How can data be true across the universe and time if it does not travel faster than light?

A confusing title, but bear with me.

Let's say we observe a star that is on the opposite side of the observable universe. We know that in the present moment, the star is gone. Dead. Based on knowing how star cycles work.

But this truth value is still a form of data. How can it be true here on Earth if the truth value cannot travel faster than light? To say that the star is not dead in the present moment is illogical.

And now let's take it a step further. How can it he that the star's death is instantly true in the past and the future? The star's death becomes something that WILL happen and something that HAS happened instantly. You cannot erase history, only perception of it. So how can it be that this happens?

Let's also take a nonguaranteed scenario. If a person does an action, it also is instantly true in all present locations, even if it is not percievable. If you were to teleport outside the observable universe, then what is happening on Earth is still happening regardless of where you are, and that person's action also becomes something that WILL happen, and something that HAS happened relative to the future and past.

Ask Physics is being rather nasty with the downvotes and I can't understand why so I came here. I guess we're not allowed to ask questions in physics lol

For example, imagine that in this spacetime that our universe currently occupies, there could be any number of other fields permeating that space that in no way interact with any of the fields comprising ours. These fields could run an entire different nature together sort of 'right on top of ours' and the only way to probe this idea physically is to examine spacetime for apparently non-local effects.

I'm wondering if anyone has thrown out any ideas for the nature of some of these fields/sectors. Even without any form of interaction, we could still try to apply logic that we assume must be universal in this context, and perhaps there are logical limitations created by certain things in our own universe too?

I have searched online and read through most of the scientific stuff on dark sectors that I can comprehend, had AI help me with some of it. But it's all so limited and then starts to spill into multiverse stuff. But what I'm talking about feels distinct from all the multiverse models it typically brings up; it's not like other copies of this place it's an entirely different set of fields. I feel like I've read ideas about realities laid out over ours in older societies but it's more or less dropped off since the advent of modern science, thus generally predate the idea of fields

I think in any case these fields have to be considered when thinking about our own nature because what if at a different energy scale than what we can test, they start interacting? That sounds plausible enough to me that it really shakes confidence in highly theoretical stuff involving crazy energies

edit

to help clarify how this is metaphysics rather than physics - the core of my question is if we assume that this sector is ontologically real, what can we say we logically know about it given that we know it is so different it can be laid out over our space and not interact with us at all?

Imagine you’re watching a river. It has parts that appear stable—a specific width, depth, and banks—but it’s also always in motion. It’s moving, changing, yet somehow stays recognizably a river. That’s close to the heart of this philosophy: reality is not just “things that are” or “things that change.” Reality is a seamless, dynamic flow of both stable presence (being) and ongoing unfolding (becoming).

In other words, each entity—like the river or a mountain, or even ourselves—has two intertwined aspects:

1. Being: This is the stable part, the “what is.” It’s what makes a tree recognizable as a tree or a river as a river, grounding each entity with a unique, steady presence.
2. Becoming: This is the unfolding part, the “always in motion” quality. The tree grows, the river flows, and even our own identities shift and evolve. Becoming is the dynamic side, the continual process that each entity participates in.

Duration: How Things Persist Without Needing “Time”

Here’s where it gets interesting: in this view, things don’t actually need “time” in the way we typically think about it. Instead, every entity has its own kind of natural duration, or persistence, that doesn’t rely on the clock ticking. Duration is how things stay coherent in their “being” while continuously unfolding in “becoming.”

For example, a mountain persists in its form even as it’s slowly worn down by erosion. Its duration isn’t about the hours, days, or years passing. It’s about the mountain’s intrinsic ability to endure in its own natural way within the larger flow of reality.

Why Time Isn’t a “Thing” Here, but an Interpretation

In this view, “time” is something we humans create not impose, to understand and measure the flow of this unified reality. We chop duration into hours, days, years—whatever units we find helpful. But in truth, entities like trees, mountains, stars, or rivers don’t need this structure to exist or persist, even 'you'. They have their own objective duration, their own intrinsic continuity, which is just a part of their existence in reality’s flow.

So, in simple terms, this philosophy says:

• Reality just is and is constantly becoming—a flow of stability and change.
• Entities have duration, which is their natural way of persisting, without needing our idea of “time.”
• We use “time” as a tool to interpret and measure this flow, but it’s not a necessary part of how reality fundamentally operates.

