Hello, I invite you to join this newly created discord community where we discuss Eastern Philosophies and Religions. Here you could find friends who might be in a similar predicament as you!

Server invite: https://discord.gg/sangha-1186306502663876628

I am also open to any questions regarding Philosophy or Buddhism, so feel free to message me on discord about anything!

I am looking for other infinitists and their practical reasons for being one. No you dont have to give me an infinite series of reasons.

It's my understanding that the Münchhausen Trilemma puts all lines of reasoning into one of three buckets. Foundationalism, coherentism, or infintism. You don't have to be an infinitist to answer why you think it appeals to others, but I would not be truthful if I did not admit I am looking for people who are infinitists. The Münchhausen Trilemma has caused some to say that reasons are not a way someone can gain knowledge, but then the Münchhausen Trilemma shouldn't be a reason to conclude that statement. I've been pushed to Epistemological Skeptism and therfore Skeptism of everything. It's been difficult for me to find someone else who would consider themselves an infinitist. Thank you.

Like you would explain it to a high schooler with an above average intelligence who has never been exposed to these concepts. Apologies if this is too dumb a question.

I tried to create a mind map of my general conception of virtue epistemology after a semester of class. It's imperfect, and this isn't to turn in, I just thought I'd post this and see what sort of feedback I receive. I apologize in advance for what may not be legible. I will try to provide clarity for any confusion people may have.

He conjures up this assumption that there is an evil demon that deceives him in every possible turn yet doesn't realize that this can never come to pass because 1) if the demon existed he would deceive you about him deceiving you, when in actually he doesn't deceive you at all and 2) he would deceive you about his existence when he actually doesn't exist

So if he exists--> he doesn't exist and thus no deception and if he doesn't exsit then he doesn't exist and thus no deception

Instead he attempts to "doubt everything" when in fact he doesn't doubt fundamental things such as: the language he uses to doubt, the existence of the evil demon, causality (the evil demon is causing him to be deceived) etc. Why did he struggle so much with this evil demon concept?

Imagine I say that "I know that gravity exists due to the gravitational force between objects affecting each other" (or whatever the scientific explanation is) and then someone says "I know that gravity is caused by the invisible tentacles of the invisible flying spaghetti monster pulling objects towards each other proportional to their mass". Now how can you justify your claim that the person 1 knows how gravity works and person 2 does not? Since the claim is unfalsifiable, you cannot falsify it. So how can anyone ever claim that they "know" something? Is there something that makes an unfalsifiable claim "false"?

A Cavalcade of Psychiatric Fallacies Fallacies: Formal vs. Informal – Taxonomy of Fallacies Deductive arguments: sound: = valid + true premises valid: = the formal logical property of a deductive argument whereby true premises would necessarily lead to a true conclusion: in which it is impossible for (all) the premises to be true yet the conclusion false. Logical form: In order for a deductive argument to be sound, it must be valid in form, and its premises must all be true or accepted as true. To conclude (infer/make an inference: deductive, inductive, or abductive) To conclude that the conclusion (Q) is true by making an argument: a set of propositions (i.e., bivalent declarative sentences) wherein the last sentence is the (final) conclusion and all the preceding sentences are premises to that (final) conclusion. An argument can have intermediate conclusions which each individually support the final conclusion (whereby: the final conclusion is premised upon those intermediate conclusions: Ex.: P1. Socrates is human. P2. All humans are mortal. P3. Socrates is mortal. | by {P1, P2}, where P3: = Q1 (for “Conclusion” #1). P4. No mortal can live for eternity. __________________________________________ Q2. (Conclusion #2): Socrates will not live forever. This argument is valid in form, therefore: If all the premises are in fact true, then the argument’s (final) conclusion must also be true.

If one accepts that (all) the premises are true, then one must also accept the conclusion to be true. One cannot accept all the premises of a valid argument yet deny the conclusion (i.e., accept that it is false), nor can one even reject the conclusion (i.e., not accept that it is true).

The premises internally consistent set of statements If (all) the premises of a deductive argument are true, then the conclusion must also be true. The validity of an argument is a conditional statement about it: If the premises are true, then the conclusion must also be true. P  C If one accepts all the premises of a valid argument to be true, then one must also accept the conclusion. One cannot reject a validly deduced conclusion without being irrational. If one accepts the premises of a valid argument yet denies or even rejects the conclusion, one is thereby made irrational or illogical. < is engaged in irrationality or illogic>

Logical form vs. material form Logical implication vs. material implication.

