Good morning,

Can anyone recommend one that includes the Pali terms that are specific to Yogacara (like the terms found in the works of Dan Lusthaus and William Waldron)?

Thanks,

Ed

Greetings, I am a Buddhist in Oregon in the Pacific NorthWest. I have been reading Yogacara for years, but am new to the idea people are practicing Yogacara outside a Tibetan or Chinese sect that just incorporates some Yogacara features.

My introduction to Yogacara was "as it would present itself" was through Prof. John Keenan's translations and Living Yogacara: An Introduction to Consciousness-Only Buddhism. By Tagawa Shun'ei, Shunʼei Tagawa.

https://www.academia.edu/63971792/Yog%C4%81c%C4%81ra

Is there still a Hosso linage in Japan?

In the third verse, the author uses examples to show why objections about space, time, and limited perceptions without an object don't hold up when considering the consciousness of a single being.

The objections in the second verse seem to draw unwanted conclusions from the proposed idea. We assume everyone agrees there is time, and space, and that different people can look at the same picture simultaneously. It's also universally acknowledged that food satisfies hunger.

If a theory leads to the negation of what everyone agrees upon, it's considered absurd and unfit to explain its subject.

The author also demonstrates that unwanted consequences don't always follow from his idea. Examples where there's no external object and the agreement of all can be found.

According to the arguments, the term "niyama," previously translated as "limitation," is better understood as "commonly accepted," "something everyone agrees on," or "consistency."

Therefore, "saṁtānāniyamaḥ" implies the absence of exclusive ownership of consciousness by only one entity. In simpler terms, it suggests that one thing can be perceived by many beings, indicating that different beings coexist in one world (intersubjectivity).

In essence, the third verse can be summarized as follows: "The absence of contradiction to the idea that external objects don't exist is demonstrated by universally accepted perceptions of space and time in dreams. The absence of contradiction to the idea, universally acknowledged in perceptions of intersubjectivity, is shown in the example of hungry spirits perceiving a river of urine."

In dreams, we perceive objects in specific places, but these perceptions don't match any external reality.

Moreover, numerous hungry spirits (denizens of hell) collectively perceive a river of urine, despite the absence of the actual river. This argument illustrates intersubjectivity from a doctrinal standpoint. Vasubandhu refers to the denizens of hell, as canonical sources suggest that they observe the river of urine and unanimously agree on this perception. However, when an ordinary human views the same river, they see only pure water. Therefore, the concept of a shared reality cannot be grounded on the existence of an external object.

Summary. In the third verse, Vasubandhu clarifies that the fundamental idealist thesis withstands the initial three objections from the second verse. Essentially, we experience coherent appearances of objects that are limited in time and space, even when these objects are entirely nonexistent, as in dreams. According to "Buddhist dogma," intersubjectivity doesn't hinge on the concept of an external object.

20 Verses, thoughts on verse 2

Objections to the Main Thesis of "Buddhist idealism".

The second verse of Vasubandhu's text lists four arguments against "Buddhist idealism". To comprehend Twenty Verses fully, it's crucial to grasp these objections individually. The second verse of Vasubandhu's text lists four arguments against 'Buddhist idealism.'

Let's remember the "idealist" thesis from verse 1:

This is all appearance(vijñapti) only; for even non-existent objects(artha) are presented to us

Considering the 'idealist' thesis from verse 1, its coherence with common sense beliefs becomes crucial for its validity.

1. I can only see the monitor when it is in front of my eyes. Not in the other cases. It is the first objection. If the monitor appears before my eyes without any real object(artha), then it must arise everywhere (since the object is nonexistent anywhere). It is nonsense, it contradicts our experience.

2. Moreover. If the monitor appears before my eyes without any real object, then it must arise all the time. The cause of our perception is the object, the thing that we perceive. If such an object did not exist then the cause of our "monitor-produced perception" is always present. Just because the monitor is non-existent stuff. It means that we should always have the perception of this monitor. It is nonsense.

