I've heard cases for both

I notice new age beliefs borrowed a lot from Neoplatonism. They claim there are certain moral behaviors and actions taken to transcend to higher levels though they tend to treat it differently than actual Neoplatonism. I was wondering what the process was and what actions are taken so that a person no longer reincarnates on Earth anymore and goes to a place of superior understanding/spiritual development?

I would preface by saying not something like Christianity where the philosophy has crept in, but at its core and theologically is Neoplatonic.

Hi all, can someone help me understand how I could apply Neoplatonism and theurgy to the idea of connecting with/communing with/worshipping Aphrodite/Venus?

How do Neoplatonists view her and other loves deities such as Eros? Do they believe that there is an objective level of reality that takes on the form of love and beauty and if so, how can one tap into or access that reality and bring it into their real world.

If it is said that the soul is immortal and has pre-existent knowledge of the Forms ("remembers them"), how is this not innatism?

(typo in the title)

Does the mind contemplate the form? Does it imitate it? I've always been confused about the particular process in which that's supposed to be happening.

For reference, Lloyd Gerson uses anti-relativism as a tenant of Ur-Platonism. Platonism has to admit the possibility of knowledge. But what exactly is that? It's certainly something metaphysically heavier than mere justified true belief.

Hi everyone 👋.

Recently, I have been exploring contemporary developments in the search for a quantum theory of gravity within theoretical physics. Among the most promising approaches are string theory (particularly M-theory), loop quantum gravity, asymptotically safe gravity, causal set theory (including causal dynamical triangulation), and theories of induced or emergent gravity. A unifying theme across these frameworks is the concept of emergent spacetime. For instance, physicists Sean Carroll and Leonard Susskind have advocated for the idea that spacetime emerges from quantum entanglement; Hyan Seok Yang has observed that “emergent spacetime is the new fundamental paradigm for quantum gravity”; and Nima Arkani-Hamed has gone so far as to declare that “spacetime is doomed.”

These emergent theories propose that the continuous, metrical, and topological structure of spacetime — as described by Einstein’s general theory of relativity — is not fundamental. Rather, it is thought to arise from a more foundational, non-spatiotemporal substrate associated with quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. Frameworks that explore this include theories centered on quantum entanglement, causal sets, computational universe models, and loop quantum gravity. In essence, emergent spacetime theories suggest that space and time are not ontological foundations but instead emerge from deeper, non-spatial, non-temporal quantum structures. Here is an excellent article which discusses this in-greater detail: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-spacetime-really-made-of/

Interestingly, one philosopher who I know that advanced similar ideas in favour of an emergent ontology of space and time was Alfred North Whitehead (who has been described as having a metaphysical system that can be described as “neo-Platonic”). He conceived of the laws of nature as evolving habits rather than as eternal, immutable principles. In his view, even spacetime itself arises as an emergent habit, shaped by the network of occasions that constituted the early universe. In Process and Reality, Whitehead describes how spacetime, or the “extensive continuum,” emerges from the collective activity of “actual occasions of experience” — his ontological primitives, inspired by quantum events.

Philosopher Edward Slowik has recently argued that both Leibniz and Kant (before The Critique of Reason) serve as philosophical predecessors to modern non-spatiotemporal theories, suggesting they may have anticipated aspects of contemporary quantum gravity approaches (https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23221/1/EM%20Spatial%20Emergence%20%26%20Property.pdf).

With this in mind, I am interested in understanding the status of space and time in the philosophies of numerous neo-Platonic philosophers (and Neoplatonism generally) throughout the centuries. Specifically, I seek to understand what was the ontological role that space and time play within this unique metaphysical system. Did the Neoplatonist’s regard space and time as independent, absolute entities, or did they consider them emergent from a more fundamental substance or entity? This can either be from the classical neo-Platonic philosophers (such as Plotinus and others), Middle Platonism, or even the Cambridge Platonists (or other neo-Platonic adjacent philosophers, such as Whitehead).

Any guidance on this subject would be greatly appreciated. Thank you!

P.S. I would also welcome insights into other philosophers or schools of thought that might be viewed as precursors to a worldview in which the material dimensions of space and time arise from non-spatial sources. Thanks.

So I wonder about this idea a lot. How can we explain Neoplatonism to say a 5 year old, 10 year old, and 18 year old?

Thanks!

Hello! Another random platonism question.

