, but a Hope kept them warm from within.

A Hope for what was happening inside the Parliament Building. There, Members of the Nationalrat were voting on the Proposal on Abortion.

Rosie, a smallish Woman with long blonde hair and wearing a thick winter jacket and Pants, was always vocal of Woman's Rights. They were human adults, why did they not get all the Rights Men had?

The Voting went on and on. Rosie and her Compatriots were starting to get real cold and began doing small runs around the Tent to keep themselves warm, always hoping that the Result would finally come.

Finally - People emerged. Members of the Parliament left the Parliament Building, sad or happy.

Rosie burst forward and searched for a MP from the SPÖ, a friend of hers. She found him smiling and her Heart began to Race.

"What was the Vote? What was the Vote?!" Rosie exclaimed in Anticipation.

"We won Rosie, we won!! 93 Yes to 88 No!"

Rosie almost hug tackled her Friend before running to the Tent and shout the result at her Friends.

A kilometer away, in a Church, the News had broke as well. The Mood was depressed - but determined.

Aktion Leben, the ferocious anti abortion organisation, will NOT take this lying down.

The Binh Chủng Phòng Không Không Quân (PKKQ), or Air Defence - Air Force Service, more commonly known in English as the Vietnam People’s Air Force, in 1973 is likely one of the most famous air forces in the world, having endured a decade long air campaign against the world’s largest and most technologically sophisticated air force, coming out arguably victorious. With the battles over the skies of Hanoi no longer an ongoing concern for the PKKQ, the process of recovery and development may now continue, to serve the fatherland and the revolution in any possible future conflicts.

Training

Starting from early 1972, eighty Vietnamese pilots each year is to travel to Krasnodar, at the A.K Serov Higher Military Aviation School where they are to be trained as pilots in various types of aircrafts, including MiG-17F, MiG-21MF, MiG-21bis and various civilian or military transport types. This arrangement is part of the Soviet military aid package to Vietnam, where Vietnamese pilots would receive the final part of their flight training in the Soviet Union, having completed primary and secondary flight training in Vietnam. After their stay at Krasnodar, up to thirty Vietnamese pilots every year are to receive the honours of being inducted directly into Soviet air combat units as part of the exchange program, allowing Vietnamese pilots to maintain consistent flight hours and precious operational training alongside their Soviet counterparts. The first cohort of thirty had served their first tour of duty with the 4th Tactical Air Army in Poland, before complaints from both Moscow and Hanoi respectively regarding concerns about Vietnamese pilots serving directly on the Iron Curtain, and the quality of the training they were receiving, meant a transfer to the 10th Independent Air Defence Army in Arkhangelsk, where all future Vietnamese pilots in the USSR are to be posted.

With the US withdrawal however, also meant continued flight training in Vietnam. Operating a mix of captured T-6 Texans, Yak-11 and Yak-18 primary trainers, dozens of new airmen are trained every year at the ADAF Academy in Ha Tay Province. Starting from late 1973, they are also to be joined by Yemeni pilots from the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen on a pilot exchange and education tour in Vietnam.

With older units of MiG-21PFM being phased out for newer MiG-21MF and MiG-21bis, conversion training has also slowly begun with the 371st Air Division.

Expansion

With a total force goal to operate some 240 MiG-21s by the end of the Second Five Year Plan in 1977, in addition to the 371st Air Division, two more Air Divisions have been stood up by decrees of the Central Military Committee, the 372nd Air Division and the 370th Air Division. The original 371st “Rising Dragon” Air Division with its three Fighter Regiments, the 921st “Red Star” Fighter Regiment, the 923rd “Steady Stance” Fighter Regiment, and the 927th “Forest and Mountains” Fighter Regiment is to begin fighter conversion to the newer MiG-21bis, 80 of which are to be delivered by the end of 1974, alongside the brand new state of the art R-60 missile. The 921st and 923rd are to be converted to MiG-21bis, while the 927th will remain flying the MiG-21MF type, though also with R-60 integration. Operating the brand new MiG-21bis and R-60 combination, in the hands of some of the most combat hardened and well trained pilots in the world, with eight aces amongst its ranks, the 921st ”Red Star” Fighter Regiment is likely the deadliest fighter unit in the Socialist bloc, if not the world.

Elsewhere, the new 370th Air Division and 372nd Air Division are to be stood up at Vinh Airbase and Hai Phong’s Kien An Airbase respectively, operating MiG-21MFs. Despite having a stockpile entirely sufficient to equip a total of six Fighter Regiments with the ”Silver Swallows”, a shortage in trained pilots on the type will mean it would take a much longer time until the VPAF could be equipped with three full air divisions of the MiG-21s.

Future

With the diminished threat of American airpower, the PKKQ looks to develop its nascent ground attack capabilities in the face of the more peer adversaries that it is likely to confront within the near future. With its three Fighter-Bomber Regiments of MiG-17Fs providing a meager ground attack capability, the PKKQ will likely look for innovative solutions in order to build a long term strike capability. Amongst these solutions include one that’s steeped in wartime experience.

Having set aside the single flight of MiG-17F that had conducted the daring attack on an American naval force outside Dong Hoi in 1972, these pilots who had pioneered the use of sea skimming bombing attack are to withdraw from frontline duties and begin training of experienced pilots specifically for the purpose of naval strike. This is to be augmented by modifications requested from the PKKQ to its Soviet engineering specialists for a dozen MiG-17Fs to be modified to carry additional equipment to facilitate the strike role, including ground proximity detectors, an aiming sight, and a ballistic computer. These “MiG-17FL” alongside the naval strike training program is to culminate in the deployment of a single naval strike squadron, trained extensively in attacking warships using sea skimming methods to avoid radar detection and complicating missile interception. Due to the extremely high technical skills required for such a mission, the naval strike squadron is to be formed with only the most experienced MiG-17 pilots in PKKQ service.

Havana, Cuba - October, 1973

Office of the People’s Council for Socialist Advancement (CPAS)

The 15 year plan established by CPAS lays out a foundation for continued economic development in Cuba. In coordination with these efforts, the Cuban Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been hard at work securing a series of investments for the next set of policies to be established during the course of the 15 year plan: The Mariel Special Economic Zone. The special economic zone will stretch from the western edge of Havana’s administrative zone, 53 miles to Playa El Morrillo acting as the central node for this new area of economic experimentation and innovation.

Key Infrastructural Investments and Expansions

Port of Mariel Expansion

The Port of Mariel, sitting west of Havana, is one of Cuba’s most important, due to its natural deepwater harbor, ability to accommodate large container ships, and placement along a zone of heavy shipping traffic in the Western Hemisphere, being just 90 miles south of the United States. Due to its significance to Cuba’s economy, the investments in the Mariel SEZ, CPAS has designated the Port of Mariel as one of the central points for investment in this project. However, owing to the significant costs that the government believes will be necessary to make the Port of Mariel one large enough to truly fuel the Cuban economy, an international partnership has been sought by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the Cuban government having secured Finland as the primary foreign investor in this project.

The Ministry of Economy and Planning, and the Cuban Maritime Administration have developed a plan to double the size and capacity of the Port of Mariel, as well as to outfit it with the latest available technologies for port operations. 

Mariel Railway Terminal

The Mariel Rail Terminal will be a complementary logistics hub to the new Port of Mariel expansions, which will act as the SEZ’s central railway terminal for inbound and outbound cargo. This terminal will be linked directly to the nations railway network, and will act as a conduit for goods to move rapidly from other areas of Cuba, to the port of Mariel for export, and vice versa in the case of imports. This large railway center will be located just behind the Port of Mariel, and infrastructural work will be done to efficiently load and unload train cargo for shipping.

Due to the large increase in size, overhaul of port systems and equipment, and the construction of a large rail cargo terminal, the plan has called for a budget ranging from $600 to $750 million dollars in investment - which would result in Cuba having one of the largest and well equipped ports along one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes - often used by ships in transit to the Panama Canal. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba has secured financing for 70% of the expenses to upgrade the port from Finland, with Cuba covering the remainder of the cost.

This significant investment has been made with the following terms being agreed to by the two governments:

• Finland will receive a proportional percentage of all revenues generated by the port (70%), with Cuba receiving the rest (fees such as port fees, cargo handling fees, all other fees that ports usually charge).

• Cuba retains the right to, at any point in time, purchase any amount of shares in the port, in exchange for the fair market price. Finland would have five years to acquiesce the purchase request.

The project will be stretched to the course of 6 (possibly 7) years, in which the Cuban government will be receiving projected funds of $79 million a year in direct investment from the Finnish government and around $37.5 million dollars a year in investment from the Cuban government.

Special Economic Zone Policies

The Mariel Special Economic Zone will be receiving special administrative status and be separated into its own administrative and economic entity within the Cuban Administrative environment, with its own rules, regulations, and policies regarding the operation of foreign and private enterprises.

In an experimental adjustment to Cuban ideologically aligned economic policies, the Mariel SEZ (henceforth referred to as the MSEZ) will be an experiment on the compatibilities between Cuban Communism, and Market Oriented policies, aiming to strike a balance between the two which CPAS has dubbed Communism With Cuban Characteristics. A general outline of policy has been published regarding the MSEZ’s business policies:

- The MSEZ will be organized with its own set of Ministries - which will not supersede Cuban Ministries, but will focus solely on administering policy within this small zone.

- Both Cuban citizens, and foreign entities to operate private enterprises, and local laws will provide a set of laws protecting personal property rights for people and companies within the MSEZ.

- In an effort to draw in money and investment, the Cuban government will be allowing American companies to operate within the MSEZ, as part of an agreement reached with the Americans that would allow companies to operate in the MSEZ.

- Tax breaks - While a corporate tax will be levied on businesses in this area, companies will receive heavy tax breaks in exchange for investments made into the zone.>!American!< companies will not be taxed in exchange for investing in the region. 

- A ban on the nationalization of foreign investments in the MSEZ. 

- All companies chartered to operate within the MSEZ will be entitled to seek international arbitration in the event of a dispute with a Cuban State Owned Enterprise in the area.

- Loosening of capital transfer laws in the MSEZ, which will allow companies to transfer profit and capital outside of the MSEZ, significantly improving the ability to move cash and capital in and out of the zone.