This view invites us to see reality as something organic and interconnected—a vast, seamless process where everything is both stable in what it “is” and constantly unfolding through its “becoming.”

I welcome engagements, conversations and critiques. This is a philosophy in motion, and i'm happy to clarify any confusions that may arise from it's conceptualization.

Note: Stability doesn't imply static of fixidity. A human being is a perfect example of this. On the surface, a person may appear as a stable, identifiable entity. However, at every level, from biological processes to subatomic interactions, there is continuous activity and change. Cells are replaced, blood circulates, thoughts emerge, and subatomic particles move in constant motion. Nothing about a human being remains fixed, yet a coherent form and identity are maintained. Stability here emerges as a dynamic interplay, a persistence that holds form while allowing for movement and adaptation. This emphasizes the concept of stability not as a static, unchanging state but as a fluid resilience, allowing a coherent identity to persist through continuous transformation.

Morality, as it plays out in the physical world, aligns closely with the three types of symbiosis observed in nature. When morality is directed at ourselves, we naturally desire mutualism (+/+), where both parties benefit. We typically overlook commensalism, where one party benefits or struggles without impacting the other (+/0 or -/0). However, we instinctively resist situations of parasitism or predation (+/-), where others benefit at our expense.

Human beings, as apex predators, are uniquely positioned to enact all these forms of symbiosis. We often seek mutualistic relationships, but our role as predators also aligns our behaviors with forms of parasitism or predation, making these dynamics part of our nature.

Interestingly, our attitudes toward different types of organisms reflect this. We commonly view parasites and pests like ticks, tapeworms, or mosquitoes with distaste, as they harm us without offering benefits. Conversely, many of us revere predators such as lions, tigers, and bears (oh my!) —beings we see as fierce but admirable as long as we aren’t their prey.

Where morality becomes complex is in our conflicts over where parasitism and predation are justified. This disagreement introduces an element of randomness, echoing the chaotic nature of Newton's three-body problem, where the gravitational interactions of three bodies result in unpredictable motion. Our varied perceptions of justified "parasitism" or "predation" reflect the challenges of finding consistent moral alignment within humanity.

TED: Video explanation of Newton's Three-Body Problem.

Forgive me as I struggle to articulate this insight. Help me out with your reflections.

The physical sciences are based on the relationship between observer and observed. As it is, the current epistemological assumption is that the objective nature to be observed is "outside" and the scientific observer is the "inside".

However, what this usually means is that the internal paradigm of the observer is not accounted for in the observation. The internal world of the observer is bracketed out as irrelevant to the study, though the observation is still colored and molded by the internal world (paradigm, thoughts, feelings, memories, identity).

The boundery which demarcates the observer and observed is actually relative. What we usually mean by observer in the physical sciences is that which is not observed. However, if we were to observe the inner world of the observer simultaneous with the external "observed" world, we would find that there is no real boundery. All could be said to be observed nature, inner and outer.

The key shift is in recognizing that the true observer is not simply the bracketed out inner world of the scientist, but awareness itself. The pure subject which cannot be made into an object. From the perspective of pure awareness, both inner and outer objects, laws, relationships, and systems are observed as a whole. The paradigm/interpretive structure of the scientist is made transparent as an object of awareness confluent with the observed phenomena, in ecological relationship without a hard boundery. The full picture is gleaned.

All systematic laws applied to the outside world apply to the inside world. There is inner time, and inner space. There is a physics of thought, emotion, and imagery just as with material objects. There is a causality to it, an interdependence which is ignored in the current paradigm and so only half of the story is ever given. Recognizing the observer as awareness, we can create a systematic taxonomy of internal/subtle objects which is continuous with our various physical and biological taxonomies without contradiction. Internal dynamics can be studied and mastered as external dynamics are. Subtle technologies can be built to influence the internal system with the same precision and reliability as physical technology.

I see this as the next logical step for science, as it is nearing the limit for novel material discoveries. It is a paradigm shift which will radically integrate all fields of knowledge into an incredibley precise and rich exploration into a truly unified system of inner and outer universe.

Lol. I couldn't think of a more ultra-cringe headline💅

Genetic homogeneity is the thesis which says that all things must come from things. So, if there's a thing or a substance or stuff, then it must come from a thing, or a substance or stuff. Stuff come from stuff.

