This is a translation i've made of the Interview given a few days ago by Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy, Admiral Credendino to the chief editor of the most important italian defense magazine: Rivista Italiana Difesa.

Here's the link to the original in italian:

https://www.rid.it/shownews/6893/indo-pacifico-droni-e-missili-parola-all-rsquo-amm-credendino

Since it's quite a long article i've also made a summary that you can find in the comments.

Pietro Batacchi: Admiral, let’s start from the fundamentals, how do you plan to balance the “double commitment” in the Mediterranean and in the Indo-Pacific?

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: Well then let’s start from a premise, the Mediterranean, as recognized in all the strategic documents of Italian Defense, is the area of our priority interest and it will remain as such. But, today, what happens even in the most distant of theaters, like, for example, the Indo-Pacific, reverberates immediately on our safety and our welfare. After all, Italy is a middle power with global interests, based on a transformative economy. Because of this, today, we can confidently start talking about a global Mediterranean, as a way to stress the interdependence between the two areas, given by the necessity – I repeat, for the kind of nation that is Italy – to keep the seas “open”, guaranteeing the freedom of commerce and of the sea [trade] routes.

To that we add the fact that the paradigm has changed and that from the Peace-crisis-war continuum, we have now arrived at continuum in which there is no [perfect] peace, with a “pendulum” that ever increasingly swings between crisis, more or less intense, and war.

Pietro Batacchi: About that, what’s your evaluation of the Russian presence in the Mediterranean?

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: It’s a factor that for the last few years has shaped the area. Until a few months ago the Russian Navy had about 18 vessels, between surface ships and submarines – in the Mediterranean. Now, their number has slightly decreased, also because due to not having dry docks and arsenals for large maintenance, the Russian ships must return [to Russia] after their deployment. The only base which they have in the theater, Tartus, in Syria, despite having been increased by a lot recently, doesn’t have said structures and this explains the reason why the Russian, for quite some time, have been trying to create new structures in Libya, at Derna, as well as in Sudan, at Port Sudan; Our hope is that they’ll fail.. the Russian presence, while not constituting an immediate threat to our [Italy’s] national territory, objectively constitutes a source of tension and concern, that forces us to always keep high our attention and to maintain, on average, 6 vessels (ships and submarines) in the Mediterranean. To that we add the general rearmament of the countries on the southern shore [of the Mediterranean], some of which are buying weapon systems and equipment from Russia itself, and the necessity to protect and monitor the submarine infrastructures, cables and pipelines, that, in a sea which for 75% of it has a depth of less than 3.000m, are potentially reachable by anyone and, thusly, are at risk of sabotage and hostile acts. Overall, the Mediterranean remains an extremely complicated theater.

Pietro Batacchi: And then there’s the Red Sea...

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: Well, In the Red Sea we are currently at war. The Houthis are shooting at us with missiles and drones – both air and sea born – and we are countering like we did in the last few months using the cannons and the ASTER missiles of our ships, to absolve our mission, of protecting the merchant traffic. Traffic that, due exactly to the Houthi’s activity in the Red Sea, has been reduced of over 40% and this represents a blow especially to those economy most dependent on international trade like the Italian one. On top of that, if western traffic has been reduced by said percentage, the Chinese one, whose ships haven’t been attacked, has increased by 15%, while due to the Houthi threat Somali piracy has also reared its head, after it had practically been defeated until last year.

Pietro Batacchi: In any case, the Houthi threat has been reduced a bit?

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: Although the Houthis seem more focused on attacking Israeli territory, the threat to merchant cargo is still present, as shown by the latest attack a few days ago. Besides, their surveillance and intelligence capacities, and their “construction and valorization” of the attack profiles, have increased and this in turn forces us to also adapt and improve. After all, it’s one thing to shoot down targets at the range during training, it’s another thing doing it in a real war scenario. For example, who had to apply modification to the warheads of our 76mm shells and also our sensors in the middle of the operations.

Pietro Batacchi: Let’s go now to the Indo-Pacific, an area that recently saw the deployment of the Cavour carrier strike group, what are the lessons that you have learned from it?

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: As I said before, what happens in the Indo-Pacific has a direct impact on us. Because of this, as reiterated multiple times by our political authorities, including at the latest G7, we must be present with our fleets and consolidate our partnerships with the nations of the region, starting with Japan. We are connected to this great Asian country not just by the aeronautical collaboration on the GCAP [the Tempest fighter jet program], but also in the naval dimension. Indeed, for the Japanese Navy, with whom we have trained extensively in the last few months, we represent a reference point for the usage of the F-35B. After all, they have also bought it, in order to deploy with their two aircraft carriers, the Izumo and the Kaga currently in their transformation phase, and thus currently need to train and familiarize themselves with aircraft carrier and carrier-borne air wing deployment, to consolidate the relative concepts and doctrine.

As for the more specific operational aspects, thanks to the projection of the Cavour carrier group in the Indo-Pacific, we have completed the IOC [initial operational capability] of our F-35Bs months ahead of the original schedule, by deploying into the field 8 aircrafts, 6 of ours plus 2 of the Italian Air Force, and 7 AV-8B Harrier II. A truly relevant capacity that we had the opportunity to test in an extremely complex theater, where we could maneuver with the 7° US fleet, the Japanese, etc., use enormous areas for our training at sea, with the possibility to use all of our weapon systems without restrictions (and that is another of the reasons for why we must be present in the Indo-Pacific) and participate in training events such as the great operation Pitch Black in Australia. By the way, during that operation the Cavour was the only carrier present, were her embarked Harriers played the role of hostile air force. And let’s not forget that an American DDG was also placed under the operational control of the Cavour carrier group, a sign of the credibility and reliability that we have earned, by escorting their [American] carriers in the Mediterranean, “hunting” the Russian submarines, and of the ever-increasing interoperability and interchangeability with our partners and allies. Overall, we return from this deployment with a truly important baggage of knowledge and experience, and a great success for our image and new opportunities for our national industry.

Pietro Batacchi: Overall, an Indo-Pacific of ever-increasing importance…

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: As confirmed by the fact that we have started a dialogue with the UK and France to coordinate the planning of the projection of our carrier groups as to maximize the effects of our presence in the theater.

Pietro Batacchi: And then we’ll have the Trieste… [the new Italian aircraft carrier]

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: Yes, the ship will be delivered to us soon. It will be the flagship of our amphibious force but it will also be able to operate with up to 20 F-35Bs.

Pietro Batacchi: How does all of this impact our training?

Today we have two wars raging in our backyard and this of course, after years of peace and stabilization missions, has forced us to return to a more conventional type of training, capable of preparing us for high intensity and multidomain scenarios. An example has been the large training maneuvers of last may with the French Navy, when we joined our Mare Aperto [training operation] with their Polaris and for a month we have faced each other in an open situation with the two carrier groups, simulating all possible war scenarios.

Pietro Batacchi: And, especially, how does all of this impact the way in which our new ships are and will be designed? Many times the ships of the Italian Navy have judged under armed or insufficiently armed…

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: First of all, we have to increase the armament of the new units and have more weapons on board: the DDX [the new Italian cruisers] will have at least 80 cells for missiles of all kinds and for the next lot of PPX [the new Italian patrol boats]. For example, we are thinking about “light” missile systems, such as the Camm ER, as a way to increase the self-defense of said units.

Pietro Batacchi: And on the FREMM EVO [the upgrade version of the current Italian frigates], will missiles be installed in the space previously occupied by the extra berthing in the old FREMMs?

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: Absolutely yes, we are studying various hypothesis, including long range missiles, and we are asking the industry the capacity to develop a multi-missile universal launcher, that would offer us more flexibility and operational versatility.