##O GLOBO - Frota Named Successor by Médici

Brasilia

September 8th, 1973

In a dramatic political development, President Emílio Garrastazu Médici has announced that the Minister of Order and Public Security and former Commander of the 1st Military Region, Sylvio Frota, will succeed him as Brazil’s next president. This decision was made public yesterday during a national address by President Médici to the Brazilian people, amidst a flurry of signals indicating the continuation of current security and growth oriented policies. 

Frota, a dedicated patriot, has been long known for his firm stance against communist threats and his control over Brazil’s security apparatus. Recently, he has positioned himself as the candidate to safeguard the legacy of Médici’s government, promising to “continue on the path of prosperity and security for all Brazilians”.Having served as the key overseer and implementer of the regime’s internal security measures, Frota’s rise to power has been widely seen as an endorsement of the status quo. 

Over the past few months, rumors of a forming political alliance between Minister Frota, Presidential Chief of Staff João Leitão de Abreu and Minister for Strategic Development Delfim Neto have been the subject of much media speculation, these rumors seemingly having been true. Shortly after the end of President Médici’s address, Abreu and Neto put out a joint statement indicating their full endorsements for Minister Frota as the next President of Brazil, calling him “a steadfast guardian of Brazil’s sovereignty and the only candidate capable of ensuring the nation’s continued stability, security, and economic growth.” 

The choice is expected to be unanimously backed by the Aliança Renovadora Nacional, ARENA (National Renewal Alliance), at a party convention later this month. The Presidential Election, which will be decided by the electoral college, is scheduled to take place on the 15th of January, with Frota being the clear frontrunner over assumed-MDB candidate Ulysses Silveira Guimarães.

Havana, Cuba

October 1973

Several months ago, the Cuban government was shocked to learn that a Cuban flight crew was arrested in Angola, and later transferred to the custody of the United States, causing a stir both abroad, and at the highest levels of the Cuban government. Following months of negotiations with their captors, the Cuban Government - through Granma - the leading socialist publication in the Americas- has publicized an agreement reached by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and American government.

After months of negotiation and frustration, the Cuban government has secured a simple exchange:

The return of the Cuban operators in exchange for 100 undesirable prisoners, which were transferred to the United States via Guantanamo Bay. When pressed for further details on the terms of the prison exchange, the Cuban government said simply that a “mutually beneficial agreement was found”.

The Cuban flight crew was greeted by raucous applause in Havana, Cuba, in which Fidel Castro personally met with and welcomed home these faithful servants of the revolution.

!Recognizing that after being in American custody that these agents could be compromised, the Cuban government will be retiring these agents, moving them to new larger houses, and will begin carefully monitoring their movements and communications.!<

Algerian high command has, with immediate effect, granted authorisation to send 3 squadrons of fighters and advisors from our air force.

Resources:

• Team of Algerian advisors

October, 1973

Although the current constitution of the GDR was only adopted in 1968, the need for some changes has already been made apparent within the GDR and the party leadership due to the changing political reality of the GDR, relations with the FDR, and new priorities. 

The main bulk of changes will focus on the identity of country and how it is reflected in the constitution. To better reflect the politburo’s priority to build and define the East German identity, the usage of the word German (and derivatives) will be cut back, as will any mentions of the GDR being the sole legal German government. Although not within the amendments, the Politburo has, at the same time as these amendments have been released, announced that the DDR’s place in German history will be clarified soon. 

The amendments will emphasize the importance of the DDR-Soviet friendship, both in the past, present, and future. 

Although there has been a debate over changing the official role of the State Council, following the death of Ulbricht, the decision was ultimately made to leave its formal role untouched. 

As most Turks worried about their daily lives, how to get enough to eat, where to work, and when to pray, and as the elites of Turkey considered the farcial events of Albania and the dreamy, pie-in-the-sky PM Ecevit, a bill wound its way through the Grand National Assembly that was very much out-of-touch with the moment. The Postal Reform Bill of 1973 was, it was said, inspired principally by the Postal Reorganization Act of the United States passed just recently in response to a crisis at the American Post Office. It gave the Turkish Department of the Post and Telegraph status as a state-owned enterprise with wide latitude in its operations and a simple mandate to provide postal and telecommunications services to as many Turks as possible. While maintaining some provisions, like the need to maintain postal banking, and sharing revenue from the lottery-bond program, the bill largely removed the postal service from direct government control, and instead left most power in the hands of Turgut Ozal, who, reportedly, had worked very closely with MHP minority-party legislators to get this law done--part of the party's push for "clean and efficient governance" that is often the hallmark of Islamist parties.

Once given this power, Ozal spared no time in making drastic changes to the organization of the Post Office. Working with a clique of American-educated Turkish engineers, a number of IBM and Boston Consulting Group consultants, and several of Turkey's most adept mathematicians, a broad plan for the reform and reorganization of the Post took place.

Firstly, the old system of point deliveries and train-sorting was to be scrapped. Instead, the Post was to now rely primarily, but not entirely, on the highways; trucks, and vans. These trucks and vans would not be owned by the Post itself. Instead, competitive bidding would exist for mail-routes between post offices and sort centers, and between the sort centers themselves. With the general inelasticity and inefficiency of the state-owned railways and airlines, it was considered likely that private actors would monopolize the trade of mail in practice--though as a sop to the unions that held so much influence in the ruling CHP and which held their coveted postal rules, the drivers of such vehicles would themselves have to participate in union shops--most commonly MISK, the ultranationalist/Islamist federation, with Turkish truck drivers being more rural in origin.

And these new sort centers would not be of the old-fashioned type. No, not at all. IBM consultants had recommended the employment of the all-new "bar code", along with a plethora of other IBM innovations and hardware. Under the new system, mail would be consolidated at each local office into a series of standardized, stackable totes according to the zip-code of its destination [with local mail obviously going right back out]. These totes would then have bar-codes applied to them, deterministically generated unique identifiers that would indicate the area of their destination. Upon arrival at a sort center, these totes would be offloaded, then scanned in by a bar-code scanner sitting on the belt, which would consult with a back-end mainframe and determine routing for the tote according to a complex computing program. In the long term, it was hoped that videotex terminals, cheaper bar-code scanners and the increased computational power available through, as some called it, "Moore's Law", would allow for every individual piece of mail to be associated with a tote and thus tracked through the system, but such technology would likely not be feasible until the mid-1970s. In the meantime, though, Turkey's roughly 20 new sort centers--mainly based in sleepy, secondary towns like Izmit, Kirrikale, and Turgutlu--would remain islands of high-technology in some of the more backwards portions of Turkey, with computerized scheduling, truck contracting, and routing of letters and small packages expected to vastly improve postal efficiency and speed up delivery, with Ozal's goal being to standardize two-day deliveries within the area of Turkey. In addition, a new overnight service has been developed, marketed towards businesses, utilizing distinctive blue-colored totes and with special handling, that aims to more standardize the current method of air-mail [and indeed to replace it in many cases with fast trucks]. And as if to add to the odd fetish for calcualting machines, the post has also acquired a Cray-1 supercomputer at considerable cost, for, apparently, "modelling".

The telephony part of the postal service would also see significant changes. Most importantly, the monopoly on telephone services enjoyed by the post was... generously interpreted. Instead of focusing on delivering telephone services to every end-point, the post would focus on developing the backbone of coaxial connections that routed between Turkey's various cities and towns. It would then sell this access to private businessmen who were now free to establish "local" telephone networks within provinces--not that Turkey has a federal structure, but a special provision was left in the new post law for such localized services with the supposed intent of allowing local organizations the freedom to operate their own internal telephony. With the new system, telephone access exploded, as anyone with ready access to capital could borrow some cash, find some men to string wire, and order some Japanese telecommunications equipment and suddenly find themselves in possession of a lucrative local telephone monopoly. That the men who would take advantage of these provisions seemed to often be part of the MHP was no surprise--the party had always found its greatest support from the petite-bourgeiosie, and so they saw great profit from new telephone businesses and new postal servicing contracts--at least some of which, it seems, was kicked back to Turgut Ozal and the MHP at large, but that's a story for another day.

Historic Self-Determination Referendums Held by the Estado Novo Regime Establish a New Federative Order in Portuguese Africa

The Portuguese government has held a number of tightly controlled plebiscites throughout its main African possessions in a historic exercise of "autodeterminação," which represents a turning point in the political development of the Estado Novo's pluricontinental empire. With overwhelming mandates for autonomy within a reorganised "Federação dos Estados Lusófonos," the referendums in Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and São Tomé and Príncipe validated Prime Minister Adriano Moreira's reformist vision of a Portuguese self-governing Africa tailored to the post-colonial era.

The only country whose voters narrowly chose to pursue an independent path was tiny Guinea-Bissau. Although it was a symbolic loss, many believed that Bissau's apostasy was a prearranged result that Lisbon stage-managed to free itself from a consumptive insurrection while keeping the more important Cape Verdean archipelago. The redeployment of battle-hardened Bissau-Guinean contingents to the Angolan and Mozambican fronts aims to bolster Portugal's military edge ahead of any federative transition. To prevent any direct route to independence, the procedures and acceptable results of the referendums were tightly limited. While organised nationalist forces' participation was either prohibited or restricted through co-optation and amnesties, voting rolls were strictly limited to a small group of Portuguese citizens and assimilados. A constant barrage of propaganda portrayed the alternative as a plunge into communist-assisted anarchy while praising the civilisational advantages of Portugal's "enlightened" policies.

Despite the revolutionary tensions of the early 1970s, the federative breakthrough represents a bow to African self-determination and a historic change in Portugal's colonial position. Moreira has attempted to repackage Lisbon's civilising mission for a sceptical global stage by putting the ultramar's political destiny up for a popular writ, no matter how manufactured. His open support of autonomy seeks to protect Portugal's geopolitical and economic interests in Africa while stifling anti-colonial sentiment. In Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, guerrilla conflicts were smouldering but subdued while the referendums took place. At the expense of growing war fatigue at home, nationalist advances were mainly restrained by a combination of greater Africanisation, strategic hamlets, and psychological action.

Moreira used the plebiscitary wager as a preemptive tactic to take control of the political process and establish the parameters of any future decolonisation. By orchestrating an "act of free choice," he aimed to lock in a neo-imperial framework that would last beyond the Estado Novo while simultaneously projecting reformist momentum. It seems probable that the narrow 54% margin in Guinea-Bissau was designed to give Lisbon a way out of its most expensive campaign while also serving as a model for selective disengagement in other places. For the restless subordinate officers who were growing more and more frustrated with Marcelo Caetano's stubbornness, the Guinean outcome was also a sop. In order to avoid an anno-style collapse and satisfy the military, Moreira's move pledged a dignified extraction. The exercise's hollowness was revealed by Lisbon's overt interference and the PAIGC's exclusion from the ballot, but Moreira was prepared to pay such a price for a peaceful decolonisation on Portuguese terms.