But, GH presupposes a type relation between cause and effect. This presupposition is in line with "like must come from like". The classic objection to the principle is an appeal to science. It has been said that science violates GH because organisms can come from a complex set of inorganic molecules and so forth.

1. if the principle fails with life, then the principle is not universal

So, maybe the principle is totally false. Is it?

Q) is it true that only things can bring about things?

How about facts? Presumably all fact-explanations, and also all explanations must have inputs. So facts are either rooted in facts or the principle that all facts are rooted in facts is false. If there is no input, or if input is nothing at all, then there's no explanation and furthermore- no fact-explanation.

R) is there a reason to think that the existential fact cannot be rooted in nonexistential fact(facts that do not pertain to existence)?

Let's take some fact to be standing for a substantive fact like consciousness

Can consciousness be explained in terms of nonsubstantive fact such as nothing? If not, then can nonsubstantive fact stand for some kind of principle whose operations constrain existence of facts in a way mathematical equations can limit possible solutions?

I know a theist will jump and exclaim: "That's God mate, wtf?", but here are some bad news. If nonsubstantive fact such as circumstance or principle which operates in a similar way as laws, modal concepts like necessity or principles of logic, is neither God as the matter of logical truth(tautology) nor is the non-God view of nonsubstantive fact a contradiction. It is a contingent statement that nonsubstantive fact explains existence, and as such, if true, it doesn't become a tautology as the matter of being always true. The sheer possibility that nonsubstantive fact explains why is there something rather than nothing, rules out God, if God is conceived as necessary being(I am not trying to offer a bad response to Anselm's OA)

But we don't care about God, because all we care about here is the existence of consciousness for this matter. If we accept the genetic homogeneity principle, then we commit to the statement that prevents consciousness coming from inorganic matter or matter at all, if conscioisness is not material anyway. But if we accept nonsubstantive fact such as non-theological principle outlined, then we are not commited to genetic homogeneity principle, so we are not conceding the statement "consciousness can only come from consciousness", nor we are commited to ex nihilo principle. Ex nihilo and nonsubstantive principle are mutually exclusive(arguably)

So here's the rub:

1. the explanation for the existence of consciousness must ultimately reach beyond the domain of consciousness

2. if it doesn't, then consciusness is either self-explanatory or there is no explanation for the existence of consciousness, but not both

3. consciousness is not self-explanatory

4. there's either no explanation for the existence of consciousness or the explanation for the existence of consciousness must be beyond the domain of consciousness

What do you guys think?

Edit: I wanted to add that no matter the fact that I'm a good old dualist, I lose my shit when I hear claims that since we cannot jump out of our "mental skin" and look at the world from an "objective" point of view, whatever that means, that's a proof that astral dimensions exist. If there is some "higher" dimension from which consciousness streams, it might well be behind my eyelids.

if we, humanity, were to create a simulation, there must exist some aspect of our originality that would be observable/measurable/perceivable within the simulation; hypothetically, if we were to make a polar-simulation — meaning a simulation where we created a life-form completely different to us — what would that aspect of originality be?

I believe the answer is math.

If you can logically defeat my presumption of the necessity of an essential-aspect of originality from the outside-reality, please do so and I will modify my views/ideologies as appropriate.

https://www.reddit.com/r/HypotheticalPhysics/s/e3EKOcNBA1

The concept of time has always intrigued me, though I would totally admit that I haven’t researched a lot about it. A book, some articles, loads of sci-fi-time related movies So, I was just thinking a lot about time. Nonetheless, it never hindered my thought process after every reading or viewing. Time always seems so fascinating!

I would solemnly admit that I am not writing this as a supposed hypothesis or too much in accordance with science. I guess it’s more philosophic in nature. It was just a thought that crossed my mind which I found interesting and worthy to share.

 A very basic and crude introduction of time would be that, time is the interval between two events. So for 'time' to exist, there has to be a start/birth/initiation of an event. Without any event happening, there will be no concept of ‘time’.

