Hey, i've recenelty been working on an idea concerning an individual's control over their phenomonological horizen using something i like to term as thought action (basically all possible movement that can be made to shift their perception of their horizen without external influence and control over frames of experience) was wondering if someone has made any similar investigations into such an area would be happy to share :)

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The primary and probably the original form of phenomenological bracketing is the suspension of “local” (“egoistic”) practical concern. A important version of this can be found, in a somewhat mystified but still insightful version, in Schopenhauer.

A more immediately accessible and relevant version is found in the first chapter of Ernst Mach’s The Analysis of Sensations. Mach sees that boundary between the ego and the world is merely a practical, conventional boundary. The appearance-reality distinction is likewise a merely relative and practical distinction. Mach explicitly transgresses the limits of the prejudices of the practical mode. He is willing to violate common sense, if that’s where the logic leads him. Mach doesn’t discuss American pragmatism (William James) directly, but Mach’s bracketing is a kind of anti-pragmatism. He sees that a short-sighted selfish egoism functions like blinkers (also known as blinders) on a racehorse. Varieties of pragmatism set themselves against the essential worldly foolishness of theoretical philosophy. This unselfish, transpersonal, and therefore courageous curiosity, which “loses itself” in the object is what enables genuine ontology in the first place.

Dr. Stockmann in Ibsen’s An Enemy of the People is one example of the “foolishness” of genuine science –and of “Machian bracketing.” While Stockmann is not a philosopher, he is recklessly honest, and he pays for it. The related story of Socrates is correctly foundational, and we might just as well talk about “Socratic” bracketing. I use Mach because I also value the ontology he achieved.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/An_Enemy_of_the_People

For completeness, and as a matter of personal honesty, I should stress that this public honesty, which in some cases even seeks punishment, and perhaps vainly makes a show of itself, getting its reward that way, is not perhaps fundamental. Radical self-honesty may be the essence here, and networks of trust and friendship may suffice for a radically insightful ontology that must remain reluctantly esoteric. [Early gnostics sometimes looked down on the eagerness of orthodox Christians for public execution. ]

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I will give some samples of Mach's awareness of the selfish obstacle which is overcome, temporarily, through bracketing.

Thus, perceptions, presentations, volitions, and emotions, in short the whole inner and outer world, are put together, in combinations of varying evanescence and permanence, out of a small number of homogeneous elements. Usually, these elements are called sensations. But as vestiges of a one-sided theory inhere in that term, we prefer to speak simply of elements, as we have already done. The aim of all research is to ascertain the mode of connexion of these elements....

That in this complex of elements, which fundamentally is only one, the boundaries of bodies and of the ego do not admit of being established in a manner definite and sufficient for all cases, has already been remarked. To bring together elements that are most intimately connected with pleasure and pain into one ideal mental-economical unity, the ego; this is a task of the highest importance for the intellect working in the service of the pain-avoiding, pleasure-seeking will. The delimitation of the ego, therefore, is instinctively effected, is rendered familiar, and possibly becomes fixed through heredity. Owing to their high practical importance, not only for the individual, but for the entire species, the composites " ego " and " body " instinctively make good their claims, and assert themselves with elementary force. In special cases, however, in which practical ends are not concerned, but where knowledge is an end in itself, the delimitation in question may prove to be insufficient, obstructive, and untenable.

Similarly, class-consciousness, class-prejudice, the feeling of nationality, and even the narrowest-minded local patriotism may have a high importance, for certain purposes. But such attitudes will not be shared by the broad-minded investigator, at least not in moments of research. All such egoistic views are adequate only for practical purposes. Of course, even the investigator may succumb to habit. Trifling pedantries and nonsensical discussions; the cunning appropriation of others' thoughts, with perfidious silence as to the sources; when the word of recognition must be given, the difficulty of swallowing one's defeat, and the too common eagerness at the same time to set the opponent's achievement in a false light: all this abundantly shows that the scientist and scholar have also the battle of existence to fight, that the ways even of science still lead to the mouth, and that the pure impulse towards knowledge is still an ideal in our present social conditions.