Militarily, the transfer of seasoned Guinean fighters to the remaining fronts was touted as a force multiplier to pacify the Angolan east and Mozambique's Tete highlands ahead of federalisation. Given the PAIGC's Cape Verdean slant and ethnic tensions with the MPLA, mass defections were thought to be unlikely. In order to avoid upsetting its Guinean auxiliary forces, Lisbon promised to carry out any redeployments under an Africanised leadership. Resolving a long-standing grievance against an imperial estate perceived as two-tiered for indigenous people, the promise of Portuguese citizenship privileges for devoted Bissau-Guinean troops and their families further sweetened the bargain. The privilege of a negotiated withdrawal and a stake in the federative finale would transfer the burden of war on those confined to Portugal by the gradual demobilisation of the less trustworthy.

Under Lisbon's suzerainty, the new arrangement places Portugal in a position to unite a renovated empire based on an Angolan-Mozambican condominium. Moreira's redesigned ultramar envisions "New Brazils" bound by cultural affinities, economic complementarity, and a collaborationist elite that Portugal could work with amicably. Stabilising the Angolan and Mozambican hinterlands through strategic repression, psychological warfare, and infrastructural development is essential to the model's success.

The federative structure's economic foundation is the transformation of Angola and Mozambique into export-driven growth engines and the backbone of Lisbon's neo-mercantilist comeback. Portugal's economic supremacy and energy security depend on its ability to tap Angola's immense mineral and hydrocarbon resources. Using Mozambique's hydroelectric and agricultural potential, as demonstrated by large-scale projects like Cabora Bassa, to support the metropole's growth is also important.

A hearts and minds realignment that transforms subject peoples into appreciative members of a post-racial ecumene is the political foundation of the Lusophone agreement. It is Moreira's enduring hope that the devolutionary promise of selective assimilation and native statute will drain the nationalist swamp and bring a "New Portugal" to Africa. Cultural fusion and "colourblind" governance are Lusotropicalist tenets that will support a collaborationist system where Lisbon is still first among equals.

Referendum Results

女の匂い | Onna no nioi | Remodelling the Japanese Archipelago

^(September-October 1973, Tokyo, Japan)

“The archipelago must be transformed into a single economic zone through a network of transportation systems.” - Kakuei Tanaka, Forward ‘to the Japanese People’

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Remodelling the Japanese Archipelago

In the summer of 1973, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei published the paperback book Remodelling the Japanese Archipelago (Nippon Retto Kaizo-ron) [aka the Remodelling Plan]. Written in his signature conversational style, it has quickly become a bestseller, capturing public attention across Japan. The book laid out an ambitious regional planning vision aimed at tackling congestion and overcrowding in major industrial hubs like Tokyo and Osaka.

Far from mere political posturing, Tanaka's book was a strategic move to introduce perhaps the single most definitive policy position of Japan in the post war era, and by result define his premiership. By the late 1960s, industrial pollution and urban deterioration had become pressing national concerns, making the need for government intervention increasingly urgent. The Remodelling Plan promises to address these issues and has resonated widely, ensuring the book's rapid rise to bestseller list.

While the timing of its release was calculated, Remodelling the Japanese Archipelago was more than just propaganda—it was a serious effort to engage the public in a vision for regional planning and urban reform.

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Introduction

Government policy in Japan has historically been shaped by the leadership priorities of successive Prime Ministers. Over the past 15 years, each Prime Minister has emphasized a singular policy goal: Kishi focused on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (1957-1960), Ikeda championed the Income Doubling Plan (1960-1964), and Sato prioritized the reversion of Okinawa (1964-1972). This trend continues with Prime Minister Tanaka, who has centered his tenure on the Remodelling of the Japanese Archipelago.

Japan has experienced sustained population growth and urbanization since the 1880s. By 1940, the population had nearly doubled from 1880 levels, reaching 71 million, with half residing in urban areas. Post-war population growth peaked in 1948 before stabilizing due to legalized abortion and birth control policies. Since 1950, the population has grown at a moderated rate, increasing from 83 million to 107 million by 1972, making Japan the sixth most populous nation globally.

Rapid industrialisation from the mid-1950s accelerated urbanisation, with cities officially designated as "shi" containing 72 percent of the population by 1970. Eight major metropolitan areas, including Tokyo, Osaka, and Yokohama, accounted for a significant concentration of this urban population. Unlike Europe and North America, Japan’s industrialisation has resulted in extreme population density, with a land area comparable to California but hosting over half the population of the United States.

The scarcity of cultivable land has concentrated population and industry along the coastal plains, which constitute only one-sixth of Japan’s total area. Using the previous example, imagine half the United States living in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego. The Pacific Belt, from the Kanto Plain to northern Kyushu, has been the primary corridor for economic activity. The latest national development plan identifies this zone as housing 63 percent of the population and generating 84 percent of industrial output. Within this corridor, three major industrial regions—Keihin, Chukyo, and Hanshin—serve as economic hubs.

The Keihin region, centered on Tokyo and Yokohama, has seen particularly rapid post-war growth. Between 1950 and 1970, the population of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, and Chiba prefectures rose from 13 million to 24.2 million, while their share of national industrial output increased from 21.8 percent to 29.6 percent. These trends underscore the critical need for government policies that balance urban expansion with sustainable regional development.

The Need for Regional Planning in Japan 

Government policy addressing the social and economic challenges of industrial growth in Japan has been shaped by rapid economic expansion and acute land shortages. Intense competition for land in major industrial regions has led to severe congestion and high land prices, exacerbating urban planning issues.

Japanese cities, particularly Tokyo and Osaka, suffer from limited open spaces and insufficient public green space compared to Western counterparts. Road infrastructure occupies a smaller proportion of urban space, contributing to extreme traffic congestion. Additionally, escalating land prices have made municipal housing near city centers prohibitively expensive, further complicating urban development. The juxtaposition of residential areas and heavy industry has intensified environmental concerns. 

By 1970, factories in the Tokyo Bay area accounted for significant portions of Japan’s steel and refined oil production, contributing to severe atmospheric pollution. The heavy reliance on imported crude oil—providing 68 percent of Japan’s total energy supply in 1969—further exacerbated pollution levels. Local governments increasingly identified oil refineries and petrochemical complexes as primary sources of sulfur dioxide emissions, prompting policy shifts, including the Remodelling focus on nuclear energy as an alternative. Ideally by 1985 nuclear energy contributed up to 50% of energy needs, reducing oil and sulfer issues by as much as 20%.

The concentration of economic activity in the Pacific Belt has also led to rural depopulation. Migration from rural prefectures to industrial centers accelerated after 1955, with regions such as Kyushu, Shikoku, and Tohoku experiencing significant population declines. The economy of these outlying regions remained predominantly rural; for example, in 1970, only 17 percent of Kagoshima’s labor force was engaged in manufacturing, compared to 46 percent in Osaka and 40 percent in Tokyo.

Economic disparities between metropolitan and peripheral regions is persistent despite previous government attempts. In 1969, per capita prefectural income ranged from ¥260,000 in Kagoshima to ¥763,000 in Tokyo. These disparities highlight the need for targeted government policies to address regional imbalances. Measures are required to curb excessive urban growth, alleviate congestion and pollution, and promote industrial development in less populated regions. Strategic dispersal of industry and population through well-planned investment and incentives remains a critical policy objective for sustainable national development.

Regional planning since 1956 

Government policy regarding regional planning to control industrial zone expansion dates back to the Capital Region Development Act of 1956. Despite differences in population density and growth rates between Britain and Japan, Japanese planners used the Greater London Plan of 1944 as a model for Tokyo’s future development. They proposed a green belt surrounding the city and approximately 30 satellite towns intended to balance industrial growth. However, the green belt was never fully realized, and the new towns functioned primarily as commuter hubs lacking industrial and essential services. The Kinki Region Development Act of 1963 aimed to implement a similar plan for the Hanshin region, but it also fell short of expectations.

A more strategic phase of regional planning began with Prime Minister Ikeda’s Income Doubling Plan in 1960. While initially promoting industrial growth in the congested Pacific Belt, internal debate within the Liberal Democratic Party led to a revised strategy addressing regional economic imbalances. This resulted in the National Overall Development Plan of 1962, which categorized Japan into over-congested areas (Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Kitakyushu, and other Pacific Belt industrial zones), adjustment areas (central Honshu), and development areas (outer regions). Industrial expansion was restricted in congested zones, while adjustment areas were carefully regulated to prevent excessive growth. Development areas were incentivized through public investment and tax exemptions to promote industrialization.

Following this framework, the Income Doubling Plan established 15 'new industrial cities,' primarily in development areas, where local authorities are tasked with providing industrial sites and attracting businesses. However, these cities are struggling due to inadequate financial support from the previous administration. The financial burden on local authorities limited the effectiveness of the initiative, and the overall impact on industrial distribution remained minimal. Some successes, such as in south Okayama, were due to pre-existing industrial growth, while more remote locations, like Joban-Koriyama in Tohoku and Hyuga-Nobeoka in Kyushu, saw population declines despite their designation as industrial hubs.

In 1969, the government introduced the New Comprehensive National Development Plan, which laid the foundation for the ambitious goals of the Remodelling Plan. Here the policy emphasises the establishment of large industrial complexes in peripheral regions, expansion of transportation infrastructure, and urban renewal initiatives in industrialized cities. However, the 1969 plan was largely a high-level outline rather than a detailed policy framework. The Remodelling Plan seeks to provide the necessary specificity and depth to transform Japan’s regional development strategy into a comprehensive and actionable program.

The Tanaka Plan: Remodelling the Japanese Archipelago

Tanaka's book provides a detailed examination of the major costs of industrial growth. Accordingly it was in 1968, the year of the hundredth anniversary of the Meiji Restoration, that the advantages of concentrating industry and population in the large industrial regions began to be outweighed by the disadvantages. Future population growth in these areas is recognized as a major source for concern. The Remodelling Plan warns that if present trends are allowed to continue, the population of the Tokyo region will amount to 40 million by 1985. Four times the size of modern Shanghai, and larger than New York, LA, and Chicago combined. 