3. We share the world with other people. We presume that at the concert all the people hear the same melody. But if there is no object, then the appearance of melody should only arise in one being (as hairs are seen only by a person with diseased eyes). It is nonsense.

4. If objects do not exist, they cannot perform their corresponding functions. Dreamed food cannot satisfy, while real food can.

In conclusion, 'Buddhist idealism' contradicts our common sense due to its implications for perception, time, shared experiences, and functionality. For Vasubandhu to substantiate the 'idealist thesis,' he must demonstrate its coherence with our everyday experience.

Hello everyone, I've started reading "Twenty Stanzas" by Vasubandhu.

I believe the text can be considered a concise, critical introduction to Yogachara. The composition does not elaborate on Yogacharin views per se. Instead, the author addresses key objections against "Buddhist idealism". The first stanza is missing in the discovered Sanskrit manuscripts but has been reconstructed from Tibetan and Chinese translations.

Let's start reading.

Verse 1. This is all appearance(vijñapti) only; for even non-existent objects are presented to us, as, for instance, a person with faulty vision sees unreal hair, etc.

Examples of the phenomenon of non-existent objects: seeing floaters, a second moon, and similar experiences by a person suffering from eye disease.

According to Vasubandhu's auto-commentary:

• By the term "this," the author denotes the three spheres (dhātu) of existence.

• Representations (vijñapti), consciousness (citta), mind (manas), and recognition (vijñāna) are synonyms (paryāya).

• By "representation," the author refers to consciousness (citta) together with its accompanying phenomena (caita), such as wisdom (prajñā), ignorance (avidya), etc.

• Consciousness (vijñāna) is only the arising of a representation (pratibhāsa) of an object. The object itself does not exist, just like when there is an eye disease, one sees floaters that correspond to no objects. In this case, "representation" (vijñapti) is used to denote any mental act (manas). The mind is not considered something distinct from its activity.

The terms consciousness (citta), mind (manas), and recognition (vijñāna) are considered to be synonyms (paryāya). They are employed to reason about a specific aspect of the mind. It is not always legitimate to substitute one of these terms with another.

How do Consciousness-Only schools such as Yogacara, Advaita Vedanta, Kashmir Shaivism, etc., account for our conclusions about the existence of phenomena whose existence we don't observe directly but can infer from other direct observations — phenomenta which clearly change when we "aren't looking" (aren't being conscious of them)?

For example, imagine I had a bit too much alcohol or am sleep deprived or whatever and wake up early morning. I am a bit discombobulated and have no idea what time it is. It could be 5 am; it could be 11 am. I don't know if I overslept or woke up too early. I take my watch from my bedside table and (assuming it works), it will tell me what time it is in a way that's synchronized with all the watches in the world. If my watch says it's 10 am, and I have a zoom call with a client at 11 am, I know I have an hour to get ready.

But my consciousness never did anything with the watch after I took it off, put it on my bedside table, and fell asleep. What was causing my watch to advance its time in a perfectly synchronous way with watches of everyone else?

Another example: space objects. 200 years ago we had no idea that some of the dots of light in the sky are actually galaxies (collections of stars). Nor did we know Pluto existed; we suspected that it did based on our calculations of other planets' orbits. Nowadays, scientists look at the orbits of some of the objects in our solar system and from them predict that there is a massive tenth planet out there that causes some of the peculiarities of the objects' orbits.

So until people were conscious of the galaxies, Pluto, or the Tenth Planet — what was causing them to exist?

"Although they believe in the doctrine, they strongly adhere just to the literal meaning of the doctrine, thinking, 'All phenomena just lack own-being; all phenomena are just un produced, just unceasing, just quiescent from the start, just naturally in a state of nirvana' Based on this, they adopt the view that all phenomena do not exist and that character does not exist. Having adopted the view of non-existence and the view that character does not exist, they also deprecate every thing through [deprecating] all characters. Because they deprecate the imputational character of phenomena, they also deprecate the other-dependent character of phenomena and the thoroughly established character.” — Sandhinirmocanasutra, chapter 7.

