I'm already well aware of capitalism and schizophrenia, But any other worthwhile reads for meta anarchism? I know anarchist theory in general works due to how meta anarchism works but id like some stuff that applies more to our school of anarchy

Listen, Meta-Anarchist! You have misunderstood the concept of deterritorialization. As Laclau and Mouffe state that they are “not just *post-*Marxists, but also post-Marxists”, you cannot say the same about your anarchism, you are post-anarchists. So then with your chatter of meta-anarchy, if they did believe in the power of the revolutionary multitude, as Hardt and Negri proclaim, “we are not anarchists, but communists” - so then why not Meta-Marxism? And why not Actionism? Just as Actionism is the direct opposite of accelerationism, and instead maintains the importance of Trotsky’s theories of the transitional demand and permanent revolution, therefore, Cannabis Communism must be separated from Mark Fisher’s ambiguous “Acid Communism” for a few not so extraneous reasons. Mark Fisher kept strange bed-fellows, the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit was an amalgam of counter-productive interests. The Funk Punk is the exact opposite of the Cyberpunk. We have no reason to speak of cyberdelic. If Timothy Leary was right that the PC would be the LSD of the 1990s, it is equally true that psychedelia wasn’t so much an attempt to replicate the effects of hallucinogens, but consisted of the musical experimentations of psychedelic rock such as extended solos and improvisation, elaborate studio effects, elements of free-form jazz, a strong keyboard and synthesizer presence, surrealistic lyrics, and elements of Indian classical music.

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1RMCV9Gnt9UXMRQ_bj41uxXb8IpShJgQPJiU1imzMUlU/edit?usp=drivesdk The more refined work on intensity to read here.

Part 2: The Sense Of Intensity

I: The Sense Of Mathematics

𝛹I.1: On The Nature Of Mathematics

Mathematics consists of the use of formal languages that consists of defining structures which we can express using the art of combining symbols together as a means to represent the relationships between what we consider various components of the mathematical system. In this mathematical system, which we shall call a system of relationality, we are only ever considered with the formal relations between all of the components, we furthermore, also state that all the components obtain their determinateness only through their relations between each other. Therefore, as each of the components do not have any determinateness within themselves, these components in isolation cannot be responsible for the relationships they have with each other because they themselves aren’t the holders of these relationships. Mathematics therefore defines zones of intensity where all intensity has been cancelled out, each of the ontologies are purely metaphysically empty and all adopt a degreeness of zero, the difference between mathematics and simple nothingness however, is that mathematics works with multiplicities of zones of zero intensities. These multiplicities contain a multitude of zero intensities which yet produce these pure relationalities between the intensities because nothing is already intensity without determination, already a productive, affirmative force which produces and not mere absence. The question, “how do we obtain something from nothing?” dissolves entirely once we recognize that nothing itself is simply the zone of intensity when all intensities adopt a degree of zero. Since relationality emerges only between the actual intensities themselves, there is no need for these relationalities to have self-consistent behaviour as such, since the contradiction will not have any consequences for any of the intensities. The intensities instead, will only construct a multiplicity which encodes or engrains the contradiction as territorialized into a mathematical form, a form which contains the sense of the original structural paradox or contradiction which enables the contradiction to be captured in a comprehensible form that can be understood and recognized. Whilst intensity in itself deals with the purely actual, actual of such violence as to engage in all possibilities of self-organisation within an indescribable, unfathomable chaos, mathematics studies relation in itself. That is, it deals with the purely virtual, the complexities of the possible territorializable zonalities that intensity can construct through its capacity to encode relationships through the relationalities they construct between themselves. Hence we recognize that relation in itself is simply the form that emerges when intensities of degree zero enter into a multiplicity with each other, constructing relations between each other, henceforth becoming intensity for itself. Intensity, which has defined its relationality, within the context of other intensities contained inside the same zone. These virtual multiplicities embody the formal order of thought.

Such mathematical structures present the ideas of how various intensities of zero degree are capable of relating with each other, such ideas provide us with an understanding of the different relationships that can exist between intensities themselves. Mathematical thinking provides us with direct access to the purely virtual, zones of intensity without degree entirely and hence we can access the realm of the true Platonic forms through mathematical thinking. These formal structures do not in themselves present us with the truth of any particular reality, they aren’t the truth of reality or themselves constituting any specific reality except specific realities of zones of intensity at degree zero. Instead, the Platonic forms simply showcase what is structurally the case for specific arrangements of multiplicities and so provides us with a series of indubitable congruences about specific zones of intensity, so long as a set of premises exist and we follow them. Hence, as mathematics are contained in an idea, we can construct an infinite variety of mathematics by setting forth an infinite set of axiomatics or premises and discovering the consequences of those axioms and/or premises. Each sufficiently unique axiomatic system or set of premises we decide to formulate, will be opening up a new series of possibilities for development that are entirely unpredictable and unforeseeable as it will be following a logic which is irreplicable by the spheres of expression that have gone before. Whether or not these axioms or premises will lead to anything useful cannot be said here. Furthermore, since mathematical thinking is related directly to intensities due to being about the structures that intensities can form within the zones they are embedded on, it means that any intensity can reveal characteristically mathematically expressible relationships. Thus mathematics can be constructed from zones with intensities with differing degrees, a mode of construction which enables virtualities to be grasped due to the way sets of intensities have relations between each other and so it becomes possible to represent mathematical concepts using intensive constructions. In these intensive constructions, we build the very relationality we are attempting to comprehend an abstract sense of, by rebuilding the relationality for us to experience directly.

In this way, structural thinking cannot meaningfully be said to have anything to do with being capable of delineating between various differences or differences of intensity, since within pure virtual multiplicity there is no degreeness of intensity to speak of and hence no possible ontological difference in itself. There is no identity to speak of either, since identity requires determinateness to establish itself, rather both difference and identity as something an ontology can be as a type of intensity, emerges only due to specified particular relations that the ontology has. In pure intensity, there can be no difference in itself nor identity, as they presuppose that structurality is already existent. Structural thinking, though it does not delineate between difference or differential intensities which take differences in their degree, delineates specifically between the types of relations that exist between intensities of degree zero. Intensity for itself therefore stands as its own way for an ontology to be independently and irreducibly to other ways for ontologies to exist as was shown here. Hence, structural thinking works with the shape of spheres of expression, revealing types of relationalities that spheres of expression can adopt and thus provides us insight into the possible structures we may encounter as we instantiate different ideas. Mathematics is the music of logical thinking. We must proceed with our analysis of the sense of intensity for itself, the philosophy of mathematics, if we want to understand the sense of different forms intensity can also adopt down the line because such analysis provides us the foundations for such developments to proceed.

𝛹I.2: Demonstrating The Universality Of Relationality

Before we charge ahead any further, we need to demonstrate that relationality is the universal substance behind all structural thinking, which includes mathematics, logic, metalogic, and metamathematics, without an ounce of exception. This is because we must show with clarity precisely if the consequences of the metaphysics of intensity construct implications that are consistent with developments found in other areas of knowledge. For if we were to show otherwise, this would immediately throw into question our theories as we would then have a case that escapes our basic understanding here, as it would throw light upon a presumption we made along the way. For if we can have something that intuitively, is arguably something structural, something belonging in these fields which make use of formal language, yet does not conform to our conception of relation, then we can say that indeed, we have assumed that anything that is entirely non-relational cannot also be structural. Our intuitions would be presented as straightforwardly wrong and limited.

In the following demonstration, we are also demonstrating our own philosophy of thinking in action, as we are showing precisely a performance of actually challenging our intuitions by putting them to the test. Furthermore, we are using the spheres of expression that we developed in this text. Those being expressions about the nature of intensity, the development intensity undergoes as it emerges through zones, and eventually, to how intensity has relations between other intensities in those zones. We are using them in this case and hence we have a great example for how ideas provide new possibilities for intuition, since we can see here how through the instantiations of our ideas, ideas about intensity that is, we have now the possibility to engage with a further analysis which introduces the possibility for something new. This possibility introduced here, no matter how deeply we go into our critical reflection on our understanding of structural thinking, will never be closed and put to an end. It will always stand there lurking because it is already potentially always there because of the very construction of our philosophy. It is precisely because we have made the developments we made from our own intuitions embedded in this text that we can therefore engage in a unique series of operations, those operations being defined as the art of making a critical reflection on relation in itself by looking at concrete cases of where we are attempting to apply relation in itself. In effect, to philosophise well, we must also ensure we continuously philosophise with examples, as we have managed to expose in this premier to the subject we will be looking at, only examples with concretes can provide us with the means to properly and rigorously comprehend our ideas. We have a problem then, does there exist anything which intuitively, we would understand as structural or logical, that is entirely non-relational?