The Plan equally recogniwes that the prospects for atmospheric pollution are hugely alarming. According to a Ministry of International Trade and Industry report in 1970, the amount of sulphur dioxide released into the atmosphere in the Tokyo region during 1968 was equivalent to slightly over half a million tons of sulphur. On the basis of present trends, the Ministry forecasts this to rise to 1-4 million tons by 1975. According to the most optimistic estimate, application of devices to cut down the discharge of sulphur dioxide will reduce this amount by 20 per cent, but even these measures would still leave the equivalent of over one million tons of sulphur to be released into the atmosphere. 

The Plan describes a serious crisis in electricity supply that is rapidly approaching in the industrial regions. It points out that the widespread use of refrigerators and air conditioners has contributed towards a shift in the annual peak demand for elect from December to August, when power output from hydro-electricity generation is generally low. Moreover, the total annual demand for electricity in the big cities has been boosted by the construction of ultra-large office blocks. The consumption of electricity by the 36-storey Kasumigaseki building in central Tokyo, for instance, is equivalent to that of 16 000 ordinary houses. Nuclear energy is critical to offsetting the demand required which otherwise would be provided by pollutant oil. 

There is little likelihood of meeting the future increase in the demand for electricity on current plans (before the renewed plan in nuclear) and the construction of more thermal electric power stations in the existing industrial regions is necessary. Here the Plan details extensive nuclear energy investment as since 1968, many local authorities in industrial regions have prohibited building of oil-fired thermal electric power stations, which are now recognised to be major sources of sulphur dioxide pollution.

The Plan envisages that without immediate remedy traffic congestion is likely to worsen. It points out as regards the total number of insured motor vehicles, Japan in 1972 ranked second in the world, with a total of 21.1 million vehicles. Government surveys forecast an increase to 40 million vehicles in 1985. More than Europe and America combined, yet at present, Japan still lags far behind analogous Western countries in the provision of good roads.

In 1972, the length of motorway in use in Japan amounted to 709 km, in contrast with 4453 km in Germany, 3907 km in Italy, and 1938 km in France. The planadvises that congestion in Tokyo has rendered the city increasingly prone to serious damage in the event of a major earthquake. It also unusually provides commentary on the vulnerability of the extensive underground shopping malls as many have been built mainly in response to land shortage. 

Taking into account other factors such as soaring land prices, inadequacy of homes and labour shortage, the Plan concludes that the main industrial regions have reached a crisis point, and outlines a highly ambitious plan for the dispersal of industry to the provinces. Throughout the Plan, 1985 is taken as the target and a growth in Gross National Product of 10 per cent per annum, from 73 billion in 1970 to 304 billion in 1985. The plan aims to reduce industrial concentration in the Pacific Belt by as much as 10% in Kanto, 5% in Tokai, and 10% in Kinki. While increasing by 10% in Tohoku, and 6% in Kyushu and other regions by as much as 3-5%. 

Changes in industrial location will be achieved by two main approaches. Firstly large-scale complexes of heavy industry will be developed in the extremities of the country (Tomakomai [Hokkaido] and Mutsu-Ogawara [Northern Tohoku], the other three now (Akita [North-east Tohoku], Suo Bay [North Kyushu], and Shibushi Bay [South Kyushu]), to accommodate integrated iron and steel works, petroleum refineries, petro-chemical plants, nuclear power stations, and other large factories likely to cause heavy pollution. Not only are these locations remote from the main centres of population, but on the shores of bays which provide anchorages deep enough to accommodate tankers and bulk carriers of between 500 000 and 1 million tons, and the plan assumes the widespread use of such large vessels by the end of the next decade.

Plans for the development of these large industrial complexes are presented in the context of projected growth in demand for iron and steel, refined petroleum, and petrochemicals. Crude steel demand is expected to rise to 200 million tons by 1985, while demand for petroleum and petrochemicals is estimated at 15 million barrels and 17 million tons (ethylene equivalent), respectively (even with the planned replacement of energy needs with nuclear energy). 

The Japanese steel industry estimates that further modernisation will allow a maximum output of 160 million tons from existing steelworks. Within the next decade, Remodelling argues, it should be possible to build steel plants capable of producing 20 million tons of crude steel annually. Thus, the gap between the maximum output from existing plants and the estimated demand for 1985 can be met by constructing two large steel-producing centers. Similar arguments justify the construction of five large oil refineries and five ethylene production centers to meet the 1985 demand for petroleum and petrochemical products.

Beyond these five massive coastal complexes, a network of over 80 smaller industrial estates ( over 100 hectares) will be established in inland provinces. These estates will be carefully planned to preserve green spaces and avoid overcrowding, and they will host labor-intensive, non-polluting industries such as electrical machinery, light engineering, automobile manufacturing, consumer goods production, and others. Many of these estates will be strategically located near motorway interchanges and railway freight terminals to optimise logistics. 

The success of this new industrial distribution model hinges on a complete modernization and expansion of Japan’s transportation infrastructure. The second part of the Remodelling plan outlines the single largest global construction in history of extensive network motorways, high-speed railways (shinkansen), and oil pipelines to be established by 1985. Make no mistake, this project is nation building on a scale unseen in human history. 

The Arteries of Tokyo: Railway, Motorways, Energy lines

The shinkansen network will be extended to 9,000 km, while motorways and electricity/oil lines will reach 10,000 km and 7,500 km, respectively. Shinkansen trains will be upgraded with linear motors capable of speeds up to 500 km per hour. A first in human history and unrivalled in capacity, speed, safety, or design by any nation on earth for the next 50 years. Additionally, ordinary Japanese National Railway lines will undergo extensive modernisation, including electrification and track expansion. Tokyo itself will see its metro lines expanded by some 500km to outer housing cities. Meanwhile, in rural areas, rail services on unprofitable branch lines will be maintained by the state to support the decentralisation of industry. 

The expansion of the motorway network is also seen as a key tool for redistributing industrial activity, with the Meishin Motorway (Kobe to Nagoya) as an example. Since its completion in 1964, the town of Ritto-machi in Shiga Prefecture has grown from having no manufacturing industry to hosting 200 factories, demonstrating the transformative power of infrastructure investment. Tokyo to Sendai, Nagoya to Izu, Osaka to Kitakushu, and Sendai to Morioka are just a new examples of East Coast motorways to be constructed, while down the West Coast Kanazawa-Obama-Kitakyushu will be the exemplar construction.

The plan also aims to open up previously neglected regions of Japan. Shikoku, for example, will undergo a dramatic transformation with the construction of three island-hopping bridges across the Inland Sea, linking it to Honshu. These bridges will carry roads, railways, and pipelines for oil and water. The Yoshino River, Shikoku’s only abundant freshwater source, will be tapped by aqueducts supplying the dry Sanuki Plain in the island’s north. Meanwhile, deep-water bays such as Tachibana Bay and Sukumo Bay will be developed into anchorages for giant oil tankers. These sites will host oil storage depots that will supply local refineries and feed pipelines carrying oil and energy to industrial centers in northern Shikoku and Honshu. This will eliminate the need for giant tankers to navigate the congested Inland Sea. 

Oil pipelines are given particular attention in the plan, as Japan lags far behind the United States and Western Europe in this area. While the U.S. and Europe had 228,000 km and 15,000 km of pipelines in operation in 1969, Japan had less than 100 km. By 1985, energy lines/oil pipelines are expected to transport 40% of Japan’s oil and energy related products.

The plan puts forward the creation of several new cities in the provinces, each with a population of approximately 250,000. Unlike Japan’s existing new towns (focused on housing) these cities will serve as industrial, cultural, and administrative hubs. Computer links with Tokyo will ensure they remain integrated with the national economy. Many of these cities will be associated with the planned industrial estates, and they will be developed by expanding existing small cities or merging adjacent rural municipalities into new urban centers.

In Japan’s major metropolitan areas, the plan calls for extensive urban renewal projects. This is particularly emphasised through allowing (even mandating) more high-rise construction to maximize land use and create more space for public amenities. In Tokyo and Osaka proper, legislation is planned for a minimum building height, prohibiting construction below seven stories. Here the Plan sets out renovations to Showa Kinen Park, Akatsuka Park, Hikarigaoka Park, Komaba Park, and the famous Yoyogi Park which will all increase by at least 30%. Yoyogi Park in particular will receive massive upgrades and land reclamation, increasing its current size of 134 acres to match Central Park in New York of 843 acres (though not contiguous). This will be achieved with a joining through underground tunnels, and procurement of space around existing constructions. 

Financing the Remodelling

The financial requirements of the plan are immense, and necessitate significant government tax reform, spending, and central bank borrowing. Taxation reform is highlighted as a key funding mechanism, both to raise revenue and to encourage the decentralization of industry. In 1970, Japan’s tax revenue amounted to only 20% of national income, compared to 30% in the U.S. and 40% in Britain. The first step to implementation is to progressively elevate taxation to 25% by 1980, and 27% by 1985. Additionally, corporate taxation policies require modification and the existing surcharge of 1-5% on corporate tax on companies in major metropolitan areas will be lifted to 4-7% with the top 50 companies by profit in Tokyo captured in a novel 10% bracket. Companies willing to relocate to outer regions will be offered incentives such as long-term municipal tax exemptions, depreciation allowances, and investment grants. Local governments will be reimbursed by the central government for the cost of these inducements. To fund infrastructure development, the plan also includes a vehicle tax, which will finance road and railway construction and help reduce road congestion by discouraging excessive use of heavy commercial vehicles.

The “heavy industrial zones” Tomakomai [Hokkaido] and Mutsu-Ogawara [Northern Tohoku], the other three now (Akita [North-east Tohoku], Suo Bay [North Kyushu], and Shibushi Bay [South Kyushu] will be nominated Special Economic Zones. Here, specialised tax will be applied limiting by up to 5% corporate tax on profit (essentially nullifying the increase), and removing entirely the cost of local mass transport - until 1999. These regions will also see reduced public service costs, including registration, health, automobile, family, pension, ect. 

