Petitioner, Travis County, files petition for a writ of certiorari and requests that the Court provide permanent injunction and response to questions presented. (Executive Order 22)

Your honors,

Kindly find attached the government's application for a search warrant for the property of SMART Alabama, LLC located at 121 Shin Young Dr, Luverne, AL 36049, United States.

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Jg_kmLhInNB1-WcMc7_L8yHDtaf9tEShPBk-xjUlvqY/edit?usp=sharing

Pursuant to the Rules of Court, a majority of the bench has voted to extend review to In re: State Naming Controversy.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has filed a complaint upon which relief may be provided.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Executive Directives are unconstitutional, among other things

The Court has come to a decision in the present case, which challenges the ability for the Executive to refer to the name of the state differently in certain circumstances. Junior Associate Justice /u/Aubrion delivered the opinion of a unanimous court. The court holds:

Held: The Executive Order is Unconstitutional as it is an executive overreach on powers held by the legislative branch to change the state name and seal. Though the Governor tries their best to step around this by having uses of Douglass mean Dixie. This is still too blatant a disregard of the actual state name and is seen by this court as an active step in changing the state name.

The Executive Order calls for “The agencies of the State shall, upon the enactment of this Order, use the name “Great State of Douglass”, or alternatives “Douglass” and “State of Douglass”, in place of the name “Great State of Dixie” or other variants in all documents published by the State notwithstanding additional statutory requirements enacted after the enactment of this Order.”[1] The court sees this as a major step in changing the State name, the executive is a substantial part of the state, and agencies within it are largely interacted with by legislature, courts, and even the public. Any layperson who may lay eyes on one of these published documents would see the name “Douglass” and would certainly interpret that to mean the State name. Even with section two stating that Douglass shall mean Dixie, this is still changing the name of the State. The change between Dixie and Douglass is such a considerable change both connotatively and symbolically that section two does not save the Executive Order from being held unconstitutional.

The Governor does their best to make clear in the Executive Order that the order does not change the name of the state by directing in sections three and four that employees are not to interpret these changes as a change in name of the State of Dixie and that Dixie is still the official name of the State[1]. This still does not remedy the fact that a major step was taken in changing the name of the state. Just because you say something was not done, does not mean it was not done. The court finds that these sections are meaningless as a substation step was taken in changing the name of the state.

Article II section 4 of the state constitution states, “The flag, seal, and other symbols of the state of Dixie shall be set and may be changed through legislation.”[2] The court finds that only the legislature can change the name of the state, and an Executive Order is insufficient in making any substantial changes to the State name. To conclude the Governor made a significant step in changing the name of the state that they did not have the power to make. Despite any interpretations saying otherwise that were included within the executive order, it is still the case that the order directed a change in the name of the state.

The executive order is struck down in its entirety.

[1] Executive Order: https://www.reddit.com/r/ModelSouthernState/comments/o61wfx/appropriate_agencies_name_executive_order/

[2] Dixie Constitution: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1iEmemm0odds_iPBPIbtVfG5WswlLRt9WBVIH5N4yLZw/edit

#In the Supreme Court for the State of Dixie

##In re Executive Curriculum Mandates

##JacobInAustin v. State

###PETITION FOR AN WRIT OF CERTIORARI

###QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Lieutenant Governor's curriculum mandates contained in two directives issued on July 31, 2021 violate the Separation of Powers Clause (Dx. Const. Art. II, § 3).

###REQUEST FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Jacob I. Austin, by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully requests a writ of certiorari to review two directives, the first being Curriculum Mandates I, Directive No. 5 (July 31, 2021), https://redd.it/ovlf67, and Curriculum Mandates II, Directive No. 6 (July 31, 2021), https://redd.it/ovlg9w.

###JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Dx. Const. Art. V, § 2 and Part II of the Rules of this Court.

###STATEMENT

The Lieutenant Governor, acting as the Commissioner of Education, issued new education mandates relating to how the history of the civil war ought to be taught, see generally Curriculum Mandates I, Directive No. 5 (July 31, 2021), https://redd.it/ovlf67, and how sexual education ought to be taught, see generally Curriculum Mandates II, Directive No. 6 (July 31, 2021), https://redd.it/ovlg9w.

The Legislature commanded that the State Board of Education “establish curriculum and graduation requirements.” Dx. Educ. Code § 7.102(c)(4). Of course, their duties “shall be carried out with the advice and assistance of the commissioner”, Dx. Educ. Code § 7.102(b), but otherwise the Commissioner is just an advisor to the Board at large and helps to carry out their will. “Advice and assistance” is different from the commonly used “advice and consent”, after all, “we presume the Legislature ‘chooses a statute's language with care, including each word chosen for a purpose, while purposefully omitting words not chosen.’” State v. El Paso Cty., 618 S.W.3d 812, 821 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2020, mand. dismissed) (citing TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011)).

The Lieutenant Governor, in short, tried to use executive authority to get around the sometimes pesky Board of Education. This violates our basic constitutional order of government. “The government of the state of Dixie shall consist of three branches: namely, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. These branches shall serve as a check and balance of one another.” Dx. Const. Art. II, § 3.

###ARGUMENT

The Lieutenant Governor, in short, tried to use executive authority to get around the sometimes pesky Board of Education. This violates our basic constitutional order of government. “The government of the state of Dixie shall consist of three branches: namely, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. These branches shall serve as a check and balance of one another.” Dx. Const. Art. II, § 3.

The separation of powers doctrine is violated “in either of two ways. First, it is violated when one branch of government assumes or is delegated, to whatever degree, a power that is more ‘properly attached’ to another branch. When a branch of government violates the separation of powers in this way, it is said to have usurped another branch’s power. The provision is also violated when one branch unduly interferes with another branch so that the other branch cannot effectively exercise its constitutionally assigned powers.” Vandyke v. State, 538 S.W.3d 561, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (cleaned up). “The first type of violation has to do with a usurpation of one branch's powers by another branch. The second type has to do with the frustration or delay of one branch's powers by another branch.” Villarreal v. State, 504 S.W.3d 494, 503 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2016, pet. ref’d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 398 (2017).

The Lieutenant Governor stole power from the Board of Education — something explicitly forbidden by our constitutional order. This Court’s intervention is warranted, yet again, to uphold the separation of powers in our State.

###CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

/s/ Jacob I. Austin

Jacob I. Austin, Counsel of Record, Law Office of Jacob I. Austin, 401 Congress Avenue, Austin, Dixie 78701, jacob@jia.law, Attorney for Petitioner

Pursuant to the Rules of Court, a majority of the bench has voted to extend review to In re: State Naming Controversy.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has filed a complaint upon which relief may be provided.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Executive Order is unconstitutional, among other things

#In the Supreme Court of the State of Dixie

##In re State Name Controversy

##Jacob I. Austin v. State

###PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The cover can be found here in Google Document formatting, the brief can be found here in Google Document formatting, and here in PDF formatting. The PDF is the final version and controls — even though the document is an exact copy of the PDF.

/s/ Jacob I. Austin

Jacob I. Austin, Counsel of Record, Law Office of Jacob I. Austin, 14293 Rural-to-Market Road 2243, Leander, Dixie 78641, jacob@jia.law, Attorney for Petitioner

The court has reached a unanimous opinion in this case. The opinion is authored by Senior Associate Justice /u/chaosinsignia on behalf of the court.

The opinion is as follows:

In this case, the court is being asked for judgement on the “Fair Work Ethic Act” passed by the Southern State Assembly and signed into law by the Governor of the Southern State. Petitioner is seeking to have certain provisions in the act deemed unconstitutional under the Dixie Constitution.

To begin, the petitioner alleges that the power of the Fair Work Ethic Act Board, known as the Fair Work Treatment Office, to terminate private employees interferes with Article I of the Dixie Constitution. Petitioner states: “The board represents an undue and unauthorized state burden on the right to own and operate an enterprise unencumbered, and to execute employment contracts for benefit without unreasonable state interference.” The court finds this to be true. Title III of the Fair Work Ethic Act, which establishes the Fair Work Treatment Office, does not contain measures for the terminated employee or the employer of the terminated employee to make a case on their behalf to defend themselves such as the right to appeal a firing or to seek intervention for the firing as the petitioner also states. This poses an unreasonable burden on the operations of the businesses of Dixie who would have to watch without any option as their employees are investigated and their employment contracts terminated without the State needing any consultation or involvement from the businesses themselves and as stated in Article I Section 11 of the Dixie State Constitution: “The right to own and operate a business in the State of Dixie, in accordance with reasonable and applicable laws, shall not be infringed.”