“The Buddha replied, “Mahamati, the tathagata-garba of which I speak is not the same as the self mentioned by followers of other paths. Mahamati, when I speak about the tathagata-garbha, sometimes I call it ‘emptiness,’ ‘formlessness,’ or ‘intentionlessness,’ or ‘realm of reality,’ ‘dharma nature,’ or ‘dharma body,’ or ‘nirvana,’ ‘what is devoid of self-existence,’ or ‘what neither arises nor ceases,’ or ‘original quiescence,’ or ‘intrinsic nirvana,’ or similar expressions.
“It is to put an end to the fear foolish beings have about the expression ‘no self’ that the tathagatas, the arhats, the fully enlightened ones proclaim the teaching of the tathagata-garbha as a projectionless realm devoid of fabrications. Mahamati, bodhisattvas of the present and the future should not become attached to any view of a self.
Take for example a potter who applies such things as manual labor, water, a stick, a wheel, and a string to a lump of clay to make different kinds of vessels. The Tathagata is also like this, applying wisdom and a variety of skillful means to what has no self and is free from projection. Sometimes I speak about the tathagatagarbha and sometimes no self. Thus, the tathagata-garbha of which I speak is not the same as the self spoken of by followers of other paths. This is what is meant by the teaching of the tathagata-garbha. The tathagata-garbha is taught to attract those members of other paths who are attached to a self so that they will give up their projection of an unreal self and will enter the threefold gate of liberation and aspire to attain unexcelled, complete enlightenment forthwith. This is why the tathagatas, the arhats, the fully enlightened ones speak in this manner about the tathagata-garbha. To speak otherwise would be to agree with the followers of other paths. Therefore, Mahamati, in order to avoid the views of followers of other paths, you should rely on the selfless tathagata-garbha.”
- Lankavatarasutra, XXVIII

“The truth is that each sentient being has a fundamental consciousness mulavijnana, (i.e., alayavijnana), which evolves in a homogeneous and continuous series and which carries the “seeds” or “germs” (bijas) of all dharmas. This fundamental consciousness and the dharmas act as reciprocal causes of one another, and because the “perfuming” energy (vasana) of the dharmas imprints its essence permanently in the alayavijnana in the form of “seeds” or bijas, memory, cognition, etc., arise in manifestation, the bijas evolving as actual dharmas which in turn produce bijas in the alaya.”

— VIJNAPTIMATRATASIDDHI SASTRA By Dharmapala and Nine Other Sastra-Masters

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“Mahamati, it is not true that what occurs sequentially is a continuity. It is merely a projection of what produces or what is produced by direct, supporting, continuous, or contributing causes. Mahamati, a sequential occurrence does not occur because it is characterized by an attachment to an imagined reality. It does not occur sequentially or simultaneously because it belongs to the perceptions of your own mind. And it does not occur sequentially or simultaneously, Mahamati, because the individual or shared characteristics of an external existence do not exist. It is only because you are unaware that the perceptions of your own mind are projections that forms appear. Therefore you should avoid views of a sequential or simultaneous occurrence characterizing the operation of causes and conditions.” - Buddha, Lankavatara sutra

For Sautrantikas, change is understood based on the notion of a continuum of mental moments. For Yogacharas, it seems to be a little different, given that mental dharmas are transformations of consciousness.

Also, how similar is Yogacara to the Western philosophical system of subjective idealism?

A lot of the Pali Canon and some of the Prajñaparamita sutras state that all dharmas are inherently empty, without self, etc. I’m aware that Yogacara and Madhyamika often coexist- am I to understand that the alaya-vijnana is just the most subtle form of an empty reality, from which other realities (without inherent existence) spring forth? That complete enlightenment would transcend mind/consciousness/alaya-vijnana? Or does consciousness function as an inherently existent base of reality like Brahman for Vedantists?