I’m just trying to give you all a glimpse of the exact cases and scenarios that crossed my mind. Try to visualize it deeply. Imagine yourself being turned into a statue, with only your consciousness being intact, inside a totally white-washed room which is completely sealed. No sunlight, no contact, nothing from outside. After some period, you won't be able to tell whether it's day or night (if your biological clock doesn't wakes you up automatically at certain times and you are keeping a count of it). But even if that happens, it’s very probable that you might displace or change your routine someday and glitches in calculation will occur, leading to false sense of time. Now, taking it a step further, consider that you don't even age or sleep (because these are events too, marked by hormonal and physiological changes in the body). Sometimes, later, you won't be able to tell how many days or months it have passed. Time will totally stop for you! Like being suspended in a white limbo for eternity. The only feeling of time you'll be possibly getting, will be, because of your thoughts or thinking firing up the neurons in the brain, which is again an even. So basically, there are these "thought-events" occurring inside your head which are creating the sense of time for you. Now this almost confirms that an event has to occur to give birth to time.

I really don’t believe in giving analogies but trying once. The general conception of time is linear (ignore time travels). So time is like a straight line. But for the line to exist, there has to be an origin of it, a point/dot from where it starts. In-fact, a line is basically a compacted series of points/dots.

Here again, a common query arises. How do we actually know that an event has occurred??? To know or confirm it, there has to be an observer of the event, a witness, which can provide the info about the occurrence. Without observer, nothing will matter.

Maybe now one must surely be wondering that, even if there is no observer, i.e., all human beings, aliens and life are wiped out, the galactic events will still continue to happen. Earth will still revolve around the Sun, stars will still explode, universe will still continue to expand and so one. So there will be a sense of time. But this is where it gets interesting. You see, if you are wondering this, you yourself are the observer in this case. You are observing these galactical events happening inside your head! So basically, time can't exist without an observer and an event. Now, I'm not trying to be spiritual, but just telling that if you believe that events are happening and time is existing, then logically, the observer too has to exist. In our own cases, we are the observers.

But what if we think that our existence itself is an event?? So going back again, if our existence is an event and galactic events are also still happening, then for time to exist, there has to be an observer again!! I guess that might be what they call a God. Kind of a much higher dimensional being, above all and observing all.

These were just a cascade of thoughts. I'm not a believer, but I'm also not an atheist. Maybe an agnostic or seeker. I'm the one witnessing my life completely, experiencing it and living it. When I’m alive, the world is present for me, when I’m dead, the world would be gone for me. Wiped out. My world exists, for me, because, I exist. We are our own God.

Hendricks' two arguments for substance dualism are intended(only as a side point to his major intention) to show that p zombies and inverted qualia arguments entail substance dualism. But he doesn't particularly argue for substance dualism, since his major intention is to propose a certain tertralemma which follows from accepting possibilities of p-zombies and inverted qualia. He introduces a me-zombie which is physically, thus functionally and behaviourally identical to me but it isn't me. Hendricks says that me-zombies are equipossible with p-zombies.

P-zombie argument:

1. p-zombies are possible
2. if p-zombies are possible, then me-zombies are possible
3. if me-zombies are possible, then substance dualism is true
4. therefore, substance dualism is true

Me-zombie being physically(functionally and behaviorally) identical to me, and not being me, means that I am not identical to me-zombie, so I am not identical to my body, thus substance dualism follows.

Hendricks then goes forward and explains that we can make a similar argument for inverted qualia. Inverted qualia is just saying that x's experience of red might be y's experience of green, where y is a me-zombie of x. He proposes that we can invert selves as well. Suppose that Sophia is a lady who works at a factory, has her own desires, beliefs, habits and so forth, and she dies at old age. It looks possible that there could be another self leading Sophia's life, sharing her beliefs, habits and desires, but has a different first-person perspective. Arguably, different first-person perspective entails that selves do not supervene on physical. Hendricks says that inverted qualia and inverted selves are equipossible.

1. inverted qualia are possible
2. if inverted qualia are possible, inverted selves are possible
3. if inverted selves are possible, then substance dualism is true
4. substance dualism is true

Hendricks does not argue for substance dualism in particular, but his intention is to show that accepting p-zombie and inverted qualia as possible, involves a tetralemma where we must commit to one of the options, which is beside the point, because I am only interested in these arguments as arguments for substance dualism.

Share your thoughts

Just for the argument's sake : let's admit that humans could resurrect their beloved dead, from a philosophical point of view, how would it change us (the living) and affect our relationship to the resurrected ?