In combination, the construction of rail, motorways, energy, and other development initiatives through the Remodelling is the single most expensive government policy ever devised in Japan - perhaps worldwide. Massive infrastructure investment, industrial decentralization, and urban renewal combine to generate a long-term cost that dwarfs all but the reconstruction effort after the conclusion of WW2 (maybe $56 billion between 1946-1966). In total the Remodelling Plan was expected to require at least ¥10 trillion (about $33 billion USD) in government spending. Following publication, some private projections suggest that total public and private investment could reach ¥50-60 trillion ($165-200 billion USD) over the long term (that is up to 1985). It will be up to the newly formed Remodelling Agency of Japan under the newly appointed Special Minister Junichiro Koizumi to manage the costs. 

The Political and Economic Context of the Plan

The Remoddeling’s emphasis on regional planning is closely linked to Japan’s evolving political landscape. Since 1968, urban voters and students have become increasingly critical of government policies that prioritize economic growth over social welfare. Local elections in major cities have frequently revolved around issues such as pollution and inadequate housing. An unusual coalition of protest voters, students and the rural communities have begun to align with the Communist and Socialist Parties, particularly in line with normalisation with the PRC; and now call for normalisation with the Soviet Union. The election of socialist Minobe Ryokichi as governor of Tokyo, who campaigned with the slogan "Give Tokyo back its blue skies," underscores the public’s frustration. Many urban local governments are now controlled by opposition parties, and the growing success of the Japanese Socialist Party and the Japanese Communist Party in national elections reflects a broader dissatisfaction with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s economic policies.

Rural voters have traditionally been the backbone of Liberal Democratic Party support, largely due to generous government subsidies for agriculture—particularly rice production. However, mounting rice surpluses since 1969 have forced the government to stabilize rice prices despite resistance from farmers. Facing potential erosion of its rural base, the LDP must appeal to urban voters by addressing environmental and housing concerns. The remodelling plan, with its promise of improved living conditions, can be seen as a strategic response to these political pressures.

From an economic perspective, the plan aligns with Japan’s need for new growth strategies. Increasing trade restrictions in the U.S. and Europe threaten Japanese exports, making domestic economic stimulation an attractive alternative - a true pivot off export growth, and towards domestic consumption. Furthermore, decentralizing industry should alleviate chronic labor shortages in major metropolitan areas, where high land prices, traffic congestion, and energy constraints hamper expansion. Thus embracing the Remodelling Plan through a whole of government approach, and with strong tax, investment, and other financial means is critical to encouraging businesses to come on board.

Potential Challenges

Despite its ambitious goals, the plan recognises significant obstacles. Japanese industry is highly reliant on extensive subcontracting networks, which would incur massive costs if relocated to outer regions. Additionally, local resistance to industrial development has emerged in areas like Shibushi Bay and Tachibana Bay, where communities fear pollution without corresponding job opportunities. Land speculation has also been a major issue, with real estate firms driving up land prices along proposed transport routes. 

To combat these issues the plan puts forth three key managements. Firstly, through the Ministry of Industry, smaller firms are given priority in connection to larger firms for reforming or managing supply chain issues. Secondly, Special Economic Zones form a ‘phase 2’ of tax policy in high performing or highly alluring new industrial cities to manage the imposition of tax, and increase job opportunities. Thirdly, the central government, in concert with local government, has quietly undertaken a land reclamation policy, similar to the post war period and began to acquire large tracts of land to facilitate industrial move and transport development. 

Conclusion

Implementation of the remodelling Plan has been slow until now; with the publication of the formal position, it commences actual positions. With two of five planned heavy industrial complexes in outer regions underway already, Tomakomai [Hokkaido] and Mutsu-Ogawara [Northern Tohoku], the other three now (Akita [North-east Tohoku], Suo Bay [North Kyushu], and Shibushi Bay [South Kyushu] begin real development. The Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industry, and Ministry of Construction are to form a joint task force called the Remodelling Agency of Japan under the newly appointed Special Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Here the new Agency will manage the enormous cost of implementing the plan, and work to ensure the cost does not exceed even Japan’s formidable economic capacity. However, whether or not the plan is fully realized, it marks a turning point in Japan’s postwar development and represents a serious attempt to address the challenges of excessive congestion in the Pacific Belt.

----

Summary

The Tanaka Plan: aka formally the Remodelling of the Japanese Archipelago is entirely OTL. Kakuei OTL launched it in 1972 as part of his campaign to get elected, ITL he launched it retrospectively in 1973 as a policy position - it is already underway. OTL the plan is cut short by his resignation in 1974. 

Tanaka’s Plan examines the costs of Japan’s industrial growth, when urban congestion and pollution outweighed economic benefits. The Remodelling Plan warns that, if unchecked, Tokyo’s population could reach 40 million by 1985, worsening pollution and energy shortages. Sulphur dioxide emissions were projected to rise sharply, necessitating nuclear power expansion to reduce reliance on polluting oil-fired plants.

The plan highlights worsening traffic congestion, with vehicle numbers expected to double by 1985, while Japan lagged in motorway infrastructure. Tokyo’s vulnerability to earthquakes, soaring land prices, and housing shortages signaled a crisis, prompting an ambitious decentralization strategy. This included shifting heavy industry to remote coastal sites and establishing over 80 inland industrial estates focused on cleaner industries.

Infrastructure investments were central, with plans for 9,000 km of Shinkansen, 10,000 km of motorways, and 7,500 km of oil pipelines. New provincial cities were to be created, integrating industrial, cultural, and administrative functions.

The plan’s cost was immense, requiring at least ¥10 trillion ($33 billion USD) in government spending, with private and public investments potentially reaching ¥50-60 trillion ($165-200 billion USD). Financing relied on tax reforms, progressively raising taxation from 20% to 27% of national income, corporate tax adjustments, and special economic zones with tax breaks. Infrastructure projects were also funded through a vehicle tax and government borrowing. A new agency responsible for financing and government coordination will be led by Koizumi Junichiro.

Sources

• Sargent John, Remodelling the Japanese Archipelago: The Tanaka Plan, 1973, The Geographic Journal
• Taro Tsuda, High Modernism and Populism in Post-War Japan: Tanaka Kakuei’s Plan for Remodelling the Japanese Archipelago, 2021, Meiji University
• Burks Ardath, Building a New Japan: A Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago, 1976
• And a bunch of my own homework essays I wrote for my masters degree in public policy.

Following the initiation of high intensity conflict in the immediate vicinity of Anatolia, the General Staff has, with the support of PM Ecevit, begun moving the 19th Infantry Brigade and the 28th Mechanized Infantry Brigade towards Iskenderun and Sanliurfa, respectively, while the 3rd Infantry Division and the 172nd Armored Brigade have initiated field exercises out of Diyarbakir towards Mardin. In addition, all leave has been suspended across the Turkish armed forces, and a select number of reservists, principally pilots and in aircraft maintenance, have been recalled to service for a temporary period of time.

This redeployment has aroused curiosity and outright condemnation on the part of the minority partner in the governing coalition, the conservative Islamist MHP, which views it as potentially aiding the Zionists in their war, but Ecevit has stressed in public pronouncements that the deployment is motivated by an ambiguous "external threat" implied, but not openly stated to be, the Soviet Union, in coordination with its vital ally in Damascus.

July 1973

With the extensive additions of encryption and decryption tools, as well as additional support from CID and Stasi, the great reformation plan is underway, mainly to address the agency's problems on improving operational effectiveness and ensuring better oversight (partly by purging hardliners). It is important to note, however, that Stasi's involvement is mainly on replacing the outdated equipment and retraining the agents to the levels of newer equipment, whereas CID will handle the international co-operation intelligence sharing and the reformation of "cultural ethics".

That is, implementing the political training of replacing unruly members (purge, for the lack of better words). The purged members are hardliners or those who resist or opposed the state's subtle alignment with the Chinese...and the other non-Communist nations like Japan and France. In place are new recruited agents, or moderates from NLF. It might dent the agency, but it will recovers and improves later on. Key sectors to improvement placed on workforce training, internal authority, and field training.

On the orders of the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the Commander-in-Chief and Marshal of Yugoslavia, the following redeployments of the Yugoslav People's Army have been made:

Elements of the 1st Military Oblast (Belgrade), have been deployed as follows:

-3rd Guard Mechanized Brigade from Belgrade to Leskovac -1st Guard Motorized Brigade from Belgrade to Sokobanja -22nd Infantry Division from Belgrade to Skopje

Elements of the 3rd Military Oblast (Skopje), have been redeployed as follows:

-2nd Corps from Titograd to Tetovo -37th Motorized Division to Titograd

Elements of the 5th Military Oblast (Zagreb) have been redeployed as follows:

-6th Proletarian Infantry Division to Virovitica

The military formations previously stationed near the Yugoslav-Albanian border have been ordered to return to their barracks as the scheduled military exercise has concluded.

The Great Purge and The Great Return

The Battle of Jars exposes the deep structural weaknesses of the Royal Thai Army (RTA)—outdated tactics, rigid command structures, and an inability to adapt to modern warfare. The Thai forces are outmaneuvered, outgunned, and ultimately humiliated on the battlefield. The defeat is not just a tactical failure; it is a national disgrace.

Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn refuses to accept another loss. Furious at the incompetence that led to this disaster, he enacts “The Great Return”—a radical military reform designed to strip the army of its weaknesses and forge it into a modern war machine.

Many within the government and military are shocked by the severity of his actions. Some fear that the rapid restructuring will destabilize the army, while others question whether such drastic measures are even possible. But Thanom is resolute—Thailand will not falter again.

I. The Purge of the Officer Corps

The Battle of Jars makes one fact clear: the officer corps is failing. Officers are too rigid in their tactics, blindly following orders instead of adapting to battlefield conditions. Initiative is rare, and incompetence is rampant. This cannot continue.

1. Mandatory Officer Retraining

All officers below the rank of Colonel must return to training academies for an intensive one-month course designed to break old habits and teach modern warfare. This course is not a refresher—it is a complete re-education in combat leadership.

The training is physically and mentally grueling. Officers wake at 0400 hours every day, beginning with a 10-kilometer march in full combat gear to simulate battlefield endurance. Classroom sessions follow, where military strategists and foreign advisors introduce the latest doctrines in maneuver warfare, counterinsurgency, and urban combat.

Afternoons are dedicated to practical exercises: • Live-fire drills force officers to direct squads under simulated battlefield conditions. • Urban combat scenarios teach house-to-house fighting techniques, using mock villages built specifically for training. • Jungle warfare exercises push officers to navigate dense terrain, set ambushes, and coordinate attacks without clear lines of sight.

Every mistake is scrutinized. Tactical errors result in immediate correction—often in the form of forced repetition of exercises until mastery is achieved.