But, let me add two further elements regarding the industry…

Pietro Batacchi: Please, admiral, go on…

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: The first is that today, when we talk about onboard weapons, we cannot refer only to so called traditional missile, but also to laser and direct energy weapons, to cybernetic weapons, and new anti-drone systems, and drone-against-drone systems, etc., Overall, we must think to a system of capacities and on how to develop them in a short time frame as dictated by the scenario. The second element is that the industry must support us with an adequate production pace in order to make possible a sustained effort. Because of this, I’ve asked to have together with every ship a missile and supply inventory appropriate for ever-more contested scenarios: today this is our priority, while before, as it’s known, armament was considered an after-thought. Thus, overall, there is a need of a change in mentality not just on our end, but also on the industrial side, as also said multiple times by [Italian defense] minister Crosetto.

Pietro Batacchi: The problem of scant missile supplies involves all of Europe, that for years rested on the laurels of the peace dividends..

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: Yes it’s a problem felt also by France and the UK. The war in the Red Sea has made it emerge in all of its relevance, as well as another problem, that of the necessity of reloading in the face of a constat usage. The British have to go back to Gibraltar to resupply, which forces their ships to leave the theater for a month, while we and the French go back to Djibouti. Because of this the French have been experimenting with the direct resupply of missiles while at sea, but so will we by deploying our Vulcano supply ships with the necessary modifications. We cannot “disengage” from the theater to go back to resupply, we must be freed from this limitations!

Pietro Batacchi: I ask you a question that I’ll also ask to the Chiefs of staff of the Italian Army and Air force: how is the dronefication of the Italian Navy going?

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: It’s a daily argument of absolute priority. We urgently need drones of all kinds, large, small, aerial, submersible, and surface kind.

Pietro Batacchi: For what concern the aerial drones, both fixed and rotary wing, there’s rumors of news, what’s cooking in the kitchen?

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: We are deploying the Scan Eagle and we are evaluating the AWHERO, for cruisers and frigates, but we are also looking at everything that the market is offering at this moment, as well as large, fixed wing drones to embark on the Cavour and the Trieste.

Pietro Batacchi: Can you give us some more details, particularly concerning these large, fixed-wing drones?

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: We are very much interested on the acquisition of similar capacities to the ones of the Mojave system of General Atomics, which as you might know the British are already testing on their Queen Elizabeth [carriers], that is a drone that would allow us to extend the defense and surveillance capacities of the carrier group. After all, we already know that future carries will have an embarked air wing made of a mixed manned and unmanned/autonomous component.

Pietro Batacchi: Let’s talk about USV [Unmanned surface vessel], what are the MM [Italian Navy]’s plans about them?

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: We are conducting a series of studies, also concerning large scale surface drones, with which to multiply and spread out our operational capacities, and this case as well we are also looking at what the market as to offer in order to understand what might be available. It’s clear the in all of this a fundamental role is played by communications, that will have to be redundant and cyber-safe, and by artificial intelligence.

Pietro Batacchi: Speaking of drones, what can you tell us about the Sciamano Drone Carrier (SDC) project?

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: It’s a preliminary study, financed in the framework of the PNRM (national plan of military research), that helps us to establish the requirements of future multi capability carrier, in particular in terms of compatibility, integrations and operability of the embarked drones. In practice, the project serves us to define a standard – minimum size that the basin must have, minimum size of the power supply, etc. – that will partially inspire the aforementioned Multi Capability Carrier.

Pietro Batacchi: What do you mean by Multi Capability Carrier?

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: We mean a family of future ships, modulable and scalable, that in the higher and most important end of the spectrum will, for example, bring about a replacement of the Cavour around 2040, and that must be considered at a conceptual stage like a hub that distributes capacities (sensors, effectors, etc.) through the intervention and the contribution of the autonomous systems, according to a scale commensurate with the operational theater in which they’ll have to operate in, with the persistence of what will have to be put at sea, or under the sea, etc. We have been studying this concept for the last two years, together with Fincantieri [the Italian national shipbuilding company] and Leonardo [Italian national weapon manufacture] and a series of small and medium sized companies.

Pietro Batacchi: New ships, new commitments, but the personnel is missing. What are your necessities?

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: They are clear and they have already been made known in the study written when the Chief of staff of the Navy was still Admiral Cavo Dragone: considering all of the commitments, the Italian Navy has a need for 39.000 men (plus 9.000 civilians) but today we don’t reach 30.000 total. By the way the personnel problem is felt also other allied navies. Let’s see, then, what could be the most appropriate instruments to move in that direction, keeping in mind, that there is already a lot of attention on that problem at a political level. On our end the Navy has already reduced, in the last two years, the structure of the general staff by 30% and increased the operational, logistical and training component; and we did so also by utilizing new technologies such as artificial intelligence.

Pietro Batacchi: Let’s close out with two direct questions: the new MPA (marine patrol aircraft) and the SCALP Naval (Embarked version of the Storm Shadow/Scalp missile), is there any news?

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: On the MPA there hasn’t yet been a definitive decision and all the options are still on the table: the [Boeing’s] P-8, the [Kawasaki’s] P-1 with an Italian mission suite, and [Leonardo’s] MC-27J ASW. On the SCALP Naval the discussions are still ongoing.

Pietro Batacchi: The discussions on the SCALP Naval have been ongoing for quite a lot of time…

Chief of staff Admiral Credendino: I’m holding out hope.

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Let's use hypothetical situation (a bit convoluted, but I specifically wanted to use some high-value and time-sensitive target) :

It's 2010, you are Ranger on patrol somewhere in Afghanistan mountains and while looking around, you suddenly spot Osama bin Laden sunbathing on the roof of some compound far in the distance. You double- and triple-check and yep, it's him.

What happens next?

What happens between the discovery and the Hellfire/JDAM/Tomahawk/Delta hit on the compound?
What are the different 'layers' this information goes through?
At which point it is decided which assets are going to be used?
Who approves the release of said assets?
Who plans the operation?
Which external agencies might be involved?
How does the time-sensitivity/target value affect the decision process?

Essentially, how the whole thing works.

Pointers to any information/articles/manuals/books I could read on the topic would be greatly appreciated.

Important Edit: I spent a good number of hours reading about some use cases of the March-In rights and the BDA. The new information I found changes my analysis of the BDA significantly in relation to the defense sector. I am going to work on a follow up post that changes and clarifies some points to make my analysis more accurate. In the meantime, take the current analysis with a pinch of salt.

I also posted this in r/warcollege and was referred to post here for additional perspectives.

I am a PhD student in economic policy in the DC area. My academic background before this was a MS in economics and a BS in economics and math. I don’t have much personal experience with defense R&D and procurement in the DoD.

Anyways, the point of this post is to get some additional perspectives from individuals in defense that have experience in the areas of procurement, research, and/or the federal contracting work.

I don’t exactly remember what got me thinking about this topic, but I stumbled across the Bayh-Dole Act (BDA) and its effects on economy. For those of you unfamiliar with the BDA, it was a law passed by congress in 1980 that transformed the way that intellectual property is treated by the government. Specifically, the BDA created a legal pathway for all publicly funded research to be filed as a patent to become private intellectual property (IP). The stipulation in this law is that IP funded by public money gives free license to the government to use that technology. So besides the federal government themselves, no other private enterprise can use that publicly funded IP, giving exclusive rights to the patent holder and whoever they decide to license.

The BDA was initially proposed to “incentivize innovation and R&D spending” by universities and small firms. However, the scope of the bill changed due to political interference by large biotech and pharmaceutical companies to include all federal contractors and research partnerships with the government. Despite not directly lobbying for it, the defense sector turned into the largest beneficiary of this law out of all sectors in the economy. The addition of defense related IP to this law wasn’t purposefully targeted for its inclusion, but rather no one had the foresight to create an exclusion for defense related R&D in the BDA.

My general argument is that the lack of exclusion of the defense sector in the BDA was a catastrophic decision that cost us trillions (yes trillions with a T). Not only was this legislative oversight insanely costly for the tax payer, it significantly weakened the capability and cost efficiency of products procured in the last 44 years by the DoD. I’ll outline my reasoning as to why I believe this is the case.