This brings the court to the petitioner's next claim. Petitioner alleges that as employment services are contracted for mutual material benefit, the board’s interference in employment agreements violates Article I Section 22 of the Dixie Constitution as well as Article I Section 12 of the Dixie Constitution. This is true. Article I Section 22 of the Dixie Constitution states: “The Assembly shall make no law impairing the obligations stipulated under a binding contract agreed upon by all involved parties that does not violate any provisions of this Constitution or any law made by the Assembly.” In enacting the Fair Work Ethic Act, the Dixie State Assembly violated Article I Section 22 of the Dixie Constitution by giving the Fair Work Treatment Office the power to terminate employees of private businesses. Article I Section 12 of the Dixie Constitution states: “The right to exchange goods and services for monetary profit, in accordance with reasonable and applicable laws, shall not be infringed.” As a result of Title III not containing measures such as the right to appeal a firing or to seek intervention, the right to exchange goods and services for monetary profit is being unreasonably infringed and Article I Section 12 of the Dixie Constitution is violated by the enactment of the Fair Work Ethic Act.

Title III egregiously violates the Dixie Constitution. Title III also fails to clearly outline the inner workings of the office itself. Within Title III there is no mention of the inner workings of the office other than the appointment of a Director of the Fair Work Treatment Office by the Attorney General of the Southern State. Other than stating that: “The director shall be able to appoint members of the office to assist them,” no mention is made of the process used to determine whether an employee will be terminated nor is it mentioned who will be the deciding factor if someone is fired. No outline or criteria is stated for the investigations that are conducted by the Fair Work Treatment Office. The assembly erred in not outlining in detail the operations of the Fair Work Treatment Office and giving the Fair Work Treatment Office the power to terminate employees of private businesses.

In conclusion, Title III of the Fair Work Ethic Act violates Article I Section 11 of the Dixie Constitution, Article I Section 12 of the Dixie Constitution, and Article I Section 22 of the Dixie Constitution. Title III of the Fair Work Ethic Act is struck from the bill.

May it please the Court:

In re: Removing Confederate Imagery Act and Combatting White Supremacy in Dixie Resolution

##Summary

The state has constitutionally barred itself from chilling any speech or the right to assemble, file grievances, conduct press or protest. The state also has completely barred any action that unreasonably infringes on how businesses choose to operate, including alleged hate groups.

When the Assembly twice ordered the Attorney General launch criminal probes into white supremacist groups without cause (or any definition of domestic terrorism, despite designating the groups as such), both violated the Dixie constitutional right to equal protection of our laws and the unique business environment their citizens enjoy. An unrestricted, indefinite criminal investigation without applicable criminal laws is thus merely designed to chill an undesirable type of speech.

The state also overstepped its constitutional bounds by taking and reselling for profit public Confederate objects. While the Assembly declared its view of what is public, relics it identified included memorials and public cemeteries that have private property interests in common law. The Fifth Amendment and Dixie equal protection clause bar the state from simply taking this property and diverting funds to an unrelated anti-discrimination program, regardless of their intent.

Both laws are unconstitutional and should be struck.

##Questions Presented

• Whether the Assembly may direct an Executive officer to begin an official act solely within the realm of the Executive, such as directing the Attorney General to launch a criminal investigation into hate speech and political viewpoints?

• Whether the Governor is empowered to investigate non-violent racial supremacy movements, and to label organizations as domestic terrorists, if no such crime exists in Dixie law?

• Whether the Dixie Constitution bars the Governor from infringing on the equal rights of citizens, such as those owning or operating a corporation which may practice alleged hate speech?

• Whether the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Governor from removing and selling private Confederate relics for public anti-discrimination funds as an uncompensated taking of the next of kin’s property (Knick v. Township of Scott (2012))?

##Parties and Jurisdiction

Plaintiff is the elite civil rights advocacy branch of the American Civil Liberties Union in the State of Dixie.

Governor /u/Tripplyons18 is the boss of the State of Dixie.

Plaintiff and defendant are subject to the general laws of the State of Dixie. This Court has general jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Court Rules II and III.

The Court does not require standing or generally parties for a Dixie constitutional question pertaining to legislation or an executive order (“In re:” cases). No deadline is requested of the Court by plaintiff.

##General Facts

The Act states the following:

(5)(a) White supremacy is hereby recognized by the State of Dixie as a domestic terrorist threat and condemned accordingly.

(b) The Governor of Dixie is called upon to dedicate resources towards combating white supremacy, including investigations into organized white supremacy groups.

(c) The Attorney General shall direct the Law Enforcement Division to prioritize the investigation and prosecution of white supremacy, including hate crimes and violent crimes committed by white supremacists.

The Resolution states the following:

a) White supremacy is hereby recognized by the State of Dixie as a domestic terrorist threat, and condemned accordingly.

(b) The Governor of Dixie is called upon to dedicate resources towards combating white supremacy, including investigation into organized white supremacy groups.

(c) The Attorney General shall direct the Law Enforcement Division to prioritize the investigation and prosecution of white supremacy, including hate crimes and violent crimes committed by white supremacists.

(c) The Government of Dixie does hereby commit to removing all symbols of white supremacy, including Confederate symbols and imagery, from public property within one year of the adoption of this resolution.

(d) The State Preservation Board is hereby directed to immediately and promptly remove any Confederate imagery, monuments, plaques, or symbols from the grounds of the State Capitol, including the Confederate Soldiers Monument.

Both the Act and the Resolution demand unconstitutional actions by Dixie state law enforcement and historic preservationists.

The power to initiate and direct an investigation belongs solely to the governor, not to the Assembly. “The chief legal officer of the Great State of Dixie shall be the Attorney General.” Article IV.

All Southerners enjoy “equal rights” under the constitution, which “shall not be denied or abridged… [by] any other factor.” Article I. This includes the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

An enumerated Dixie right is that “[e]very person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish their opinions on any subject, and are equally responsible for the abuse of that privilege. No law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press.”

An express Dixie restriction on the Assembly is that “no law shall ever be passed prohibiting the right of the people to freely and safely assemble and protest.” Another limitation is that “[n]o law shall ever be passed prohibiting the right of the people to petition the government and to file grievances.”

In addition, the “right to own and operate a business in the State of Dixie, in accordance with reasonable and applicable laws, shall not be infringed.”

The State of Dixie encompasses the highest density of white supremacist organizations in the United States according to the Southern Poverty Law Center.

Sensitive Southern subjects affiliated with white supremacy beliefs are subject to the government’s new actions. Former state assemblyman, grand wizard, and President Trump affiliate David Duke is a political subject directly implicated by “combatting white supremacy” using law enforcement to search for crimes that are not yet legislated, such as supporting a domestic terror organization as labeled by Dixie police. Another example is President Trump, retired to Dixie, who publicly supported the hate group the Proud Boys in 2017 and 2021 after violent attacks on civilians and federal police.

As a hate group in Dixie, the KKK has unincorporated, and incorporated, chapters under Southern business laws.

The Dixie Department of Public Safety has identified dozens of hate subgroups in the state, including anti-LGBT, anti-Islam and anti-Semitic, pro-black supremacy, Christian Identity and fundamentalist, neo-Volkisch, male supremacist, conservative extremism and other hateful causes. These related and unrelated causes are not subject to the two laws quashing only the ideology of white supremacy through official police action.

Dixie does not presently have a law to guide the Attorney General in limiting the scope of the mandated investigation to abide by Article I protections against prosecutorial abuse. Neither does Dixie law “require law enforcement agencies to report hate crimes.” DXDPS, the alleged basis for launching police investigations into hate groups.

##Arguments

###On Combatting Hate Speech

The Dixie Constitution prohibits the Assembly from passing laws ordering the Attorney General to launch criminal and civil rights probes. This protects the people from arbitrary political investigation implied by the Dixie “separation of powers” clause in Article II.

The Governor and Assembly are engaging in a fishing expedition to find crimes encircling a detestable ideology, but there is no state guardrail to this likely unconstitutional investigation under federal law. Domestic terrorism is not defined by Southern law, and hate crimes are not presently tabulated or reported by Dixie state agencies. Investigating groups of citizens and designating them as domestic terrorists in effect chills the targeted speech under the guise of official purposes.

According to DXDPS, if a violent crime were to occur, it would be anyway be resolved by prosecuting the underlying crime at the time of offense as is already practiced by Dixie law enforcement. For example, a murder or conspiracy charge enhanced by existing hate crime laws.