2. The Final Examination

Graduation from the retraining program is not guaranteed. Officers must pass a two-part examination before they are reinstated: 1. The Written Exam – Held at the Royal Thai Army Headquarters, this test is designed to separate the competent from the unfit. Officers must score in the 80th percentile or higher to pass. Questions cover everything from logistics and unit coordination to real-world tactical case studies, forcing officers to think critically. 2. The Wargame Simulation – Officers who pass the written exam must then prove their leadership skills in a combat simulation. They are given command of a unit and must compete against one another in a series of war games. • The tournament structure ensures that only the most capable rise to the top. • Officers who reach the quarter-finals, semi-finals, and finals receive commendations and priority promotion opportunities. • Those in the lower bracket must either request a second evaluation or accept an honorable discharge.

This process ensures that only the most skilled officers remain in the Thai military. No longer will seniority be the sole path to advancement—leadership and competence now decide rank.

II. The Restructuring of the Army

The defeat at Jars proves that Thailand’s infantry-centric army is obsolete. Infantry alone cannot hold ground against mechanized forces, break through enemy lines, or coordinate large-scale offensives. The new doctrine mandates a shift toward combined-arms warfare, integrating armor, artillery, engineers, and logistics into every formation.

1. The New Order of Battle

The army undergoes a complete structural reorganization, redefining the roles of its fighting units:

Squad (10 Men) – The Basic Fighting Unit

Each squad is now designed for versatility and firepower. • 6 Riflemen – Carrying M16 rifles, trained in close-quarters and long-range engagement. • 2 Grenadiers – Armed with M79 grenade launchers to provide explosive support. • 1 Automatic Rifleman – Equipped with an M60 machine gun, serving as the squad’s suppressive fire element. • 1 Recon Radioman – Responsible for battlefield communication and forward scouting. • 1 Squad Leader (LCPL or CPL) – Leads the unit in combat. • 1 NCO – Provides additional tactical guidance.

Squads train extensively in maneuver warfare, learning how to rapidly reposition, suppress enemies, and call in artillery support when needed.

Battalion (2,500 Men) – The Core Combat Formation

Each battalion now operates as an independent warfighting unit, capable of sustained combat. • 5 Sections (500 men each). • HQ Unit led by a Captain and a Major. • 5 Artillery Batteries (25 Guns) for direct fire support. • 1 Armored Detachment (25 Tanks) to spearhead assaults.

Every battalion undergoes joint exercises with armor and artillery units, ensuring that infantry, tanks, and fire support work seamlessly together.

III. Mandatory Combat Certification Policy

The Royal Thai Army can no longer afford to have untested formations. A new combat certification policy states:

“No military unit shall be recognized as an official formation of the Royal Thai Army until it has engaged in real combat in at least one theater of war.”

This policy forces the army to maintain a state of constant readiness. No unit is merely ceremonial—every formation must prove itself in battle.

IV. The Transformation of Basic Training

The average Thai soldier is no longer just a conscript trained for a few months and sent into combat. The new basic training program is designed to produce hardened, professional warriors.

1. Physical and Mental Conditioning

Recruits wake at 0430 hours every morning, beginning with: • 15-kilometer endurance runs while carrying full gear. • Obstacle courses designed to simulate battlefield conditions, including trenches, barbed wire, and urban structures. • Hand-to-hand combat training in Krabi-Krabong (Thai sword fighting) and modern close-quarters combat.

2. Weapons Training • Recruits fire live rounds daily from rifles, grenade launchers, and machine guns. • Combat drills teach rapid target acquisition, cover-and-move tactics, and fire discipline. • Live-fire exercises require recruits to advance under fire, coordinating with teammates.

3. Tactical Training • Recruits undergo jungle warfare training, learning how to ambush, evade, and track enemies in dense terrain. • Urban combat scenarios simulate clearing buildings, suppressing hostiles, and coordinating with armored support. • Night operations training teaches recruits to fight in low-visibility conditions, relying on stealth and coordination.

Graduation from basic training is not automatic. Every recruit must pass a final combat test—a multi-day war simulation where they must operate under constant pressure, exhaustion, and enemy engagement. Only those who complete the test without failure earn the right to be called soldiers.

A New Army for a New Era

The Royal Thai Army will no longer be a weak, outdated force. The Great Purge ensures that only the strongest officers remain. The Great Return transforms it into a modern, professional military—one that is battle-ready, strategically capable, and prepared to defend Thailand at all costs.

The next time Thailand fights, it will not lose.

#Whitlam vs Fraser, Question Time

###Parliament Buildings, Capital Hill, Canberra

October 1973

Malcolm Fraser (Leader of the Opposition). Mr. Speaker, this government’s inaction during the Yom Kippur War is not just a matter of indifference; it is a grave failure of leadership and responsibility. In a time of crisis, when Israel faced an existential threat, the Whitlam government has stood by, failing to assert Australia's unwavering support for one of our closest allies.

It is deeply troubling that the Prime Minister and his foreign ministers have refused to unequivocally back Israel in its struggle for survival. They have failed to make any meaningful statements condemning the aggression from the Arab states. Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister’s refusal to stand with Israel in this critical moment is not only a betrayal of an ally but a betrayal of our own national values of democracy and freedom.

Gough Whitlam (Prime Minister). Mr. Speaker, let me make one thing absolutely clear: Australia’s position on the Yom Kippur War is one of neutrality, not complicity, and certainly not inaction. The war we are discussing is not merely a conflict between Israel and its neighbours; it is a war of Arab nations seeking their rightful independence. The Arab states involved in this conflict, particularly Egypt and Syria, are not simply aggressors—they are asserting their territorial rights, rights that have been denied for far too long.

To paint this war as one of unprovoked Israeli defense ignores the larger historical context. Israel’s occupation of territories beyond its borders is a matter of international concern, and as a responsible member of the international community, Australia must be measured and fair in its approach. My government refuses to be drawn into a one-sided advocacy for Israel when the true picture is far more complex.

Malcolm Fraser:. Prime Minister, your position is one of moral equivalence. To compare Israel, a democracy, fighting for its very survival, to the totalitarian regimes that have attacked it is simply wrong. The Israeli people do not seek to dominate their Arab neighbours; they seek peace and security, and your failure to support their right to exist is a profound misstep.

Moreover, your government has shown little regard for the tragic human cost of this war on the Israeli people. By failing to act, by failing to advocate for Israel's right to defend itself, you give comfort to those who wish to see Israel destroyed. Your silence on this matter is deafening, and it sends a signal that Australia is not a reliable ally of those who share our values of freedom and democracy.

Gough Whitlam: The Leader of the Opposition may choose to simplify this issue into a binary of good versus evil, but this is not the reality we face. Yes, Israel is a democracy, but it is not without responsibility in this conflict. My government believes that the path to peace must involve recognition of both Israeli and Arab rights. A true lasting peace can only come through a resolution of the territorial disputes that have been at the heart of this conflict for decades.

We should not, and we will not, take a position that ignores the rights of the Arab peoples seeking justice and recognition. The Arab world, particularly Egypt and Syria, has long sought to regain the land that was taken from them, and it is not Australia's role to align blindly with one side when both sides are responsible for the war. We must call for peace, for negotiations, not for the perpetuation of violence.

Malcolm Fraser: Prime Minister, your rhetoric may sound measured, but it is precisely this stance that emboldens Israel’s enemies. By refusing to voice support for Israel at this critical juncture, you leave Australia without a clear moral compass in this conflict.

The Israeli people, under constant threat of annihilation, deserve more than a hollow call for negotiations. They deserve the unequivocal support of democratic nations like ours. You have failed to deliver that, and in doing so, you have forsaken the responsibility that Australia has to its allies in times of crisis. Your government has failed to act in the face of aggression. History will judge you harshly for it.

Gough Whitlam: Mr. Speaker, I reject the argument that moral clarity can only be achieved through unconditional support for one side in this conflict. It is the role of Australia to advocate for a just peace, one that respects the rights of both the Israeli and Arab peoples. My government’s policy is clear: we are for peace, we are for negotiations, and we are for a future in which both peoples can live side by side in security and dignity.

Australia will not be swayed by simplistic calls for blanket support of one side or the other. We must be guided by the principles of justice, equality, and peace—principles that require us to consider all aspects of this war, not just the interests of one party.

Malcolm Fraser: You may call it peace, Prime Minister, but your stance only prolongs the suffering. The time for neutrality is over. We must stand firm, stand with Israel, and stand for the values that we, as a nation, hold dear. Anything less is a betrayal.

Gough Whitlam: Mr. Speaker, I will continue to advocate for peace, not for the endorsement of war. That is the stance of this government, and it will not be swayed by partisan rhetoric.

Australia refuses to state a position condemning any party in the Yom Kippur War, establishing a rigid Doctrine of Neutrality with regard to the conflict

##Readopting Soviet Ranks and Doctrine

###Defense-in-Depth and the Fortress Albania

Особой важности!