1. Different from other industries like pharma and biotech, the R&D cost for defense is shouldered almost entirely by the government. In this fiscal year, the R&D allocation for the DoD reached 144 billion dollars. This is not even including research done on projects covered in the black budget which is around another 50 billion per year. Who knows exactly how much of that money is dedicated to research. This compares to private defense R&D investment which amounts to less than 10 billion dollars per year. In total, the private sector contributes around 5 to 7 percent of total defense R&D. This is in stark contrast to the pharmaceutical industry that the BDA was initially written for. In the pharmaceutical sector, only 20-30% of total annual R&D is provided by the government. This funding is usually awarded during the nascent stages of drug development. The costs associated with testing and bringing the product to market are taken on almost entirely by the firm. In general there is a 1 to 2 billion dollar average private investment per FDA approved drug. So even though a defense research project may be paid for in its entirety by the government, the firm engaged in the R&D process still has the right to the IP exclusively.
2. Even though the military has the right to use all publicly funded technology, the functional implementation of this policy is meaningless. This is because the DoD does not produce anything itself. So while the military holds the right to use the technology they funded, very often the implementation process of that technology is provided by the private firm’s products. This directly leads to the problem of vendor lock. Despite the military owning the rights to a patent alongside a private firm, they are locked in to using that firm for that specific technology for its production/implementation. For example, Lockheed may have IP regarding stealth paint coating for aircraft. Even if other firms, like Boeing for example, could produce this product, they have no legal right to the production, effectively eliminating all competition for that contract. So despite the entire R&D process being publicly funded, Lockheed can charge exorbitant prices because no other firm can provide that technology.
3. The secrecy of defense patents kills all incentive for privately funded R&D and causes a very costly duplication problem. The IP rules regarding classified patents are absurd for lack of a better term. Let’s go back to the example of stealth paint between Lockheed and Boeing. Lockheed has been the choice partner for the development of stealth aircraft technology with the DoD. So, they already benefit from the institutional knowledge their researchers have and also hold innumerable secret patents. Boeing, recognizing they are behind Lockheed, could invest private money to come up with a more competitive product. Here’s where the insane part comes in: Boeing can independently develop stealth technology with no knowledge of the existence of classified Lockheed patents. Boeing researchers could come up with a lot of the same ideas that Lockheed has. They could spend millions or billions of dollars in this process to be competitive. Once they have a theoretical working product, they can submit for a patent. Only once all of this money and time has been spent, Boeing will be told that not only can they not file that patent, but that an existing patent already conflicts with their proposal. In this case, Boeing still can’t be competitive, the military is forced to procure from Lockheed, and researchers had thousands of hours wasted due to the duplication research.
4. March-in rights were codified into law with the BDA, but have not been used a single time by any government department or agency in the 44 years since the implementation. The BDA specifies March-in rights for a bunch of federal agencies. These rights give the government the legal ability to force the licensing of intellectual property from one firm to another in order to compel commercialization of a product. This is basically included for the theoretical case where a pharma firm could sit on IP for a drug that cures cancer but refuses to produce it for business considerations. In this case, March-in rights were included so the NIH or FDA could force the drug to come to market. So technically, the DoD has the right to compel private firms to share IP, even secret IP, but has not exercised this right a singular time.
5. The effects of the BDA on the procurement of complex systems is disastrous. One of the reasons why the defense sector is particularly harmed is in the size and scope of the products they want to procure. A drug generally has a single patent, with rare cases of 2 , 3, or 4 depending on the uniqueness of production, distribution, or use. These patents aren’t just fewer in number, but are widely published to prevent unintentional duplicate research. Compare this to a program like the JSF procurement. Each one of the planes submitted for the contract had private IP that could have amounted to hundreds or thousands of patents associated with each submission. These firms were not only competing to provide the best product at the best price, but also had to balance the technological innovations included in their products to be sure they don’t accidentally infringe on the rights of firms owning secret patents.
6. The rollout of the BDA assumed that the enhanced rights that firms get over innovations that are publicly funded would make the environment more competitive between firms. The opposite happened. Firms now perform rent seeking activities in their provision of products to the military by stifling innovation by abusing the IP system. A claim that I’ve seen made is that the IP system motivates firms to do research to achieve a profitable patent, and without the IP system, no one would be innovating. The fact is that the actual scientists and engineers involved in the R&D process in defense firms don’t give a shit if they are able to secure an exclusive patent. The only people who care about the profitability of research are the business minded people in the defense firm. People who do the actual research perform it because they’re passionate about it. They won’t suddenly stop being inventive because they’re cant monopolize a patented product sold to the government.

So, I think the economic costs of this system are evident enough. The defense sector is unique in its operation compared to other sectors due BDA IP rules. The classified nature of patents, the extreme levels of public funding, and the vendor locking that occurs because of IP completely destroys any economic efficiency in the sector. However, I don’t even think that the lack of economic efficiency is the biggest problem with this system.

The ramifications of the system don’t just impact the budget, but directly affect the war-fighting capability of the military. Firm endowments of classified patents are not homogeneous, so firms rarely share or license IP to competitors to maintain a competitive edge in the procurement process. Instead of using all of the best available IP (that was paid for by the tax payer anyway) to create a better product, firms are forced to use potentially sub optimal solutions to be compliant with patent ownership at competing firms. Consider the JSF competition between Lockheed and Boeing. If Lockheed has better stealth technology with patents filed from their work on the F117 and B2, and Boeing had better avionics, why on earth would we want the military to make compromises on the performance of a combat product to accommodate IP regulations? Ideally we would want the best, most efficient product for the military, regardless of IP conflicts.

This is why I believe the exclusion of the defense sector in the BDA is necessary. Before the BDA, all defense technology that was funded with public money belonged solely to the DoD. They were able to license this technology out to qualified firms, preventing duplication research and giving them the opportunity to incorporate the best, most modern solutions to technical problems.

The immediate removal of the defense industry from the BDA could significantly decrease costs of R&D and procurement. All defense IP should be pooled together in a single program that is accessible to qualified firms that generally do business with the DoD. Contracts would be much more competitive, costs will go down, duplicate research can be avoided, complex products will benefit from the inclusion of the best technology available rather than settling for non optimal solutions because of IP barriers, etc.

The most shocking part about my analysis of the BDA and its effects on defense is that I didn’t find anything else like it. In the 44 years since the passing of the BDA, there has not been a SINGLE amendment, bill, debate, or public discussion about the effects of the law for defense (as far as I know). There’s next to no research on this topic specific to defense. All public discussion about the BDA generally focuses on the medical sector implications with not a single person raising the alarm regarding the negative effects the act has on the defense sector.

Based on the DoD budget for procurement, R&D, and the black budget compared to the problems of duplicate research and vendor-lock, I’d give a rough estimate of savings of between 50 and 100 billion per year. This is not including the gains from the reorganization of human capital to more efficient products informed by the existing body of defense knowledge that they are now aware of.

I don’t want to be the guy that fear-mongers about China, but I do have to make one comment. Despite the much lower nominal spending on defense compared to the US (not adjusted to PPP), the efficiency gains in research and procurement stemming from a shared IP framework should not be underestimated. The elimination of inefficient research, procurement, and sustainment will make a budget go much farther than the current system in the US.

If you made it this far in the post, thank you for taking the time to read it. I am concerned about the deafening silence regarding the problem of the BDA in defense. I found it eerie that such a critical part of public policy is absent from public discussion.

Edit: Thank you all so much for replying. Sorry I haven't been able to respond to comments yet, I got a bad stomach virus in the time between posting this and now (The MIC might be coming after me). I am reading all comments and am very grateful for your input. I will respond as soon as I can.

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So declares Frederick Kempe, President and CEO of the Atlantic Council, in a recent essay. Within his argument, he quotes Hoover Senior Fellow Philip Zelikow about a reality few US voters seem to have accepted this election season: that America today is actually very close to outright war and its leader can be considered a wartime president. Pointing out that we are already more than a decade into a series of cascading crises that began with Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Kempe amplifies a recent article from Zelikow where the latter suggests the US has a 20–30 percent chance of becoming involved in “worldwide warfare” in the next two or three years.