A set of statements is consistent if all the statements can be true together: that is, a set of statements which are jointly possible.

Contradiction [at least one contradiction exists up to and including all contradictions exist.] Consistency: joint possibility (satisfiability) [no contradiction exists] Joint Possibility: Propositions Xi: {X1, X2, …, Xn} are jointly possible if they can all be true (together, at the same time, in the same sense). If at least one contradiction exists, then the set is inconsistent. Entailment: P logically implies Q is equivalent to P entails Q: P |= Q. P |=Q is moreover equivalent to P |- Q. Note: The symbol |- denotes ‘yields’ (i.e., results in, produces, etc.) |= : is called “double turnstile” and denotes ‘logical entailment’ |–: is called “single turnstile” and denotes ‘logical yield’ ≡>: denotes “logically implies”. Sound: = Valid & (All) True Premises Valid: = In such a logical form in which it is impossible for all the premises to be true but the conclusion to be false.

Validity Test Steps: Grant the premises as true: accept that all the premises Pi are true. Negate the conclusion: apply a negation (~) to the conclusion (C) resulting in: ~C. Check whether a contradiction arises! (between the premises and the conclusion). If no contradiction arises, then the argument is invalid because it is possible for all the premises to be true but their conclusion to be false: by def.’n : = an invalid argument. If a contradiction does arise, then the argument is valid because it is not possible for all the premises to be true but their conclusion false, which is what the contradiction between the premises and the conclusion indicates. A valid argument is one that is in such a form that precludes all the premises being true yet the conclusion false, in which true premises would necessarily lead to a true conclusion. If all the propositions of an argument are jointly possible (i.e., consistent with one another: not contradicting each other): that is, all the premises and the conclusion must be a consistent set of propositions: i.e., which are jointly possible together. , then….

Formal fallacies: only having to do with logical form (i.e., validity) Informal fallacies: not having to do with logical form (at all) but having to do only with the content of the argument which relate to the soundness of the deductive argument which addresses both validity, which goes to logical form as well as the content – to whether or not it is true: i.e., whether or not it comports with reality (i.e., is externally consistent with reality).

Informal Fallacies: Fallacies without respect to logical form: not a question of whether the argument is valid or not, Validity For a valid argument, the truth of the premises necessitates the conclusion also being true, AND/OR accepting the premises as true rationally compels one to also accept the conclusion, otherwise, one is being irrational, illogical, and in conflict with sound logical reasoning. A valid argument: all the premises being true necessitates (ex., guarantees) with absolute certainty (100% confidence level) that the conclusion must also be true. An invalid argument: all the premises being true does not necessitate the conclusion being true: the conclusion may or may not be true, and the argument has not accomplished proving its conclusion is true. All invalid arguments are fallacious. A fallacious argument: an argument that takes the form of a logical fallacy: a structure of arguments that commit a fallacy of particular kind. For example, ‘The Argument from Ignorance Fallacy’ Arg.of.Ignor.: Proposition X is true because ~X has not (yet) been proven true or cannot be proven true. Ex1. God exists because no one has ever proven that god does not exist. God exists because god is unfalsifiable: god’s existence cannot be falsified (proven (to be false). This has to do with whether god’s existence is not falsified/has not been falsified (yet), etc. Ex. 2. God exists (proposition G [is true]) because no one will ever be able to prove that god does not exist. This has to do with whether falsifying god’s existence cannot be done/will not be able to be done, etc. Ex. 3. It is possible for god to exist because the impossibility of god’s existence has not been proven/cannot be proven. All the above three arguments fall within the category of arguments called “the argument from ignorance (argumentum ad ignorantiam)’ because they take a particular logical form: X is true because X has not been or cannot be proven false. OR X is false because X has not been or cannot be proven true. Soundness  Validity + Truth (of Premises) Soundness addresses

Inductive arguments: cogent: = strongly supported by the premises demonstrating that the conclusion is probably true. Neuroleptics ‘lower dopaminergic activity’. Neuroleptics are thought to suppress positive symptoms of schizophrenia Double Blind Studies: Invalidating the procedure by undoing the blinding. Atropine in placebo: Atropine is psychotropically neutral: it has no mental effects (and is presumed to be such by default until such time as the contrary has been demonstrated). When people take atropine, they get side effects such as dry mouth, blurred vision, sensitivity to bright light, dizziness, nausea, etc. and they think they have been given the (psychotropically) active drug. An SSRI’s effects are not greater than this amplified placebo effect = placebo effect + subject’s role in recognizing that an active drug has been given to the subject. That is why in randomized control trials (RCT’s), atropine or something equivalent in effect ought to be used. When the placebo group receive the amplified placebo (= placebo + atropine), We can thereby isolate the effect that adding the atropine would have on the test:

Placebo: {placebo effect, its amplified effect – due to atropine being added to it and used conjunction with it.} SSRI Antidepressant Group: { placebo, SSRI, amplified effect of SSRI but not of placebo (since the SSRI group was not given any placebo (whether amplified or not).