The Constitution prohibits the state from imposing unequal laws based on protected or “any other factors.” Unequal laws, particularly those targeting speech, assembly, grievance, and press, are expressly prohibited in Dixie without an extremely significant state interest. No such interest or urgent criminal matter existed until the Assembly demanded the Governor engage in policing it by political vote.

The state also may not regulate business entities (see e.g., In re Fair Work Ethic Act) whatsoever. As understood by plaintiffs, the bar on such regulation of businesses to include hate group chapters is constitutionally barred. If limited regulations were found constitutional however, they should not include laws restricting corporate speech and political activities in Dixie based on ideology and non-violence without an even greater state need.

##On Auctioning Confederate Relics

In Knick, the town where Knick’s property is located passed an ordinance that required all owners of cemeteries to provide public access to those sites during daylight hours, through a right of way from the nearest road. This ordinance, town officials said, applied to a private cemetery that was entirely located on Knick’s land.

Knick successfully appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court decided that the government violated the takings clause when it took her cemetery property without compensation, and that a property owner may bring a Fifth Amendment claim under 42 U. S. C. §1983.

The State has not offered any assurances that it will not simply take private property in the public sphere using this law, which is also unconstitutional in Article I. Like Knick’s cemetery, the state arbitrarily deemed private property as a public good and then infringed upon it. Where kin maintain rights of ownership or exclusion, such as a charitable Confederate cemetery or monuments, Dixie authorities will again violate the owner’s property interest.

Agencies are also explicitly instructed to not repay the owner but to fund a grant for underrepresented citizens. This is an unlawful seizure of these profits to develop a new, and unrelated, government program. Both laws are unconstitutional.

##Relief Requested

Plaintiff asks the Court to exercise its constitutional discretion to restate the meaning of the constitutional provisions pertaining to equal protection enjoyed by Dixie businesses and citizens. If the Court should deem the Dixie or federal constitution incompatible with the law and resolution, it should strike both legislations and then bar the Dixie Government from investigating implicated non-violent organizations or from removing Confederate property in public areas that retain any private ownership rights. The Assembly has already doubled down on what may amount to a highly unconstitutional understanding of Dixie law.

Respectfully submitted,

###Carib Cannibette Biden, Jr.

The court has reached a unanimous opinion in this case. It is delivered by the Chief Justice on behalf of this Court. The opinion is as follows:

Today this Court has found its way into another case that is controversial - this time over the environment. The petitioner raises multiple questions, primarily driven by a plain reading of the laws of this state as they stand, alongside some constitutional issues. We shall begin at the beginning, and go point by point throughout the initial petition and various latter filings, to determine if the issues are actual in law.

First, the petitioner alleges that the governor's executive orders have not the force of law. This is false. "Petitioner confuses the ability to legislate statutes (solely given to the Assembly) with the capacity for law-making (a textually testified component of executive power). ... Article IV, Sec. V of the Constitution of Dixie: 'The Governor shall have the power to issue executive orders, which shall have the same force of law as any legislation passed by the General Assembly.'" (Brief amicus curiae in favour of neither party, Amicus Curiae, (2021)) Which, as it stands, invalidates the argument of the entire section of the brief, as the mere idea of the governor's order not legally being the force of law the same as legislation is central to the arguments therein.

Next, the petitioner claims that the governor did not properly allocate the emergency funds spent in section 4 correctly. To that, we must discuss what under the laws of Dixie an emergency is, and how it is declared. Title 4, chapter 418, section 418.014 of the Government Code of the state of Dixie states that "The governor by executive order or proclamation may declare a state of disaster if the governor finds a disaster has occurred or that the occurrence or threat of disaster is imminent." The power to declare an emergency, as noted by the State, is reasonable and useful. Yet there are conditions under which it can be issued - to writ "An executive order or proclamation issued under this section must include: (1) a description of the nature of the disaster; (2) a designation of the area threatened; and (3) a description of the conditions that have brought the state of disaster about or made possible the termination of the state of disaster." (Id)

Did the declaration of emergency follow these requirements? The State denoted in section 3 of the order that "A climate emergency is hereby declared in the State of Dixie." There is, to the knowledge of this Court, no attempt to justify the nature of the disaster beyond discussion of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and the apparent refusal of the current presidential administration to refute an old, Trump-era, executive order that increases the ability of American companies to drill for oil off America's coasts, as well as claiming that said order is "a direct threat to the value and beauty of the Dixie Coast". However, there is no linkage to that with the "climate emergency" that is declared, no information on what the impacts of the disaster are, or so forth. Just a sentence in a section with no elaboration. The governor did follow requirement 2, if just enough, by declaring the entire state a disaster area, but once again broke requirement 3 by not describing the conditions that brought this emergency about.

The state proclaims in their merits brief that "The State has an obligation to prevent climate change", and cited Juliana v. United States (217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016)), and its reversal in the 9th circuit, in their efforts. This ruling bears no mandatory precedential force on this Court, as we are noticeably outside the former state of Oregon, as well as the 9th Circuit in general. “Similarly, when the Ninth Circuit or any of its coequal circuit courts issue an opinion, the pronouncements become the law of that geographical area.” (United States v. AMC Entm’t, Inc., 549 F.3d 760, 771 (9th Cir. 2008)) Therefore, we will treat it as persuasive, not commendatory, precedent. It ought to be noted that he Governor failed to put any of this reasoning into the actual executive order - had they done so, there would have been a high likelihood that the declaration of emergency would have been seen in a much more favourable light by this Court. The State's defense in this regard aplombs with platitudes, but little to no legal precedent in this regard, beyond a single case reversed for lack of standing, a singular citation on the general duty of the government to protect its citizens from harm (a citation so broad that it could bridge the Pacific Ocean without stopping), and non-legal citations multiple.

We at this Court do not question global warming, climate change, whatever you wish to call it. We do, however, question section 418.014 of the Government Code "if the governor finds a disaster has occurred or that the occurrence or threat of disaster is imminent". While the Governor probably believes such, it is questionable if the State could do anything more than "only aver that any significant adverse effects of climate change 'may’ occur at some point in the future" (Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior , 563 F.3d 466, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2009)), but we will leave that for another day. With that all said, it is clear that the emergency must be struck, because the declaration was not valid within the boundaries of the law of this State. This therefore invalidates the spending of any emergency funds, because the emergency was not properly declared - which strikes down section 4 of the executive order, in addition to the previous section, number 3. This Court does not wish to get into the weeds of the legalities of appropriations unless it absolutely has to, and we strive to solve the issues in the easiest of possible ways.

Now, we move on to the other component of the case - the issue of banning oil drilling within the state. Section 52.097 of the Natural Resources Code points out that "No injunction may be granted against the board, its agents, or persons with whom it has contracted, to restrain the board from enforcing its orders or contracts or from carrying out any development that has begun or was contemplated by the board until notice is given to the board and its agents or the contracting parties and a hearing is held." The state portends that the board must take orders from the Governor, when there is no law that says this is the case. While the governor does play a role in appointing members, that is in effect the only role the governor plays. The State primarily discusses the meaning of the word "may" without discussing the actual power of the State to order the board to stop drilling on the lands and waters which it owns. This Court finds that there are no such powers - and that section 1 is in conflict with, and violates, section 52.176 of the Natural Resources Code therein, as the governor has illegally attempted to refute drilling rights on lands under control of the School Land Board, a body which the Governor does not control under the law. It is also therefore struck down.

Which leaves us with 2 sections - section 2 and 5 - respectively establishing a new energy board and ordering an investigation into the freeze in Texas during February 2021, which have any actual impact. This Court notes that they were not challenged, and are therefore unaffected by the decision of this Court on the other sections of actual impact. We do denote that section 6, subsection 2 of the executive order "This Executive Order shall remain in effect unless it is superseded by another statute or repealed by another Executive Order", is incorrect in its legal basis - this Court had the order to strike down parts of the order, and has done so. While we sympathize with the idea of contributing to the fight against climate change and global warming, we feel strongly that the ways the governor went about it at the very least violate the laws and constitution of this State. Sections 1, 3, and 4, of the order are struck down - sections 2 and 5 remain.

It is so ordered.

May it please the Court:

#Parties and Jurisdiction

Plaintiff is a managing general partner of CannibalHookers, a registered government relations firm based in Miami, DX. As part of its business, plaintiff employs lobbyists to develop long term relationships with public figures and/or their families.

Governor u/Tripplyons18 is the executive leader of the state of the firm’s incorporation and author of the law in question.

Plaintiff and defendant are subject to the general laws of the State of Dixie. This Court has general jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Court Rules II and III.