Kempe declares, "Americans on November 5 will be electing a wartime president. This isn’t a prediction. It’s reality." He also argues, "War isn’t inevitable now any more than it was then [circa 1940]. When disregarded, however, gathering storms of the sort we’re navigating gain strength."

So, if we are not currently at war, but worldwide warfare is a serious geopolitical possibility within the term of the next administration, should the American electorate consider this a wartime election? If so, how do you think that assessment should affect how voters think about their priorities and options?

Additionally, how should the presidential candidates and other political leaders communicate with the American public about the current global security situation and the possibility of another world war?

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For reference, the DIA's report of the North Korean military as of Sept 2023 and the Army’s report as of July 2020. The KPA's involvement and commitment in Ukraine in support of Russia will impose serious pressures upon the ZSU which, if properly exploited by the Russian Armed Forces, could lead to significant battlefield results. As of current reporting, the KPA is dispatching between 10,000 and 12,000 troops to fight in support of Russia. It is unclear if this is the first of a regular commitment of forces. This post will not cover ballistic missile usage, as it has been covered in detail before in articles such as this from the NYT and this from the DIA. This post will also not cover North Korean air defenses being deployed, though note that advances in air defense technology may be offered to North Korea in exchange for their involvement in Ukraine.

Notable excerpts as it pertains to the Ukrainian conflict:

North Korea has a large manpower pool to pull from:

As many as 20 percent of North Korean males between the ages of 16 and 54 are in the military at a given time and possibly up to 30 percent of males between the ages of 18 and 27, not counting the reserves or paramilitary units. The active-duty forces account for at least 6 percent of the population and at least 12 percent of the male population. With universal conscription and long-term service, the KPA serves as a key socialization mechanism for the state and a pathway to Korean Workers' Party membership. (DIA, 36&37)

Note: The famine in the 1990s is expected to have a visible impact on certain segments of the force.

Over the next few decades, the effects of the 1994-97 famine will continue to affect the population that constitutes the majority of the KPA reserve manpower pool. North Korean children born in the 1990s suffered malnutrition, which resulted in declining physical development, stunted growth, and mental underdevelopment. This trend suggests that some number of KPA conscripts in the reserves will function at lower levels of effectiveness due to mental and physical impairments. (DIA, 37)

KPA SOF maneuver units make up a significant portion of their army's manpower, potentially well-suited to the Ukrainian battlefield:

The newest SOF unit in the KPA is the light infantry division. Beginning around 2003, after observing U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, the KPA began converting seven regular infantry and mechanized infantry divisions into light infantry divisions. Each new division only contains about 7,000 soldiers, as the KPA stripped legacy units of most of their former organic support, including artillery, armor, and air defense units.(ATP 7-100.2, 1-4)

Core SOF doctrine emphasizes speed of movement and surprise attack to accomplish the mission... SOF personnel are present at all echelons of the KPA (from brigade and division to corps) as well as the strategic-level 11th Corps, which controls a number of SOF brigades for strategic missions. SOF light infantry, sniper, and reconnaissance elements and air and naval SOF elements are present in many infantry divisions and the forward corps.... The various SOF units comprise over 200,000 personnel organized into brigades of 3,000–5,000 members and separate regiments and battalions of varying strength... Operational SOF units support corps objectives with light infantry and reconnaissance missions... Because of the importance that the regime places on North Korea's SOF capability, SOF members often receive more frequent training of a much higher quality than regular KPA infantry receive. (DIA, 52&53) The modern KPA emphasizes small and large units attacking an objective simultaneously, such as SOF or light infantry attacking the objective from the rear or flank while heavy infantry supported with artillery assaults from the front and flanks. (DIA, 47)

Defeat of an enemy can be a combination of excessive casualties; an inability to extract forces in contact because they are fixed or isolated; disruption of C2 and logistics; loss of tactical initiative; or KPA EIW effects indicate continuation of tactical operations is not worth the additional loss in combat power; and convincing the enemy commander that his or her force has culminated and is defeated. (ATP 7-100.2, 4-34)

Lastly, KPA labeling of a unit as SOF does not make it so. Many of the SOF units are more likely trained to the same standard as conventional forces in other militaries. The KPA SOF units are only special in comparison to other units in the North Korean military. (ATP 7-100.2, 1-5)

Note: KPA SOF are perfect for filling out Russian mechanized and motorized units. Though a different battlefield with different conditions than the Korean peninsula, these units are likely trained to conduct breakthrough/breaching attacks with potentially high expected casualties. Russian planners could leverage this training and manpower reserve to pull Ukrainian units into long, attritional battles which could be further exploited, or launch opportunistic strikes along areas of the line held by undermanned and equipped ZSU units.

KPAGF urban doctrine similar to tactics utilized by Russia in Ukraine:

Operations conducted in urban or rural areas often require precise application of fires to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties. The KPA uses this typical restriction by enemy forces to support its force protection. KPA units will have fewer restrictions on weaponry use and less likelihood of concern for causing civilian casualties. Collateral infrastructure damage and civilian casualties can be a KPA-expected or - intended outcome when employing fires on an enemy. (ATP 7-100.2, 4-35)

The KPAGF often maneuver to remain very close to enemy units to avoid the effects of enemy precision fires. (ATP 7-100.2, 4-35)

The KPA has a large artillery park, as well as large stocks of ammunition, with severe operational limitations:

Over 70% of all KPAGF indirect fire units are deployed in the southern third of the country and are focused on South Korea. This includes the KPAGF’s artillery units usually located in fortified underground emplacements called hardened artillery sites (HARTS). (ATP 7-100.2, A-2)

North Korea may have sufficient supplies for only 2 to 3 months (of war with the South). Subsistence supplies could last up to 3 months, and ammunition could last slightly longer. (DIA, 35)

There will likely be large numbers of unexploded ordnance from all the indirect fire weapons the KPA will use. During the North Korean artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island in August 2015, 60 of the initial 80 rounds hitting the island exploded, indicating a dud rate of 25%. For artillery rounds to function properly and explode on impact, they must be used in a timely fashion or the stock rotated to the factory to be rechecked. Due to cost of ammunition and the limited economic abilities of North Korea, it is likely the KPA does not fire (in training) artillery ammunition when it is close to the end of its reliable service life or rotate it out for new ammunition.

Note: North Korea's logistics are artillery-heavy. Being able to sustain a heavy artillery war (though unlikely due to Coalition targeting) means large reserves. Of these reserves, as many as 8 million shells have likely been shipped to Russia so far. North Korea also maintains large stocks of artillery shells for systems not (yet) used by the Russians, such as 170mm artillery. North Korean artillery production is known to have increased shell output for the Russians. At least 1 factory's goal is 72,000 152mm shells per year, yet that number has not been reached as of late July. Bottlenecks come from supply chain issues from China. Raw materials from Russia could likely increase production.

The KPA has a large number of vehicles compatible with integration into Russian mechanized operations:

A KPA tank brigade would field approximately 2,500 personnel, including around 230 officers. Major equipment for the tank brigade (relevant to RGF integration) includes the following:

• T-55/62 tanks: 93

• IFVs/APCs (often BTR-50, Type 63/VTT-323): 58

• BRDM patrol cars: 3

• M-1985/Type 62/63/PT-76 light tanks: 40

• 152-mm self-propelled howitzers: 18

• 122-mm self-propelled howitzers: 18 (ATP 7-100.2, 3-14)

Note: While there is currently no indication that the KPA intends on deploying units with their equipment to Russia, they could partially (or entirely, depending on composition) share logistics with the Russian Ground Forces if they did. While the KPA's tank and AFV fleet is decades old, their introduction to a Ukrainian battlefield which is increasingly seeing a high-low mix of equipment may not be an extreme shock. Kim may be incentivized to deploy armored forces in exchange for technology transfer, replacement of losses with newer Russian equipment, real battlefield experience and Russian upgrades. North Korea also maintains active production lines for both tanks and APCs, though their output is likely low. Russian assistance, likely with raw materials and machining equipment, may help in boosting output.