J.P. Moreland offered an argument from consciousness, which is apparently making the case that the existence of consciousness plausibly entails theism.

Here's the argument:

1. genuinely non-physical mental states exist
2. there's an explanation for the existence of mental states
3. there's a difference between personal and natural scientific explanations
4. explanation for the existence of mental states is either personal or scientific
5. the explanation is not scientific
6. the explanation is personal
7. if 6, then the explanation is theistic
8. the explanation is theistic

The argument seems to be filled with contentious premises, like 1, 2, 4 and 7, but I am curious about 5. Moreland offers some of the reasons for 5. Here are some reasons:

1. epiphenomenalism is false
2. correlation between mind and body is radically contingent
3. uniformity of nature
4. inadequacy of evolutionary explanations

It seems to me that Moreland assumes methodological dualism and then tries to convince others that they should adopt it as well, without giving any explicit reasons with respect to desirable epistemic attitudes or methodological standards(such as methodological dualism), but tacitly presupposing that fishing around will make others subscribe to the position.

Anyway, what is your take and which premises are problematic in your view? Are you convinced by Moreland's argument and why? Why not? Does the idea behind his argument deserve a better argument? Can you offer one?

Time is a measurement of change but it doesn’t have its own inherent existence. Reality is always ever present and the way time is experienced is relative to the observer. Your perception of time can change depending on what you’re doing and how you’re feeling. When we say time is going by fast or that it feels slow that’s not really “time” moving but it’s our relationship to the experience we’re having. If we rewind all the way back to the Big Bang in the singularity, the laws of physics break down because the nature of time doesn’t make sense in that state. Since reality exists, it always has existed, and the “start” was totally timeless. The moment the Big Bang existed in isn’t any different than this moment and that’s the tricky thing about time. For time to exist there must be an infinite amount of realities/moments for the one you exist in, to exist relative to.

This may seem far fetched and selfish but hear me out...

What if I am the only conscious and everything and everyone in my reality is part of this simulation centered around me? If you think about it, it is truly impossible to know this, as my conscious is mine, and I cannot be someone else. Perhaps, everyone I know does not make their own decisions. I don't really know how to explain this, but this is all I have been thinking about this week. This, and the idea that my whole life is a dream.

On the idea that my life is a dream, I have read that some people have taken psychedelics (and some even did not) and they unknowingly went into a dream. Their "dreams" last years and they live whole lives, when they finally awake, they struggle as they have memories and connections with fictitious events. What if, this life is a dream, and when I die, I will awake.

Anyway, sorry for the weird topic, I hope you forgive me I am a mere beginner in the world of philosophical thinking

edit: the lamp looks odd

Let's say the idea of time existing all at once, parallel timelines and reality are true. There would likely be an infinite number of parallel timelines and an infinite different outcomes. Would "you" in another timeline be you? Would the other "you" have the same physical body but a different consciousness?

I need one definition: any unobservable object whose existence is specifically entailed by a theory of physics is a special physical object, and the assertion that for physicalism to be true it must at least be true that all the special physical objects exist.

Given the following three assumptions: 1. any object is exactly one of either abstract or concrete, 2. the concrete objects are all and only the objects that have locations in space and time, 3. no two objects can occupy the same space at the same time, let's consider the case of two metal rings with significantly different diameters.
As these are metal objects they are concrete and have locations in space and time. Associated with each ring is the special physical object which is its centre of gravity and depending on the location in space and time of the rings, the centres of gravity also have locations in space and time. But these are rings of significantly different diameters, so by positioning one within the other their centres of gravity can be made to coincide, and this is impossible, as no two objects can occupy the same space at the same time, so there is at least one special physical object that does not exist.
1) if physicalism is true, all the special physical objects exist
2) not all the special physical objects exist
3) physicalism is not true.

I quoted the first page from the electronic version of Smith's article, and for the rest of the paper there's a link at the bottom of the post.