𝛹I.3: Relationality and Logic

In logic, we take a logical connective to be anything which operates on a set of terms, that is, either symbols representing particular entities or constants, or symbols representing sets of variables. The first set of logical connectives we shall consider are the Boolean constants, true and false, for they do not take any arguments and are thus zero-ary operators. Therefore, they themselves do not relate to anything, rather, they describe how something is related to them in the sense that something may either be true or false, or perhaps, consisting of some other attribute. Hence, as these zero-ary operators are attributes of terms, terms are therefore related to these operators in that we can consider terms as one set of intensities and the zero-ary operators as attributes about those intensities, that is, the term in question has a relation between itself and only itself. It can only adopt a relation between itself if we consider how the term is not itself related to anything, it cannot by itself sufficiently define any relation because it is entirely in a vacuum, however, as it can define a zone of intensity which is already in a phase-state, it can already adopt a relation between itself as having a specific attribute about itself. The term is connected to itself and it connects to itself precisely by having a relation towards the zone it constructs by being related to exactly the phase-state or state of possibilities that it determines, hence a zero-ary operator on a term expresses simply the entirety of the phase-state that the term holds despite it having zero intensity in abstract form. The term is simply related to the zero-ary operator by having an attribute, say either true or false, simply by means of how the zone exists relative to the potential construction the term is said to engage in, hence this relation exists in an absolutely heterogeneous form. For the relation here admits only of the pure quality of attributability that the term holds, and admits of nothing else but the quality of attributability assignable to the given intensity or what we can say, logical term here. We can have a many-valued logic that could also include indeterminate. We can also have a fuzzy logic of truth-values between 0 and 1, each a heterogenically qualitative assignment. The only difference with fuzzy logic however, which deals with partial truths, is that 0 and 1 admits of a homogeneity in a differential intensity of the partiality of the truth, as there can be something that is more partially true than another, such as having a truth-value of 0.9 instead of 0.254, hence the absolutely heterogeneous state of relations when we speak of the attributes of intensities, or for logic, terms, can adopt even more complex forms on-top of such. Conclusively, simply put, zero-ary operators on terms is constructing a relation that simply describes how anything A is connected to itself, A is true, hence something true is A. For every attribute X, to say A is X, already implies something X is A.

What we perceive here is how A, though a term of zero intensity, having an attribute, has a relation with itself that captures a heterogeneous “location” in the field of possible definable relations, an enfolded virtual multiplicity of only one intensity. This multiplicity can consist of an infinite possible variety of these relations with itself, denoted in an absolute infinity of ways, all that counts here is simply that the purely heterogenic form exists. For as it adopts the form, A is X, something X is A, A is already related between itself because the relation it has with itself, the attribute X, will already implicate the corollary that what has the attribute X is A. In that way, A is connected to itself simply by both relating to itself via an attribute and having the attribute in the same sense. That is the attribute becomes in a Deleuzian paradoxical way, something that is both somehow “outside” A and yet “within” A at once. The between itself relation A has, exists because both cases of the sense are affirmed for A, if we do not affirm both cases of the sense, we argue that A does not have any attributes but is simple nothingness, hence, is entirely non-relational, hence we can only take an intensity A. Otherwise the ineffability of A in itself forces us to stay silent utterly, as though it were like an unspeakable, unknowable, and unthinkable noumenon we should stop attempting to grasp already. The meaning, however, we assign to an attribute of A, such as true or false, partially true or partially false, indeterminate, is grounded externally. A is related to another zone of intensity such that its truthness means that A is in that zone or A is not in that zone, for instance, our experiences as a zone of intensity, may take the intensity of a colour blue as existing, since there is an experience of blue in that zone. In other words, the meaning-creation here is entirely contextually reliant, a zone of intensity must perceive another zone of intensity such that a logical term A can emerge in the first place, hence it becomes possible to evaluate attributability, either its truthiness or falseness. As to what we make of what it means for A to be true or false and so on, only makes sense in relation to a specified zone within the absolute infinite, otherwise, it has no meaning, since A has no further relation with anything else for meaning to exist in in the first place. Formalistically then, A’s relation to itself is simply purely relational without any atom of meaning to be assigned to A given in its own zone because A is not related to anything outside itself for interpretation to even take place to begin with. Hence these relations A has between itself provides us with possibilities of procedure, given the zone is at a phase-state. However, the moment A is related to other intensities, A therefore reflects types of relations, it becomes about something, which complexifies the potential relations.

Take logical connectives that are unary operators then. They take A and operate on A such that we connect A with the connective. We are not simply attributing A as holding a certain logical property such as being true or false. If the unary logical connective, such as the negation connective ¬, is something that changes the attribute that A has, then it is clearly a relation because it takes an attribute of A here, such as A is true, and using the connective ¬A, we get A is false. Hence through this change, the connective is relating itself with attributes, such as true, false, or say, indeterminate, and outputting that the original term A now has a new attribute. Hence we have made a connection with two distinct attributes or zero-ary operators using the unary operator. For other types of unary operators that function outside of changing the attribute that terms, such as A have, the unary operator relates itself to A such that there is a simple output represented by the operator and its taking of just one argument. Though there is no connection between distinct attributes, there is still a connection made between A and the operator and either the type of zone A exists on. For example, in modal logic, where we may use the modal operator ⬜A, which means “necessarily A” then A exists on the type of zone of “necessary terms.” If we say ⃟ A instead, “possibly A” then A exists on the type of zone of “possible terms.” Thus the modal operator is a relation A has with the modality that the operator represents, that being in this case either of the modality of necessity or possibility. Hence all zones with a specific type as determined by the intensive modality of the zone, which therefore determines further relations that necessary terms and possible terms can have with other necessary and possible terms. Zones can be made to relate to each other as well to generate more complex logical thinking in modal logic. Necessity for a zone of intensity simply says that this zone contains intensities that are necessary and thus can have a particular relationship with other zones of necessity and possibility.

Finally, when we consider unary quantifiers such as “for all” and “there exists/for some,” that is, ∀ and ∃ respectively, upon A. The quantifier is something which specifies how many individuals within a domain of discourse satisfy an open formula, that is, a formula with free variables such that these variables could take on values of a number of different particular entities. This domain of discourse is the set of entities we are considering over which certain variables of some formal treatment may range. Then, for instance, when we say ∀xP(x) says that everything in the domain satisfies the property denoted by P. We can also say ∃xP(x), which says that something in the domain satisfies the property P. Hence the quantifiers for all and there exists upon A relates A to its defined domain of discourse and therefore quantifiers are definitely a relation without question. Take more complex relations of the form R(a, …, x) where the number of arguments in R is indefinitely long, with an infinite series of approaches we could take in determining the range of arguments that R actually takes and what those arguments are in particular. Then there is no closer analysis needed to say that R, as an n-ary relation or arity greater than one, is a relation in the metaphysical sense we understand relationality to be. Simply because, so long as the relation operates over many terms rather than one or zero, then the relation already has to do with how an A, B, etc, to X, connects. Furthermore, for the functions, which are n-ary and map a tuple of n-entities to other entities, that is already a relation between one set of entities and another set of entities, hence the metaphysical understanding we have of relation is still intuitively consistent with the fundamentals of logic. We hence have nothing more we need to analyse in the area of the fundamentals of logic.

II: The Three Phase-Conditions

Thus far we have discussed intensity in itself when we wanted to describe the essence of intensity at the start of our text about intensity, then we began to show how intensity for itself or relationality emerges due to the way intensities enter into relations between each other. We then gave a demonstration as to how intensity for itself behaves when we throw it at concrete examples of various aspects of fundamental concepts found in the field of logic, such as modality, quantification, and connectives. Intensity in itself, due to being entirely non-relational, can be taken as pointwise, whilst intensity for itself, as relations, can be said to be linewise. We can take pointwise and linewise to be phase-conditions that intensities can exist in. Phase-conditions are the particular ontological manifestations that intensities have due to the phase-states they determine within the zones that they are inhabiting. These phase-conditions shall be denoted ℙ and ℒ. We need to consider the phase-conditions that develop when we allow ourselves to mix intensities in themselves with intensities for themselves, that is, we both have intensities with degrees and relations between those points of distinct degrees. In this way, we will have a phase-condition that is determined as a composite of the primitive phase-conditions, such that we would be capable of taking ℙ and ℒ as separate considerations, whilst at the same time the composition will produce something that emerges as greater than primitive conditions taken separately from each other. This is because we will produce a third phase-condition which produces more complex ontological reality from the fact that intensities of ℙ when related in the ways ℒ will generate intensities with types of relations ℒ which constrain those intensities into a well-defined multiplicity, phase-condition ℳ. ℳ is equivalent to ℙ&ℒ, which says, combine pointwise with linewise. Though we have a primitive pair that is dichotomous in structure, this pair does not exist in a mutually-exclusive manner but instead is capable of coupling with each other to produce a higher-order condition. Furthermore, the content of all logic is precisely of ℳ as a purely virtual multiplicity because ℳ consists of nothing but pointwises that are of zeroth degree, the content is about intensity without determination. Examples of multiplicities or taking something at the third phase-condition would be discussions of difference in itself, as well as possibility versus the real, since they already embody a structured logic to them.

Multiplicity as the third phase-condition takes the original dichotomy required to determine a stable meaning for our discussion, the dichotomy being the pair of intensity of degree without relation and relation existent between intensities without being any form of intensity, then combines dichotomous terms to produce a higher-order term. This higher-order term ensures that the dichotomy does not exist mutually-exclusively, the dominant term of intensity combines with the recessive term of relation, to produce a new term that adopts a depth of meaning greater than the meaning obtained in the starting dichotomy. Our third-term encapsulates the entire dichotomy within itself such that it is determined by existing only because both terms in the dichotomy are affirmed to be aspects or conceptual components of the greater third-term. This makes the dichotomy here both immanent to the term, multiplicity, yet multiplicity transcends the limitations of the original dichotomy that enabled us the pivot-points required to stabilise a textual meaning. In this way, through following the consequences of the particular understanding we have of our opposition, we succeed to transcend the either/or nature of the dichotomy such that the new phase-condition reformulates the either/or into a mutually-inclusive condition, it becomes an, and. Multiplicity therefore becomes a term that stands without need for definition by anything opposing multiplicity as its meaning has already both been captured and stabilised by the dichotomy underneath which it had been determined through, such that it exists in an entirely non-dichotomizing form. There is not an atom of binary logic contained within multiplicity because multiplicity as a term that transcends the original limitations of meaning of the separate primitive phase-conditions pointwise and linewise, breaks free from the separate logics of intensity in itself and intensity for itself. It exists upon its own unique logic, precisely because its logic cannot be decomposed into the logic of either of the original pair of primitive conditions which determine the higher-order term. Multiplicity exists as an “and” logic, “this and this and this,” etc, rather than the binary logic of “either/or,” “this is either this or that.”

