Hola , yo de Proudhon solo he leído la propiedad es un robo y el principio federativo . a fines prácticos , realmente vale el esfuerzo leer algo más ?

Podrían clasificarse los libros nombrados como lectura para "un anarquista apurado" ?

Siento que esa "caja de herramientas" me da suficiente para argumentar para una sociedad anti-capitalista. Que piensan ustedes ?

If you open up your Tor Browser and visit the dark web, you’ll notice that a lot of these illegal marketplaces have escrow systems, because they can’t rely on the law and courts to resolve disputes in transactions.

In a mutualist economy, would escrows be a big thing?

Once we take out the laws and courts, it seems there could be a demand for some sort of replacement to fill the void, and existing illicit markets already have such systems in place.

I had recently completed the democracy chapter of Proudhon's "Solution of the Social Problem". Since I didn't read the first chapter, and to my knowledge the entire thing isn't fully translated, obviously I am missing in context. Since I lack full knowledge of what Proudhon means by various different things, I also am severely missing in context stuff. Chapter 2 of this work is a critique of representative democracy and also slightly touches upon a critique of direct democracy or its impossibility as an ideal. I have some questions as well as an outline of Proudhon's overall arguments to the best of my understanding to make sure it is correct.

Outline of Proudhon's Critique of Democracy

First, Proudhon states that the rationale upon which representative democracy is based stems from the idea that one could discern the "will of the People" and enforce it. He points out that both monarchy and democracy derives their legitimacy from claiming to represent or enforce the sovereignty of the People (by extension, you could generalize this to be inclusive of dictatorships and other non-democratic forms of government). However, Proudhon points out that "the People" is an abstraction and its "will" cannot be discerned. Proudhon goes through the gamut of different possible avenues for determining "the will of the People" in the government contemporaneous to him such as the press and points out that they contradict each other and that there is no clear, unified "voice" that communicates a singular idea, perspective, vision, etc. In other words, there is no consensus among "the People" and so there is no way to adequately enact its "will" since you cannot know it.

He asks lots of different questions (paraphrasing) like "Does the People sleep?" and "If so, when because your rule when they sleep will be dictatorial and not representative of the people?" or "Does the People adhere to Hegel's or Aristotle's philosophy?". These are sort of ridiculous questions but they are meant to attack the characterization by democrats of "the People" as this unified, homogenous entity. As such, they should be answerable if the premise of democracy's understanding of "the People" is correct.

He also discusses whether "the People" can make mistakes or commit errors. If it can, he states, then there are only two approaches. Either it gets obeyed even though it is mistaken which would be undesirable or it would be a duty of the "representative" of the People to resist and deny the People they are supposed to represent.

Proudhon goes onto say that "the People" is sovereign and does have a will but that it is immanent to itself and discerning it externally is impossible. He distinguishes between "external sovereignty" which includes representative democracy and monarchy from "the consciousness of the masses".

Second, he points out that people with existing wealth and power will be most equipped to become representatives and obtain political power in the government. This seems self-evident to me. He called that section of his critique "democracy is aristocracy". There are some weird stuff in there I am confused by but I think the general argument is that existing economic and social inequality will facilitate the rise of "the bourgeoise" as representatives in government.

Third, Proudhon states that even if we assumed we could discern the will of the People, all electoral systems are exclusionary and incapable of encapsulating all of "the People". He points out how his current government excludes women, servants, children, and convicts from voting. He discusses a common argument against this which is that it would lead to "societal instability" as women, servants, children, and convicts would obtain new powers or rights and use that to expand their interests. He retorts that, by that logic, you should exclude the working class from voting since they will also prefer to vote in favor of their interests in ways which might cause "societal instability". He points out how in any electoral system there will always be "exclusions, absences, invalid, erroneous or unfree votes". How people who are working, are ill, are travelling, or lack money will be forced to abstain.