Mereological universalism—hereafter universalism—is the thesis that necessarily,

any (material) objects whatsoever compose another (material) object. Universalists have found it necessary to argue for their position and it is not hard to see why. Pretheoretically, while it is plausible to believe that there are composite objects, it is also plausible to deny that the Taj Mahal, the Stanley Cup, and Michael Jackson’s nose compose something. But if universalism is true, there is something composed by the Taj Mahal, the Stanley Cup, and Michael Jackson’s nose. Pretheoretically, then, it is plausible to believe mereological restrictivism—hereafter restrictivism—the thesis that there are composite objects and possibly, some objects fail to compose something.

Surely, some reason is needed for believing universalism. In this paper, I investigate one of the more influential reasons for so believing, what I will call ‘the Vagueness

2 Argument’. The argument has been defended by David Lewis (1986) and more recently 3 by Theodore Sider (1997, 2001). The Vagueness Argument, so I argue, fails to adequately support universalism. Throughout, I assume the falsity of mereological nihilism, the thesis that necessarily, there are no composite objects. An argument for nihilism—and an argument is surely needed here, as well—would also serve to defeat universalism and thereby falsify some premise of the Vagueness Argument. Moreover, my aim here is to defend restrictivism—the intuitive view about composition—against an influential argument.

1. The Vagueness Argument

Proponents of the Vagueness Argument think that if restrictivism is true, then it can be vague whether composition occurs and that it cannot be vague whether composition occurs. Given the assumption that composition occurs—that nihilism is false—it follows that universalism is true. Here, then, is the Vagueness Argument:

(1) If restrictivism is true, then it can be vague whether composition occurs.

(2) It cannot be vague whether composition occurs. Therefore, (3) Restrictivism is false. (4) Composition does occur. Therefore, (5) Universalism is true

Link: https://philarchive.org/archive/SMITVA

I've been getting into philosophical metaphysics and have been reading a book called scholastic metaphysics by Edward Feser. In the book he described act, what an object is, and potency, what an object could be and describes both as making up the whole of an object. So for example a red rubber ball has in act the colour red, a spherical shape and being made of rubber, and in potency can be melted, or moving or bouncing.

The problem here is that potency of the ball is not restricted by extrinsic factors, for example to melt the ball you need to heat it up. If this is the case then couldn't the potency of anything be to become anything else?

In modern physics we know that everything is made up of the same elementary particles, quarks, leptons and bosons and we know that these elementary particles can turn into each other (a quark can turn into a boson which then turns into a lepton, for instance). Because an objects potency isn't limited by possible environment factors, doesnt that mean that everything has the same infinite potency? With enough steps you can turn a rubber ball into a nuclear bomb, or a human, or a puff of smoke, because fundamentally everything is made of the same stuff, energy.

That would also mean that everything has the power to do everything, given enough steps. This seems like it makes the whole concept of stochastic metaphysics completely useless, because everything has no unique definition with regards to both it's act and potency and ONLY has a unique distinction in its act. You could maybe put a restriction on what potencies are valid for a given actuality but then what is that restriction? Why is that restriction in place? Etc.

What do you peeps think?

Is perception paradoxical? How come we can only see others from the third person point of view but we can only see ourselves from the first person point of view. Everyone can see you from the third person point of view but they can only see themselves from the first person point of view. Could this be due to the nature of the observer? The observer is always observing what it sees but it cannot see what it is. If you were to hypothetically jump outside of your body and perceive yourself externally you would still be incased in another layer of perception as you wouldn’t be able to see what’s seeing your body. And so as the observer you can keep zooming out but what’s observing can’t see what it is so as long as it is an observer.

1_Whatever exists, exists either by virtue of itself or by virtue of another.
2_The universe does not exist by its own virtue.
Conclusion: the universe exists by virtue of another, (ps: and this "other" is what we call God)

the reason for this is that I can conceive of the universe not existing, which implies that existence is not an intrinsic property of the universe; in other words, it is contingent.)

First-person facts are facts like having this experience right now. My native language has a colloquial term 'first-hand view'. Anyway.

Let us have two agents A and B. A's and B's first-person facts are non-compossible. What this means is that two facts cannot be co-instantiated as first-person facts. If their FPF are non-compossible, then they're incompatible.

For two facts to be compossible, these facts must remain invariant under the shift of perspectives, therefore we have an immediate implication that all first-person facts are non-compossible. There are certain issues with that move, but I won't get into that here.

Composable facts are facts that can be co-instantiated. No two non-compossible facts can be co-instantiated, therefore no two non compossible facts are composable.