Multiplicity is the nature of the ontological structures that have sufficient complexity to be discussable in the first place, since discussion requires intensities with relations between each other. Furthermore, intuitions grasp the intensities within a multiplicity whilst operations enable the unfoldment of multiplicity to evolve this multiplicity into a new multiplicity. Ideas provide us with new virtual multiplicities, virtual because they are like blueprints which guide us towards particular instantiations of them that can construct new actual multiplicities that exist. Sense then, is entirely the interplay between evolutions of actual multiplicities as expressed within a sphere of expression of virtual multiplicities that outline the possibilities of evolution/transition from one zone of intensity into another zone of intensity in a purely continuous or undivided, unbroken manner. Illusion is taking the virtual multiplicity as if it were the real, actual multiplicity.

My name is Rayne.

I have been spending a long time trying to make sense of my own ever-evolving subjectivity. Ebbing and flowing seemingly chaotically, I find myself a peculiar combination of subjective processes all running together. I will simply identify myself here as neurodivergent, mad, disabled. I am writing because it is my personal belief that the subjective bears truths that cannot be extinguished by any means to crush and remove the subjective wherever it exists. The inability to destroy that light is why I have become a force of nature on the ground today. There is nothing that can be done to stop subjective power once it has established itself and finally found a way to entirely break free from its own alienation from itself and the world, a breakdown of relationality that creates the clinical schizophrenic under Capitalism. My philosophy of intensity which I wrote that's core tenants can be captured in a dissertation provides a means to philosophize my own subjectivity meaningfully. In a chaosmosis of intensities, raw powers of experience and emotion utterly unhindered, the answer becomes to work to construct one's relation with themself and the world. To radically regain the ground stolen from all of us in the groundless, ever-accelerating deterritorializing forces of Capitalism. In my eyes, the schizophrenic process spoken of in Deleuze and Guattari's work can so easily be swept up in the catastrophic meltdown of Capitalism, creating an out of control deterritorializing spiral. Here's where the rubber finally has met the road though. The stronger the deterritorialization, the stronger the potential reterritorialization, and in the territorializations I am actively constructing to gain a new form of seemingly unrecognizable equilibrium, there is left only answering the straightforward question as to how one creates harmonies, symphonies out of the chaos. Through territorializing within the great sense of perpetual motion of pure intensity, we are a becoming-musical, we have built new songs that create these resonances across all knowable spaces as they cannot be contained. You will note how my name can mean, "beautiful song." We are continually spontaneously creating new structures and taking the chaos of seemingly primordial soups to generate creative and unique works of art, doing, and being. My two major inspirations of the becoming-musical are found through Terry Davis and his TempleOS work as well as Louis Wane and his amazing, unique artwork of cats, sometimes expressing fractal harmonies so astoundingly intricate that it leaves one in awe. I feel that a contemplation of what could be becoming-musical with these two works, how they build orders in chaos, potentially comprehends becoming-musical and rendering territorializations from pure intensity, more deeply comprehends what I am saying than my own explanation here. I plan to infect myself with the happy virus on purpose now.

III: Becóming Intense

In the becóming intense, we ought to consider that though we could take every intensity we are met with as a brute fact in a solipsistic leap, we have no excuse to do so. Though intensities are their own self-determining ontologies, this does not mean that brute factuality is universal across everything that is an intensity. Since intensities admit of degrees and are becóming intense, they are already intensive forces which disrupt the dynamic absolute nothingness such that they induce new possibilities of becóming intense due to the novel contexts that they have emergently created. That every intensity therefore in its becóming generates these new contexts through the intensive zones that they create therefore end up mapping a new field of possible potentials and becómings, means that every intensity ends up storing implications through itself. These implications cannot be ignored, unless we are to reach an utmost philosophical point. That every moment we can establish that one has attempted to completely ignore and push aside intensity, to conquer intensity at the universal scale such that we can terminate real thinking which attempts to explore singularities to obtain a greater comprehension, are thought terminating efforts. That we must be constantly vigilant and against all finality of thinking, all self-reassured self-completion we can rest upon, is cardinal. Through our complete and whole-hearted affirmation of intensity and unconquerable becóming, we therefore position ourselves with a most aggressive anti-totalizing approach to our theories. In turn we should never even take the developments we might make within a philosophy of intensity in the becóming intense too seriously is also cardinal. A good humorous and witty spirit ought to straighten out any nonsense espoused by myself writing this, which we would see as the most excellent practice a philosopher of intensity could engage in.

It is since that every intensity through it’s becóming generates contexts which build these intensive implications due to the construction of enriched zones of intensity which can always become beholden onto new intensities through the transformation of these zones, that we must reason from the opinion that intensities we meet ought not to be taken in their brute state. Such requires an approach to intensity which directs our attention towards how intensity is both a self-genetic entity yet through its construction of new zones can also behave as the new genetic elements for intensities to emerge from that. Hence we move from intensity which constructs these zones and reflect upon the structures that those intensities spontaneously develop through the zone and enables the zone to embody such that new intensities will emerge through a newly assembled process that is composed of these particular intensities. In other words, philosophy becomes an ontology of the genesis of intensities through expressing how intensities are genetically composed from the processual assemblages that intensities emergent within zones provide for us. Such a philosophy focuses on how metaphysical essence and its relationship to the thinkable, the experienceable, hence we deem here the true sense of the intensity emerges only through the powers of intensity in its own capacity for self-organization into these processual assemblages, an entirely metaphysical Anarchism.

In the pure non-relationality of intensity, intensity is organized across a field of an infinitely sprawled zonality of pure continuums. The actual particular becómings of intensities will create these more defined determinations which, though not de facto related to each other, become related to each other in accord through their continuity because they are underlied by a continuity which unites these intensities together within locatable points in the zones. These locatable points are pseudo-locatable because they are not locations of anything except a constellation of distinct ontologies with distinct degrees to them. It is rather in their distinct degreeness that they generate relations with each other because they spontaneously coordinate themselves by the generation of new processual intensities which constructs these heterogenic modes of becóming amongst them. This spontaneity emerges from the simple sufficient reason that the existence of particular intensities already invites the possibility of unifying intensities together through processual assemblages that coordinate these intensities towards emergent relationalities. This is because intensities existent upon a zone already produce within that zone a phase state which introduces new possibilities for evolution as the particular evolution of the next phase state could not occur without the older phase state. Hence the relations emerge because, even though the points of intensity upon the zone are entirely non-relational, the zone adopts a relationality in reference to the ordered possibilities for that zone. In other words, a relation, as processual assemblage, is to do with new deeper becómings that are induced through the starting intensities which ends up creating a zonal order for intensities. It creates multiplicities which exist through a synchronicity of the particular becómings being undergone. In this continuous multiplicity which unifies intensities together such that due to the relationalities they construct within their zone, they therefore construct relationalities that can be spoken between the intensities. It is the first time in the utter chaos of the pure continuum that we do in fact introduce disruptions, breaks, cuts, simply because of the harmonious tunes of the continuities with each other that were specifically present within a zone of intensities.

The synchronicity that constructs the harmony here, should not be mistaken as though we proposed a mechanistic manner through which intensities formulate relations with each other. Instead, it is a synchronicity that is constructed simply out of the fact that the raw intensities of a zone already provide the possibility for the existence of intensities which create these processual assemblages within the whole zone to create a multiplicity. This multiplicity is not like a mechanical combination of elements stuck together with glue but is rather more akin to being analogous to an organized song or tune that has emerged spontaneously from the seemingly “random” striking of the various notes that intensities perform. The harmonious flow of intensities within the zone with relationalities is a consequence of something which is like a becoming-musical which enables essences and senses to be formulated, articulated, activated. We should cease thinking mechanistically here and think musically, organically. There is no mechanism forcing intensities together to behave in specific ways but rather it is intensities which in their existence end up creating the very self-organizing relations between each other in the first place because they are drawn together through other intensities. They coordinate each other through the locatable points they are a constellation of which has at last created these definite disruptions, cuts, discontinuities in the continuous, a harmony from the chaos, since they were capable of manifesting points that chart upon a boundedness of “dimensionality.” It is as though the relationships between intensities were entirely contingent upon the condition that very specific intensities emerge within a very specific context which enables a “song” to be played in the first place. The same way in music, there is no reason that notes have to exist in the sequential order that they do, they simply do, which ends up creating these synchronicities that unroll a broader structure. Now, naturally there is a lot more to music than just a randomly-generated synchronicity, we use the example of music only to enable us to attempt to illustrate what is going on with zones adopting spontaneous orderings. The becoming-musical of simulations of experienced affects and intensities which express themselves in an uncontrollably non-relational yet utterly forceful moment of becóming is an existentially pertinent example, as it is as though the flow of the transition is its own order unto itself. In these simulations, the spontaneously emerging processual assemblaging of the intensities are revealed. To feel as though one is becoming-angel for instance, and then enacting the angelic voice, self-expression, and act, is precisely to engage in a becoming-musical of intensities that throw oneself into various flows that aren’t analogous to an angel, it is that they are angelic.