This is all stuff we are familiar with (less the women and servants part since women in most democratic countries can vote and servants, if they are citizens, can vote as well though obviously this is an indirect exclusion from the political system since most servants in countries aren't citizens). However, what is more interesting of a critique that I haven't seen as often (though I have understood the phenomenon) is this: Proudhon points out that many people just vote whatever way an authority figure tells them to vote and that this undermines the authenticity of the vote being representative of "the People". Similarly, if others can sway or influence the votes of others, then it isn't "the People" that is heard but the voice of the different capacities of individuals and specific groups (e.g. lobbying).

Afterward he talks about the specific problems with the specific government he is critiquing with respect to deputies. I don't really understand what that is about. Something about electors electing the departments instead of the voters or election by department and how this undermines the entire point of democracy.

Fourth, he points out that democracies only really express "one idea" or "one interest" in elections. That it is the majority that rules not the minority and that it is the majority on one singular opinion which then goes onto the National Assembly. So, in other words, it is the "voice of the majority" on one singular matter and basically nothing else is his contention. Moreover, that this majority could be slim which, if it is, then means that you're excluding like half of "the People". Not sure how true this is or what "one idea" means here.

Fifth, this is the section of how democracy is absolutism. I basically didn't really understand what Proudhon was talking about here. Something about democracy favouring incompetence and a weird thing about how monarchy favoured talent? Not sure what that has to do with absolutism.

Sixth, he talks about how democracy is atomism in the section on democracy being materialist and atheistic? Not sure what he means here either?

Seventh, he talks about how the ideal of democracy which is direct democracy or consensus democracy does not exist in representative democracy and cannot exist at all. He points out that ministers deliberate on affairs not the People. That the citizens do not fulfill a public function, the Greeks used to do this but he points out they could only do so because they had a slave-based economy.

Eighth, he states that democracy is incapable of solving the social problem and also critiques this guy called Lamartine's program for representative government. Also he discusses how big the budget for a democracy is and how slashing this budget and having cheap services is part of the social problem? It isn't very clear to me.

This is my full outline and understanding. Please critique me or point out what I got wrong! My questions will be in a comment under this post.

At Proudhons time there was a thesis that the world revolution would begin at europe or the so called developed countries then spread around the world. Did Proudhon believe in that?

I recently read "The Social Revolution Demonstrated by the Coup d’Etat of December 2" and have some questions and comments regarding it.

Historical background

I have some questions regarding the specific historical events that Proudhon is talking about and referencing. First, the December 2nd, 1851 coup d'etat which a cursory skim of Wikipedia refers to the self-coup of Napoleon Bonaparte to stay in power, dissolved the National Assembly, and granted dictatorial powers to himself. This was followed up with the establishment of the Second French Empire a year later. Second, he mentions the 1848 revolutions as setting the context for the 1851 coup or setting into motion it. Finally, he mentions off-handedly the "war on Rome".

So, regarding the coup d'etat itself, was this something Proudhon expected or was it something that revealed something to him about his theory? How much of an impact, in other words, did the coup have on his work? It feels, throughout the work, that he is simply reiterating what he has said before (indeed, he literally mentions, I think, that he has proven his points before). However, I could be wrong.

He also states that the current situation pertaining to the coup is such that there is a cross conflict between the Elysée, or president I think, the republican left, and the majority. Who is the "Republican left"? He states they "represent the revolution" and my questions pertaining to what this means will be in the following section, but what was the "Republican left" and what spurred him to understand that faction of 19th century French politics in that way? What is "the majority" and why are they "counter-revolutionary"? Is it related to what Proudhon said later on which is that the people don't want socialism but also don't want things to regress? And what is the role of the Elysée in this three-way conflict? Do they play a deciding role?

For the 1848 revolutions, he states that they set the stage for the coup. In what respect? He also states that material conditions demanded revolution but the ideas were not there for it to go forward. Was this a popular thought during this period?

Finally, what is the "war on Rome" which he states was against social revolution and that the opponents of Rome were about as democratic as Mazzini? I believe Proudhon is talking about Giuseppe Mazzini who was the unifier of Italy? I don't think there was a war by France against him though so I don't know what he is talking about.