Coherence thesis is the view that the world is not constituted by incompatible facts.

Possible worlds are possible states of affairs that are composable. Impossible worlds are non-composable states of affairs.

If the actual world is constituted by non-composable facts, then the actual world is an impossible world. Moreover, all 'possible worlds' containing conscious beings are impossible worlds, so there is no possible world containing mental subjects. At least prima facie.

Notice that this bears to two theses:

i) absolutism: the view that the constitution of the world is absolute(non-relative to perspectives)

ii) perspectival neutrality: the view that no first-person fact is priviledged

So if composable facts require compatibility of A's and B's first person facts to be composable, then the actual world violates coherence thesis.

I won't get into issues right now, so I'll just make a quick argument:

1. if we don't live in the impossible world, then all facts of the world are composable

2. if all facts of the world are composable, then first-person facts are compossible

3. first-person facts aren't compossible

4. we live in the impossible world

Are the totality of the facts in the actual world composable?

Let's assume that the actual world is populated by large body of facts which constitute the actual world. All these facts should be composable. For the facts in the world to be composable, it is possible to instantiate those facts at the same time in the world. Non-composable facts are mutually incompatible, thus the world constituted by non-composable facts would be an impossible world.

What is the criteria to determine a posteriori if the actual world is an impossible world? Surely some philosophers a priori eliminated impossible worlds to be actualizable. But is there a sort of 'one miracle would do' type of criteria?

Is a posteriori analysis even legitimate for this case? I don't see why not, but it's hard to see how it would be decisive.

In a convo with u/jliat I suddenly remembered Jacques Vallee's book 'messengers of deception' in which he suggested the idea that the world works by means of association. Suggesting the immediate similarity with Ralph Cudworth's 'plastic nature' is maybe a stretch, but here is idea, quote:

Time and space may be convenient notions for plotting the progress of a locomotive, but they are completely useless for locating information … What modern computer scientists have now recognized is that ordering by time and space is the worst possible way to store data. In a large computer-based information system, no attempt is made to place related records in sequential physical locations. It is much more convenient to sprinkle the records through storage as they arrive, and to construct an algorithm for the retrieval based on some kind of keyword. So if there is no time dimension as we usually assume there is, we may be

traversing events by association. Modern computers retrieve information associatively. You “evoke” the desired records by using keywords, words of power: (using a search engine,) you request the intersection of “microwave” and “headache,” and you find twenty articles you never suspected existed … If we live in the associative universe of the software scientist rather than the sequential universe of the spacetime physicist, then miracles are no longer irrational events.

I'm not sure how relevant though, since I'm not sure if Vallee's suggestion bears to non-composable facts, but it sounds interesting.

Anyway, does anybody here believe that impossible worlds are actualizable?

What makes 'now' now? What if what we call 'now' is just a 'then' moment from the past or the future? As time travel appears theoretically possible in a single universe then there can be no objective 'now', just a scale of 'thens' experienced as a relative 'present'.

What if what we call 'now' is just a 'then' moment from a past or a future? If there are multiple universes, I arrive at the same conclusion, as we cannot state that any sense of 'now' exists synchronously or simultaneously across the multiverse. Synchronicity or simultaneousness loses their objective meaning in a multiverse.

If what makes 'now' now simply the perceived arrival of sensory input then time is surely more relative a condition than most would believe. In that case, I assume that 'now' can theoretically be experienced both simultaneously across 'time' in this universe and asynchronously across the multiverse.

I am interested in any feedback on these thoughts and questions.

Van Inwagen believes that God can ressurect the body, iff, the body has been preserved in nearly identical state to the state of the body before the moment of death.

God somehow replaces the newly dead body with an imitation and stores the original body who knows where, until the day of ressurection.

Sounds like ancient egyptian's mummification logic made supernatural, but note that van Inwagen's materialistic metaphysics motivates him to believe in this type of body swapping procedure.

Sounds as bizarre as Karla Turner's books "Into the fringe" and "Taken". The issue is that Turner's story seems to be more plausible than theology van Inwagen runs.

Surely van Inwagen believes that cremated bodies won't be reassembled, because God has no powers to recollect molecules of a cremated body in the same way he does for persons that were not incinerated. The reason is that mere reassembling doesn't do justice to natural processes involved with the existing person when the person was alive. These cremated persons will be lost and the best God can do is to reassemble a perfect duplicate, but preserving no original individual.