These harmonies are already both an essence and a sense. An essence, since they express the entire essentiality found within the multiplicities we are concerned with given by not what multiplicities “represent” but brutally, what they simply are. In a sense, simply in the same brutal tone, the pure relations that they have when the essence is coordinated with thought, is the expression of the experienced brutal multiplicity and the flow of its very implications such that the zonal possibilities are made manifest immediately. We see not in the order of synchronicity a lack of sense but rather a bludgeoning, overflowing hyper-sense. We do not lack sense so much as there is too much sense embedded within the overflowing intensities which cause any sensible organization of these intensities to be for all practical terms, impossible. Hence there are bare relationalities all chaotically interacting with each other so as to create these aggressively rhizomatic-like connections between intensities in ways that are utterly disorganized itself, such as to often become expressent in a seemingly cacophonic manner. That new essences and new senses emerge so forcefully in the synchronous order of things is to effectively live the subjective chaos of liquid subjectivity itself, a subjectivity closest to the chaos of the absolute infinite. It is insofar as it is a subjectivity that is as though it were simply a manifestly constructed zone or finitude that discontinues the permeating continuousness of the absolute infinite and exists only in its raw self-assertive powers as a multiplicity that is a fragmentation of the universally unifying essence of the absolutely infinite. Though it is in that organic cacophonic series of orderings that we still find a multiplicity of logics, albeit at times heavily discordant, which can yet afford us a more controlled and stable multiplicity of logics ultimately. Our project shall be to find the harmonies seemingly amongst the appearance of what may at first glance be hopelessly unreasoning flows of chaos. We therefore shall investigate harmonies, by investigating specific types of harmonies whilst avoiding taking these harmonies to be descriptive of the harmonies that all intensities will therefore necessarily adopt. As the becóming intense is a disruption of absolute nothingness and the emptiness of pure zonality, harmony is the disruption of the utter chaos of the becóming intense.

We trust ourselves then, to the harmonies formed through our experienced, lived intensities and thoughts, orienting our philosophy specifically to explore the implications of these self-ordered multiplicities which combine a multitude of singularities together into something which can resemble a listenable, discernible music that we can listen to. As we listen to these harmonies, we pick up on essences or the metaphysical nature of the multiplicities we are confronted with, whilst at the same time we pick up on the senses or the way these multiplicities through the essence we identify of them expresses itself through its self-organizing powers as the experienceable harmonies we feel. The processual assemblages that is. For example, we deciphered the essence behind the being/nothing concepts in Hegelian metaphysics which enabled us to understand on a deeper level the sense or processual assembling that the concepts underwent with each other. The essence is the genetic conditions of sense, the sense, the implications through the intensities that are of such self-determining genesis. The essence/sense division we have here is analogous to a virtual/actual division, in that the actual would be the manifested sense of the intensities and the virtual would be the zones that those intensities are embedded upon.

IV: Harmony And Multiplicity

Multiplicity is something which is simply something which contains a continuity which emerges due to the way that intensities have “enfolded” each other because they have put themselves in relation to each other. These harmonies have emerged because of the way that intensities have organically entered into synchronicities with each other due to forming relationality that becomes inherent within the zone because it is always of both a particular and unique phase state in accordance with the particular intensities that the zone contains. Hence the intensities have relations in between each other, yet they do not themselves exhibit any relationality with each other, since there is not an atom of relationality within the intensities themselves. It is specifically in every multiplicity that relations only exist in between the intensities due to the harmonies that the intensities form in their becoming-musical that we must recognise, relations are external to intensities and are not internal within intensities. Multiplicities as continuities of related intensities, are not necessarily differential multiplicities containing ontology, a multiplicity of difference within the same zone. Difference is already a particular relational term, since difference in itself is the utterly unequal in itself such that the ontology is self-distinguishing from all other ontologies which may exist. In comparison, multiplicities of intensities in themselves are multiplicities simply of ontologies which is a complete non-compositionality of pure continuums of degrees. Difference discretizes the singularities of degrees found in intensity as extracting from every singularity of degree, its own discrete determination as such as being entirely discontinued from all other determinations contained in the absolute continua.

To understand therefore, intensities through the lenses of continuous multiplicities which are enfoldments of intensity, we can neither approach this through difference and certainly not through identity. To understand these multiplicities, we are forced to reflect upon the complex web of elements it contains whilst at the same time we have to actually identify where particular multiplicities exist, where we can uncover harmonies that can be reflected on. We do not go simply from the solely empirical, that is to solely focus on the plain multiplicity of experiences we have in front of us, we have to identify how experiences we have construct harmonizations which enable us to speak about relations in the first place, which also includes difference in itself. In other words, what we need in our deliberation are intuitions. Intuitions here being the furnishing of workable multiplicities with types of relationalities within them such that it determines the very fields of the thinkable that we encounter. The thinkable being that which can go beyond the passive experiencing of intensities and into the capacity to actively transform one’s own experiences through the sense that one obtains through experience, as it is through how one actively relates to the transformations of what is experienced which actualizes the zonal possibilities that sense reveals to us through the relations that is held in the zones. Therefore, intuition provides us with a zone of relation towards the experiences that are being had such that active transformation can be activated, rendering it thinkable as thought, taken in the broadest possible understanding of what it means to think, captures various zonal possibilities and traces means towards self-activating transformations. Such as in the simulations in the synchronous order for instance, that each change in what is experienced changes the nature of what can be expressed, therefore the newly expressed is a reflection of radically new thinkables that would remain unthought otherwise. The fields of the thinkable are therefore what we shall call operations which intuitions determine, as operations also, as they are perpetually always transformable to new phase states, are therefore inherently always transforming. Therefore, operations provide the harmonistic multiplicities which enable the operatabilities that can be undergone and can be expressed within one’s internal conception of the experience. These operations are not mechanistic because they do not drive toward hard deterministic endpoints with predefined goals but rather are potentials which capture the essence of the states of possibility of the encountered zones. Operatibility is action potential in itself, completely opened up through intuition which captures action potential through the relationalities between intensities that we take as actuals.

There are therefore, on the one hand, actual multiplicities, which contain the potential source for operations or potential multiplicities through intuitions which furnish ever-evolving, dynamic fields of the thinkable or possible evolutions of the zones of intensity. First and foremost, thought as ideas is not something estranged from experience, thought as ideas embodies the action potentials of experience within the otherwise passive act of experience of the passively felt. As action potentials, they are grounded upon the actionable powers that intensities imply through themselves. Hence to obtain new intuitions which allows us to produce new operations which enables us to develop in both thought and action, we need to undergo a constant engagement with the world around us. For it is only in an active engagement with the world around us, a breaking down of our alienation, estrangement, isolation, disconnection from the world that we can develop truly solid intuitions. This means that nothing of our intuitions is sacred but must be perpetually challenged and met against other forces that create new powers of intuition within us through our willingness to connect with and encounter the world around us. We go entirely against dissociated Platonic philosopher who crushes all feeling and intensity within themself to obtain a false image of harmony as a hopelessly hyper-rational, hyper-detached orientation towards the world such that the focus is only upon the grander, higher forms supposedly above all encounterable reality. In the false image of harmony, we effectively attempt to completely dissociate away from all affect, intensity, and action altogether by allowing ourselves to become increasingly removed from our actual experience and more focused towards our own fanciful thoughts instead. In the most extreme form, effectively sinking deeper into a logic which makes sense only within our own heads for thought does not have to cohere to any aspect of the real anymore as to numb intensity away, we have already thrown away the real altogether. True harmony is formed only through the willingness to connect with and engage in the intensity of reality.

Operations presents us with phase states that can lead us into different places when we see how the operatabilities continuously evolve through the metamorphosis of zones of intensity into new states. Since operations are opened through intuitions which are fueled by the complete uniqueness of the intensities being engaged with that formulated the intuitions, then it is impossible for us to fully capture the extent of the implications of operations on thought. Intuitions relate themselves to the unique ineffability of the intensities presented, ineffable exactly because they are non-relational. Blue cannot be expressed in words because it cannot be explained in words for instance, it can only be experienced as an intensity in itself. Hence, operations are the ineffable potentialities contained within the ineffable actualities, such that in a most Bergson move, operations refers to senses which cannot be captured in language or any analysis in fullness. Rather, operations in themselves can only be performances within the world which can never be captured back into language or analysis, they are asignifying. For instance, in any of our actions that we really succeed in performing, such as in motion, drawings, and so on, we could never teach one of these operable skills simply by describing the skill in enough detail. These operations can only find their development and evolution through the act of making performances within the realms of the thinkable that intuition has opened up for us. Therefore, operations are undetermined fields of creativity which means that the creations we make through these operations are reflective only of the actualization of the possibilities that the operations have introduced rather than a philosophical completion of all possible implications or extents that the operations can introduce. To engage in philosophical analysis of operations is therefore to create particular actualizations of something that can inherently never be captured in itself. The contents of intuitions are inherently unanalyzable as the unique intensities in themselves, as we cannot give any analysis of blueness or redness or loudness, they are realities simply to be experienced. This does not prevent us from however, analyzing those experiences in an external manner, that is from the perspective of contents that are outside the actual experiences themselves, such as for instance, analyzing the different wavelengths of light that we are processing in our minds which create for us the particular experience of so and so color. Rather, it is important to note because philosophy cannot uselessly flail around attempting to eff the ineffability of the uniqueness of intensities. Rather, philosophy becomes productive when we make analyzes of operations, as we are making actualizable performances through the operations that generate analyzes which will already be immediately in motion and action. Hence we shall proceed with a discussion of operation.