The primary fact is not the ego, but the elements (sensations). What was said on p. 21 as to the term " sensation " must be borne in mind. The elements constitute the I. s have the sensation green, signifies that the element green occurs in a given complex of other elements (sensations, memories). When I cease to have the sensation green, when I die, then the elements no longer occur in the ordinary, familiar association. That is all. Only an ideal mental-economical unity, not a real unity, has ceased to exist. The ego is not a definite, unalterable, sharply bounded unity. None of these attributes are important; for all vary even within the sphere of individual life; in fact their alteration is even sought after by the individual. Continuity alone is important. This view accords admirably with the position which Weismann has reached by biological investigations.

But continuity is only a means of preparing and conserving what is contained in the ego. This content, and not the ego, is the principal thing. This content, however, is not confined to the individual. With the exception of some insignificant and valueless personal memories, it remains presented in others even after the death of the individual. The elements that make up the consciousness of a given individual are firmly connected with one another, but with those of another individual they are only feebly connected, and the connexion is only casually apparent. Contents of consciousness, however, that are of universal significance, break through these limits of the individual, and, attached of course to individuals again, can enjoy a continued existence of an impersonal, superpersonal kind, independently of the personality by means of which they were developed. To contribute to this is the greatest happiness of the artist, the scientist, the inventor, the social reformer, etc.

https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/mach.htm

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Hello everyone, I have a question regarding daseinsanalysis. For my bachelor's thesis, I would like to try to apply daseinsanalysis to autism. But what I'm really stuck on is how to create a framework from daseinsanalysis (from either Boss, Binswanger or other philosophers for that manner). I'm looking for let's say a number of criteria or specific ways of interpreting phenomenological research on autism with the psychotherapeutic method. Would anyone have any advice for me on this regard? I'm thinking about trying to find case studies and studying those for example, but would be open to any suggestions if people were to have them.

Below I try to find new phrases for the "equiprimordiality" of world, language, community, and self --- for their living fusion and entanglement. One inspiration for this is what I take to be a common misunderstanding of direct realism. I'm not currently a member or a participant, but I have been following this particular discussion on The Philosophy Forum. Some of the direct realists in the discussion are doing OK, but I think what's missing is an appreciation of the foundationalism which is implied from the beginning, albeit implicitly, by the role or mission of philosophy. One cannot 'scientifically' challenge scientificity or any of its enabling conditions. Husserl discusses this in LI. Any theory that speaks against the possibility of theory is confused. Yet this is not only common but even misunderstood as the mark of sophistication.

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The source is here. But here's an image (because I like the typesetting.) I don't claim originality except that the phrasing is mine. I'm happy to talk about my influences (for instance, Karl-Otto Apel.)

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Hello everyone!

I am a Ph.D. student working on aspects of Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorder from a phenomenological perspective. If you are a Ph.D. student or already hold a Ph.D., and your research is similar, please feel free to text me. Let's discuss and exchange ideas.

I really loved this for German philosophy and German idealism. I have read some Merleau Ponty but am interested in the broader school. Is there an equivalent of this book but for phenomenology? Thanks in advance

Largely inspired by Zahavi's book on Husserl and a phenomenological reading of Ernst Mach and William James, I supplement below what I've already sketched in a previous post as something like a direct realist neutral monism. Wittgenstein's understanding of (the vanishing of) the 'philosophical I' (basically a pure witness or transcendental ego) is another strong influence. This thinking largely came out of a consideration of the meaning of truth. I think the pro-sentential approach is basically right. "All we have is belief, never truth." In other words, endorsing the truth of P is basically asserting P. Such assertion is irreducible, since the world in its blazing and raging plenitude is always already significant (conceptually structured). Constraints of space force me to leave out justifications of my claims, but these claims are largely informed by grasping the absurdity of (a certain kind of ) Kantianism and indirect realism in general. Note that I include a 'reddit text' version of my image below, for easy quoting and discussion.