#Introduction

This action seeks declaratory judgment that certain provisions in the Dixie "Fair Work Ethic Act" ("FWEA"), recently passed by the Assembly and written by and signed by Governor u/Tripplyons18, are unconstitutional under multiple sections of the Dixie Constitution, both on their face and as applied.

For the first time in Southern history, the Assembly has empowered a politicized reliant agency to investigate workplaces and terminate employment contracts without an employer or employee’s assent, upon a mere allegation of workplace harassment or bullying. There is no right of appeal or of intervention. The board represents an undue and unauthorized state burden on the right to own and operate an enterprise unencumbered, and to execute employment contracts for benefit without unreasonable state interference. The manner in which the Assembly has granted investigative powers to the board also strongly implicates violations of the the Fourth Amendment and Dixie equivalent.

Though the Assembly recently adopted a new constitution that voluntarily eliminated the power of the Assembly to impose taxation, FWEA also creates a business tax to fund an expansion of paid spousal leave far beyond any other federal or state program. Mandated paid family leave is considered by the federal government and major accountancies as benefits subject to income tax treatment, to be reported by employees and employers and withheld by businesses as needed. For example, beneficiaries may withhold family leave taxes through the federal W4-V form.

Aside from Washington D.C., the current states that mandate PFL [like FWEA] require employees to pay into the fund. Deducting the employee’s portion before withholding taxes means their contributions are not taxable (e.g., pre-tax deduction). Deducting the employee’s portion after withholding taxes means their contributions are taxable (e.g., post-tax deduction). So, which is it? Are employee PFL contributions pre-tax or post-tax deductions? Employee PFL contributions are post-tax deductions, therefore their contributions are subject to taxes... Employee PFL benefits are subject to federal income tax (aside from the disability portion of Rhode Island’s program). However, PFL benefits are not subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes, or federal unemployment (FUTA) tax... When an employee receives PFL benefits, the payments come from the state. Employers do not withhold taxes on an employee’s PFL benefits because they are not included in payroll. State governments do not automatically withhold paid family leave federal tax from an employee’s PFL benefits. However, an employee can request to have income taxes withheld by filing Form W-4V, Voluntary Withholding Request. Mercer.

As designed, FWEA’s funding renders it a state-federal tax accountability and relief nightmare, but a nightmare requiring tax powers.

This unconstitutional law in addition to “separate but equal” requisite power granted by the people in the Dixie Bill of Rights cannot be enforced by the state.

#General Allegations

FWEA, unless enjoined, violates several sections of the Dixie Constitution:

• The power of the FWEA board to terminate private employees interferes with the “right to own and operate a business in the State of Dixie, in accordance with reasonable and applicable laws, [and] shall not be infringed.” Art. I.

• As employment services are contracted for mutual material benefit, the board’s interference in employment agreements impairs “obligations stipulated under a binding contract agreed upon by all involved parties that does not violate any provisions of this Constitution or any law made by the Assembly,” and also because the “right to exchange goods and services for monetary profit, in accordance with reasonable and applicable laws, shall not be infringed.” Art. I.

• FWEA implicates civil rights protections in both constitutions because the board’s civil search and seizure power actually implicates the Fourth Amendment according to federal precedent, and it also cannot be enforced by the Dixie Court, because a “person shall [not] have their persons, houses, papers, and otherwise personal property be unreasonably searched or seized without a warrant,” and “the Supreme Court or any other lower court shall not issue any warrant unless probable cause is presented, proven, or otherwise apparent.” Art. I.

• The taxes imposed on businesses by FWEA are unconstitutional and unenforceable because the Assembly rejected the authority to issue state business taxes. Legislative Powers, Unitary Clause.

#Analysis

##An unreasonable state burden on business and against the contracts binding willing employees and employers is impermissible under the Constitution and this Court’s own doctrines, fundamentally destroying carefully guarded Court precedent.

The Dixie Courts “have long recognized the strongly embedded public policy favoring freedom of contract. And, absent a compelling reason, courts must respect and enforce the terms of a contract that the parties have freely and voluntarily made.” Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. SPEP Aircraft Holdings, LLC, 572 S.W.3d 213, 230 (Tex. 2019); Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc., 554 S.W.3d 586, 595 (Tex. 2018); Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 95–96 (Tex. 2011).

Employment contracts, particularly those already in force willingly accepted by both employees and employers, are granted significant constitutional protections under Dixie law. These critical agreements power Southern enterprise, typically exchanging legal services for benefits such as pay or leave, and remedies outside litigation to address capricious or biased termination.

[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to consider—that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract.” *Wood Motor Co. v. Nebel, 238 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex. 1951); see also *St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Griffin, 171 S.W. 703, 704 *(Tex. 1914) (“The citizen has the liberty of contract as a natural right which is beyond the power of the government to take from him. The liberty to make contracts includes the corresponding right to refuse to accept a contract or to assume such liability as may be proposed.”)

This Court does not recognize the ability of the Assembly to terminate or alter legal business contracts without overwhelming public interest. As an example of permitted regulation, at-will employees may be terminated for any legal reason or no reason at all, but Dixie still may penalize businesses in the appearance of biased termination. An employer that fires an employee based on mere allegations sent to a state agency subjects itself to costly civil liability issues at the state and federal levels.

“These [multiple U.S. state] courts have reasoned that a negligent-investigation claim would be inconsistent with, and would significantly alter, the at-will employment relationship.   We, too, believe that recognizing such a duty in this context would significantly damage the at-will employment relationship that Texas has so carefully guarded.   See City of Midland, 18 S.W.3d at 216. By definition, the employment-at-will doctrine does not require an employer to be reasonable, or even careful, in making its termination decisions... And creating an incentive for insurance companies to summarily dismiss their agents when misconduct is merely rumored is certainly not in the best interest of agents in Sears's position.” Texas Farm Bureau Insurance Companies v. Sears (Tex. 2002).

Plaintiff and other businessss agree that there exists a reasonable level of needed protection for employees in an at-will contract, such as racial or gender-motivated termination. The state cannot force employers take preemptive action and assume civil liability for firing the morally accused. The state also cannot force employees and employers to renegotiate private contracts whatsoever based on this executive board’s determinations. The Assembly has decided without foundational police power to render Dixie’s “carefully guarded” judicial protections void.

##Dixie and federal constitutional precedent prohibit abusive and general administrative searches of the workplace.

Sweeping administrative search power by a state agency may be at times permitted. This is often employed in long-regulated industries like alcohol, radio, securities, and tobacco. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). Firearms are also subject to warrantless search, because weapons were already “pervasively” regulated with an urgent need for investigative speed and surprise. Therefore, these business dealers already have little expectation of privacy. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).

On the other hand, a scheme similar to FWEA was deemed unconstitutional. The Supreme Court rejected OSHA’s argument that warrantless searches of all businesses in its legislative purview without evidence was allowable. Because occupational inspections of every business serves little explicit government purpose, the administrative powers exercised were arbitrary. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).

The FWEA board offers businesses employing morally accused employees an unconstitutional bargain implicating the Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment and mirror texts of the Dixie Constiution. This is because a search of a business and its records, and seizure of material benefits to both employer and employee, is “equivalent [to] a compulsory production of a man's private papers.” Even with an arguable public purpose, such a demand is “an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (state law allowing state and private agents to issue warrants to search business papers for the purpose of debt recovery is unconstitutional). This choice presents a further Dixie Constitution violation because of the absolute bar against self-incrimination in “any matter, civil and criminal.”

A politically appointed board with no independent arbiter is also suspect. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972). “Warrants provide the ‘detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, and thus ensur[e] an objective determination whether an intrusion is justified.’” Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2187–88 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989)). Judicial warrants should always be sought, and therefore “give life to [the Court’s] instruction that the Fourth Amendment ‘is designed to prevent, not simply to redress, unlawful police action.’” Id. at 2188 (quoting* Steagald v. United States*, 451 U.S. 204, 215 (1981)).

##The state cannot popularly reject state tax power in its Constitution months ago, and then mandate a sizable tax on all business operating in Dixie without amending its powers to fulfill such an agenda.

The Governor of Dixie may propose the amount of revenue required for the annual budget. Revenue includes anything from property and sales taxes (as in all other states), to intergovernmental transfers (such as through Dixie congressional advocacy), to government-run liquor stores, pension funds and public utilities (as under Dixie statutes). The assumption that raising revenue means issuing appropriations laws and tax powers would render both terms meaningless, when Texas and Florida each had separate executive, legislative and county Revenue and Taxation agencies previously.

The Assembly approves or rejects the suggestion that there could be an inherent tax power inline any other in the nation and reserved to the states if the opportunity is taken:

Section 1. All political power is inherent in and derived from the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit. The rights of the people shall not be denied or infringed upon.