KPA units maintain commissar attachments in order to monitor political attitudes:

KPAGF divisions contain a security company that focuses on internal unit security to ensure all soldiers are politically reliable. All units down to company level have at least a political officer that is separate from the unit commander. The size of this political security unit increases with parent unit size. (ATP 7-100.2, 3-11)

Political officers may have as much power as the KPA unit commander. They are to ensure that the soldiers in the unit remain supportive of the Kim family and the current regime. Political officers will conduct investigations of anyone accused of disloyalty—including saying negative things about the country or its leaders—and can have the individual arrested and charged with crimes. During combat operations, political officers must approve all the unit commander’s plans and any subsequent changes. At the lowest level, company political officers will ensure that the unit’s soldiers carry out their duties diligently, and will execute any soldiers that attempt to flee the battlefield or retreat without orders. Cowardice is not tolerated in the KPA, and the political officer is the enforcer. (ATP 7-100.2, 3-11)

Note: It is unlikely that the KPA will deploy unreliable forces to Russia where they can then defect and embarrass the regime. It should be assumed that deployed units, at least initially, will be closely watched by commissars. The RGB likely to react harshly to any instance or even indication of an intention to defect. Similar to Wagner's treatment of surrendered forces, it is unlikely that returned POWs will be treated warmly and is should be expected that KPA troops deployed to Russia will by politically reliable and regularly informed of the consequences of surrender or defection, including but not limited to family back home. Contrary to allegations by certain pro-Ukrainian outlets, this may mean that KPAGF troops are significantly less likely to surrender than Russian troops. Of course, KPA troops will be completely green, likely unaware of the state of the Ukrainian battlefield and may suffer a cultural shock while there. The GUR may seek to exploit these vulnerabilities to try to entice defection and surrender.

KPAAF threat minor, but not nonexistent:

The Air Force’s most capable combat aircraft are its few MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters procured from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, its MiG-23 Flogger interceptors, its Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack aircraft, and its Il-28 Beagle bombers. (DIA, 45)

Compared to most Western air forces, KPAAF pilots do not receive sufficient training time to become truly proficient in their skills.... Before Kim Jong Un took power in North Korea, pilots flew only 15–25 hours per year due to the cost, a shortage of aviation fuel, and the lack of spare parts. Most training flights usually only lasted 30–45 minutes and focused mainly on taking off and landing the aircraft safely. Units flying the MiG-29, MiG-23, or Su-25 received additional training hours. After Kim Jong Un took power, pilot flight time double to 50 hours per year. The latest economic sanctions may have cut back the KPAAF pilots’ flight time, but the effects are not fully known. It is likely that KPAAF pilots are substandard when compared to other modern air force pilots who receive many more flight hours in both simulators and the actual cockpit. (ATP 7-100.2, B-2)

Note: At this time, there is no indication that the KPAAF has been requested or has offered to serve in Russia. Severe training deficiencies mean that KPAAF pilots get half to a third the level of training that Russian pilots receive. That said, they represent additional aircraft and pilots that could be leveraged by the Russian Air Force, potentially through the provision of aircraft in a better condition. North Korean Su-25 pilots for example can be given additional training and utilized in ground strike missions, whilst MiG-29 pilots can assist in anti-drone interception duties. Language barriers would need to be overcome, but there exists a pool of pilots with base-level training that can be accessed by the VVS. Russia could enable increased KPAAF training through the provision of spare parts and aviation fuel. Kim may find increased training, upgrades to existing aircraft, or the provision of current-generation Russian aircraft as a persuasive case for detaching elements of the KPAAF sometime in the future.

Conclusion:

Though not an exhaustive analysis of the KPA's capabilities and capacity to fight, as well as being written before KPA troops see conflict, this post hopes to serve as a helpful, sourced reference for those who have questions about North Korea's current and potential assistance to the Russian Armed Forces. Importantly, a significant commitment of North Korean troops which sees little Western response could dramatically tip the war into Russia's favor through sheer weight of men and equipment. Though green and inexperienced, the introduction of fresh troops will undoubtedly introduce a tough strain upon the ZSU, who are currently suffering manpower and ammunition shortages across much of the front. The Russian population and indeed Kim Jong Un's (likely) apathy towards KPA casualties means that the Russian Armed Forces could sustain offensive operations in more areas of the front at a longer pace than previously possible. Without reciprocal NATO support, the current trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war could turn dire for the ZSU in 2025.

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https://youtu.be/KDTHmgHdYu4?si=U9H6cmz8L0b1g-Px&t=1135

Lithuanian side was played by general Ben Hodges, Russian - by general Philip Breedlove.

Assumptions:

1. US is preoccupied in conflict with China over Taiwan and is involved in Middle East

2. US is involved in after-election armed unrest.

3. Russia uses full-resources (6 armies) and Belarusian brigades.

4. Russia has developed a full army in Konigsberg as planned by Shoigu

5. Attack happens in 2027. Lithuania's upgrade plan happens according to current plan. German brigade is deployed by 2027 according to plan and is combat-ready. Lithuania invests 10bn

Results after 10 days:

1. Russia is unable to continue the attack as it loses half of its capability and needs

2. Lithuania restores control over its territory

3. without additional investment (i.e. with current plan), Lithuania would lose its capital and its statehood would be threatened.

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https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-draw-is-a-win-the-houthis-after-one-year-of-war/

Abstract: The Iran-backed Houthi movement has delivered a strong military performance in the year of anti-Israel and anti-shipping warfare since October 2023. They seem to be aiming to be the ‘first in, last out,’ meaning the first to cross key thresholds during the war (for instance, attack Israel’s major cities) and the last to stop fighting (refusing to be deterred by Israeli or Anglo-American strikes inside Yemen). Facing weak domestic opposition and arguably strengthening their maritime line of supply to Iran, the Houthis are stronger, more technically proficient, and more prominent members of the Axis of Resistance than they were at the war’s outset. The Houthis can now exploit new opportunities by cooperating with other Axis of Resistance players in Iraq as well as with Russia, and they could offer Yemen as a platform from which Iran can deploy advanced weapons against Israel and the West without drawing direct retaliation.

Recent Trends in the Houthi War Effort

• Operational tempo of the Houthi anti-shipping campaign has not decreased. In fact, there was a surge of tempo in June and July 2024.
• The international effort failed to stop or slow down the Houthis. Even worse, the Houthis learned from the lessons and became more efficient and effective. The technological deficiencies had been one of the Houthi weaknesses, but the Houthis have now improved.
• The adversaries of the Houthis has yet to effectively address other weaknesses of the Houthis, such as their smuggling network with Iran.

The Puzzle of Houthi Targeting Choices

• Most ships in the world are tangentially linked to Israel, US, or UK, as these ships are partly owned, managed, or engaged in trading with companies located in these countries. This targeting choice presents a very wide set of targeting options to the Houthis.
• Many Russian tankers have shipped oil to Israel in the past, thus making them valid Houthi targets.
• The Houthis are sometimes confused by outdated ownership data of the ships.

Can the Houthis Maintain a Target Lock?

• Sometimes the Houthis would strike the wrong ship. They have difficulty identifying one ship from another.
• Nevertheless, the Houthis have a lot of sensors to fix the location of a ship, including AIS transponder from potential target, intraship radio transmissions, and cellphone emissions monitored by Houthi-controlled telecom providers. Close-in sensors of the Houthi include UAV, ship-based radio monitoring, visual identification from boats, and Iranian spy ships.

Tactical Evolution

• Houthi operations have become more complex as experience is gained.
• Houthis are now capable of all-system operations, involving flotillas of small boats, unmanned surface vehicle, UAV, and anti-ship missiles.