Through our discussion, we seek to discover specifically how we construct zones of analysis, hence we move from zones of intensity to spheres of expression, which move from the raw operations, towards discovering a sphere of defined relations that express.

V: Operations and Spheres Of Expression

We construct spheres of expression through operations by creating these ordered zones of the virtual which establish defined relations that are capable of “expressing.” We take multiplicities which are already enfolded intensities together, in the next step we move towards a reversal of the enfoldment of singularities such that we are plotting new singularities through unfolding these singularities by realizing zonal possibilities. Through this unfoldment, there is a use of operation involved whereby the particular inherent relations in between the intensities within a zone move towards the actualization of specific analytical zones which capture a particular manner of unfolding the multiplicity as we move into the establishment of new zones of intensity. This actualization is developed through asignifying performances which enables a metastable capturing of specific intensities through making a relation from one zone of intensity to another zone of intensity. These distinct zones become distinguished from one another due to their relationality not in terms of temporality, since at this stage there is no sense of time that we are working with necessarily but merely different zones that are not necessarily separated in time. They are not distinguished spatially either. Rather, the metastability exists because cybernetically there becomes identified constraints upon possibility which ensures that so long as particular zones of intensity are related in a specific manner such that a specific performance as such leads us one to another. Through this we realize a form of possibility which becomes more well determined due to possibility becoming defined by the very constraints of possibility, which construct these boundaries or limitations upon possibility such that there is no longer an absolutely continuous flow of the possibilities inherent within intensities. This continuous flow is precisely why operations are ineffable because effability requires that there are implicit limitations upon the possible, there is a range of what it means for a particular set of possibilities to be that set of possibilities, which must be defined analytically. Similarly, we can recognize that intuitions grasp contents within our experience that are of self-complete continua, continua that can never be fully captured by anything outside of the lived experience themselves. To capture it is to construct tangential contours surrounding the experience, which escapes the self-complete continua and outlines something that has a boundedness to it, a limited reflection of the continua through expressing a discontinued, tangential feature of the intensity experienced. Hence the analytical zone is a zone of well determined sets of possibility that are determined through their very own constraints which provides the determinable range of new intensities that can be unfolded from a given multiplicity of intensities.

These analytical zones are virtualities, virtualities can be considered on the one hand, constrained means of unfolding for a multiplicity which is determined through the constraints provided by specific forms of possible evolution that zones of intensity have. Virtuality is therefore not brute potential nor action potential but potential which has been given a form, a form which can be either in the passive sense of describing the metaphysical essence of unfoldment or in an active sense, the sense of an unfoldment. As the sense of unfoldment, virtualities are ideas. As ideas relate to well determined sets of possibility, hence, sets of possibilities for how zones of intensity can metamorphose into other zones of intensity, ideas must contain in themselves the entire range of possible relations that can be developed through intensities in themselves. Ideas are the essence of spheres of expression because they are what is enunciated through the reversal of the enfoldment of intensities. They construct boundaries or limitations upon intensity such that intensity becomes discontinued by the extents outlined by ideas. Ideas contain relations which are constructed through the zones of intensity which enables these relations to emerge, which means ideas themselves must contain intensities which implicate the entire range of possible relations that ideas make well determined. Ideas construct spheres of expression, spheres which engage in possibilities of enunciation which produce new instances of the idea which exists. Each new instantiation of an idea, instantiates new possibilities, including possibilities for intuition. In this way, ideas are an utterly creative force, the manner of development that ideas will participate in are entirely unpredictable and trace only seemingly, concretely predetermined sets of pathways towards particular instantiations in hindsight. In working within different spheres of expression therefore, our focus should be upon the premises that are being constructed which enables one to engage in a meaningful analysis in the first place. Furthermore, since all premises which exist have these identified genetic conditions to emerge in the first place, no premise can be taken as de facto articles of thought but must be conceived as revealing particular ideas that thought has been capable of deriving from the zones of intensity it is embedded within.

The forced comparison of disagreeing premises with each other is a mistaken comparison because premises can only reveal the habitual sense produced through ideas, which define only a specific performance that makes sense within the specified context of those ideas. Rather, when confronted with disagreeing premises, the correct move is showing how the implications of a premise must lead into problematic instances which are too self-destructive for our premises. Either this, or we must admit altogether that the premises are related entirely to their well determined analytical zone of study and should not be drawn outside its own region of speciality onto other analytical zones which escape the original context of the premises. Against oppositions, we enable every set of premises their own independent existence to reveal the instantiations that they are capable of generating, thereby enabling us to develop philosophy without any care that the premises may or may not in themselves be well justified whatsoever. For what counts here is not the strength of the justification of premises necessarily but rather in the power of premises to produce spheres of expression that enables the most effective expression of different virtualities which helps inform our intuitions and operations. With such information, the aim is a pragmatic exploration of the different possibilities of operations. Hence, we shall look towards the enunciative power of a theory and what it is capable of instantiating, which means we wish to make use of theory as though it were a specialized apparatus which is designed to enable us to perform specific operations. For every sufficiently unique set of premises reveals new instruments, virtual productive powers which can perform something that we could never otherwise have conceived before. In short, ideas are a power, it is up to the philosopher to show us how to utilize it.

Pure intensity is of a pure continuum of degree without further compositionality. It must be of degree because it is a continuum that is fundamentally undividable rather than a divisible continuity, for divisibility indicates the possibility that we could introduce breaks or disruptions into pure intensity. One therefore would be otherwise capable of delineating between discrete sections of intensity that demarcate exactly so and so boundary, which we are capable of doing only for homogeneous continuities that admit of no heterogeneity within each of its elemental points it contains. For instance, the real numbers are homogeneous and divisible, the nature of the real number is maintained no matter how we choose to divide up the real number line, furthermore, we can present different conditions of boundedness upon the number line. With pure intensity, there is no such divisibility, it is an indivisible continuum of distinct degrees, that is, of points which are all their own singularities. Hence, pure intensity as pure continuum of degree is an infinitely continuing force which cannot be stopped or broken through any possible determination. Therefore, it is impossible to express the nature of pure intensity through the use of analogies that correlate directly with pure intensity. We can only mentally approach pure intensity through our different conceptualizations of intensity, such as the homogeneous intensity of sensations adopting distinct degrees of moreso or less so. This incapacity to reason by analogy of any kind is a consequence of the fact pure intensity is intensity which has been conceived entirely independently of representation and hence it bears no resemblance. It can neither be reasoned about by discussing the difference that pure intensity constructs, for pure intensity to be differential, it would imply that pure intensity itself is a singularity that can be put into relation with other singularities. Yet it cannot, since pure intensity is the purest form of what is inherently non-relational. When we speak of determinations, we are therefore speaking of determinations that are of this or that, they are simply taken to mean an intensity which has become captured through a confinement of new definiteness, a definiteness that invites a discontinuity or stoppage. Furthermore, pure intensity is something which is an expression of utterly unrestricted manifestability, anything which has a manifestation of some kind is hence an intensity.

Let us consider, though, nothingness. Nothingness means there is no ontology whatsoever, there is a complete absence of any determinateness whatsoever and hence there is an utter absence of any relationality that could possibly exist. Hence nothing is an entirely non-relational absence that cannot admit any degree of intensity whatsoever. However, this means that nothing occurs when the degree of intensity has approached absolute zero. The existence of this true zero of intensity therefore itself is already a positive expression of intensity, as it represents a presence of zones of zero intensity. Within these zones of zero intensity, there is therefore no possible constraints that exist and no possible internal mechanisms or entities within the nothingness which provides nothingness with any specific nature, it is specifically the absence of all nature in essence. Therefore nothingness reflects both an infinitely indeterminate state in its own non-determination, which is not to say that it is negatively simply in contrast to being as though there is a dichotomous opposition of nothing and being to be made here. Being is also infinitely undetermined such that being is never further determined from itself and hence nothing can be intuited or structured about being. The dichotomy between being and nothing is merely a binaristically dialectical one, something which puts into contrast the non-existence of an intensity with the existence of intensity in such a way that it is as though nothing and being reveal themselves to be equivalent yet separated. However, simply because of the equivalent non-relationality that both nothing and being share, it does not provide us automatically with the logical development that we must adopt a resolution to the paraconsistency revealed in the equivalence yet non-equivalence of being and nothing. This paraconsistency exists only in a purely conceptual manner. It says very little how the concepts are actually connected with the nature of thought or consciousness and therefore it does not enable us to say anything more than we have outlined here. Though thought is already connected and oriented towards the self-related consciousness that it is a part of, merely holding the concept of nothing and being does not inform us as to the real intensities that are at play here. That is, there are deeper realities within the logical categories which behave as the genetic preconditions for the dialectical binary to emerge, there are conditions behind the representations we are analyzing and the consequences of those representational pictures. We therefore will have much to say about the nature of intensity in relation to nothingness and being. This will have consequences upon how we would evaluate Hegel’s philosophy and methods in his “Science of Logic.”