Also I am confused by what this entire section is supposed to mean:

On December 10, Louis Bonaparte obtained the preference over General Cavaignac, who had however well deserved the peerage, whose civic-mindedness, selflessness and modesty will be noted by impartial history. Why that injustice in the election? Because General Cavaignac (destiny!) had to combat, in the name of law and order, the revolution in socialism; because then he was presented, in the name of revolution, as an adversary of the dynastic parties and as frankly republican; because, finally, in the face of that rigidity, at once constitutional […], the name of Bonaparte was raised: for the masses, as the hope of the swiftest revolution; for the partisans of the altar and throne, who steered them, as a hope of counter-revolution. Revolution, counter-revolution, the yes and the no, what does it matter! it is always the same passion that stirs, the same idea that directs

If anyone could parse out what Proudhon is saying here that would be much appreciated.

Historical analysis and understanding of socialism, revolution, etc.

These are the questions about the specific terms Proudhon uses. What does Proudhon mean by "socialism"? What does he mean by "social revolution". He says that the coup proves social revolution but it is very clear that he thinks the social revolution entails the absence of all hierarchy or anarchy. He says here:

But why have the republicans, worshipers of 93, held themselves apart from the movement in 1848? Because they realized from the first that the social revolution is the negation of all hierarchy, political and economic; that this void can’t bear their organizational prejudices, their habits of government; and that their minds, stopping at the surface of things, not discovering beneath the nakedness of the form the intelligible link of the new social order, recoil at that aspect, as before an abyss.

So if the coup is a demonstration of the revolution, I think he means that the coup is indicative of what will happen in the future. However, it is not clear to me what about this coup demonstrates the revolution even after reading the entire work? Does it do so by demonstrating the flaws of representative democracy? However, this is obviously not the first time Proudhon has noted the problems with democracy so that doesn't seem to be it. Is it that it shows that seeking some middle ground between government and liberty is impossible because representatives are impossible?

This leads me into my next point. It is rather obvious that Proudhon, from this work, looks to have some sort of "historical analysis" or at least a set of social science principles he is using to analyzing past historical events.

He mentions, first, that in 1848 everything in "the realm of things", which I take to mean "material conditions", facilitated a revolution but in "the realm of ideas" there is nothing to cause it. How does Proudhon understand "the realm of things" and "the realm of ideas" and how changes in both leads to societal change or movements?

He also has an unfamiliar understanding of socialism. Socialism could not give rise without "violent contradictions", which indicates some form of dialectics right? Socialism, he states, will also "bare the foolishness of all its adversaries". He also says that the people are frightened of socialism and that this partially had motivated them to be averse to it. Obviously socialism is connected to social revolution but I am not sure what Proudhon specifically means by socialism here.

Going back to how Proudhon understands "social revolution", doesn't he not contradict his prior definition when he says "by affirming universal suffrage, the voice, one supposes, of the revolution"? In what respect is universal suffrage "the voice of the revolution" or is this what other people popularly say?

The underlying argument or critique of representative democracy

I have less questions pertaining to this matter since I believe I have understood the underlying critique. I do have some auxiliary questions pertaining to small bits of Proudhon's argument but besides that I am only putting my understanding here so that there could be some critique of that understanding of what Proudhon saying.

My sense is that Proudhon's argument is that representative democracy is impossible in that the rationale or thesis of representative democracy is that free interests or people need representatives to manage their affairs and govern them. However, Proudhon points out that this is a contradiction since the representatives would constrain the freedom of those people or interests that they are supposed to represent through authority.

Therefore, he concludes that representation of free interests is functionally impossible and that if you wanted to take that representation seriously, the "relation of free interests" would be sufficient enough to be that representation (or a contract). In the same way that an ecosystem doesn't need a "representative" or a hive of bees doesn't need a "president".

This is a rather intuitive critique. It's basically just saying freedom cannot exist under an authority and even making that authority be derived from election doesn't change the fact that this authority is constraining the freedom of the supposedly "free interests" that they are supposed to represent.