H0: This drug has no mental effect. H1: This drug has some mental effect(s). , two major types of which consist of delusions and hallucinations in short-term studies (6-8 weeks). Nothing can be further from the truth. Safety & Efficacy [ Neuroleptics treat positive symptoms of schizophrenia (or psychosis) by superimposing onto the effects of psychotic illness: namely, the symptoms of psychosis, rather than acting on the cause: i.e., the source of the symptoms.

Disease centered view Drug centered view: neuroleptics work to treat psychosis by inducing mental and physical effects which are conducive to the alleviation of the symptoms: by suppressing positive symptoms of psychotic illness. A neuroleptic’s therapeutic effects are derived from their superimposition onto the symptoms of schizophrenia/psychosis targeted for treatment rather than by reversing an underlying brain abnormality: such as a bio-chemical imbalance: namely dopamine dysregulation: hyperactive dopaminergic neurotransmitter system (i.e., hyperactive dopamine pathways): due to amount of dopamine released, the rate of release, receptor density, receptor affinity state (the chemical binding strength with which dopamine binds to the receptors: the greater the affinity, the more tightly dopamine binds to the receptor.

Receptor density: = d: = # receptors in unit surface area (available for binding) Receptor affinity: = chemical binding strength of ligand to receptor (forming ligand-receptor complex): ξX + ρR  ωX-R r_f= k_f *[X]^ξ 〖 * [R]〗^ρ r_r= k_r *[X-R]^ω At equilibrium: the forward rate (r_f) equals the reverse rate (r_r), from which it follows (that): k_f *[X]^ξ 〖 * [R]〗^ρ= k_r *[X-R]^ω Equilibrium association constant: K_a=k_f/k_r = ([X-R]^ω)/([X]^ξ 〖 * [R]〗^ρ ) Equilibrium dissociation constant〖: K〗_d= k_r/k_f = ([X]^ξ 〖 * [R]〗^ρ)/([X-R]^ω )

Special case: ξ = 1, and ρ =1, and ω = 1 Non-special cases: ω ≠1, or ρ≠1, or ω ≠ 1

The lesser the value of the dissociation constant, the greater the affinity (i.e., binding strength) of the receptor-ligand complex. Ligand: whatever binds to a receptor is called a ligand: (it can be a neurotransmitter or a pharmaceutical agent) ex. dopamine (itself), dopamine agonists, dopamine antagonists, dopamine inverse agonists, and dopamine partial agonists. Receptor: a binding site.

See: CHE Reactor Analysis II

Potency: Potency through affinity and intrinsic activity (relationship).

EC50 Follies and Fallacies in Medicine Source of Ref.1: British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data; “FOLLIES AND FALLACIES IN MEDICINE” Third Edition, by Petr Skrabanek & James McCormick: 1. Medicine I. Title II. McCormick, James 610; ISBN 1 870781 09 0 "Non-diseases have one important characteristic which we have hitherto neglected: they are incurable.Because they are incurable there are no possible advantages of therapy.All therapeutic activity directed at non-diseases is harmful; sometimes the harm is substantial." [Pg.86] – Petr Skrabanek & James McCormick

〈█("An association,if biologically plausible,may suggest a causal link @but proof is only obtainable by experiment".[Pg.21] @- Petr Skrabanek & James McCormick)〉

〈█("Coma in diabetics may be due to either too little or too much insulin,@ and since these two states may be difficult to distinguish in the first instance,@ proper first aid is to administer sugar,@because insulin excess is more immediately dangerous and less easily reversible." )〉

My notes: Diagnosing a non-disease is more common than missing a diagnosis of an existent illness (that is actually present). Type I Error = a false positive: Ex.’s, diagnosing a person as having a disease when one is absent, or convicting the innocent

Type II Error = a false negative: Ex.’s, failing to diagnose someone as having an illness that is present, or acquitting the guilty

Consequences of a Type I Error: Unnecessary treatment Diminished perception of health & encouraged to become and remain sick Doctors are at no risk of being sued over a misdiagnosis Correcting this type of error is unusual and difficult

Consequences of a Type II Error: Legal action for negligence Moral condemnation This type of error may be corrected when the disease becomes more florid, more readily apparent

A necessary cause does not have to also be a sufficient cause. A necessary cause is not necessarily both a necessary and a sufficient cause. If one smokes cigarettes, one will die: => smoking cigarettes is a sufficient cause of death. If one dies, then one must have smoked cigarettes:=> smoking cigarettes is a necessary cause of death.