In "The Indefinite Dyad" from Soul Matters, Danielle Layne argues that Plato deliberately undermines the seemingly-sexist comments that appear to permeate his dialogues on a surface reading.

I have two questions about Layne's exegesis of the Timaeus in particular.

1. Layne cites various scholars including Findlay who claim that the demiurge (referred to as a father) is active and primary in the Timaeus while the feminine "receptacle" that creates space for being is abjectly passive (224). She adumbrates many characteristics of the receptacle that would seem to suggest that the receptacle, far from being a subordinate quasi-nothingness, is actually a source of power which is equal to the One itself. For example, Layne argues that the receptacle has "desires," "limited power," "activity of relation, connection, and participation," "a boundary," "invagination, a cave, an opening into interiority, an invitation to filling, inscription, penetration... an exteriority, an opening out, giving room, dimension, depth, and magnitude," a "dual movement," "the gift of making space for others," "active and passive elements," and that it "motivates us," "refuses to admit of destruction," and "safeguards." For Layne, all these characteristics and many more are necessary to describe the active creative power of the receptacle.

On the other hand, the Timaeus itself is clear that the receptacle is necessarily "totally devoid of any characteristics" (50e). To even speak of the receptacle requires a "bastard reasoning that does not involve sense perception, and it is hardly even an object of conviction" (52b). Although Layne characterizes the receptacle at some length, she never seems to mention that the Timeaus explicity denies the possibility of any such characterization. Can anyone help me understand why Layne thinks that such a richly characterized receptacle is an accurate reading of the Timeaus in the face of the Timaeus' own clear statement that characterizing the receptacle is impossible?

2. Timaeus argues that vicious men are resurrected as lower women (228-9). Layne argues that Plato subtly but deliberately undermines this sexist argument. Layne notes that the Pythagoreans analogize the feminine with the bad and the indefinite (228-9). Timeaus is traditionally identified as a Pythagorean due to the nature of his thought and his geographical origin. Layne comments that, for Plato, the Pythagorean definite and indefinite both exist in the soul. Accordingly, if the definite and indefinite are equivalent to the male and female, then all people are both male and female. Layne argues that this proves that Plato is cleverly deconstructing Timaeus' Pythagorean heteronormativity (229). But if Pythangorean definite and indefinite are only analogous rather than fully equivalent to male and female, then it would not necessarily follow that a mix of definite and indefinite necessarily implies a mix of male and female. Accordingly, how does this argument for a feminist Plato still stand up?

The absolute simplicity of the ultimate requires that the dependence of any creature upon it must make no difference to the Ultimate itself. Vallicella describes contingent existents as being actively externally unified. Thomists would say that a being existing means that the essence has an act of existence which is actively derived from Existence itself.

How do different Platonist authors understand that idea? How exactly should we understand the process of the One generating the Intellect? Is it a unification? Can we speak of it without compromising absolute simplicity? How do we best describe the difference between contingent and necessary existence and which Platonists ever spoke explicitly about what being is and what it means to be? Ideally in regards to the Ultimate as well.

Hello! I have been doing a deep dive into neoplatonist theurgy over the past few weeks, reading some original as well as secondary sources. Struggling with Gregory Shaw's interpretation of Iamblichus' perspective on matter and could use some help to understand.

One important piece of Shaw's argument in Theurgy and the Soul is that "Iamblichus had a positiive view of matter" (38). This insight becomes crucial for Shaw, for example in his efforts to distinguish Iamblichus' pagan theurgy from Dionysius' Christian theurgy ("Neoplatonic Theurgy and Dionysius the Areopagite", 597). Shaw acknowledges that this positive view of matter seems to clash with Iamblichus' perspective on the creation of animate statues, where Iamblichus asks "What good can be generated from matter" (43)? Shaw argues that Iamblichus must view matter positively because otherwise this would imply a contradiction with "his remarks in the Theology of Numbers and On General Mathematical Science," and because the context clarifies that Iamblichus is talking about a specific context and is not against matter in general. I have three points of confusion with this:

1. Shaw acknowledges that Iamblichus did not write Theology of Numbers (36). So, why is it appropriate to use a quote from Theology of Numbers as solid evidence for Iamblichus' position against On the Mysteries, a document that scholars widely agree was written by Iamblichus? He cites one scholar who conjectures that Theology of Numbers may have been written from notes on Iamblichus' lectures, but he doesn't provide any evidence to conclusively demonstrate his claim that Theology of Numbers 100% reflects Iamblichus' ideas.
2. How do the quotes that Shaw draws from On General Mathematical Science support his position? Also, is the translation that he provides from OGMS legitimate? Shaw writes: "Iamblichus flatly denied that the material principle of numver was evil. In On the Mathematical Science he says: 'it is not appropriate to contend that this [material principle] is evil or ugly...It would be far from true to suggest that the material principal is evil'" (36-7) But why should the fact that a "material principal" is not evil necessarily imply that matter itself is not evil? Also, I translated the greek for each word and didn't see anything that seemed to suggest any term referring to a "material principal" was literally included in either the first or second quote (see notes 22 and 23 in the image atached).

https://preview.redd.it/jvxwbk5wrj0e1.jpg?width=1497&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=1977a1e927ed61e04ae4b20bb0eff7726571317b

3. Shaw argues that Iamblichus was talking about matter "as a pollution from which souls must be cleaned" in Book V of On the Mysteries because that book discusses a specific stage in the theurgic journey (43-5). But why does Shaw not also respond in the same context to various other seemingly anti-matter quotes in other books of On the Mysteries? For example:

I. XI. – "The obscene language which then takes place, affords an indication of the privation of good about matter, and of the deformity which is in material subjects, prior to their being adorned"

II. VI. - "The vision of other souls draws down to generation, corrupts the fruits of hope, and fills the spectator with passions which fix them to the body."

III. XX. – "For the human soul is contained by one form, and is on all sides darkened by body, which he who denominates the river of Negligence, or the water of Oblivion, or ignorance and delirium, or a bond through passions, or the privation of life, or some other evil, will not by such appellations sufficiently express its turpitude."

Would Shaw refer to other special circumstances in all of these case that would imply that Iamblichus is actually pro-body and pro-matter?

Is Shaw reading his own pro-matter worldview into Iamblichus' text, as opposed to reading the text as it actually exists? What am I missing here?

Thanks!

Bonus: in comparison with Aristotle

Lloyd Gerson in his identically named article argues that the concept of hylomorphism is already present in Plato. That's good, because as a philosophy of nature it's most certainly correct. The question is whether it can exhaustively explain all mental phenomena.

It's also not fair to describe it as a form of substance dualism, since the distinction between material and immaterial isn't really given either.

So what should we describe it as?

I know that we have the "Iamblichus curriculum", but it seems like a bit much as preliminary reading, given that my primary interest is Neoplatonism specifically (and not Plato per se). How much of Plato's work is absolutely essential to begin studying Neoplatonism (especially Neoplatonist metaphysics)? Are there any Platonic dialogues (or secondary sources on Plato or ancient Greek philosophy) that stand out as truly important context for understanding Neoplatonism and being able to read primary sources? Thanks in advance to anyone who answers.

• Notion The One is unsatisfying, such poetic language such as "Overflowing" leaves people unsatisfying. (I am saying this as a person that believes in a degree of metaphysical unknowability)
• Issue of Evil just being absence of good is a particulary vulnerable point. Sure it works but people can just say "Nuh Uh. We can see evil. Evil is an activity"

Is it the individuality? Is it our subjective first person perspective? How is it, how does it come to be and does it survive? And what would be the retort to a perspective that denies it?

I'm interested in this perspective, as it pertains to the question of persistence. I've been engaged with some Buddhist literature lately and while I find the idea of the self-denial preposterous, it is not that clear where the reasoning actually goes wrong

I am a Hellenist, a devotee of Zeus, and I have been very interested in Neoplatonism. How do you see the deities? How do you see Zeus? Do you think Olympus exists? The Champs Elysées? What do you think of monotheistic religions?

I've ordered the book Reading Plotinus A Practical Introduction to Neoplatonism by Kevin Corrigan in hopes of understanding some of the basics of Neoplatonism (before delving into the primary sources). I would, however, like some book recommendations (primary or academic secondary sources) for prayers, hymns, contemplative practices and maybe even a calendar? I was unsuccessful in my search.
What other tips do you have for someone like me? Any subreddits or discord groups that I could join? I want to find a community that has as its grand goal the revival of these ancient religious practices in a more orthodox, organized manner, for lack of a better word.

I’m trying to better understand how it works. I understand the DDS and how one can’t have any metaphysical composition, but how does the intellect not entail it as being a ‘part’ of the one, I assume it’s something do with the emanation and the one not being changed but being able to cause change, but if someone can help clarify the distinction and relationship between the two it would be appreciated