He goes into more detail pertaining the specifics of this analysis with respect to France. He discusses how the various representatives of these "free interests" have gone against their demands or their freedoms such as making Catholicism the state religion of France due to it being the religion of the majority. How representatives silenced people and censored the press. How taxes are significantly high despite most interests wanting lower taxes. How representatives have placed duties on beverages despite the interests not wanting them just because it gives those representatives more revenue. Basically, a bunch of examples of representatives not doing what the interests who elected them wanted and also how the interests of the representatives are at odds with the interests they are supposed to represent.

Please offer any sort of critique or argument against the understanding I have put forward if you believe I have said anything wrong or left something out.

As for my questions, I am confused about this passage pertaining to the role of representative of interests as leaders of armies and the navy here:

In the expectations of the interests, war should be the last argument to which the nation would have recourse in order to preserve the peace. Apart from the case of war, the maintenance of a permanent army seemed to them an anomaly that the institution of the national guards had especially aimed to end. — But the representative of the interests, leader of the armies of land and sea, always finds some reason to assert his title; and when he does not make war, he still keeps his armies complete, under the pretext that without them he cannot address domestic order, maintain the peace between the interests! So the interests are not in relation or, to put it better, that relation is not represented, since the representative can only keep the peace by force.

So prior Proudhon establishes a pattern of pointing out what the interests want and how that is at odds with what the representatives do. It is not very clear to me what that is in this passage.

Another question I have is related to principles upon which French society is based that Proudhon discusses. One of which is "free property". He states that "Property must be transformed, undoubtedly, by the economic revolution, but not in the extent to which it is free: it must, on the contrary, ceaselessly gain in liberty and guarantees" and that property must become free enough that there is something similar to Westphalian sovereignty applied to property (e.g. "the principle that was introduced into the right of nations by the treaties of Westphalia").

My question is that doesn't Proudhon actually often argue the opposite that property on its own is tyrannical but must be balanced? And isn't occupancy-and-use significantly less "freer" than capitalist property with its absentee property-ownership and the lack of accountability to anyone?

The main question I have is what does Proudhon mean by "relation of the interests" or "relation of the free interests"? He states that this is what the government is supposed to represent and he claims that it is unnecessary as it would undermine the entire raison d'etre which is that the interests be free and interests can deal with each other without the intermediary of representatives or a government. However, I would like more elaboration on the concept since it appears to be a concept that Proudhon used before.

That's really it. Hopefully you all know more enough to answer my questions.

So a recent conversation about cost price signaling got me thinking.

Basically, if we abide by the cost principle, then price is effectively the same irrespective of demand right? Because regardless of demand, the cost of production should remain more or less constant (unless higher demand leads to higher intensity work, thereby increasing the subjective labor cost, but that's not going to hold true in the general case).

So let's say that we have all good A that can be produced using method 1: 2 goods of X and 3 of Y or method 2: 3 of X and 2 of Y.

The prices of X and Y are essentially going to be fixed at the cost of production right, irrespective of relative scarcity. So let's say that a lot of X is needed for other kinds of production. If demand were a factor in price then as the demand rose that would raise the price in the short term as the supply is relatively fixed then. But in the long term higher prices drive up more production of X which lowers the price again. It also signals producers to use method 1 cause it reduces the need for X, the more expensive good.

But if we treat X's price as fixed at the cost of production, then demand cannot shift the price right? And so X may be cheaper to produce even if there is less of it in the economy at the moment, thereby leading to a temporary shortage right as X is cheap relative to the demand for it.

In fairness, it's worth pointing out that if X is cheaper that means it is easier to produce and therefore to gear production up for and so any increase in demand for X leads to an increase in production even without the price. But it doesn't signal to ration X right?

Idk, how does cost-price signaling account for spot conditions and relative scarcity?

Edit:

A thought I had re reading some old posts is that, since workers have different relative costs for goods, and we assume that the cheapest cost-price goods are purchases first, we then would expect to see a general correlation between scarcity and price right?