Section 16. No person shall be deprived of the rights put forth by this Constitution without ample due process under letter of the law.

Section 5. All legislation enacted by the state of Texas prior to January 20, 2021 shall continue in effect upon adoption of this Constitution, except legislation which contradicts the provisions of this document.

Section 1. The Legislative power of this state shall be vested in a unicameral General Assembly consisting of 7 members.

Section 6. (a) The General Assembly may make no law except by bill. ... (c) No bill shall be so amended in it’s passage through the Legislature as to change its original purpose.

Section 7. Upon passage by the General Assembly, the bill shall be sent to the Governor. The Governor may sign the bill, at which point it shall become statutory law.

1. The General Assembly shall have the right to amend this Constitution by an absolute two-thirds majority of the sitting Assemblypeople in the affirmative.

Section 2. All amendments to this Constitution must either directly amend Articles I-V of this Constitution or add a new section to Article VI of this Constitution. No new Articles may be added to this document.

In A.001 (the proposed and adopted Constiution), the Assembly by and through the “supreme power” of the people, adopted language that did not intend and never did grant the Assembly the power to tax. The budget process is the Governor proposes adjustments to state revenue, and the Assembly retorts. That a governor both wrote his bill and signed it may in fact be a retort between branches, but the dilemma exceeds the timing issue.

The Assembly debated this arrangement and finally decided it would clearly adopt the Atlantic Constiution’s (and New York’s) approach that the Governor proposes revenue measures and the legislature accepts or rejects them upon presentation.

It is abundantly clear the amount of thought the Assembly placed into this process: Dixie citizens today must constitutionally address the Assembly in a non-gendered state title; Dixie governors constitutionally and uniquely may have executive orders directly vetoed by the Assembly; The Dixie Assembly expressly prohibits any citizen amendment in two instances: reproductive rights, or renumbering the Constitution; The Assembly moved itself from Florida to Texas while keeping Florida legal precedent; The Assembly allows a veto override without receiving a gubernatorial veto; It constitutionally prohibits independents to be appointed to a vacant Senate seat; it expanded Florida’s opinion capacity of the Attorney General to nearly any topic...

What the Assembly decided not to empower itself with is the burdensome tax process, a decision popular with the Dixie people and with business.

By the letter of the law, a look to neighboring states, and the historical debate record, the Assembly cannot now pass a bill taxing business for expanded spousal leave or any purpose. It would be unethical and unconstitutional for any other branch, serving as “checks on the other,” to empower another branch to do so for political purposes.

FWEA contains multiple revenue schemes, but its mandate that businesses provide 20 weeks of paid spousal sick and parental leave is “fairly possibly” construed as a tax benefitting Dixie, as Chief Justice Robert’s expressed in NFIB v. Sebelius interpreting the The Affordable Healthcare Act. FWEA’s mandate looks like an unconstitutional tax, not only because of its content, but because family leave deductions can be required by the state; the amount of tax is based on numerous factors in the bill; it mirrors IRS and other state reporting and withholding requirements; and the work and benefit is itself taxed and at times held held by the government.

Because the law deploys an unsupported legislative power to impose a mandate or tax with penalties for noncompliance, it should be struck.

#Relief and Conclusion

Plaintiff CannibalHookers seeks declaratory relief clarifying the fundamental rights of CannibalHookers as a business operator and employer, and as a state taxpayer, pursuant to the FWEA and Dixie and U.S. Constitutions, chiefly on the issues of the regulatory reach of state agencies into corporate affairs and of the state’s constitutional capacity to legislate taxation on domestic and foreign business entities operating in-state.

Respectfully submitted to the Dixie State Court,

Hon. Carib Cannibette Biden, Jr., Esq.

Pursuant to the Rules of Court, a majority of the bench has voted to extend review to In re: EO 010, Protecting Immigrants.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has filed a complaint upon which relief may be provided.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Act is unconstitutional, among other things.

Applicant respectfully submits the following petition to the State of Dixie Supreme Court:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1euuH6FyCKRGs4l6meGZNDfG9GlgC6OHzAUDywaPG9RQ/edit?usp=sharing)

Pursuant to the Rules of Court, a majority of the bench has voted to extend review to In re Executive Order 007: Sensible Immigration Policies

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has filed a complaint upon which relief may be provided.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Act is unconstitutional, among other things.

Pursuant to the Rules of Court, a majority of the bench has voted to extend review to In re: EO 006, Addressing the Climate Crisis .

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has filed a complaint upon which relief may be provided.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Act is unconstitutional, among other things.

Applicant respectfully submits the following petition to the court: link

Applicant submits the following petition to the State of Dixie Supreme Court.

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Nnra7ryDxUTvA26vppMG-C3hY2H-JS8lSuYe7alW8RA/edit?usp=sharing

Applicant seeks a ruling on the legality of EO 007: Sensible Immigration Policies, signed by Governor Tripplyons18 on 29 March 2021. Applicant claims that this executive order is illegal as an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power by the executive; in particular, with regards to the inclusion of undocumented immigrants in the Southern Health Service, as established by the Southern Health Service Act of 2021.

BACKGROUND

The executive order issued by Governor Tripplyons18 included provisions that “The state of Dixie shall offer undocumented immigrants access to the following welfare programs via state funds [...] Access to healthcare coverage under the provisions of B.001: Southern Health Service Act”. EO 007, section 4(1). Applicant claims that this expands the scope of the Act to undocumented immigrants, in an unconstitutional executive act of legislation.

THE SOUTHERN HEALTH SERVICE ACT LIMITS SERVICES TO CITIZENS

The Southern Health Service Act limits the scope of who is eligible to receive services under its provisions. In particular, title II prescribes the scope of the enrollment for the programme. “Every citizen of the Dixie State will be, at the age of 26 when they are ineligible to remain on their parents’s [sic] benefits, automatically enrolled in the Dixie Health Service.” Southern Health Service Act of 2021, section 203(a).

EXPANDING PROVISION TO NON-CITIZENS IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

To be sure, undocumented immigrants are not citizens: this is true by definition. To expand the provision of the services of the Southern Health Service requires some other method of enrolling the undocumented immigrants who seek to access its services. No such method exists in law: the Southern Health Service Act does not include any provision that allows the Governor to enroll people in the service. Instead, it limits enrollment (done automatically) to every citizen aged twenty-six and over.

To permit the enrollment, then, of undocumented citizens would require the amendment of the Act. The Governor does not have the power to do so via Executive Order. That remains the sole prerogative of the legislature. “The Legislative power of this state shall be vested in a unicameral General Assembly”. Dixie Constitution, Article III, section I. The Act may not be amended save by another Act of the General Assembly. Governor Tripplyons18’s attempt at amending the terms of the Act are unconstitutional under the Dixie Constitution.

REMEDIES SOUGHT

That the court strike down the Executive Order.

Respectfully submitted,

lily-irl
Resident of the State of Dixie
Attorney at law

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF DIXIE ##PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

QUESTION PRESENTED

• Whether B.549 (the Kidney Donation Act) is preempted by the National Organ Transplant Act (42 USC 273 et seq.).

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)

Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963)

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)

Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501 (1912)

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)

Statutes

42 USC 273

42 USC 274e

REASONS TO GRANT CERTIORARI

1. The National Organ Transplant Act impliedly conflict-preempts B.549 because compliance with both acts is impossible.

On October 19, 1984, President Ronald Reagan signed the National Organ Transplant Act (42 U.S. Code § 273 et seq.) to "[promote] the donation of organs, especially liver transplants for children [and strike] a proper balance between private and public sector efforts to promote organ transplantation." President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the National Organ Transplant Act (Oct. 19, 1984). In enacting the legislation, Congress emphasized the ethical and medical dangers of a commercial trade in organs, see H.R. Rep. No. 575, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1983), and took federal action to establish a national, not-for-profit system of organ transplantation.

The federal Act at section 303 states:

It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce. The preceding sentence does not apply with respect to human organ paired donation.

42 USC 274e.

Briefly, Congress enacted section 301 of the National Organ Transplant Act to criminalize the nationwide sale in human organs—in other words, it has expressly prohibited what Dixie has now allowed. Under longstanding precedent, a state law is void when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility." Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963). In this case, any person who attempts to avail themselves of Dixie's new regulations would necessarily violate federal law prohibiting organ trafficking, violating the fundamental constitutional principle that "no form of state activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to Congress." Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).