Nothingness is intensity without determination. Nothing as a concept therefore exists in a disruptive relation to thought, as nothing exists as something which must be logically outside all thought, yet when manifest in thought is expressed as a completely unrecognizable difference, an intensity which adopts no representation. Nothing is in our thought, therefore a pure degree of thought which does not have any speed, it exists as this degreeness of a comprehension which is entirely static and does not relate itself towards anything else. As a degree without relation or motion, it can be put binaristically in contrast with being, as being is also of degree without relation or motion. Yet the important differential here, is that being is of the degree which has adopted representation, being is the presence of representation where nothing in our thinking of nothing would be the completely unrecognizable absence of representation. Hence nothing is dual-sided. On the side of noumena, nothing is an intensity without determination whatsoever, a zone of zero intensity which cannot be phenomenally manifested in our experiences and is something which is understood to be entirely outside ourselves or anything that can exist. It makes itself therefore, the characteristic mark of the noumenal itself, for the noumenal cannot be made manifest through any intensity whatsoever, it is then simply the delineation between what is real yet unthinkable and what is real and thinkable. Nothing is also what is found from a very close introspection into our own self, which does not exist with any representationality but is instead an entirely unrecognizable difference which is always defined in terms of the differenciating elements contained in experience and never defined in-itself. Hence, the self is an intensity which is merely felt and not captured. As nothing is intensity without determination as zones of zero intensity, it is therefore in fact, an affirmative, positive force, rather than simply a negative canceling it may initially be taken to be.

Nothing as a positively existing force, is also of a force of degree zero. It is therefore something which cannot be the causal power behind any effects, nor can it be an influencing factor that leans towards one state or another. It’s rather like a phase state which is the phase state at absolute zero, an ontological vacuum which ensures that there is a complete indetermination of any causality or probabilistic mechanics. Nor can we say that there is anything which conducts random generation. However, as it is a zone of zero intensity, it is therefore a “located” singularity, the zone could alternatively be zones of new intensities with their own unique degrees. Due to this alternativity here, though the actual zone is of degree zero, the possible zones would be every possible zone outside of degree zero. We can say that nothing ensures that anything else, hence everything else, would serve as new zones which exist counterfactually compared to nothingness. Nothing therefore, as in-itself entirely non-relational, does nothing to negate the counterfactuals either because nothing is non-declarative, it is simply in its absolute essence something which is the empty zone existent within every possible zone of intensity. It is therefore the place for all determinations of intensities, as though nothing is like an empty zone, it is yet at the same time the placeless place which we can extract pure zonality through. Nothing therefore in the continuum of pure intensity, represents the singularized center of all intensity which binds together intensity through pure zonality which describes intensities as being plotted upon nothing else other than themselves and therefore, plotted upon true nothingness in the first place. There is therefore genetically, no intensity which is a prerequisite before the existence of an intensity and therefore the genetic condition behind all intensities is simply that they are their own self-determining forces, forces which exist in a complete disruption of any absolute stability of ontological zones. We therefore determine through nothing the transcendental ground of pure zonality which is a zonality that is acknowledged through a kind of mysticism of nothingness. The point of such mysticism of nothingness is not concerned with analysis, it’s not logic, rather it is confirmed with the affirmative power of simply being capable of mystically connecting with and transforming through the power of the non-intensity of pure zonality.

As we travel across pure zonality, we are hence met with a singularization of the infinitely sprawling planes of zonality of intensity, such that the zonality becomes entirely wrapped into a kind of primordial all, an all which takes the infinite potential of pure intensity and expresses that potentiality into its form as an actuality. As this zonality contains everything, everything that is taken altogether that is contained is of the order of the absolute infinite or true infinite. George Cantor spoke of the absolute infinite as the most supreme maximum for which there can be no increase whatsoever. Since it contains all possible properties, it therefore cannot be understood to have any particular property and therefore is ineffable. As Cantor says, “the absolute can only be acknowledged and admitted, never known, not even approximately.” In our conception of absolute infinity, it is something which is of all intensities which may be when we land on any particular zone that we can think of. In itself it is entirely inconceivable and only relates to everything else in the sense that any property within the infinite is held by some intensity. The absolute infinite is simply the emergent consequence of the transcendental ground that we stand upon with pure zonality, which is centered around the singularity of the zone of completely zero intensity. This relationship between nothing and the absolute infinite does not say that nothing somehow self-annihilates such that it annihilates itself so absolutely as to become the absolute infinite. Nothingness always exists as a permanently existing positive force of zero intensity, a zonality in the continuum of pure intensity that can never cancel itself out because it is always existent as a possible zone, regardless of any actual zone one finds themselves in. Furthermore, the absolute infinite relates to any particular thing with zero intensity, since if there were any degreeness of intensity that something was being moved via the absolute infinite, it would simply generate a motion that is absolutely infinite. That would be to simply absolutely negate the particular and submerge it entirely within the absolute infinite itself again. Yet this zero intensity that the absolute infinite interacts with anything else is a zero intensity born as though akin to a mathematical limit that is removed from its virtuality because of it being a logically necessary actuality. That is, as we approach the absolute infinite, the intensities of the interactions between those intensities must increasingly approach zero such that the original intensities being interacted via other intensities are not annihilated or transformed into those other intensities through submergence. Once we reach the absolute infinite through the approaching limit, we get a true zero intensity of interaction. It is because of that zero intensity of interaction that makes the absolute infinite utterly ineffable, unthinkable, inconceivable, no matter the subjectivity we deal in. For to eff the absolute infinite would be to already be the absolute infinite, hence to become uncontrollably submerged within the absolute infinite.

We can understand that the philosophy of intensity therefore becomes a deeply mystical philosophy, a philosophy that is dealing with absolute nothingness and absolute infinity as different forms that intensity can express itself as within the pure zonal continuums that the intensities reside within. What we then end up showing is simply that there is indeed a noumenal realm, an in-itself, which exists outside the boundaries of the phenomenal. This is because intensity in-itself is the noumenal in-itself as we have explicated that intensity in-itself is furnished with a pure zonality which is of the emptiness which all intensities are manifest through. We therefore see that the transcendental ground is at once the immanent ungroundedness of every intensity which exists. The intensities exist because they are their own genesis, which requires no other explanation through any other genesis, it is as though they were brute facts. We render, however, any philosophy of true intensity utterly inert by thereby taking such an excuse to assert that therefore, there is no more philosophizing to be performed. All that we have pointed out is that any philosophy of intensity is always a philosophy that must work within and through intensities, of particulars and exploring the depths of singularities. Yet there is an absolute infinity of different intensities, particulars, depths to be explored, there are therefore an infinity of subject matters to discuss, constructions and creations we may make. It is impossible, therefore, to formulate a theory which purports to take into account everything such that there is a universal guidebook of principles which express the exact principles that we use to understand the natures of intensities all across the board. The philosophy of intensity therefore begins its analysis of particular intensities by simply acknowledging that the intensities that it begins with are already acceptable as the givens, that it is already apparent that we are engaging in an exploration of particular zones we had conceived of. In the exploration of these particular zones, we transfer our thinking from any sense of beingness whatsoever into an eternal middle-ness with no start or end, for we entirely overturn any element of beingness or nothingness contained in the pure becoming of particular intensities under investigation. For every degreeness it is of its own becoming, for it can never exist as a static being because it is upheld by a forever forceful nothingness which is ever dynamic, an intensity without determination. The being of intensity simply does not ever attain. Intensity is forever a self-determining and perpetually self-asserting becoming which is of its own character altogether and cannot be replicated by the mark of any other intensity. This becoming, we deem instead becóming, for it refers to something about intensity uncaptured by the dichotomy of being/nothing.

Being is only the condition of negating the dynamic nothingness and is therefore synonymous only with an entirely indeterminate univocity which is of the bare presence of intensity rather than the bare absence, it is henceforth a univocity without extension. The static reality of being is entirely undermined however, by being disrupted utterly by the positive intensity of nothingness. In this way, on a conceptual level, we have witnessed the real genetic conditions for the Hegelian dialectic to emerge. Nothing as intensity without determination, being as an entirely undefined intensity, both in their extensive meanings refers to absolutely no contents. Rather, it is a raw dichotomous delineation between raw presence and raw absence taken in their contrast. The dialectic strips the lived intensity from both concepts such that we are left only with the extensive emptiness of both concepts and with the basic self-inherent difference of those concepts. Hence the Hegelian nothingness is not the absolute nothing, the Hegelian being is only an affirmation which is already the negation of the absolute nothing as complete silence. Nothing as the negation of being is only a negation of the negation and was never the negation of an affirmation simply. Becoming which sublates nothing and being due to their identity as having no extension yet their difference as inherent within the meaning of the concepts themselves, such that nothing passes over into being and being passes back over into nothing, is not becóming. Becoming is a dialectical category that emerges when we cancel out all the actual intensity of the intensive concepts and leave only the bare-bones structural aspects that the intensity naturally induces, such as the structural aspects of identity and difference. Hence becoming expresses only a structurality of representation, the logic of representation we obtain once we strip all lived, non-representational intensity from the concepts that intensity can prop up. In ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be, we have logical relations which can be ascribed only on well-specified types of intensities, yet cannot fit intensity universally. Hence intensity is something which always escapes the limited structures of any particular logic or philosophy, it will always create an overflowing remainder which can never be captured since there must be intensities that create the sphere of residues. Becóming does not reside in structuralities that intensity may bear, it resides only to state that intensity is a self-determining force that is responsible for its own genesis, emergent through a dynamic nothingness which upholds it through its zero force. That it can be withheld at any moment just as inexplicably as it emerged is an always present reality of becóming and thus in becóming the intensity must perpetually assert itself.