The Balance Sheet Between the Houthi and U.S. Efforts

• It is assessed that 62 percent of Houthi strikes are intercepted by adversaries of the Houthis. Still, this is not enough to deter the Houthis, and freedom of navigation has not been restored.
• Iranian supply lines to the Houthis have not been stopped. The UN embargo on arms deliveries to the Houthis has not been effectively enforced.

Updating the SWOT Analysis of the Houthi War Effort

The April 2024 CTC Sentinel study issued an assessment of the demonstrated strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats facing the Houthis in the first period of their war against Israel, the United States, the United Kingdom, and global shipping. As the war turns one year old, the picture is arguably even bleaker for the forces trying to contain the Houthi threat.

• The strengths shown by the Houthis are abundant and have been reinforced by events.
• Technological weakness of the Houthis are getting addressed by the Houthis.
• Currently the Houthis are only able to deny the use of the Red Sea, but if the Houthis become able to control the Red Sea, by selectively letting some shipping companies pass, this can be financially lucrative.
• Houthis have proven themselves to be the most useful allies of Iran. Houthis will be rewarded with more technology and materiel, and opportunity to expand to Iraq.
• Russia might also find the Houthis useful in retaliation to the US.
• Perhaps the only sharp threat facing the Houthis is the decline in power of Iran. In some sense, Iran itself may be more vulnerable than the Houthis.

Personal note from the OP: I saw this report because people are sharing this chilling footnote on X.

[ak] By some accounts, an ASBM or other missile arrived at a very shallow trajectory, with minimal warning, without a chance for interception, and splashing down around 200 meters from the Eisenhower. Details gathered from interviews with Yemen-focused U.S. and U.K. intelligence officers for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. The Houthis propagandized the carrier’s departure. See “America’s withdrawal from the Red Sea confirms the fall of the myth of Washington’s great power,” Sabant – Saba Agency, May 1, 2024.

A sea-skimming cruise missile is only detectable at about 50 km, due to the Earth's curvature. If the missile is moving at Mach 1, this gives about 2.5 minutes of reaction time.

An ASBM, no matter how depressed its trajectory, should be easily detectable, but it moves quite a bit faster. So the reaction time will still be just several minutes.

The Aegis system is not on full auto, probably due to civilian concerns (fear of shooting down airliners). Therefore, several minutes of warning is not enough.

Another compounding issue, if it's an ASBM with depressed trajectory, is that the SM-3 is not suitable for endo-atmospheric intercept. Only the SM-6 can do this, but older Aegis vessels (like USS Carney which saw so much action in the Red Sea) cannot use the SM-6.

All of the discussion above show one thing, that it is no longer safe for a carrier to stay within 100 km of enemy shoreline, even if the enemy is some Iranian-backed insurgents.

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Research suggests that op-eds can be effective in shaping public opinion, which raises the question: does the defense industry agree? 

Littoral Precedent

The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) program might offer clues.

The LCS program was a U.S. Navy initiative launched in the early 2000s to create a fleet of small, agile, and versatile warships designed for operations in shallow coastal waters (the littorals). The program promised fast, stealthy ships with interchangeable mission modules for various tasks like mine-sweeping, anti-submarine warfare, and surface combat. However, the LCS program would eventually become notorious for its failures. 

Over the years, the value of LCS would be questioned for good reasons, such as:

• Performance concerns about real-world combat effectiveness and survivability
• Dramatic cost overruns
• Mechanical issues with the ships already delivered
• Delays in their interchangeable mission packages, one of the original key selling points
• Downgraded performance specifications, leading to criticism that the delivered ships were less capable than initially promised

And whenever those questions put funding in doubt, op-eds would be published offering answers. The author Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute wrote a variety of op-eds on LCS, including:

• 2007: Littoral Combat Ship and the Birth of A New Navy
• 2011: Low-Cost Warship Rescues Navy From Shrinking Fleet
• 2012: Rough Seas In D.C. Unlikely To Slow Revolutionary Warship
• 2016: Size Matters: 5 Reasons The Littoral Combat Ship Is Crucial To Future Naval Operations

Notably, Thompson includes a disclosure in each: “The Lexington Institute receives funding from many of the nation’s leading defense contractors, including Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Technologies”. Loren Thompson is the COO of The Lexington Institute. 

Nonetheless, the rosy op-eds slowed around 2017-2019 when a major reassessment and reduction of the LCS program occurred. Reality set in after the Navy conducted its own internal review, which was effective in highlighting the magnitude of its failures. The narrative justifying ever-increasing investment in LCS finally collapsed.

Today, much of the interest in LCS is in not repeating it. To the program’s credit, it has generated substantial material for case studies:

• 2021: Lessons from the Littoral Combat Ship
• 2023: A Deep Dive Into US Navy’s Epic Shipbuilding Failure
• 2023: The Inside Story of How the Navy Spent Billions on the “Little Crappy Ship”

From the introduction of Lessons from the Littoral Combat Ship:

“The military-industrial complex “has more tentacles than an octopus,” and its “dimensions are almost infinite.” So wrote Sen. William Proxmire in his excoriating 1970 book Report from Wasteland. He described the military-industrial complex as a “military-contract treadmill” that had unwarranted influence over U.S. politics.

Does this treadmill still exist half a century later?

The littoral combat ship can answer that question… 

The program has one saving grace – It offers some important lessons about the American defense industrial base.”

One lesson is in demonstrating a pattern: op-eds favorable to defense contractors repeatedly appeared when the LCS program faced heightened scrutiny and questioning, seemingly aimed at shaping public opinion at important times.

That raises a second question: Does the practice still exist, or has defense journalism evolved past the use of op-eds to influence opinions? 

Setting the Record Squared

The Osprey program might offer clues. 

The V-22 Osprey has come under increased scrutiny lately following a pair of recently released mishap investigations, most notably for the tragic crash of GUNDAM-22 off the coast of Yakushima Island, Japan in November 2023. 

The official investigation for the GUNDAM-22 mishap, published on August 1, 2024, immediately sparked controversy. Despite compelling evidence pointing to well-known materials problems, training issues, and ultimately broader failures having led to the crash, the official report strongly suggested the primary cause was the fault of poor decision making by the crew instead. This conclusion drew sharp criticism from experts, fellow service members, and the families of the deceased. 

Stories skeptical of the official narrative quickly followed, including:

• 7/31/2024: Air Force makes big changes after the Osprey crash that killed UR_WRONG_ABOUT_V22
• 8/7/2024: Pilots, Family Members Say Crew Is Being Unfairly Blamed for November's Deadly Air Force Osprey Crash
• 8/21/2024: Flaw in Osprey Gears Was Known a Decade Prior to Deadly Japan Crash, Internal Report Shows
• 8/21/2024: Report Finds Pilot Violated Strict Orders Not to Die Onboard Flawless Military Aircraft
• 8/23/2024: Flawed metal & failed communication: Breaking down the Air Force’s fatal Osprey crash

Next, on September 7, 2024, Newsweek published an op-ed by the widow of Staff Sergeant Jake Galliher, one of the crew members that perished in the GUNDAM-22 crash:

• 9/7/2024: Widow: Ground This Military Plane Before More People Die | Opinion

The piece received significant attention beyond traditional military aviation circles, bringing V-22 safety concerns to a broader audience. 

If the LCS pattern now holds, the heightened scrutiny in the V-22 information space would seem like an ideal environment for a favorable counter-response op-ed to materialize. Would the Iron Triangle oblige?

Indeed, within two weeks, two op-eds appeared just 9 days apart:

• 9/23/2024: Setting the Record Straight on the V-22 Osprey
• 10/2/2024: Setting the Record Straight on the Safety of the V-22 Osprey

The first, Setting the Record Straight on the V-22 Osprey, was written by Congressman Ronny Jackson’s staffer. 

Setting the Record Straight on the Safety of the V-22 Osprey was written by Robert Kenney, who is a retired Marine Corps. Colonel and a helicopter pilot. 