Cause if it is the case that we have different prices for the same good, due to differing costs, then we would expect that as more goods are purchased the lower cost goods are taken off the market first, which then leads to a higher average price.

Is that an accurate description?

It appears to have been a bad week for American mutualists given the US's election results. However, this makes this particular question topical. Did Proudhon have an analysis which believed that democracies, by their structure, tend to degenerate into autocracies? Do we have a good understanding of that analysis?

I was recently talking to someone about parecon, but I needed a bit of a refresher. So I did some googling and got curious what Kevin Carson and Shawn Wilbur had to say on it.

In one article written by Shawn I found this:

But Parecon is certainly very far from my ideal — and one of my aims in exploring that sort of collective compensation is the possibility it seems to open of freeing the market in other areas of the economy.

I'm curious, why is this the case? Why is parecon far from Shawn's ideal? Are there sort of mutualist/proudhonian critiques of it? I'd love to read them! Thanks!

Right now, I have a pretty solid understanding about how anarchist organization works. To reiterate it for anyone who was unaware, the basic idea behind is that its "free association at all scales" or "groups are formed around decisions, rather than forming groups that then make decisions".

Ex: I want to build a road in X area. I decide to form an association with others who also want to build a road in X area. Then we freely associate, in accordance with our interests and the needs of the project, into the different tasks required to build the road (excavating, grading, paving, etc.).

Determining what those tasks are is a matter of science, that is to say the plan is determined by whatever most efficiently achieves the project with available resources and labor as well as other external constraints (like avoiding negative externalities).

Concurrently with that free association of division of labor, conflicts that arise over the course of the project are dealt with through free association as well, with conflicting parties associating into groups (if there are multiple members) and dealt with by putting them into contact with each other to resolve their conflict through a mutually beneficial solution or compromise.

However, while this model makes sense, I struggle to connect it to other facets of anarchist ideas.

For example, what role do mutual banks play into all of this? How about associations external to this road-building association? What is their relationship? Let's say I wanted to build a school and there was already an association of teachers somewhere, how do they get involved? Or what about associations that maintain and act as stewards for fixed or productive assets like land, factories, tools, etc.? And how does the alegal character of anarchist society effect things? How does systemic coercion?

And, most importantly, how does Proudhonian sociology play a role into all of this. The idea behind Proudhonian sociology, to my knowledge, is the idea that we should organize ourselves in accordance to how society actually works (i.e. social science should inform social organization). How does that serve all of this?

Haven't been active on Reddit in a long while, but I wanted to share that a group of co-ops in Rhode Island is officially launching the RI Worker Cooperative Alliance (RIWCA) on November 14 in Providence.

The Alliance's activities will include:

• Worker Cooperative Education
• Advocacy
• Shared Services

I'm hoping I can convince the Alliance to start a mutual credit circle, but perhaps there are other ways to make a bigger impact. If you have any thoughts or recommendations, please comment.

I hope this post isn't too long or off topic for this sub (and I hope I'm not missing anything too obvious!).

There was a post on Anarchy101 yesterday (that I couldn't find today) that got me thinking about a potential issue with 'cost the limit of price'.

By the time I'd typed all this out today I thought I'd gotten my head round a potential answer - but I haven't - so posting it here for discussion if anyone is interested.

In a hypothetical anarchist economy that has embraced 'cost the limit of price'...

...and where everyone is actively seeking out productivity improvements and efficiencies to reduce the amount of time, effort or toil it takes to do a certain amount or type of work, or the amount of work they need to do to secure enough needs and wants to thrive;

...and where these productivity improvements lead to a decrease in cost and therefore to a decrease in the price of that work or product that is always passed on to the customer;

...and that these productivity improvements themselves are shared so that over time the price for a particular good or service returns to something approaching an average/equilibrium/market price;

...and this is happening across the entire economy;

...if I identify a productivity improvement that allows me to reduce my costs by 'x amount';

...and I share this improvement so that all my 'competitors' are also able reduce their cost/price by 'x amount' so demand for my work/product is unchanged relative to price vs. demand;

...given that it would be naive to think that every 'supplier' I use outside of making my product (e.g sourcing needs and wants) is also able to reduce their costs/prices by 'x amount' at exactly the same time as I do...