Not all people who smoke cigarettes die: that is, smoking cigarettes is not a sufficient cause of death. (Not a sufficient cause: b/c for some people smoking cigarettes does not lead to death). Not all people who die have smoked cigarettes: that is, smoking cigarettes is not a necessary cause of death. (Not a necessary cause: b/c there are other ways to die other than by having been a smoker of cigarettes) Therefore, smoking cigarettes is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of death, but it is a cause, nonetheless. All causes can be exhaustively categorized as follows: [I]. Sufficient [II]. Necessary [III]. Neither or some combination thereof inclusively disjoined: {[I] and [II]} i.or {[II] and [III]} i.or {[I] and [III]}; i.or := inclusive or; or = disjunction; Any cause has to belong to one of the following categories: Therefore, a cause can be:

1. Sufficient Cause
2. Necessary Cause
3. Necessary & Sufficient Cause
4. Neither Necessary nor Sufficient Cause

Events A and B may have the following five relationships with one another:

A causes B (i.e., A is the cause, B is the effect)
B causes A (i.e., B is the cause, A is the effect)
A and B cause each other (either simultaneously or in sequence)
A and B are both caused by a third event C (i.e., C is the cause, A and B are the effects).
A and B are connected only coincidentally: i.e., A and B coincide; that is, A and B are associated by chance: i.e., there is no causal relationship between events A and B.

Are there any arguments against the claim that there are no objective truths, only subjective ones?

Basically, this is a skeptical scenario where the truth or falsity of a belief is placed into doubt, but how the belief is based on reality, before we can say that it is justified. Are there any proposed solutions here? I've only seen one response and it doesn't seem to be discussed a lot.

Here is the source

I thought this group would find this note interesting, despite being a bit closer to pure math than epistemology. Specifically, I talk at length about the Kolmogorov Complexity of a graph (math) but then I get into its connections to Ramsey Theory (starting to look like epistemology), specifically, that as objects get larger, they can have more diverse properties. This is intuitively the case since e.g., a rock can be thrown, whereas an asteroid could disrupt the gravitational field of a planet.

What's incredible about Ramsey Theory is that it's pure math, it has nothing to do with physics, and there are a ton of results that show that as objects get larger, certain properties must exist with certainty (i.e. it's not probabilistic).

One thing I show is that the number of properties that are possible must also increase as a function of scale. So Ramsey Theory tells us that as things get larger, we know certain substructures must exist. But what I discuss in this note, is that as objects get larger, the set of properties that they're capable of having also grows larger.

There's a bunch of other interesting stuff discussed about complexity in the context of infinite sets.

Comments and thoughts are welcomed!

https://derivativedribble.wordpress.com/2024/03/16/on-the-complexity-of-a-graph/

I've reflected on some of the ideas I shared before and developed new ones. You can refer to my previous post on my profile to better understand this perspective. I won't reiterate everything from scratch, as I believe these new ideas will clarify my previous writing.

Let's imagine a chessboard with coins on each square. In the first scenario, the coins are arranged with heads on one half and tails on the other. In the second scenario, the heads and tails are randomly distributed. The entropy is lower in the first scenario and higher in the second. When we consider this system over time, entropy will always increase due to statistics.

The information in the first scenario is less than in the second because of the lower entropy. Systems with low entropy typically have less disorder, requiring less information to describe, such as "heads on one half, tails on the other." In the second scenario, almost every square's state needs to be individually described, representing the information in the second scenario.

Now, let's think about data instead of information. Are the data in the first and second scenarios different? No, the sizes of the data (raw data) are the same in both cases. This is because we use 64 data points to represent the two states of 64 different squares. These data go through a kind of compression algorithm, and we obtain more abstract, called information, like "half heads, half tails."

Let's consider these scenarios over time. At the beginning, we have a chessboard with low entropy, easily describable in a single sentence. At the end, it's describable only in 64 different sentences. As time progresses, entropy always increases. The increasing "information" mentioned in the increasing entropy is the degree of abstraction the system allows us, i.e., the maximum level of abstraction used. If we had wanted, at the beginning, instead of maximizing abstraction, we could have used 64 different sentences, but we didn't because we maximized the level of abstraction, which makes more sense in everyday life.