The two op-eds are remarkably similar. 

Their titles:

• Jackson: “Setting the Record Straight on the V-22 Osprey”
• Kenney: “Setting the Record Straight on the Safety of the V-22 Osprey”

Both highlight the GUNDAM-22 controversy:

• Jackson: “The crash of a CV-22 Osprey, call sign Gundam 22, off the coast of Japan in November 2023 has generated a wave of unfair scrutiny against the aircraft ”
• Kenney: “The mishap report that has received the most attention lately concerns the Air Force CV-22, call-sign Gundam 22, which went down off the coast of Japan…"

Both suggest recent mishaps were due to pilot error:

• Jackson: “The Department of Defense conducted a thorough investigation into the incident, and we are working collaboratively to address the findings while taking the necessary steps to ensure the Osprey continues to operate safely and effectively”
• Kenney: the Marine Corps MV-22 accident "pointed to operator error as the clear causal factor, not the aircraft" and the Air Force CV-22 crash "implicated both a failure of material and subsequent operator error in decision-making… The report on Gundam 22 unfortunately indicates that the crew discounted the urgency of these alerts. "

Both compare to conventional helicopters:

• Jackson: “When compared to conventional helicopters, like the H-60 Black Hawk or the H-47 Chinook, the V-22's safety record remains well within acceptable industry standards”
• Kenney: “In that same period, the military has experienced roughly the same number of fatal H-53 helicopter accidents, twice as many fatal H-47 Chinook accidents and scores of fatal H-60 Black Hawk helicopter accidents.”

Both quote Gen. Eric Smith:

• Jackson: “Despite its extensive use, the MV-22's mishap rate per 100,000 flight hours is "equal to or less than any airframe flown," according to the commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Eric M. Smith. He also recently said, "They're completely safe. They have a better safety record than most aircraft."
• Kenney: “The MV-22 is a safe airplane. Its mishap rate per 100,000 flight hours is equal to or less than any airframe flown.”... “They’re completely safe. They have a better safety record than most aircraft.”

Both emphasizing unique capabilities:

• Jackson: “Its unique tilt-rotor design enables it to take off and land in confined spaces while flying faster and farther than traditional helicopters. These advantages provide critical support in combat, medical evacuation operations, and disaster relief efforts, often meaning the difference between life and death.”
• Kenney: “It enables missions no other aircraft could, thanks to its speed and range. For the Marine Corps, the Osprey has transformed its combat assault concepts of operation from what was possible with the CH-46 Sea Knight. For Air Force Special Operations Forces, the Osprey has enabled record-breaking long-distance rescue missions. And for the Navy, the Osprey will become critical to enabling distributed maritime operations and contested logistics.”

Both acknowledge inherent risk:

• Jackson: “While military flight operations are inherently risky, the Osprey remains an indispensable asset in our defense strategy.”
• Kenney: “Make no mistake — flying military aircraft is inherently dangerous. That said, those who build and operate these fantastically capable machines make every effort to make them as safe as possible”

Both emphasizing ongoing safety efforts:

• Jackson: “At every stage of the V-22's lifecycle, from development to combat operations, highly skilled professionals work diligently to ensure the aircraft's safety and effectiveness.”
• Kenney: “Going forward, the military and contractors are looking at the feasibility of a “triple-melt” process that would melt the metal yet a third time to further minimize the risk of an inclusion.”

Both attempt to establish personal credibility through experience:

• Jackson: “During my time in the Navy, and now as a member of the House Armed Services Committee, I have spent considerable time flying onboard the V-22”
• Kenney: “As a former Marine Corps pilot with over 5,000 flight hours and as an engineer, I want to help set the record straight on the safety of the V-22”

And both end with positive, forward-looking conclusions about the Osprey program:

• Jackson: “As we move forward, we will continue to improve and build upon the innovative technology embodied by the V-22, because ultimately, enhancing the capabilities of the V-22 will contribute to a more secure future for our country and ensure our military has the advantages it needs to compete with and win against our adversaries. “
• Kenney: “The Osprey program has encountered and overcome challenges before. I remain confident in the Osprey, as do the Marines who fly and maintain the fleet, and I look forward to seeing the aircraft safely flying for another 30 years or more.”

Fwd: re: re: Conclusion

What could explain the similarities? And would the answer clarify whether favorable op-eds still tend to appear in the defense contractor's time of need?

One possibility is that it's not a crime to:

• Reach out to potentially willing contacts.
• Provide those contacts with materials like facts, quotes, or talking points.
• Pay a private citizen after publishing an op-ed.
• Make campaign contributions to a Congressman sometime later.

If that were the case, it would indicate a coordinated and timely strategy designed to influence a narrative using op-eds. This would provide a clear answer to the question at hand.

However, if it were true, the authors would have disclosed potential conflicts of interest:

• Jackson represents the district where Bell-Boeing assembles the Osprey.
• Kenney is a former Vice President of the Osprey Program at Bell-Boeing.

But they didn’t, which raises more questions. 

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Note: I did post this on LCD as well, just a heads up. I formatted this with detail in mind, everything within this is from the INSURV report I linked, with some of my thoughts sprinkled in. Feel free to remove if this is not up to standard, I will modify and resubmit under mod guidance.

After over 200 days of delays from when they were originally supposed to release it, they've finally released it. For the Navy nerd in me, this is deeply disappointing, but I'd attribute it to budgeting issues, and perhaps not wanting to release these numbers, since a lot of them are less than desirable.

To explain for those of you who do not know, INSURV reports (Board of Inspection and Survey) are documents that detail the readiness of the US Navy vessels. These are intended to provide critical assessments of the conditions and operational capability of our fleet's ships, submarines, and other such naval craft, and these extend to under-construction vessels too, not just in-service. This is a report mandated by law, under Title 10 of the US Code, Section 8674, requiring the Navy to assess the condition of its vessels periodically and report these findings to Congress.

Either way, I will be hitting six main areas of concern, and one small one at the end for positive consideration, regarding these different issues. I will try to explain this in as much detail as I possibly can so everyone can understand the issues we face, in the USN.

Decline in Fleet Material Condition (aka IFOM Scores)

The report indicates a slight but notable decline in our Fleet's material condition, which is measured by the INSURV IFOM (Figure of Merit) score. The IFOM is based on the standard Equipment Operational Capability, or EOC, definitions, which are found in the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual, which is known otherwise as JFMM, ranging from a score of 0.0 (which is considered completely inoperative) to a score of 1.0 (which is fully operable). The IFOM scores do not factor in programmatic assessment or major system demonstrations, but instead mostly focus on operational conditions of equipment.

• Surface Ship IFOM: This decreased by 0.02 in FY 2023, bringing the overall average below the five year trend, not a great sign.
• CVN IFOM: Aircraft carriers would see a more pronounced decline, dropping 0.05 in FY 2023, which is 0.03 below the five year average.
• Submarine IFOM: Thankfully remained steady, still below five year average though.

This indicates a gradual degradation in our material readiness, even more so in terms of our CVN and Surface Ship categories.

Degraded Functional Areas in Critical Ship Classes

This is going to highlight some degraded functional areas, revealing widespread material deficiencies across more specific ship classes.