Because Dixie's law conflicts with longstanding federal regulations on organ transplants, conflict preemption is applicable and B.549 should be held void. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 261 (2000) ("If state law purports to authorize something that federal law forbids [...] then courts would have to choose between applying the federal rule and applying the state rule, and the Supremacy Clause requires them to apply the federal rule."); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 482 (2d ed. 1988) (Congress may preempt "those laws which purport to [permit] conduct which would be a violation of the federal statute").

2. Alternatively, B.549 is conflict-preempted because it stands as an obstacle to Congress' objectives.

If, arguendo, the Court determines that compliance with both statutes is not strictly impossible—in spite of the fact that every possible use of the state law is invalid—B.549 is still conflict-preempted because it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). "What is a sufficient obstacle is determined by examining the federal statute and identifying its purpose and intended effects." Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 363 (2000).

Federal policy regards organs as "a national, rather than a local or regional, resource." Task Force on Organ Transplantation, HHS, Organ Transplantation: Issues and Recommendations 86 (1986). Accordingly, Congress legislated broadly to establish a uniform system of organ transplantation rooted in ethical considerations and non-financial incentives.

A key component of the federal strategy was the National Organ Transplant Act. With the Act, Congress clearly and unambiguously intended to "prohibit the purchase or sale of human organs" in any capacity that affects interstate commerce. H.R. Rep. 98-1127, 98th. Cong., 2nd sess. (1984). Such sweeping and definitive congressional intent is facially irreconcilable with the state's policy of promoting the very commercial sales that federal law was intended to stamp out.

Here, Congress decided to eradicate what Dixie has now decided to allow. Because federal policy in the field of organ transplantation "else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect" by the Dixie statute, "the state law must yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its delegated power." Crosby, supra, at 373, quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the petition and review the constitutionality of the Act.

Respectfully submitted,

/u/hurricaneoflies

APPLICANTS

pik; Temmie134

APPLICATION

Applicants pik and Temmie134, hereby, pursuant to Dixie Statute 741.01, request a certificate of marriage.

Enclosed is $94 for all the required fees.

Applicant One

Name: pik

Sex: Male

Is this your first marriage? Yes

Is the other applicant presently married? No

Are you presently married? No

I am not related to the other applicant as an ancestor or descendant, by

blood or adoption; a brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption; a

parent's brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption; a son or

daughter of a brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption; a current

or former stepchild or stepparent; or a son or daughter of a parent's brother or

sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption. Yes

I affirm that the information I have given in this application is correct.

Applicant Two

Name: Temmie134

Sex: Male

Is this your first marriage? Yes

Is the other applicant presently married? No

Are you presently married? No

I am not related to the other applicant as an ancestor or descendant, by

blood or adoption; a brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption; a

parent's brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption; a son or

daughter of a brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption; a current

or former stepchild or stepparent; or a son or daughter of a parent's brother or

sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption. Yes

I affirm that the information I have given in this application is correct.

Conclusion

The application should be granted.

DATED: July 1st, 2020

Austin, Dixie

The Court has reached a majority opinion in the case. Sections I and III of the opinion are unanimously agreed to by the Court. Section 3B of the bill, forbidding state employees from testifying or offering information or assistance in a capital case under pain of termination from their jobs as state employees, is unconstitutional due to 1st amendment concerns. The federal law breeches alleged by the Petitioner are rendered moot, as the Court has struck them down within other parts of the opinion Section II is agreed to by a majority of the Court. Section 3B of the bill, putting an import ban on drugs used in the lethal injection process, is struck due to violations of the commerce clause. Section IV is also agreed to by a majority of the Court. Junior Associate Justice Aubrion has filed a dissent in part, dissenting to section II. Chief Justice FPSLover1 has filed a dissent in part, dissenting to section IV. The opinion was wirtten by the Chief Justice with the exception of section IV, which was written by Junior Associate Justice Aubrion. The opinion and its dissents can be read below.

Introduction

This is a complicated case. While on its face it might not seem like much, in particular due to the petitioner's curious and wide grounds for an attempt to overturn the entire law, in reality, the decisions we must make regarding the legal validity of the petitioner's and the amicus' arguments, are easily broken down into several, in some-cases complicated, matters of fact and law. The first two relating to constitutionality - are sections 3B and 3C unconstitutional, due respectively to infringements on free speech and commerce? Are the US code arguments, that this bill forces the state or its employees to break federal law by its wording, presented by the petitioner valid? What should happen to these prisoners now that every single deadline mentioned in this bill has seemingly been forgotten by this State? Does the ambiguity in language make the bill vague enough in action to force its repeal, as the petitioner claims? All of these will hopefully be answered in this opinion.

Section I: First Amendment Considerations

Let us start with the easiest thing in the case - section 3B. "No officer or employee of the State of Dixie shall enable or partake in an execution, nor shall any State officer or employee share any information with a state or foreign government when such information is liable to become evidence for the prosecution in a capital case. Any officer or employee found in violation of this section is, when possible, liable for termination in a manner consistent with and prescribed by applicable civil service laws." This is clearly and unequivocally unconstitutional. While the amicus proclaims that leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant applies here, as the petitioner addresses Dixie Statutes Title XLVII, Chapter 914, Subsection 4, as well as Dixie Statutes Title XLVI, Chapter 876, Subsection 42, we find that section 3B does indeed cause a reasonable conflict with both subsections of earlier-passed laws. Certainly enough that there is a large inconsistency with the law as we are dealing with today - as a person cannot be blocked or prosecuted from producing testimony. We reject the idea that these statutes can be made to conform with the one we are discussing at present - due to its inherent conflict. To quote another famous principle of law that applies just about as much as Black does on this point- "Chewbacca is a Wookiee from the planet Kashyyyk. But Chewbacca lives on the planet Endor. Now think about it; that does not make sense! Why would a Wookiee, an 8-foot-tall Wookiee, want to live on Endor, with a bunch of 2-foot-tall Ewoks?" (South Park: Chef Aid (Comedy Central television broadcast October 7, 1998) Similarly, Black proclaiming that all statutes must conform to each other under statutory interpretation principles, while usually respected including by this Court, does not make any sense when the laws in question do not conform with each other, without distorting the law or otherwise mangling it to the point where the judiciary in this Court would be making a new law. As once said by another respected authority in the legal profession - "The Judges do not make the law; they administer it, and that however much they may disapprove or dislike it." (Lopes, L.J., The Queen v. Bishop of London (1889), L. R. 24 Q. B. 246.) We do so here.

While the amicus alone mentions it, the Court notes that there is certainly a concern over the 6th amendment with regards to this section - assuming that is, that a state in this country besides Dixie ever repealed their ban on the death penalty - there is not enough detail in that passing mention, or a semblance of an argument, to rule on it there. Instead, we will focus on the 1st amendment argument - and here is where the true argument against this particular section of the law presides. In particular this section of the subsection is under contention: "nor shall any State officer or employee share any information with a state or foreign government when such information is liable to become evidence for the prosecution in a capital case". We denote that the test in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), as mentioned by the Petitioner in his response to the question about the possibility of a 1st amendment argument against that particular section, applies here. The three steps are simple. "The first requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. ... The next question is whether the government had 'an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the public' based on the government’s needs as an employer" (Id.) Rather than inventing another fictitious person for our purposes - we will generalize. Are matters of testimony at trial a public concern? Yes, yes indeed. Particularly when these are capital cases, where life and death hangs in the balance. “Speech on ‘matters of public concern’ … is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U. S. 749, 758–759 (1985) This Court also notes that as per Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), that "such speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt", which many would claim that testimony impugning the death penalty upon another human would be. We agree. As for if the government worker is a citizen, and therefore protected under first amendment grounds - we stand firm. "The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the first time to these shores. But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders. Such rights include those protected by the First and the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. None of these provisions acknowledges any distinction between citizens and resident aliens. They extend their inalienable privileges to all 'persons' and guard against any encroachment on those rights by federal or state authority." Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161, 65 S.Ct. 1443, 1455, 89 L.Ed. 2103 (concurring opinion). Therefore, we hold that any lawful alien who works for a state government ought to be considered a citizen when it comes to this test.