By the way, the "abstraction limit" I mentioned here is the highest level of abstraction without loss of information. There's always some loss of information in each abstraction process, but in abstractions where the limit isn't exceeded, there's no loss of information.

As entropy increases, our ability to abstract decreases. If we can't abstract enough, how will we convey information? We won't; we'll only convey its appearance, its observable part. We'll convey its "randomness." Apart from stochastic systems, there's no ontological randomness in any system. If it's mentioned, it's because the data in that system couldn't be abstracted enough. And when we forcibly abstract, exceeding its limit, we'd see something like noise or randomness emerging. Calling these data random due to their inability to be abstracted leads to significant data loss. For example, with the sentence from the first scenario, we could indeed arrange the chessboard without needing more information, but with the sentence from the second scenario, i.e., with the "random" information, we can't definitively arrange the chessboard in that "randomness."

Most abstraction processes result in information loss due to exceeding their limit. In everyday life, a natural language is an example of this in abstract concepts. Expressing some concepts in natural languages and conveying their information to others is very difficult. This indicates that the abstraction limit for these concepts is low. We can say that the entropy of these concepts is high.

Hi,
Can you please suggest movies and/ or documentaries on the impossibilty of escaping our unconscious conditioning/ socialization.
I'm thinking of the Iceberg Theory (Edward T Hall) where 90% of our culture is concealed from us though it drives our lifestyle and actions.
I'm also thinking of systems theory where brain is society/ environments/ our experiences.

Maybe there are documentaries on how (a) our experiences (b) our environments are inextricably part of our brains therefore perceptions?

Thanks!

Heyo! I run a blog called Going Awol where I wrote about philosophy. Here’s a piece is just wrote about the epistemology of conspiracy theories, if anyone here is into that. I argue there are good prima facie reasons to be suspicious of most conspiracy theories prior to looking at the evidence, but there’s no blanket reason why conspiracy theories as a genre are prima facie irrational, and oftentimes we should hold our pre-investigation suspicions loosely https://open.substack.com/pub/wollenblog/p/how-to-treat-conspiracy-theories?r=2248ub&utm_medium=ios

Pretty much what is said in the title.. Does objective truth exist and if yes how can we know that it does?

https://the-lessthannothing.blogspot.com/

Hi there! I'm running a blog called 'Less Than Nothing', where I speak about Science and Philosophy, I recently spoke about the nature of Human Inquiry into reality, specifically relating to universal constants and their bearing on the formation of a fundamental theory of reality, if this sounds interesting to you, I want to start a nuanced discussion around this topic, so please provide your perspective.

Imagine Wikipedia, but each page is just a one sentence proposition, for example "The earth is round".

On the same page are links to other propositions that justifies the current proposition. And there can be links to external sources, just like Wikipedia has.

Is it possible to break down the world's knowledge into really small parts this way? A large list of propositions that form a huge graph of dependencies.

What else do we need to make this practical and feasible?

All concepts lie on a spectrum between abstract and concrete, and the relationships between concepts can be explained through this spectrum. All concepts are either the abstract or concrete form of each other. Algorithms abstract or concretize concepts, introducing new concepts to us. I'll come back to algorithms later. For example, in mathematics, abstracting "3 apples" yields "the number 3". Numbers are further abstracted with variables, transitioning into a more abstract form. Variables are then abstracted into functions, becoming even more abstract. Calculus is even more abstract in comparison. In a more general sense, physics is the concrete form of mathematics.

Not all concretizations lead to a single outcome. The concretization of multiple concepts can result in concepts that are the same. For instance, computer science is a more concrete form of mathematics.

The more abstract something is, the more judgments we can make about it. Philosophical perspectives work this way too. By abstracting facts into basic propositions, they can make judgments about many things. Group theory in abstract algebra, for example, encompasses all of number theory because of its high level of abstraction, allowing for many judgments. Those that interact with us physically are the most concrete form we can perceive. Are there more concrete forms beyond those that we can interact with physically? We don't know.

Algorithms are what abstract concepts. Algorithms can be processors, consciousness, or natural laws. How can a natural law be an algorithm? The law of evolution can abstract a concrete organism into abstract species through probability and statistics. Are probability and statistics algorithms then? Yes, algorithms can be something abstract. For instance, computer algorithms abstract the electromagnetic environment and concretize Boolean algebra. When you apply the laws of computer science in a space other than the electromagnetic one, you end up with something other than a computer, showing that the electromagnetic space serves merely as a platform.