...then at that point - it seems that I would be financially worse off.

In this scenario my income would be less due to a reduction in cost without any guarantee that my expenses (i.e. other producer's costs) would be reduced accordingly.

Thoughts?

In Pierre Ansart's 'Proudhon's Sociology', in the section on Federalism, he mentions Proudhon's 'anarchist period' multiple times but doesn't give any context of what he means. e.g. "Proudhon’s statements on this topic in his more specifically anarchist period are still applicable..." and "Proudhon introduces a dialectic that he had rejected in his anarchist period...".

What or when is he referring to?

The terms personal and private property often get confused and are already loaded terms relavent to other economic systems.

Using the term commodity for anything owned, but that can't generate wealth and using the term capital to describe anything that is owned but that can also generate wealth helps better disambiguate the concepts.

It's also easier to describe how a commodity can become capital from either intentional market scarcity like housing, from limited access like a utility, or from the use of labor.

Explaining this helps describe why consumer cooperatives are needed to address exploitation from scarcity or limited access driven capital and worker cooperatives are needed for labor driven capital.

Many modern day scholars who advocate for creating a stateless society draw on real world stateless societies in the historical and ethnographic record for evidence about how such societies could look, as well as evidence of the possibility of society without a state in the first place. However, most of the ethnographic accounts of real stateless societies were published after 1900.

I know that Clarence Lee Swartz briefly discussed mining camps in the North American far west in What is Mutualism?, but I am curious to what extent earlier authors drew on historical or ethnographic accounts of stateless, or quasi-stateless, communities for inspiration. Did Proudhon discuss the topic at all in his work? What about Benjamin Tucker, Lysander Spooner, Dyer Lum, Josiah Warren, Stephen Pearl Andrews, or other, similar authors?

I understand that Warren and Andrews of course created intentional communities of their own to experiment in alternative forms of association, but did they discuss historical records of stateless societies as well?

Thanks in advance for your help.

Was Proudhon anti-positivist or pro-positivist? I recall he was pro-positivist at one point and became anti-positivist later. What changed and what was his understanding of positivism?

Proudhon's Sociology

"Anyone wanting to learn about Proudhon but perhaps daunted by the sheer bulk of Iain McKay’s wonderful Property is Theft! Proudhon anthology now has a book to read in advance that will light their way to engaging with Proudhon.”
Dr. Michael Tyldesley, Emeritus Honorary Fellow, Department of History, Politics, and Philosophy, Manchester Metropolitan University

Been looking for an introduction to Proudhon's ideas and particularly anything related to economics. This sounds like a good fit for me. Anyone here read it? Thanks.

So some nuts and bolts questions today

First off, I noticed something i hadn't noticed before when reading the Wikipedia page for Cincinnati Time Store

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cincinnati_Time_Store#/media/File%3ALaborNote.JPG

In the above image you'll see a labor-for-labor note that was used in the time store (according to Wikipedia anyways)

What i noticed now that I didn't before is that the note is labeled "Not Transferable" at the top. So I suppose that means it doesn't circulate right? But then how did this sort of note system works? If we don't have circulation isn't this basically just barter, with all it's inefficiencies? I was under the impression these notes circulated. Did they?

The second question is somewhat related to the first.

What's the usual method for managing counterfeit in mutual credit schemes? It seems quite possible for me to print a note claiming that you own me 10 hours of labor when I did nothing for you or anyone else.

I would argue that today this isn't much of and issue because digital technology allows for much more rapid and up to date record keeping, but in the past it may have been difficult to update the records quickly and so paper currency would've been used, paper that can be counterfeit.

What was the approach for managing counterfeiting?