Which means, dutifully, that any person working for the state government ought to, per the law, be able to speak on matters of public concern. Again, see Snyder v. Phelps, on what is considered a matter of public concern - "be relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community" (Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 145 (1983)). So we move on to the next question. Does the State have such a justification for treating their employees any differently than other members of the public, who must follow the laws of the other states of this Union and other countries when they visit? We hold not. Particularly when this act applies as a blanket proviso against cooperating with law enforcement, while during the working hours of that particular employee or otherwise. It does not matter if the employee is on vacation or assignment as part of their employment - the law holds that they will be terminated if possible. As even the amicus noted "If it is not legally possible, they will not be terminated." While they proclaim that " For one, it is very clear that testimony is not included in the meaning of 'enable or partake in an execution'", we reject that argument wholesale. The idea that testimony, compelled or otherwise voluntary, cannot convince a judge or jury to decide to levy the death penalty against a guilty criminal, is rather suspect, suspect enough that we cannot endorse it. Many prosecutors claim that they will seek the death penalty before a trial has begun, and getting it off the table is quite a regular fight for defense lawyers of those charged with such crimes - particularly when the crime is heinous enough to warrant the possibility of such a sentence. We cannot, in good conscience, agree that in a first degree murder trial, or equivalent, that the possibility isn't there that something a witness employed by the state has said, will not play a role in the deciding factor of death or life. If a person employed by the state gives information to the police, or to a Court, that is used in the proceedings of a death penalty case - they have broken the law and will be terminated according to the law. The law says they must be terminated, so therefore, they will be terminated unless they can find some reason, a remote possibility, to say so otherwise. The government has no reason, as an employer at the state level, to require its employees to break laws elsewhere, in particular in countries where it holds no jurisdiction. That much should be obvious, and requires no explanation - for it holds not authority beyond its own borders. We hold that, for the reasons expressed above, that this conflict with the protections under law and the constitution, and that this section must be struck.

Section II: Commerce Clause Considerations

Secondly, we move to section 3C - "The State Department of Corrections is prohibited from importing or purchasing potassium chloride, pancuronium bromide and sodium thiopental for the purposes of executing an inmate, and all existing stocks of these chemicals held for the purpose of executing the death penalty must be destroyed by no later than December 31, 2019." Here, this Court relies on the word "import". We note that Congress holds the power with regards in "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." (United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3) We note that the Supreme Court has found that "In saying that innately harmful articles 'are not legitimate subjects of trade and commerce,' the Bowman Court was stating its conclusion, not the starting point of its reasoning. All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset." (City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)) We therefore hold that this ban is unconstitutional. We also note that, insomuch as the amicus raising the idea that the state is favoring in-state producers of potassium chloride, pancuronium bromide and sodium thiopental, that too would be unconstitutional - despite the state being a market participant. "Mississippi is not privileged under the Commerce Clause to force its own judgments as to an adequate level of milk sanitation on Louisiana at the pain of an absolute ban on the interstate flow of commerce in milk. However available such methods in an international system of trade between wholly sovereign nation states, they may not constitutionally be employed by the States that constitute the common market created by the Framers of the Constitution. " (Great A&P Tea Co., Inc. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976)) The same applies here. A state cannot unilaterally ban items from being imported from another state, let alone another country, unless an easier remedy is found first. No attempt at an easier, less judicially questionable, remedy was even attempted to be found before a ban was put into place. No state holds the power to regulate international imports into their own state (again, see Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the constitution) - and the law makes no distinction, in plain reading or otherwise, to limit this Court's reading of the statute in a way that prevents that reading from being correct. Therefore, it too must be unconstitutional.

Section III: Federal Law Considerations

Next we move onto a number of other arguments made. As for claims under 18 U.S.C. - while we note that the particular sections are inconsistent with the particular sections of the law as provided - this Court has already struck the sections in question down under other territory and will not consider the matter further.

Section IV: Upholding the Remainder of the Law

Arguments for other sections to be struck or the whole law entirely have not met any reasonable convincing burden. A rather weak argument about some deadlines being missed was made, but this has no impact on the constitutionality of this law and is disregarded.

It is so ordered.

Dissent in Part to Section IV

Chief Justice FPSLover1, respectfully, files a dissenting opinion in regards to section IV of the opinion.

I cannot, in good conscience, agree with the idea that the law, as it remains, is constitutionally sound, or even legally sound in an expanded sense. To reach this conclusion, I decided to look deeper into some of the claims raised by the petitioner - particularly on vagueness and the missed deadlines, which were not accepted by my colleagues. In particular, the following two sections were snipped from the bottom of the opinion that currently stands as a majority opinion when my colleagues would not agree to them. While I accept their ruling, I cannot help but believe that they skipped over important points in the legal canons that could have caused us to reach a far different outcome.

As for the multiple deadlines missed in the case, from the non-destruction of the lethal injection drugs, not removing the death penalty from the administrative code, no new sentencing hearings for those convicted of death, no destruction of any other means of death, and no certification by the Attorney General of this State that these deadlines have been met, I remain concerned. The petitioner made an argument of what is in effect a constitutional version of desuetude, in effect that as the deadlines on the law had sufficiently passed that the law ought not to be enforced, and that since the law was not enforced, it ought not to be valid. Laws must be enforced to be considered valid, and their disuse can be taken as a legal argument against their usage. (see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)) Whilst the only state-level enforcement of this principle is Committee on Legal Ethics v. Printz, 416 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1992), that is a criminal matter, and not a constitutional one. I denote that these missed deadlines provide a serious 14th amendment concern for those imprisoned, preventing them from being re-sentenced in a timely fashion, and opening up the possibility for the assembly to simply repeal the law and put them to death despite the law intending otherwise - after all, the instruments of death are still playing their haunting chorus, unused but not destroyed. This was not addressed by the amicus, and so I am left to interpret with only one side of an argument, and what precedent tells us. This Court agrees that there is an element of desuetude to this - that the law has clearly had enough time to be enforced, and by non-action, the state has refused to enforce it. It is clear that the state did not mean to do so, but knew about the law and its need to be enforced, and did not do so. The state knew the deadlines were coming. And yet, this Court can do nothing to enforce them if the state refuses to do so, except say that they have passed and are clearly invalid. There are still people on death row who can be put to death - and the state has not followed its own law seeking to prevent that, for malice or incompetence. I cast no judgement on either as the prevailing opinion of this Court as to why the State has not enforced its own law. The Supreme Court has previously invalidated laws, de facto, for being unenforced (among other reasons) - see again, Lawrence, as well as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). I must also agree that this is a valid course in action during this case.

As for vagueness, the petitioner does have a point. It is this Court that wrote "A very serious question is raised as to whether the statute meets the recognized constitutional test that it inform the average person of common intelligence as to what is prohibited so that he need not speculate as to the statutory meaning. If the language does not meet this test, then it must fall." (Franklin v. State, 257 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1971)) We are left with a series of deadlines that have been missed, with nothing to say if the State, through the Attorney General, misses the deadlines set out. Currently the inmates on death row are in a sort of legal limbo - they clearly cannot be put to death, but they still have death sentences, which the state is capable of carrying out. And yet, the state cannot put them to death - as per section 3A of this law. Effectively since the passage of this law, nothing has happened, and with the State forgetting to execute its duty, in effect allowing much of the law to be put under desuetude, the future of this law is vague at best. In fact, it's completely unstated. Which, as one can understand, is problematic in the grandest of ways - to claim that this is, essentially, a non-issue, opens us up to a case in the near r further future where we will simply have to revisit these issues once again. That also does not include the precedent set by our unanimous opinion with regards to In Re: B031, the Death Penalty Abolition Act of 2018, where I wrote that a similar law “effectively leaves each death penalty inmate in a state of illegal limbo, sentenced to die but the law still maintains that he can be killed”, and noting that it too was unconstitutionally vague. To forgo precedent is deeply concerning, particularly when that reasoning behind said precedent is still good law - having not been overturned by any higher court, or even this one.

Taken in concert with the previous two sections, we have a bit of a picture. The State refuses to enforce its own law. It enforces only one part of it - section 3A, which forbids a death sentence or execution, while leaving every prisoner in death row, as previously mentioned, in a sort of purgatorial state, where they may be sentenced to death depending on the whim of an assembly election or two. In good conscience, this Court cannot allow this law to stand at all - as it is clearly unenforced, and it is clearly vague on what happens when the law is not enforced. While there may have been good intentions to it, as a whole the law is doing far more harm than good, in terms of a 14th amendment issue - as the law's non-enforcement has prevented their due process of law as provided in both said law that is unenforced and the constitution. It cannot stand, in part or wholly, and must therefore be struck from the record. Or at least it would if I were in the majority, which I am not on this portion of the agreement - a rare one where there are multiple dissents depending on the section - and the only thing anyone can agree on as a unified Court is the easiest of legal issues - that the federal questions are not our place, and that the first amendment overrules free speech concerns with regards to federal employees. The rest is more or less a barrage of split opinions, regrettably. I do so believe that we will see round 3, attempting to strike down the remainder of the law, relatively soon - and we will be left back at square one once again. How strange.