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I see that-the-mail-hasn’t-come-yet. I “read off” concept or mean- ingstructure from experience “automatically.” The world is always already meaningfully structured for me. Heidegger’s idea of the equip- mental nexus is helpful here.

Husserl’s signitive and fulfilled intentions are also helpful. With the box closed, I guess that it contains a book. This is an empty intention. I “picture” a book in the box. Then the box is opened, and I see a book. Now my intention is fulfilled. A “potential meaningstructure” “matched” an “actual meaningstructure”. I use quotes because the terminology is only a tentative tool for communicating concepts.

Dualism is avoided if we “empty” the subject. Consciousness is “just” the being of our shared world which is only given perspectively. So consciousness is the being of “the-world-from-a-point-of-view.”

Traditional mental entities are still public rather than private in the sense of belonging in the public space of reasons. We understand that “you” have a different kind of access to “your” toothache. But we also understand why and that “one” calls the dentist when “one” has a toothache. This “inferential role” approach to entities gives us a kind of radical pluralism. The world-from-a-point-of-view includes toothaches and forks and promises. The philosopher as such takes only reasoning itself, and what makes that possible in its blurriness, as fundamental.

All these claims/beliefs together might be understood as a “rationalist” pluralistic phenomenological perspectivism.

This is not carefully revised, etc., but more of an attempt to start a conversation. How does the 3rd person POV connect with the confusion about aperspectival 'objects in themselves' ? Have others noted how frequently the posits of physics are (absurdly) cast as objects-in-themselves ? A weird half-Kantian confusion that takes the scientific image as a bottom layer, treating the life world (the foundation of the scientific image) as illusory.

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This is inspired to some degree by the essay Blindness and Insight, where de Mann uses Husserl as an example. (I should have written Paul de Man, but I can't edit the title.)

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I am hoping to start a discussion on the ideas presented below.

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I'm trying to find people working on contemporary issues about self consciousness from a phenomenological lense. Zahavi's work seems the obvious place to start and I was wondering whether there's anyone here looking into him.

Can you give me an overview of what important Japanese or generally Asian authors there are who have contributed to phenomenology? I would also appreciate it if you could elaborate in which tradition they stand or which classical authors they refer to.

Whenever I move to a new place, which happened a lot the last few years, I get a strange feeling. Everything is new, I don’t know where anything is, I can’t relate much because I don’t have previous experiences to relate it with.

I get this feeling that I won’t remember being here or it won’t be the same because I can’t process what’s happening and store memories.

It happens every time I move somewhere, months down the road, places I specifically remember will look and feel slightly different. It’s as if I’ve been there but I don’t remember actually being there or my memories cloudy. I can’t remember things that I should.

I’ve been living in this spot for 4 months and one of the first places I went to visit was the thrift store. Today at work, a lady said she goes to this thrift store all the time and loves it. I asked where it is and she pointed, it’s across the street. Not directly but slightly visible. I go to work 4 days a week and totally missed that we were so close to it. It gives me a weird feeling.

I’d like to understand it more but when I go to google this I don’t know what to ask..

The phenomenology of new places changing as time goes by? Just ridiculous because of course that can happen but it’s also a feeling in my body. Hard to describe

Okay, this is going to sound weird and I'm not going to get anyone who hasn't experienced this themselves to understand. But this has been bugging me for a long time not finding anyone who has a scientific name for it.

My entire life I was able to visibly see the same place one way, then out of nowhere it can just change. Every thing looks exactly the same, but visibly looks like an entirely different place. It's hard to describe.

Has anyone here experienced this before? And if so, do you know what this is called?

Hello, I am teaching undergrad students and was hoping to include some practical examples to explain the main concepts of phenomenology (Husserl and Heidegger). I am familiar with Don Ihde's book "Experimental Phenomenology". Could you please recommend more stuff?

Hi everyone. Phenomenology is a philosophical school of thought that seems to have grown more complex and diverse with both time and the unique contributions made to it by different philosophers. I was therefore wondering what are the main similarities and differences between Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, Heidegger’s existential and hermeneutical phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty’s embodied phenomenology. Thanks