For algorithms to emerge, other concepts must either be abstracted or concretized.

For an algorithm to be distinct from the concepts involved, it only needs to behave like an algorithm compared to other concepts. For example, by concretizing electromagnetism, we create computer processors; here, electromagnetism is the abstract concept, computer processors are the concrete concept, and algorithms are the laws of physics. Computer processors function thanks to the laws of physics.

Knowledge is a concept that we can obtain by abstracting data. Hence, it takes up less space than data. Knowledge doesn't necessarily have to be within the data itself. Algorithms can derive other information from data. Suppose we have data consisting of 1s and 0s, representing an image file stored on a computer. How does the computer, or algorithm, know that this data represents an image? Knowledge doesn't always reside within the data; rather, it's the algorithm itself that uncovers knowledge. Can we speak of the existence of knowledge? If we only have data, then no. But if we have an algorithm that processes the data and thereby extracts knowledge, then at that moment, the knowledge exists, and if that moment has passed, then the knowledge does not exist.

The transmission of knowledge requires the concretization of knowledge, i.e., its transformation into data. When people communicate, they transform knowledge into sound data using the rules of natural language and specific templates, transmitting these sound data by vibrating the air. Here, knowledge is first abstracted into sound data through the rules of language and algorithms in the brain. However, this level of concretization is not sufficient for the transmission of knowledge; these sound data are also transmitted to the physical environment by vibrating air molecules through the algorithms of biological accents, creating kinetic energy. The abstract concept known as knowledge is now nothing more than the kinetic energy resulting from the vibration of air molecules. The recipient, through the algorithm of the ear, converts the concrete vibration into sound data, abstracting it. But this level of abstraction is not enough for the existence of knowledge; the algorithms in the brain that use the rules of language must transform this sound data into knowledge, and thus the transmission of knowledge occurs. For the transmission of knowledge, both the sender and the receiver must have processors capable of abstracting-concretizing operations.

Mathematics, physics, and other fields can be obtained by abstracting. Hence, they take up less space than physics and similar fields. With less, they can make more judgments. Similarly, the weights of artificial neural networks are smaller than the dataset used to train them, yet they can generate similar data to those in the dataset.

When I attempted to consider the new topics in physics from this perspective, I came to the following conclusion. In the holographic principle, the 2-dimensional space where the data that ensures the existence of knowledge is found is concretized by the universe into a 4, 10, or 11-dimensional space. I've tried thinking about other topics in physics from this perspective, but I haven't written them here.

"There's always going to be a mountain behind the mountain" Such an inspiring words said by the Arts museum volunteer, about the work of an artist The Smaller one is always getting beaten by the larger one.

In the knowledge domain, How could one know where he is without comparing thyself with others (Wait, isn't that the worst approach, too? Haven't you got some ethics about not comparing self with others, only self reflecting on your own progress?).

Realistically speaking, I'd like to know how to become a larger mountain using information I have on hand.

More importantly, how would a more knowledgeable person be able to clearly demonstrate his pure ability to do things he's able to do, on a regular basis (No marketing, whatsoever).

Relativism is Valid but Not Sound; Is the Argument for the Truth of Relativism Deductively Valid in Form?

Argument R (for the truth of relativism):

P1. Positive Thesis = A claim is only evaluable with respect to a point of view

P2. Negative Thesis = There are no absolute truths (implying that truth is not relative to a point of view/frame of reference).

Relativism is Valid

Question: Is the Argument for the Truth of Relativism Deductively Valid in Form? Argument R (for the truth of relativism): P1. Positive Thesis = A claim is only evaluable with respect to a point of view P2. Negative Thesis = There are no absolute truths P3. Relativism = Positive Thesis & Negative Thesis P4. Relativism is true if and only if both its positive and negative theses are true Conclusion. Relativism is true.