Intensity as the lived force of experience is something which is first introduced as a postulate of experience in the work of David Hume in his, “Treatise of Human Nature.” The postulate of intensity that Hume introduces is that there are two different types of experiences which are underlined by a difference in intensity. For impressions are those which strike the soul with much force and vivacity, hence they are experiences of high intensity. Hume cites two types of impressions in his proposal. There are firstly, sensations, secondly, emotions. Ideas are, according to Hume's view, simply those faint images which are left in the aftermath of the experienced intensities, they are simply an experience of low intensity. Hume therefore formulates two postulates of intensity. That experiences admit of differences in degrees of intensity and that all experiences admit of an intensity. Hume does not proceed to spend much time attempting to further explain and give examples, taking it upon our sense that we would be capable of comprehending the meaning of the two postulates from a simple, immediate inspection. However, the complexity of the postulates of intensity begins to unravel themselves when we really do begin to inspect much more closely as to the meaning behind various experiences becoming more or less intense. Let us consider more closely the implications of the two postulates of intensity as applied to our lived experience of intensity, the postulates then, of magnitude and of the universality of intensity as applied to experience.

When we consider the numerous sensations in our experiences, we find that each particular degree of a sensation is firstly, fundamentally distinct from another sensation which is in appearance of lesser degree to the first sensation. For instance, when we hear sounds, sounds may either be louder or quieter. It is plain to see that the louder sounds do in fact strike the soul with a greater force than the lesser sounds, louder sounds are of a higher degree than the lesser sounds. Yet at the same time, the loud sound is of an entirely distinct sensation than the quiet sound. There is no means of dividing the loudness of the sound that we have experienced into lesser degrees without thereby changing the quality of the sound experienced. Another example we may give is temperature. We may experience a temperature as either being scorching hot or very cold. We cannot divide the degree of the temperature without transforming the real experience we have of the temperature, for two temperatures that are equal to half the degree of the hot temperature may be experienced as simply a pleasant warmness. We can push the envelope of this line of thinking further. If each sensation which adopts different degrees creates profoundly different realities, then perhaps the postulate of intensity as magnitude is an illusion. This is the route that the philosopher Bergson participates in within the work “Time and Free Will” where he will proceed to argue exactly against the psychophysical conception of different sensations adopting truly different extents of intensity. It is precisely because sensations do not adopt any homogeneous type of experience but rather are differentiated into a multiplicity of heterogeneous terms which cannot be broken down into simple, extensive magnitude, that one must argue that instead, our sensations are qualitative multiplicities. That is, of heterogeneous continuities. We must consider the seeming increase in the intensity of a sensation only in terms of an increase in the range of sensations that are being changed within the particular experience. For instance, in anger we will experience a range of sensations that may include the clenching of jaws, muscle tension, hot headedness, agitation, our thoughts may perhaps be vengeful and violent. Another instance, when we perceive colors, though we may perceive that a vivid white light from a candle is growing dimmer, we are still equally aware that it is growing dimmer as we were aware of the vivid whiteness of the candle. Bergson’s point here is that each sensation we experience impresses an equal reality upon us in our mind, such that greater and lesser degree makes sense only because the extent of the sensations we are experiencing are potentially increasing or decreasing.

Through Bergson, we have proposed a challenge in the postulate of intensity that Hume opens his comprehension of the human mind with. For intensity cannot be then of greater or lesser degrees, it is simply a leftover confused term that we have because of the way we experience different sensations each succeeding each other as though they had an order. Rather, instead of conceiving of our experiences as universally containing a continuous range of impactfulness or force upon us, as would be to commit us to a homogeneous extensive magnitude, we ought instead to see that our experiences universally are instead of a continuous heterogeneity. Hence there are two contending theories of intensities that pit Hume’s comprehension and Bergson’s comprehension against each other. Either intensity is a continuous homogeneity or continuous heterogeneity. Though Bergson had desired to overcome the common sense which had suggested that experiences all had the mark of degree or magnification, there is no less a force of habit being applied when he suggests that experiences are qualitative multiplicities. Both perspectives are guilty, ultimately, of applying a habitual sense to the problem of intensity. Bergson may have overcome the common sense of the understanding of his time but he had not overcome habitual sense as there appears just another intuitive appeal to determine our experiences as qualitative multiplicities just as there is intuitive appeal in determining our experiences as admitting of different, extensive degrees of intensity. Though there is nothing incorrect with the art of intuitive appeal. It complicates matters when there are several disagreeing angles of intuitive appeal. Hence habitual sense which tends towards adopting a plurality of distinct positions based upon an intuition of distinct premises, will construct entirely distinct theories of the problem under investigation with there being no pathway to agreement. A level of intuitive appeal, however, is absolutely necessary to start with. Yet within the forces of intuitive appeal, we are always in danger of becoming most unphilosophical, to end up merely regurgitating habitual sense which we had never come back to challenge. Challenging habitual sense is what enables us to learn of the limitations of habitual sense, hence allowing us to break free from old cliches of our thinking. Now, it is that challenging of the habitual sense of the day that we must give compliments to Bergson in achieving.

It is undeniable in either conception of intensity of experiences however, that experiences with different intensities are themselves truly distinct experiences. Whether or not we should adopt intensity as a concept of a continuous homogeneity or continuous heterogeneity which speaks of the properties of our experiences, is now the problem we are confronted with. To embrace intensity as a continuous homogeneity means that we concede to Hume that there must be a different we can meaningfully make in our experiences between impressions and ideas, experiences of high versus low intensity. Whether or not impressions and ideas hold the relationships that Hume claims that they hold is a different matter altogether. Under this understanding of experience, it is then possible for ideas to become impressions simply by the intensification of our ideas, hence experiences exist upon a common plane of degree. On the other hand, in Bergson’s model, experiences exist simply as qualitative multiplicities which are entirely differential in kind, such that they generate the differential in degree. Hence the formulae of intensity in experience becomes entirely flipped upside-down in Bergson’s case in comparison to Hume, for Hume’s postulates suppose that differences in degree result in differences in kind. For impressions and ideas are two distinct kinds that experience resolves itself into. There is nothing in either philosophy that can move us towards one position or the other, except upon a discussion of empirical cases of our experience to enable us to justify our habitual sense. The trap that we can fall into here, is that due to the necessity of appealing to empirical cases, we entirely distort the very language we are using to make sense of and communicate the nature of the cases under study. Our observation language becomes as much a reflection of the habitual sense as it is attempts to justify the habitual sense. In the observation language that someone who agrees with Hume’s rendering of intensity may adopt, they will speak of the lower and higher intensities of different sensations, pointing out how the different sensations strike the soul with more or less force. Someone with more Bergsonian inclinations, will instead observe that there appears to be an increased multiplicity of psychic states correlated to the seemingly more intense sensation, such that a sensation, such as a loud noise, is composed of more sensations, feelings, thoughts. Yet this Bergsonian leaning still does not grapple with the original sense of intensity of the loud sound itself, nor the sense of intensity in the emotions, content instead to a direct appeal to the fact that the sensation or feeling induces a grand variety of experiences, with the presumption already held that this grand variety is correlated directly with the intensity.

These traps in our attempts to understand intensity demonstrate that ultimately, any discussion of the nature of intensity based upon appeals to experience must inevitably trap us in a circularity of habitual sense. It is not that we are begging the question here. For we are making a claim, with our premises being our capacity to understand the nature of experiences through inspection, that we are still defending within the framework of the premise. There are still arguments based on the empirical evidence. Yet the issue is that the empirical findings are altered through our observation language such that the meaning of those experiences were already presumed within the habitual sense that articulates in the observation language. We cannot presume there are experiences given to us in a simple purity for such purity becomes invariably undermined as reliable as the observation language has already primed us with expectations as to the nature of what we really are experiencing. The circularity stems from the fact that the meaning of the experiences observation language has for us and the conclusions of the nature of the experiences presume we have already adopted the same comprehension of meaning. As this circularity always holds for any understanding of what our experiences of intensity truly is, for intensity is already embedded within our experiences, we are forced to comprehend the true nature of intensity without being derived from particular manifestations of intensity.

Yet if we cannot comprehend intensity through its particular manifestations, then intensity can neither reveal itself as either a manifested homogeneity or heterogeneity. We must take intensity as though it were existent as its own concept, outside our experiences of intensity and itself holding its own metaphysics. We could behold intensity as though it were a universal commonality amongst all our experiences, in which case, we conceive intensity through the path of representation. Yet a representational theory of intensity falls apart because representation requires intensity to be formulated as a picture of a world which presumes the identity of intensity within the postulation. Yet intensity could never be representationally formulated because experiences neither reveal any identity of their own homogeneity or heterogeneity. Different intensities of a sensation such as loudness is of an apparent magnitude that never reveals itself through an identity of an extensity existent outside the sensations, as each different degree of loudness is inherently different itself amongst all other degrees of loudness. Similarly with our experience of temperature, of the degrees from cold to hot, which confess no resemblance amongst each other. For resemblance requires that there are means to translate one from the other. To form the picture of intensity would be to extract, somehow, a common nature of the different degrees in experience, which is fundamentally impossible because each distinct degree is a difference in kind as well. Intensity flies in the face of all representation, we can no more extract intensity as a picture that reveals resemblances as we can avoid habitual sense in investigating intensity through an extrapolation of empirical cases.