Tl;dr:

1. Did Josiah Warren's labor for labor notes circulate? If so, why is the one in the Wikipedia page labeled not transferable, and if not did warren just use barter?

2. What are the standard approaches to anti-counterfeiting in mutual credit and local currency schemes?

Can I have a simple explanation of the cost-price principle and mutual credit/banking?

The economics is one of the weakest areas in my anarchist theory.

When people talk about translations of Proudhon's writings they're often referring to things like letters, notes, correspondence, etc.

Given that some of these might be over 200 years old now - how much of his original source material is there? Who has it? What material do translators generally work from?

I know this sounds like a stupid question, but I find that there are some disputes about the exact definition of what constitutes “ownership.”

If there is a norm of respecting people’s personal possessions, would this be a form of “property?”

Does the social tolerance of occupancy-and-use qualify as an informal social permission or sanction?

Research into anarchy, anarchist social analysis, and anarchist organization is rather uncharted territory, we don't know too much about anarchist social organization aside from there being indications that it is possible and that assumptions that hierarchy is inevitable or necessary are completely unsubstantiated.

While the burden of proof of actually proving that hierarchy is inevitable or unnecessary is exceedingly high, thus we aren't going to get a good answer as to whether hierarchy is necessary or not for a very long time, there is always a level of uncertainty here and perhaps I have exaggerated the sort of certainty I have in the viability of anarchy, which I don't have much to substantiate. Anarchy, in its fullest sense, is difficult to really prove too though that may depend on how our experiments go.

Does anyone know how to deal with or overcome this uncertainty and how have you done so? Should be overcome at all? How can I say I am an anarchist if I cannot have certainty that anarchism is possible?

I don’t really understand federative organising or the concept of the external constitution.

I could also improve my knowledge on the economics side a bit more.

They intuitively seem like a neat way to reward those who give rather than those who own, and some have commented on unique economic advantages, but I don't have solid data to verify either of those. Another mutualist told me it was a bad idea because of the incentives it creates, but I don't remember exactly what they said and can't find where they said it. I'm specifically interested in achieving an economic system that incentivizes generosity--would time banking achieve this?

In this passage, with respects to the impossibility of achieving knowledge of the capital T truth, Volin says:

Third obstacle. – The most characteristic trait of life is its eternal and uninterrupted movement, its changes, its continual transformations. Thus, there exists no firm, constant and determined truth. Or rather, if there exists a general, complete truth, its defining quality would be an incessant movement of transformation, a continual displacement of all the elements of which it is composed. Consequently, the knowledge of that truth supposes a complete knowing, a clear definition, an exact reduction of all the laws, all the forms, all the combinations, possibilities and consequences of all these movements, of all these changes and permutations. Now, such a knowledge, so exact an account of the forces in infinite movement and oscillation, of the continually changing combinations,—even if there exists a certain regularity and an iterative law in these oscillations and changes,—would be something nearly impossible.

However, are there are not laws or fixtures to life which do not change like the sun rising and falling or the law of gravity? Is it our knowledge of those laws or fixtures limited that Volin is talking about or is he saying that there are no fixtures or laws to life?

I believe that Proudhon in What is Property made a distinction between ownership and possession.

Property would be the right of possession and use, as opposed to the mere fact.

“Absentee ownership” is then simply an emergent phenomenon of the mismatch between the fact and the right of possession.

Is the force/authority distinction then just derived from this deeper fact/right distinction?

I know a little bit about the libre milieux (basic stuff like there being no laws or authority and what not) but I don't know too much about the specifics. Is there any information available on the specifics of different communities, how they were organized, etc.?

Usually I hear the term “restorative justice” bandied around, but I’m always unsure whether the term is loaded with governmentalist or legalistic assumptions.

In an alegal social context, people might want a formal system of conflict resolution to solve their disputes peacefully, and may willingly choose to participate in certain non-binding processes in order to avoid undesirable forms of social war.

If such systems emerge, what would they look like exactly? What kinds of disputes might these systems be suited for handling?