Is the argument for the truth of relativism valid? If so, how so? Explain! If not, why not? Relativism is self defeating; it is contradictory on its own terms because its constituent elements – its positive and negative theses – are in direct conflict with one another yielding a contradiction, which is a necessary falsity. Therefore, relativism is self-refuting on its own terms and the argument for the truth of relativism is not logically sound, though it is logically valid. A deductively valid argument is such for which true premises would necessarily lead to a true conclusion; that is, for which it is impossible for the premises to (all) be true, yet the conclusion false. So, we can devise a validity test: assume the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false and observe whether a contradiction arises. If a contradiction does arise, then the argument is valid, because a valid argument is one in which it is impossible for the premises to be true while the conclusion false. Relativism = Positive thesis + Negative thesis If we grant both the premises true, then relativism is true. Relativism is true if and only if both the negative and positive these are true. However, granting them both true yields a contradiction, which is a necessary falsity that cannot possibly be true. To make the conclusion false is to say that relativism is false. A contradiction arises out of jointly affirming the positive and negative theses (taking them both to be true). No contradiction arises from granting the premises true and making the conclusion false. A contradiction arises: namely, that one both arises (as a result of granting the premises true) and does not arise (as a result of setting the conclusion to be false). This latter contradiction, namely that a contradiction both arises and does not arise, is the indicator that this argument is valid. If relativism is false (i.e., if the conclusion is false), then either exactly one of the theses is not true, in which case a contradiction arises from the validity test or they both are not true, in which case no contradiction arises. Def.’n: Relativism is the conjunction of its negative and positive theses! Relativism is true if and only if both its theses are true. If at least one of the premises is false, then relativism is false. The problem is that the truth of the negative thesis (i.e., that there are no absolute truths) conflicts with the positive thesis (that all claims are only evaluable with respect to a point of view), and vice versa. Therefore, granting the premises true leads to a contradiction (it leads to relativism being self-refuting) it does not lead to relativism being true since true would imply that both theses are true (simultaneously). If there are no absolute truths, then it cannot be stated that claims are only evaluable with respect to point of view. And if claims are only to be evaluated with respect to a point of view, then in whose point of view does one claim that "there are no absolute truths”. By leaving out the point of view, a claim becomes unevaluable (since the qualifier in whose case a claim may be evaluable is not supplied). Relativism cannot be both contradictory (granting the premises true) and not contradictory (the conclusion is false: relativism is false). If relativism is false, then either one or both of its premises are false. (…then there is not a contradiction.) The denial of the conclusion that relativism is true amounts to making at least one its premises false. The positive thesis that partly constitutes the relativist view keep nesting "from whose point of view?"... claims are infinitely deferred and never achieved. There is this annoying, vexing quality of deferring infinitely and never achieving something. An objection to an argument is an objection to at least one of the premises of an argument. Objecting to the premises allows us to conclude that the conclusion of the argument is false (rejecting the conclusion). If it is not objectionable, then the premises are sustained. Think about what problem generates from assuming the premises true and the conclusion false. If there is a contradiction, the argument is valid. If we grant the conclusion false, then Relativism is false, which implies that at least one of its theses is false, because the argument for the truth of relativism is valid. If the negative thesis is true, then there are no absolute truths. If there are no absolute truths, then it cannot be stated as a matter of absolute truth that there are no absolute truths. The negative thesis contradicts itself. If there are no absolute truths, then the claim that any claim is only evaluable with respect to a point of view cannot be absolutely true. The negative thesis contradicts the positive thesis. If the positive thesis is true, then a claim is only evaluable with respect to a point of view, that is, points of view don't have any intrinsic truth or validity, and that truth itself is only applicable in a particular frame of reference or a vantage point of view, framework of assessment, etc. If the positive thesis is true, then the negative thesis 'there are no absolute truths' is left incomplete, since the relevant frame of reference or point of view is not specified. The positive thesis contradicts the negative thesis. The positive and negative theses contradict each other, therefore granting the premises 1 and 2 (the positive and negative theses) true leads to a contradiction. Assuming the conclusion to be false leads to relativism being false which implies at least one of the theses is false, which resolves the contradiction, since the contradiction only arises when both the positive and negative theses are true simultaneously. Since granting the premises true leads to a contradiction, while granting the conclusion false leads to no contradiction, a contradiction arises: namely that a contradiction both arises and does not arise. Therefore, the argument is valid.

How contradictory premises make a deductive argument valid…

Given a syllogism with two premises (P1 and P2) and a conclusion (C): {P1, P2 | C}. How does the contradiction between premises P1 and P2 (i.e., [P1 & P2]) make the argument {P1, P2 | C} valid? An argument is deductively valid if and only if it is impossible for (all) the premises to be true yet the conclusion false.

So, we devise a validity test: i. Assume all the premises true: P1 ^ P2 ii. Make the conclusion false (i.e., negate the conclusion: ~C).

! Take the premises to be true and negate conclusion: • If a contradiction arises, the argument is valid. • If no contradiction arises, the argument is invalid.