It sounds bizarre that the way you die decides if you'll be ressurected or not, lost forever or flying round the heaven on a golden chariot like Helios, for eternity, besides other moral conditions which are typically assumed to bear the crucial importance for ressurection purposes. In fact, van Inwagen says- you can stick your benevolence, altruism and all good deeds of yours straight back into your ass, because if cremation happens you're gone forever.

The other strange thing is that van Inwagen prohibits God to restore broken causal chain, but body swapp? No problem- says van Inwagen. God can do it, because I say so- chuckles van Inwagen, and continues to misread Chomsky's literature, while inventing some new logical loop as he should be doing🤡(half joking)

Do physicalist christians agree with van Inwagen? What are some good counters to his account?

I’m fascinated by how eternalism (where past, present and future moments exist simultaneously) intersects with questions of free will and determinism. If future moments are as real as present ones, this seems to raise deep questions about whether our choices are truly ‘free’ or are fixed aspects of an eternal block universe. What are the strongest metaphysical arguments you’ve encountered regarding how eternalism impacts our understanding of agency, causation, and predestination?

There is a popular complaint the term “physical”, central to many metaphysical discussions, is ill-defined. Here’s a shot at silencing it.

My idea is to formulate recursive definitions consisting of a base clause stipulating certain paradigmatic cases of physical objects, together with recursive clauses showing what else counts as physical given some things do.

This idea yields at least two definitions, corresponding to different base clauses. Each definition has its own advantages and shortcomings.

The recursive clause is the same in either case. It is mereological in nature:

Recursion: if some Xs are all physical objects, and some Ys are among the parts of the Xs, then the fusion of the Ys is a physical object too.

Because of the way plural variables work, this clause says any fusion of physical objects and any part of a physical object is itself physical. As a result, it conflicts with a few metaphysical doctrines such as versions of trope theory or Aristotelian realism, that claim physical particulars have non-physical parts. Hence, neither of our definitions are completely theoretically neutral. Whether that is a bug or a feature I’ll let you decide.

Now our base clauses:

Ordinary Base: Macroscopic ordinary sized objects such as tables, persons, trees etc. are physical.

Theoretical Base: The theoretical entities of fundamental physics (particles, fields etc.) are physical.

So our definitions consist in two:

D1) Ordinary Base + Recursion

D2) Theoretical Base + Recursion

A few remarks on each of them.

D2 has an interesting advantage over D1, namely that it is practically feasible to completely state its base clause: if you think the theoretical entities of fundamental physics are just the particles of the standard model, e.g., you can just list them. On the other hand, although you intuitively know which objects fall under D1’s base clause — tables, cars, rocks, etc. — listing them all is a superhuman task. Not impossible — not even physically impossible, let alone logically — but definitely not practically.

Moreover, there are cases where you’ll waver on whether a given object falls under D1’s base clause or not: does the Champs-Élysées? What about the whole of Paris? And the entirety of France? What about an amoeba barely visible under the naked eye? Some of you will respond differently. This doesn’t mean you’ll end up with different extensions for D1—the recursive clause can make up for individual differences. Still, this counts as a flaw in my eyes.

But D1’s problems are compensated by a very important advantage over D2, namely that what counts as physical might change too frequently under D2. For accepted theories change, and with them, the theoretical posits. Yet we’d like a fundamental term such as “physical” to not fluctuate in meaning across these changes of opinion. After all, it fixes what those opinions are about.

Finally, how to formulate physicalism might vary with our definitions. Suppose you adopt D2—then defining physicalism as the thesis that everything is physical may be reasonable enough. Not if you adopt D1. For then there might be theoretical posits of physics that do not fall under D2’s extension, such as force fields, and therefore do not count as physical.

Edit: There is a further problem for D1. Suppose we discover particles that are not parts nor fusions of parts of the sort of thing picked out by Ordinary Base. Then they won’t count as physical. Yet we’d like to count them as physical anyway. This, together with the rest, may spell decisive doom for D1. Plus, I think the problem of variation of meaning of D2 might be solved by appeal to an ideal theory, not too far off from current physics. Then the tenability of D2 rests on the hope we’re not so very wrong about physics.