!Minister of Defense, Beqir Balluku, has been peeved at Hoxha for years for the needless spending on randomly placed concrete and steel bunkers across the country, eating away at the national defense budget. The bunker program resources could have better been used by the armed forces on education, training, or re-spent by the Central Committee on societal needs. Although the bunkerisation program has been a massive waste, there is some merit to the program- the bunkers were scattered randomly, but some small networks were created in the Albanian highlands. Under Hoxha's 'people war' doctrine, Albanian forces would, albeit in an unorganized way, defend the mountains and hills with partisan warfare and once the enemy could no longer attack in the hills, the Albanian forces would counter-attack. Balluku is proposing that the bunkerisation project is gutted and replaced with a limited layered tunnel and network bunkerization project in the highlands along the Yugoslav border, and key points along the coast. Rather than individual bunkers, the bunkers will be built as several tunnel and bunker combination networks in the highlands, and shore where the most focus of defensive forces will be in the event an invasion occurs. With a network of strategically placed fortifications and tunnel-bunker systems along the border, rather than individually placed bunkers in their thousands, the new bunker strategy will draw less resources, but allow for plug-and-play with the adoption of a defense-in-depth doctrine for national defense.!<

!This new adaptation of the existing policy supports the unchanged primary goal of Albania, which is defense the Albanian motherland, rather than offense. Unlike the Soviet Union, Albania has no territory that it can sacrifice given its size, every inch of territory must be held for as long as possible, and the enemy will pay for every inch. Furthermore, this continues to confirm the prevailing mood of Albanian military leadership, and political leadership, that if any invasion comes- it is most likely going to come from the sea, or from Yugoslavia. Ultimately, the goal of the Albanian Armed Forces is to inflict as many casualties as possible for rugged territory, and delay capturing of cities long enough for the Soviet Union to deploy additional troops or launch a counter-attack on the invader.!<

###Bringing Back the Soviet Rank Structure to Albania

Ranks for the Armed Forces

When Hoxha adopted the 'People's War' doctrine, he truly meant it. Much to the ire of most of the General Staff, Hoxha gutted the rank structure in Albania. Most officers were removed, and what officers there were, had little control over their units and missions. The purpose was to make tactical decisions at a lower level. While this worked quite well in Albania's partisan era, there are not exactly hordes of Albanians that Balluku can send at the enemy to solve the problem, like perhaps our former Chinese compatriots, or Stalin's Red Army. To preserve Albania's manpower, each unit must be trained, each rank must have responsibilities, and hierarchy must be deferred to so that planned missions from the top can be implemented. Balluku has ordered the 'people's war' doctrine, and the rankless-structure to be axed, and has implemented a full-return of the Soviet rank structure. This system existed prior to the Soviet-Albanian split, Balluku has just returned the old system, and made minor updates to the rank structure that the Soviet Union has changed since then. All rank titles are in Albanian, and Russian- more on that momentarily. Where there isn't an exact equivalent structure in the Armed Forces, the rank will go to the most similar structure- for example KGB ranks will go to Sigurimi units. Balluku has made this change for two reasons. First, he wanted to return Albania to an era of better organization, preparedness, and communication, where leadership was able to actually plan and direct outcomes. Second, Albania aspires to Warsaw membership one-day, and the rank system must be in near-privity with the Soviet system to minimize any misunderstandings.

Political Commissars

The Albanian Armed Forces never got rid of political commissars. In fact, political commissars will remain in the new armed forces. The role of political commissars will be reduced from leading peasant units- being essentially ungovernable by officers- whereas now they will only hold morale-boosting and political education and motivation roles. The commissars will carry no power to command troops in battle, and will not have seniority in battle. The Soviet Union decided it wasn't working for them years ago and downgraded their commissars to mostly political and morale related responsibilities, and Albania will do the same.

###Integrating Albania into the Soviet Doctrine

Albanian Active Measures

Особой важности!

!Albanians have been fighting guerilla wars essentially for their entire history. As Albania makes its way into the proper Eastern bloc, the Sigurimi and the Ministry of Defense are exploring ways in which Albania can adopt an 'Active Measures' policy to buttress the Soviet's 'Active Measures'. To some extent Romania, and to a much larger extent- D.D.R. has already determined where and how they will get involved abroad to support Active Measures. Perhaps the greatest display of Active Measures support is from Cuba, who has taken upon itself the mandate of interventionism in fighting against global imperialism- a most noble cause. The Sigurimi will begin sending agents to the Andropov Institute to be trained in guerilla warfare, guerilla warfare instruction, and military advisory- these agents will eventually make up a 'Sigurimi Spetsnaz'- an Albanian take on the Spetsnaz organization. As an Albanian unit of elite military trainers and fighters is ready, Albania can deploy it as requested or needed abroad to support the Soviet policy, Active Measures.!<

Russian Language Institute and Russian-language forces

If Albania is to ever truly ascend to the Warsaw Treaty, it's troops must be able to interact with their Soviet and Warsaw contemporaries. Speaking Albanian is not going to be particularly helpful when coordinating. The Ministry of Defense is establishing the Russian Language Institute to address this issue. The Russian Language Institute is an academy of Russian-language instructors for the Albanian Armed Forces, where officers and enlisted are taught Russian in classes and by immersion when brought into the Armed Forces. Similar to the French Legionnaire program, Albanian recruits and officers alike will be rigorously trained in Russian, where they will learn how to use operational Russian within 4 months. Instructors from the Russian Language Institute will teach Russian classes, and convert all military and intelligence instruction manuals, policies, regulations, rules, media, and intelligence into Russian. They will be responsible for translation of existing material from Albanian to Russian, editing and revising material improperly created in Russian, and training the Armed Forces and Sigurimi to proficiency in Russian. The Sigurimi, and the Albanian Armed Forces will be instituting a policy of 'langage de guerre,' (Language of War), where the new official language of the Albanian Armed Forces and Sigurimi will be Russian. While on official duties, Russian is to be the only language used, until they are given leave or are off duty. For recruits or those in training, they will not even be allowed to use Albanian while off duty-to promote comprehensive growth. The question may be raised- how will the existing military be trained? The answer is- they have to be fully retrained anyway, including the officer, almost two decades of eccentric misguided training and policy- so the soldiers will be taught Russian just as any new recruit would. The aim is to create an Armed Forces that can integrate without any difficulty with their Russian comrades, so that they may fight successfully together. Moreover, all signs on bases will be written in Albanian and Russian. The Russian Language Institute will also be responsible for creating the official Russian-language national map, which translates all of Albania's cities and roadways into Russian- for military planning purposes.

Central Africa 1973

Within Japan recent reports have come out of the country that they are seeking to expand uranium power plants within the country and looking for sources of uranium, Mitsubishi, not wishing to allow Sumitomo Mining to take full control of mining operations in central Africa has opted to build off the Sumitomo & national Japanese investments in central Africa additionally given urging from the national development plan and its need for uranium ore Mitsubishi has decided to take on the gargantuan task of tapping into central African uranium reserves.  

Building a path 

Uranium Ore deposits can be majority found in the Bakouma region of central Africa, some 250 kilometers from the currently being developed river port of Kemba or 300 kilometers from the mining town of Ippy, HOWEVER, two issues present themselves, namely no paved roads exist to the area and of the dirt roads leading to the bakouma region the ippy one uses an incredible roundabout that adds some 290 kilometers to the journey. So Mitsubishi has taken on the task of effectively updating its own path to the bakouma region to allow for further mining

Now, constructing a 250 kilometer paved road in the middle of the jungle is no easy feat, and not one that Mitsubishi can just financially back for the chance to prospect uranium. Yet, all hope is not lost for the Kemba-Bakouma road exists, which while a dirt road is a good basis to build off of being some 283 kilometers Mitsubishi has opted to invest some 950,000$ to turn the dirt road of Kemba-Bakouma into a gravel road to allow for trucks and heavy equipment to move much more easily on the road. 

This project should be easily completed by end of 1974, however the road is still lightly usable for the time being will be the first major region for a company to use the new Kemba River port being built within Central Africa.

Surveying the Region

The Bakouma region is estimated to have 30,000 Tons of uranium ore deposits throughout it mitsubishi surveyors have been flown into the country and tasked with finding suitable places to setup open pit mines near the Bakouma region that could yield uranium ore. Surveying should take about 6 months which also gives time for Mitsubishi to begin setting up the roads for proper use and transporting equipment to the region. 

Setting up the first mines

Unlike with gold prospecting there is no local artisan mining of uranium, this is entirely untapped potential within Central africa that the japanese will be dealing with, to this end a small pit mine some 15 acres in size will be the first step to extracting uranium ore. Bringing in drills, excavators, bulldozers, and other such heavy machinery they should be capable of mining much of it for the time being using small amounts of manpower.

A small Pit mine staffed by Mitsubishi power equipment operators and a few central african laborers for use of shovels. Following similar standards outlined by the sumitomo mining co whilst taking in mind that uranium mining carries with it a stigma comparatively to gold mining due to the nature of uranium. 45 Japanese will be brought in to manage, supervise, and operate the heavy and advanced machinery. Given the language barrier Japanese translators who can speak French will be brought into the country, then they will work with Central African translators who speak French to further translate to Sango for those who aren’t fluent or good with French.

Additional 10 Central Africans will be given the opportunity to attend in country training by the Mitsubshi Mining Co on how to operate heavy machinery, use modern survey techniques, and work with modern drills to facilitate further expansion of operations.

The Japanese will be given typical Japanese wages + additional “hazard pay” of 35% extra for the market rate going in Japan for this field while Central Africans who are regular miners will be given a daily pay of 0.42 cents a substantial increase from the average annual wage in the country. While the Central Africans given heavy equipment training will be paid a wage of 0.79 cents a day a huge wage for the region over double the annual pay of a normal citizen.

To this end some 60 native central africans will be hired to perform the mining by hand with picks and shovels or hammers 

1973 will see this operation getting off the ground with likely little in the ways of actual noticeable extracting of materials. 

1974 will hopefully see some 50 tons of uranium ore extracted, this is a testing ground and will be used to prove that uranium can be extracted in larger quantities throughout the region

1975 with success in 1974 mining expanded from the small 15 acre mining venture to cover a 100-acre area looking to have production for 1975 be 150 ton. Additionally, staffing will increase to 85 Japanese 30 Central African equipment operators and 125 Central African miners 

1976 production should begin to be in full swing with annual production hitting 300 tons this should be to the point where its considered truly profitable for mitsubshi mining in central african to sustain the business and promote possible growth. The eventual goal by this point is to reach 500 tons of uranium extracted and exported annually. Additionally in order to lower costs and increase profits overtime the Japanese equipment operators and trainers will be entirely replaced with central african ones leaving for the most part just Japanese supervisors and managers. 

#Santiago, September 1973

The Allende Administration has moved to open up Project Cybsersyn to the wider world. The success of the project since the end of 1972 has shown that the project can see viable applications in regards to the management of resources and communication between the various sectors of a national economy. The telex machines and the wider system are a pride of the administration - and soon they will be the pride of South America. A project of the future.

Ten million dollars is not nearly enough to cement the project. It falls short of the funding Project Cybersyn truly needs to advance further.

Stafford Beer and his Chilean assistants moved to invite scientists from all across the country to The Ministry of Economics on September 12, 1973 to observe and propose ideas to improve the telex machines network. Fernando Flores, the Chilean director for the project, has taken to the podium to garner global attention on Chile’s efforts.

At a gathering at the Chilean Production Development Corporation, Mr. Flores faced the media with a short but firm speech. “Project Cybersyn has become well known to the Chilean media. A telex machine network capable of coordinating the movement of resources and labor at a national scale…how can such a project remain hidden in Chile? From the world?”