Testing for validity…

1. A contradiction arises as a result of step [i] of the validity test because the premises are contradictory
2. No contradiction arises as a result of step [ii] of the validity test because the premises being true does not contradict the conclusion being false.
3. A contradiction arises: namely that one both arises (1) and does not arise (2).
4. Therefore, the argument is valid.

We assume the premises true (P1 ^ P2) and the conclusion false (~C). If a contradiction arises, then it is an indication that the argument is in such a form that would make it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. Therefore, the argument is valid. If our assuming the premises true and the conclusion false leads to a contradiction, then our assumption that “the premises can be true and the conclusion false” is false. Therefore, the premises cannot be true while the conclusion false, and therefore the argument is valid. If, however, our assumptions do not yield a contradiction, then it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. Therefore, the argument is invalid. It is impossible for the conjunction P1 & P2 to be true because they are contradictory: P1 = X, P2 = ~X; [P1 & P2] = f, where f: falsum, which stands for a contradiction If (P1 & P2) yields a contradiction, the argument is valid because it is impossible for both premises to be true and the conclusion false (~C). As the premises cannot be true, they also cannot be true while the conclusion being false. So, if negating the conclusion (~C) contradicts the premises both being true (P1 & P2), then the argument is valid.

I. Neither Thesis is False: A contradiction arises out of the joint affirmation of both premises. II. Only the Positive Thesis is False:

III. Only the Negative Thesis is False:

When the negative thesis is affirmed, a self-referential internal contradiction arises between the negative thesis and itself, which sets up a paradox.

(So, a paradox contradicts the positive thesis.) IV. Both Theses are False: No contradiction arises from denying them both: by stating neither P nor N is true (nor: = joint denial). LEM is a necessary falsity as is LNC. LNC rules out affirming a contradictory pair of variables {X, ~X}. The joint affirmation of contradictories is called a contradiction. LEM rules out denying a contradictory pair of variables {X, ~X}. The joint denial of contradictories is also called a “contradiction” in propositional logic. LNC excludes accepting both X and ~X as a possibility. LNC rules out a contradiction: the joint affirmation of X and ~X. LEM excludes there being a third option besides X and ~X. LEM excludes there being a truth value other than true and false for proposition X (as well as for ~X). LEM rules out this other kind of logical falsity: namely, the joint denial of contradictories. ? Q: Both logical falsities are ruled out: one of them by LNC, the other by LEM. In propositional logic, both logical falsities are called ‘contradictions’. Yet the law of non-contradiction applies only to the former kind of falsity (i.e., the joint affirmation) and not to the latter (i.e., the joint denial). No thing can both be and not be (what it is). The Law of Non-Contradiction: Something cannot both be and not be (what it is) =

‘Something cannot both be what it is and be what it is not’ materially implies that ‘something cannot both be what it is and not be what it is’ and the latter likewise implies the former.

It is not the case (~) that: (something can be [what it is] and something cannot be [what it is]) Hence: ~(X ^ ~X) X: “Something can be what it is” ~X: “Something cannot be what it is”  (where: ‘’ denotes ‘ is materially equivalent to’)

X: Something can be what it is. : Something can be what it is not. ExEyA(x,y)[ A(x,y): = “x can be y” P1. Something (x) can be that which x is not P2. Something (x) cannot be that which x is not. P1 ^ P2 Something cannot be both what it is and what it is not: i.e., Something cannot both be what it is and be what it is not A proposition cannot both be and not be true. A proposition cannot both be and not be false. A proposition cannot be both true and not true. A proposition cannot be both true and false. No thing can both be what it is (T) and not be what it is (T): LNC No thing can both be what it is (F) and not be what it is (F): LEM

            R: =	   P	  ^	N)
         T	          T	         T
         T	          F	         F
         F	          F	         T
         F	          F	         F

A contradiction only arises from jointly affirming the positive thesis and the negative thesis, and not from jointly denying them. Jointly affirming a contradictory pair of propositions yields a contradiction and falls under the purview of the law of non-contradiction. Jointly denying a contradictory pair of propositions yields a truth value for the proposition that is neither true nor false (but some other middle/third option besides true and false) and falls under the purview of the law of excluded middle, which states there is not middle option between X and ~X, or equivalently stated P and N cannot be true together without contradicting each other. P and N can be both false together without contradicting each other?

Relativism is false if and only if at least one of its theses is false. No contradiction arises from negating the conjunction of the negative and positive theses: ~(N ^ P) = ~N V ~P, which means either ~N is true or ~P is true or both are true (but not none).