Dissent in Part to Section II

Junior Associate Justice Aubrion files a dissenting opinion in regards to section II of the opinion.

It is unreasonable that any person would find section 3C to infer that the state is interfering interstate commerce to any degree. It is clear the intent of the law, and the text taken at face value, that the state department of corrections is to stop the purchase of potassium chloride including international purchases. While the word import may be used in certain contexts to imply that an actor would be involved in the trade process which would be deferred to the federal government, in this context it seems clear as a simple direction for the department of corrections as a market participant to simply not make any purchases of potassium chloride. It’s ridiculous to think the department of corrections would, or even has the ability to interfere in these processes as a market regulator, they simply don’t have to, as just not putting forth any orders for potassium chloride would suffice in every instance for the purposes of this section of the law. Though the word import is used, it must be taken in context, and in this context it does not have any reasonable weight to hold it in violation of the Commerce Clause.

Application for Marriage

The court has decided to hold oral arguments in Re: B. 385 - The Death Penalty Abolition Reaffirmation Act Of 2019.

Arguments will last for 5 days, with each counselor being allowed to make an opening statement if they please and to respond to any questions asked by the Justices. No rebuttals will be permitted to statements made.

In addition to petitioner /u/comped and Attorney General /u/ecr01, the court has chosen to allow /u/huricaneoflies to participate in these arguments as an amicus curiae.

Pursuant to the Rules of Court, a majority of the bench has voted to extend review to In Re: B. 385 - the Death Penalty Abolition Reaffirmation Act of 2019 .

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has filed a complaint upon which relief may be provided.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Act is unconstitutional, among other things.

Mr. Chief Justice,

And if it may please this Most Honorable Court, I, Comped, a lawyer you're probably familiar with by this point, have come before you to ask that B.385 - the Death Penalty Abolition Reaffirmation Act of 2019, be declared unconstitutional for a number of reasons. Now, before I begin with that, I should note that the act in question is, unequivocally, the result of two prior cases before this court. In Re: B031, the Death Penalty Abolition Act of 2018, in which the previous ban on the death penalty was struck for vagueness, as well as In re: EO.11: Concerning the Death Penalty (and its hearing), which was struck due to a procedural issue on the plaintiff's side. This case is primarily on the constitutionality of certain sections of the bill.

Oddly enough, Your Honors, I believe that there is a particular section of the law in question, section 3b ("No officer or employee of the State of Dixie shall enable or partake in an execution, nor shall any State officer or employee share any information with a state or foreign government when such information is liable to become evidence for the prosecution in a capital case. Any officer or employee found in violation of this section is, when possible, liable for termination in a manner consistent with and prescribed by applicable civil service laws.") which violates quite a few laws, at both the state and federal levels. Firstly, as per Dixie Statutes Title XLVII, Chapter 914, Subsection 4 - "No person who has been duly served with a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum shall be excused from attending and testifying or producing any book, paper, or other document before any court having felony trial jurisdiction, grand jury, or state attorney upon investigation, proceeding, or trial for a violation of any of the criminal statutes of this state upon the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of the person may tend to convict him or her of a crime or to subject him or her to a penalty or forfeiture, but no testimony so given or evidence so produced shall be received against the person upon any criminal investigation or proceeding. Such testimony or evidence, however, may be received against the person upon any criminal investigation or proceeding for perjury committed while giving such testimony or producing such evidence or for any perjury subsequently committed". Section 3b of the act in question clearly and profoundly violates the law as previously set on the inability of witnesses to be fired due to their testimony. Indeed, according to Dixie Statutes Title XLVI, Chapter 876, Subsection 42 "no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which the person may so testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, and no testimony so given or produced shall be received against the person, upon any criminal investigation, proceeding, or trial, except upon a prosecution for perjury or contempt of court, based upon the giving or producing of such testimony." Again, violated.

And under 18 U.S. Code § 241, "If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same" (Conspiracy being defined as "an agreement between two or more people to commit an illegal act, along with an intent to achieve the agreement's goal" - of which the state legislature by passing this act may have been guilty of.) I would be amiss by not mentioning Dixie Statutes Title XLVII, Chapter 914, Subsection 22 (tampering with or harassing a witness, victim, or informant) and 23 (retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant), both of which apply here, as well as 18 U.S. Code § 242 (deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 245. Federally protected activities (b)(1)(b), and others.

In addition, the state has clearly breeches its duty under the law's section 2 (c) and (d), section 3 (b) and (c), and section (4), missing the deadline in all cases mentioned (M: according to Flash/the Head Elections Clerk). Nothing has been done - no hearings, no dismantling of the machines of execution, no reports, nothing of the sort. Which in itself breaks more than a few laws - but I'm not here to argue that. In addition to the many laws that this law has already broken, I'd like to argue that section 3 (c) also violates Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, which gives the states no power over interstate (or international) commerce. Interstate imports are a federal issue, not a state one. See, for example, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, as well as Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888), and others. The impact should be obvious - the state cannot ban the import or export of a particular good under the clause - only the Congress may do that, as it must either be imported from another state or an international territory (which, again, due to Congress holding the cards in the area of foreign relations, that doesn't swim either). By banning the interstate (and international) import of such chemicals, the government (or at least the legislature in passing this law) has abridged the constitution again. And further still, I would argue that the law is vague and uninacted at best. There have been no removals of the death penalty from the administrative code - meaning that, as of this moment, there are still prisoners on death row, awaiting their re-sentencing hearings that more than likely won't happen before the deadline.

I will quote a section of my brief from the previous case I litigated on this front, "In Franklin v. State, 257 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1971), this Court wrote 'A very serious question is raised as to whether the statute meets the recognized constitutional test that it inform the average person of common intelligence as to what is prohibited so that he need not speculate as to the statutory meaning. If the language does not meet this test, then it must fall" While the law does prohibit the death penalty, an average man of common intelligence would question what exactly is going to happen to the inmates as per the act's Section 3 (d) ("Any individual who was sentenced to death prior to the coming into force of this Act shall as a matter of right be entitled to a new sentencing hearing before a State court on a date on or before June 30, 2020, for the modification of their punishment to comply with this Act"). What will they be sentenced to? There is no law, to my knowledge, that affirms what sentence they are to be given, as the Jury clearly chose for them to die. And as I said previously, in that other case: "A man of average intelligence would not be able to decide what would happen to a death penalty case, be they sentenced to life in prison, or sentenced to die by Old Sparky, hanging, the gas chamber, firing squad, lethal injection, or any other manner of executable methods as allowed in this state before this bill successfully passed its override", given that the State did not amend the sentencing guidelines to reflect the non-capital nature of the formerly capital crimes - the crimes, it should be noted, retaining their capital nature as first sentenced.

Your Honors, if I have not already established, I find this entire law to be both reactionary (against this Court), illegal, and yes, even unconstitutional (not even speaking of the violation of the criminals' 8th amendment right to confront witnesses silenced by the threat of termination, or other issues). It is such a mess of unconstitutionality, that I believe it must be struck from the record in its entirety. It is too much of a mess for the judiciary, who should not continue to play editor with the laws passed by the assembly, to sort out what should happen to these inmates. Restore the laws struck, cancel the law as written, and restore constitutionality to the laws of this Great State of Dixie.

Yours in the Law,

Comped,

Former US Attorney General

Member of the Bar in Good Standing.

It has been a pleasure serving with my brother justices. However, the American people have called upon me to serve them as their Vice President. As a result, I must take my leave of this Court. I wish my brother justices and all who appear before the Court the best of luck in all their future endeavors.

Attorney General /u/ecr01, Secretary /u/dr0ne717, Attorney /u/hurricaneoflies,

The court has unanimously reached a decision in the case. It can be read here.

The Court is pleased to announce that it has unanimously agreed upon significant revisions to the Rules of Court, which can be found here.

Among other changes, some alterations in the Rules are as follows:

• A word limit has been added for petitions for writs of certiorari (3000 words)
• All briefing word limits have been expanded from 1500 to 3000 words.
• Respondents may now file a brief in opposition to a petition for a writ of certiorari.
• Grant of a writ of certiorari now needs the approval of only one justice, not a majority.

##The updated rules can be found here

Attorney /u/bionexus, Governor /u/BoredNerdyGamer,

The court has reached a unanimous opinion on the case. It was written by Junior Associate Justice /u/dewey-cheatem on behalf of the court and can be found here.

Pursuant to the Rules of Court, a majority of the bench has voted to extend review to In Re AB. 468 - Dixie Sexual Education Act of 2020

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has filed a complaint upon which relief may be provided.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Act is unconstitutional.