“Since the first implementation of Project Cybersyn exactly a year ago, the telex system has allowed us to sustain food distribution operations alongside directing resources to factories needing repairs. In essence, we have staved off economic collapse due to the network.”

“Now our group at CPDC is close to finishing the control room for the national telex system. Afterwards, we intend to implement a more human focused sector to Cybersyn. Adding a sector within the telex system for communications from the citizenry. This sector will allow Chilean citizens to relay their worries to a national base of data. It will allow us to track the happiness of Chileans and through this system we can better address the concerns of the whole…”

“As our advance into the future continues, we invite the rest of the world to join us. We invite citizens from The Americas, Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Oceania to observe the system in action. Furthemore, governments interested in our work may provide us funding and in turn receive blueprints and relevant information in their efforts to create their own national systems.”

“Project Cybersyn is going international.”

Project Cybersyn will no longer be relegated as a national project. With this move, Chile has opened up the project to international involvement. In preparation, the Allende Administration has made several moves to protect the project. A military attache has been added to the headquarters in order to monitor movement around the site of the Cybersyn Network.

Furthermore, the Foreign Ministry has moved to prepare transportation for expected visitors to the project. Its embassies in Europe have been ordered to contact various scientific institutions to gain relevant input from the continent.

Even in the realm of literature, efforts to promote the project have been made. Isabel Allende, wife of Salvador Allende and famous writer known for her works in magic realism, has set about entering the world of science fiction. The New Fire of Prometheus is a science fiction book written by Isabel Allende depicting a future in which Chile is run by a fully automated system of communication and machines. Instant communication and rapid transportation have elevated the nation to a near utopian level of living as all resources in the economy are directed to serve the needs of the people.

Following a request from Spain’s partners in the Central African Republic, Madrid has authorised urgent and immediate changes to the ongoing deployment as part of Operation Operation Aliados de Apoyo at Bangui-M'poko Airport.

##Instructions:

Orders: Spanish forces will maintain constant surveillance of the CAR’s South-Western airspace to ensure Cuban >!or Soviet!< aircraft are not using it to reinforce Cuban forces deployed throughout Africa.

Rules of Engagement: Spanish forces’ deployed as part of Operation Operation Aliados de Apoyo Two will operate under strict Rules of Engagement. Spanish Forces will enforce Centroafricain airspace as if it were Spanish and follow the same procedures for evicting aircraft. A failure to heed orders to leave the airspace will result in a lethal use of force.

##New Units:

##Existing Units:

##Returning Units:

##COMECON: Albanian-Cuban Exchange

September 1, 1973

The People's Republic of Albania and Cuba have come to an agreement on the discount exchange of goods. Albania knows that Cuba would appreciate additional petroleum, while Albania could benefit from adding additional product to its stores, to increase the quality of life in Albania. Given Albania's gift of petroleum, Albania is willing to provide Cuba a 30% discount on all petroleum to be purchased by Cuba, and in exchange, a 30% discount will be provided to Albania on all Cuban coffee, cigars, and rum, for import into Albanian stores. Albania hopes, that in this way, not only can the diversity of goods available in Albania increase, but that Cuba can continue to power its nation and vehicles for years to come- at a more affordable price than the going OPEC rate.

October 6th, 4:30 Hours

Several squads of Egyptian Intelligence operatives were posted at various positions around Alexandria, all of them awaiting a signal. The sun had yet to rise on the beautiful port city, and aside from the quiet step of boots, all that could be heard was the waves of sea against the shore. After arresting a CIA mole in the Egyptian Army, the GIS conducted a thorough interrogation of the man, who revealed the presence of an American spy ring operating out of Alexandria. After beating, berating and forcing all the information they could out of the mole, they had enough information they needed to conduct raids on multiple locations within Alexandria, and had a list of individuals to arrest based on identities (most likely falsified, but adequate enough to arrest them).

The quiet of the morning was violated by the sounds of doors being kicked down, orders being yelled and handcuffs clinging against each other. Dozens of individuals suspected of either being CIA agents or CIA assets were taken away by GIS, as well as any documents, passports, currency or other evidence that was found on site. All of the evidence, operatives, individuals and those associated with them in Egypt will be taken to Egyptian Intelligence facilities to be interrogated and examined. The GIS hopes to potentially uncover more ties between this cell and other potential CIA operations in Arab states, or Mossad involvement with the CIA in Egypt. All in all, President Sadat was extremely pleased with the GIS, knowing that he would have a potential bargaining chip against the United States if it came to it. No public declaration was made regarding the apprehension of these individuals.

TLDR: CIA spy network in Alexandria dismantled.

“Without significant Land Reform, the traditional land management system of Botswana, amplified by the legacies of the industrial revolution and colonialism, will undermine the country's future.” - Executive Summary of a Cabinet Submission tabled by the Minister of Lands and Agriculture on 4 September 1974.

With the 1974 General Election fast approaching, the last thing President Khama wanted to discuss was land reform. Land Reform was, after all, perhaps the only issue that could seriously threaten the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)’s position as the country’s dominant political force. The party, which had ruled Botswana since independence in 1965, had traditionally drawn its support from the very same rural tribespeople who would be most impacted by any reform. Indeed, it was the actions of many of the party's constituents who were causing the problems, albeit unintentionally.

The core of the challenge facing the Republic of Botswana is water, specifically, the country’s lack of it. Since the 1950s, Botswana has been on a borehole drilling spree to address water shortages and open up new land to grazing year-round. In its original goal it has succeeded, however, the law of unintended consequences has raised its ugly hand and thrust a new challenge onto Botswana’s populace: overgrazing.

Boreholes are by their very nature localised. Unlike a lake or a river, which span kilometres and meander through the landscape, boreholes occur at a single point and provide water only there. That leads to vegetation growth being concentrated around boreholes and them becoming regional centres for watering cattle. While that isn’t a problem in and of itself, given the traditional land management system in Botswana, it absolutely is.

That is because under the traditional, communal, system graziers are free to move their herds wherever they please. In practice this means that graziers, acting entirely logically and without malice, bring their herds to boreholes where there is relatively abundant food. Unfortunately, as there are only relatively few boreholes, that practice is leading to massive overgrazing in key agricultural areas. Overgrazing is, in turn, causing the quality of land to deteriorate. In fact, around some of the older boreholes which were drilled in the 1930s, the land has already deteriorated to the point that important food for cattle cannot grow.

Something thus needs to be done.

On October 2nd,. 1973, after the confirmation of the Italian SSB program, the second IRBM test for the Italian military was conducted. Again taking place at the Salto di Quirra launch site in Sardinia, the second test was fitted with a dummy second unit. This time, the test was for a full flight, and all flight characteristics were recorded. After a splashdown in the Atlantic Ocean ~1600 miles away, the full success of the flight was confirmed, and the Italian government was informed of the specifics of the test and the fact that this meant that Vittorio Veneto was ready for a refit, which was immediately approved. After the end of its current deployment, the ship will come in to receive new helicopters, a new FCS, new radars, and the 4 missile tubes it was built for but not with. This will allow for greater Italian defense in the Med and a capable response to the recent Soviet aggression in Albania.

While Albania had a government change back in June, the situation at the border with Yugoslavia has left a cause for concern for the Albanian People's Republic. The Soviet Union in June, following the coup, had deployed two divisions and multiple squadrons of the VVS to Albania, to reinforce the country's security situation, but it may not be enough.

There is also the issue of the Warsaw Pact. Albania itself has had worries about its current ability to function in the pact. Further, Romania is likely to be intransigent in the event that Albania does formally attempt to rejoin, which could cause difficulties. Given this, the USSR and Albania have agreed to, independent of the Warsaw Pact, a Mutual Defense Treaty.

The provisions of the treaty are extremely similar to those of the Warsaw pact, though with an added provision that should Albania rejoin the pact, the new treaty would be voided earlier than the 20 year requirement set out by the original pact. The expectation is that this will be a temporary affair until such a time as Albania can rejoin, but it will hopefully dissuade the Yugoslavs or, more worryingly, NATO forces from an attempted invasion.

Orders are to be given soon to Soviet Personnel to prepare plans of action in the event of invasion by either the Yugoslavs or NATO. It is not expected that anything will occur, but still, caution is necessary.

It is reported to, the Tunisian and international press, that around 4,000 Tunisians have volunteered to join the Egyptian Army in Libya. In civilian clothes, brave men are seen entering buses and airplanes meant for the front, President Bourguiba was seen shaking their hands and wishing them victory in their bold and noble venture.

[S] In order to maintain Tunisian neutrality, it is officially off the books, but has been formally organized all the same in secret by the Tunisian military. Who will play a generally larger role in it than assumed. All troops will be paid back-pay on return from the venture, and will have lower-level officers actually leading them in conjunction with the Egyptians. Egypt's role will be to arm and command them as best fit in the grand scheme of the war.

A small contingent will actually fight with Egypt, but most will serve in support roles. Trucks, loaded with equipment, 'sanitized' OD green uniforms, and supplies will be sent. But otherwise the material footprint of the country will be small. They will be organized as follows:

• Tunisian Volunteer Infantry Regiment: 1,000 predominantly light infantry, to be used by the Egyptians as fit on the front.
• Tunisian Volunteer Engineer Battalion: 500 combat engineers and sappers to be armed with what engineering vehicles Egypt provides.
• Tunisian Volunteer Medical Battalion: 500 doctors and medics will be attached to whomever the Egyptians see fit.
• Tunisian Volunteer Logistics Regiment: 1,000 men working to supply Egyptian soldiers on the front, maintain and load trucks. 100 ZIL-157 trucks held in the Tunisian Army reserves will be loaned to Egypt to help in this venture, sanitized of TNA markings. Permission has been granted by Libya to transit through their country.
• Tunisian Volunteer Support Regiment: A mix of 1,000 communications, MP (mainly from Tunisia's gendarmerie), and Air Defense artillery soldiers will be organized into subsidiary units and distributed as needed by the Egyptians.
• 12 AN-2 biplane transports will be put under EAF markings and loaned to the Egyptians, and around 50 volunteer pilots will join the EAF to be used as they see fit.
• Additionally, 50 men of the 1st Platoon, Tunisian Rangers will be sent from Tunisia's infant special forces. They will be directly put under the Egyptian Sa'ka. Armed by them to their specifications.
• Brigadier General Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and a number of other Army, Air Force, and Naval officers will also be sent to Egypt for the duration of the war as military attaches and observers. As close to the action as reasonably possible.