• Surface Ships:
  • 15 functional areas were evaluated as degraded status, some of these areas are as follows:
    • Main Propulsion (MP): This is essential for our ship movement and execution, pretty much self-explanatory, we've had issues with this lately so this makes sense.
    • Weapon Systems (WP): Degraded weapons systems, again pretty self explanatory, impairs our ability to have effective lethality and hinders defensive capability among ships.
    • Communications (CC) and Information Systems (IS): These are critical for command and control functions, degradation in these areas impacts our fleet coordination and mission success.
    • Damage Control (DC): This is about ship survivability in combat situations, mostly related to damage and fires.
    • There are other areas, including Deck (DK), Aviation (AV), Supply (SP), Environmental Protection (EP) and Navy Occupational Safety and Health (OH).
• Submarines:
  • Three functional areas were evaluated as degraded:
    • Auxiliaries (AX): These relate to supporting systems like cooling, power distribution, and hydraulic systems, this is actually a very important area as it can lead to broader operational failures in other systems.
    • Deck (DK): As I mentioned earlier, but did not detail, this is important for maintaining hull integrity and operability, during surface operations especially.
    • Navy Occupational Safety and Health (OH): This can be a very broad category, but can impact living and working conditions on board, this mostly has potential for health and psychological impact among crew.
• Aircraft Carriers (CVNs):
  • 13 functional areas were degraded, which is perhaps more concerning than the Surface Ships area, given that CVNs are an element of power projection:
    • Notable degradation occurred in the areas of Weapons Systems (WP), Aviation (AV), Damage Control (DC), and Information Systems (IS), compared to the others.
    • Lesser degradation seemed to occur in the areas of Ventilation (VT), Preservation (PR), and Habitability (HB), from what I saw.

This is not great either, to say the least. It indicates a systemic stress on the material readiness of these platforms, with risks to areas of importance (these being, in my eyes, mission success, operational capability, and long-term ship health).

Ship Construction Deficiencies and Trial Failures

While the previous section was bad enough, you might think that our naval construction would be better, looking forward. Heads up, nope.

• Acceptance Trials (AT): Of the 13 ships that were present for AT in FY 2023, 9 of them had significant construction deficiencies that precluded their acceptance into the fleet.
  • These deficiencies included unperformed or failed demonstrations of mission-critical systems, mission-degrading deficiencies, and pending or late installations.
  • Such problems would indicate to me recurring issues in shipbuilding quality control (which we have seen reports on recently), delaying fleet introductions and increasing the cost of post-delivery corrections on the ones that do make it through QC.
• Final Contact Trials (FCTs): All nine of the ships that did go under FCTs required Re-Trials (RTs), further delaying their fleet readiness, as I said. These primarily arose from system installations that were pending or failed during their trials, which points toward failures in contractor performance and shipyard readiness. This was evident in the report for advanced platforms as well, like the Zumwalt-class Destroyers and Littoral Combat Ships, which have struggled in material readiness even at their trial stages.

Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) Program Issues

The LCS program, extending to both variants, Freedom and Independence, experience material readiness issues to this day.

• FREEDOM Variant (LCS 1): Following the resumption of deliveries after the CNO's moratorium in 2021 to fix combining gear design deficiencies, one ship (LCS 25) successfully completed AT with no significant deficiencies. However, two ships that did conduct FCTs (LCS 21 and LCS 23), performed poorly, earning the lowest IFOM scores in the past five years. This, once again, is indicative of the systemic design and construction flaws that still hamper LCS readiness.
• INDEPENDENCE Variant (LCS 2): Three ships (LCS 30, 32, and 34) also showed below-average performance in trials, with at least one major warfighting system inoperative, limiting their operational capabilities.

These recurring issues just go to show that engineering and design shortcomings are still present, which has made me and other analysts cast a heavy amount of doubt on whether the program is fully viable as a core component of the future of the Navy.

Backlog of Material Inspections

INSURV itself is facing a massive backlog of material inspections due to staffing shortages and the COVID-19 pandemic's lingering impact, as seen below:

• 34 percent of ships have exceeded their mandated three-year inspection periodicity, with 110 out of the 321 vessels overdue for inspection.
• With current manning levels, INSURV's inspection periodicity is averaging 4.7 years, well above that three year cycle that is mandated. This backlog is leading to delayed identification of critical material issues, compounding and exacerbating readiness challenges that already plague our fleet.

INSURV has estimated that this backlog will continue to persist for the foreseeable future unless manning levels are significantly increased. Even with 40 newly authorized civilian billets, INSURV still needs an additional 55 military billets, programmed for funding within FY 2025. Unless these positions can be filled, critical inspections will just continue to be delayed.

Issues with Trials and Acceptance of New Ship Programs (not including LCS)

Several new ship programs continue to experience material and construction deficiencies, besides the LCS. Three are detailed below:

• Arleigh Burke-class Destroyer Program (DDG 51): Despite this being a longstanding and reliable program so far, several recent DDG trials have revealed deficiencies that precluded positive Fleet Introduction recommendations. This is concerning, to say the least, given the centrality of the DDG 51 class to the surface combatant fleet.
• Zumwalt-class Destroyer Program (DDG 1000): The Zumwalt Class continues to face systemic material problems, with issues ranging from design, procurement, and sustainment decisions. The program's failure to perform well in FCTs points to a deeper rooted challenge that could impact the future of the platform as a whole.
• John Lewis-class Fleet Replenishment Oiler (T-AO): Significant problems with two critical systems were encountered while construction of the vessel, and the vessel during service, delaying a proper full-operational introduction of these support vessels, which are key in terms of sustainable fleet operations.

Military Sealift Command (finally a positive)

On a more positive note, MSC vessels showed slight improvement, with an average IFOM score increase of 0.03 compared to the previous five years. This would align with the increased number of SMART inspections conducted by INSURV on MSC vessels since FY 2021. I would say though, Damage Control systems have remained an issue/area of concern, ever since they have been evaluated as degraded since FY 2019.

Concluding

A lot of this was in line with what I expected, having done a fair share of reading into the Navy, beyond the reporting. Still, especially with our considerable changing world environment, it would do the US way better to have a Navy that is well prepared, not in this type of condition. I linked the report at the start but will do so here too. Here you go!

Don’t know if they’re related, but recently, the Indian government gave its approval to construct 2 SSNs (nuclear attack subs), with a total of 6 planned so far. These subs are to be constructed in the city of Visakhapatnam in the Southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, where India’s SSBN’s are also being constructed. Moreover, the SSBNs are to be stationed in INS Varsha, a new naval base under construction in the village of Rambili, about 50 km from Visakhapatnam. This base will be adjacent to a nuclear facility of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, which will presumably handle India’s seaborne nuclear deterrent.

Now, there’s news that India is setting up a missile testing range further south in Andhra near the village of Nagayalanka. Given the proximity of the testing range (which supposedly will primarily deal with surface to air missiles) to the location India’s seaborne nuclear leg of the triad, could a testing range like this be effective at air defence? Especially at ICBM defence?

Sources: INS Varsha

New Missile Testing Range

New nuclear attack submarines for Visakhapatnam.

Hypothetically of course. I don’t wish for any war or invasion. But intellectually this question fascinates me. If the United States or any other super power were to attempt an Iraq style invasion of Iran, how would it go?

Iran is a very odd country to surmise when it comes to their standing. They have mastered asymmetric warfare, are shielded by their geography, have a highly educated workforce which has resulted in surprising advances in tech despite sanctions, 160,000 plus in military man power yet they still operate tomcats.

https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/fish-out-of-water-how-the-military-is-an-impossible-place-for-hackers-and-what-to-do-about-it/

There’s nothing inherently military about writing cyber capabilities — offensive or defensive. Defense contractors have been doing it for decades. And unless an operator is directly participating in hostilities, it’s not clear they need to be in uniform either. The talent pool is much larger if we look beyond servicemembers.

/u/Eyre_Guitar_Solo notes the author's bio is a perfect example:

Josh Lospinoso is an active duty Army captain. After graduating West Point in 2009, he earned a Ph.D. at the University of Oxford on a Rhodes Scholarship, where he also co-founded a successful cybersecurity software startup. After graduating Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course and Ranger School, he transferred into the Army’s newly formed Cyber Branch in 2014 and became one of the Army’s first journeyman tool developers. He currently serves as the technical director for Cyber National Mission Force’s tool development organization. He is resigning from active duty to complete his forthcoming book, C++ Crash Course, and to prepare for his next entrepreneurial venture.

Human resources are poorly managed by the defense establishment as a whole, with Beoing's strikes and supply issues, to the failing dockyards and inability to keep/train workers, to intelligence struggling to get analysts who understand their fields... How can this be addressed?