If we approach intensity through the lenses of difference, intensity becomes a differential continuity rather than a uniform continuity which is always instantiating a unique element at each point. Intensity therefore becomes a form which organizes difference. Hence intensity is expressly the very differential contained in the differences in themselves. This approach towards intensity appears much more fruitful and is the great progressive leap that Deleuze's metaphysics takes when comprehending the nature of intensity. Yet if intensity is the differential within difference, it is hence postulated as the form of the singularities of being. Intensity therefore becomes entirely tangential towards actual difference such that degree becomes only of the kind of difference and not of a difference as comprehended in a true continuum which embeds differences. Intensity adopts a differential multiplicity which simply adapts Bergson’s experiential qualitative multiplicity and translates it into purely metaphysical terms. As we admit not of qualities but only of intensities, we therefore have taken it that intensities are of purely differentials. When we represent intensity as a difference in degree of a quality, such as the loudness of a sound, we hence cancel out the differences of intensity as intensive quantity. Yet we should realize that by covering over intensity as an intensive quantity, we therefore form representations of the world through qualities because we can express the resemblances between those qualities. For instance, the perception of depth requires an intensive differentiation. It is only formulated because impressions further away are less intense than impressions closer, which hence one constructs an extensity of objects being either further away or closer. Note that we can approach an experience of depth in itself through vertigo. Vertigo is an experience of depth in itself because as the world continues to move, the depths shown are of continuously shifting intensities which cannot be meaningfully reduced to a quality or an extension of measurement. It is a distortion of the senses. The Deleuzian approach to intensity enables us to escape representation. However, as a differential continuity, intensity is already the tangents of the differences themselves and hence the virtual multiplicity of the gradients that differences can obtain. This tangential reasoning still does not allow us to approach intensity in itself. What we have is rather a virtualized conception of intensity that, though unreliant on deriving the meaning of intensity through particular manifestations of intensity by reflecting on empirical cases or making intensity a representational concept, still is subsumed by difference as the necessary means to uphold the concept. We can have experience of intensity itself in its pure, stripped form, yet this requires that intensity is utterly embodied within our experiences. Intensity is of forces and affects, it cannot be a tangential form then but must also be an immanent field of gradients one exists within. Intensity cannot simply be then, a differential continuity, for it to be a differential of difference is for it to be tangential to differences which are manifest with an intensity. Intensity must be pure continuity itself, it is of continual degreeness without further compositionality. Intensity, as forces and affects, are expressions of raw intensive magnitudes that are already different points within their own continuums as estranged from difference. There is no term for intensity to be differential, it is already an immanent continuum which is grounded as its own concept. A philosophy of sheer intensity would be an utterly mad confrontation with the truly infinite and unbounded, for pure continuity is continuous in essence and cannot be divided, broken up, discontinued.

At the very least, difference in itself has enabled a containment of the sheer power of intensity. For difference contains intensity by chaining it down into being expressive of mere tangential continuities of singularities which admit of no spatiotemporal coordinates themselves. These singularities enable the infinite chaos of intensity knocking at the door to be held down within particular conceptions we produce in philosophy to make something from the infinite chaos of endless indeterminability yet endless intensity. Deleuze sought a philosophy of creativity, yet he warned against becoming so deterritorialized in our thinking that we would be lost in a cacophony, a discordant and incoherent collapse which destroys the structures of thought proposed in on themselves. He was correct in one sense, there is a rightful and nagging apprehension towards chaos taken. Deleuze did not find himself tolerating chaos that much for chaos is at worst, horrifically violent and counterproductive. I however, have the opinion that chaos is capable of being fully utilized, that there is both an infinite potential and infinite power of actualization that pure intensity itself is capable of performing. It is something that I whole-heartedly believe, to the point that even in my encounters with experience becoming a vertigo of raw intensities as all collapses into a pure continuum, there was an immense effort to utilize the real powers of intensity. My philosophy will at last resolve the fundamental paradox I had expressed I was trapped in when I had a manic-psychotic break from reality at 18 years of age. That paradox of the all-consuming, uncontrolled energy or inertia of pure intensity as one falls into an encounter with the absolute, a total inability to obtain a mental homeostasis, yet the spirited will to pursue whatever pathway causes mania and psychosis to harmonically dance with material reality and the thoughtful materialisations of different problems, goals, and activities. See me in hell if I don't, I am a hellspawn from the deepest pits of the underworld that ought never to have been awakened. For my Anarchism becomes the realization of the complete sense of actualization and total liberation of the social and subjective that creates the spheres of self-controlled powers which turns any chaos into a harmony.

(Note: I appear to have accidentally deleted my post on the first chapter of schizomemetics whilst removing my other posts on schizomemetics since I felt it was fairly bad metaphysics. Don't worry, there hasn't been anything lost as I've an essay on intensity to upload too!)

Memetics originated from a literalistic interpretation of Richard Dawkins original metaphorical discussions on memes, being analogous with genes, in his book a Selfish Gene (1976). The interpretation was expressed in the collection, The Mind’s I (1981), written by Douglas Hofstader and his philosopher friend Daniel Dennett. Memes are taken to be self-replicating ideas, such that memes contain elements that express the genes of these self-replicating ideas. Ideas replicate by making use of replicator-machines that make copies of the ideas, though ideas are understood to have very high variance and mutability, such that mutations in ideas occur rapidly. Furthermore, ideas evolve in the virtual soup due to their competition with other ideas such that eventually some ideas take dominance over others, old ideas become extinct and new ideas take the spotlight, in a mental ecological system that looks much like the Dawkins natural selection theory. At least, that is the evolutionary culture paradigm of memetics, which attempts to take the framework of biological evolution as the means to understand the nature of cultural information transfer. In this essay, we will be arguing against the evolutionary paradigm of memetics and argue in place of a new paradigm. This new paradigm will take the concept of self-replication and challenge our understanding of what it means to instantiate new instances of something repeatedly. We shall argue that every instantiation of an idea must substantiate a unique transformation of the localized systemic network of ideas that exists within environments of the mental ecology such that the instantiation causes the idea to take on radically new forms and functions. Ideas when instantiated in new ecological spaces generate different differenciabilities as the information contents of the idea undergoes changes and hence the idea has distinct differences that make new differences. This enables ideas to differenciate between elements that would never have been differenciated before to reveal the differentiations underneath the appearance of homogeneity. For such a task, we shall proceed now.

Firstly, when we think about ideas, we are thinking about inherently abstract objects. In the same way, if we talked about mathematics, we would understand that they are also abstract objects. Therefore, though we could correlate mathematics with specific neuronal patterns, it would not enable us to explain mathematics because we wouldn’t look at mathematics by looking at the neurophysiological states of all parties involved in doing the mathematics. It is looking at mathematics in the wrong light because the complex activity of mathematics will be greater than the components that constructed the physical system that is enunciating the mathematics. We mention this because when we are discussing ideas as self-replicating machines, we are doing so under the pretext that ideas can be constructed out of genetic elements which can be replicated and mutated in the same way that physical objects can replicate and mutate. It makes no sense to explain mathematics or ideas in terms of neurophysiological states, thus it makes little sense to view ideas as if they were composed of physical genes that manifested a phenotype like a material object. Therefore, we must take it that ideas as self-replicating machines are replicating themselves, taken as they are, as we directly experience them from the first-person perspective, such that these ideas are composed of different ideal elements. If this is the case, everytime we take a given idea, we have to argue that there is a way for that idea to take hold of a replication-machine such that the idea is so copied that it sufficiently manifests as the same unit in its new mental context, for memetics to hold.

This is deeply problematic. Ideas as a type of mental experience, when we consider how they replicate themselves, must either replicate themselves by instantiating themselves again within a subjective space, or they must be transmitted through an intersubjective space to transform a different subjectivity to hold that idea. Ideas are not objective, physical spaces, they do not have hard bodily structures which can simply be copied repeatedly by physical processes without any element of experience. Rather, an idea, as it is experienced, will be within the context of the entire range of experiences a subjectivity is having, such as other ideas, sensations, affects, which make up the entire mental ecology as a whole. If we wanted to explain anything about the replication-machine that ideas use, we would have to consider this replication-machine within the context of the same mental ecology that the idea belonged to, which itself would have to involve subjective elements in turn. This means though, that the replication-machine must be constructed of components taken from the mental ecology, which themselves would have to undergo replication for ideas to replicate themselves, and thus we get an unending digression of replication before the actual replication we are interested in begins. Genes do not have this problem because they are physical objects that already begin, as self-replicating molecules, their self-sufficient reason for replicating due to physical mechanisms we can point to. With ideas, this isn’t so, there are no primordial sets of ideas we can point to that are the self-sufficient reason for their own replication and self-complexification. This is especially because we never take it that there are primordial ideas to begin with, as it makes little sense to think about ideas this way. Yet clearly, ideas do in fact seem to repeat themselves, even if they cannot copy themselves the way genes do. What we should recognize is that rather, it is that every idea is its own self-sufficient reason for its own replication. It does not need its own replication-machine because it can already assemble itself with other machines in order to instantiate itself in new contexts. The machines that enable new instantiations of ideas, we shall call the enunciative machines.

This means that ideas cannot have genetic components to them because there are no genetic pathways and structures that made them in the first place. Ideas, being their own reason for their replication, aren’t undergoing replication by either communication of information units or imitation of information units. Communication presumes the pre-existence of other ideas that form enunciative machines for other ideas to be instantiated. Meanwhile, imitation works through the repeating of observed behaviors within one’s own subjective space, which requires a multiplicity of elements combined together to make some form of pattern, thus it cannot simply be copies of units of information. For instance, when I imitate a dance move, it is an entire activity that involves a multiplicity of elements, such as parts of my body, the specific nature of the motion I am attempting to perform, and the timing of the performance. Imitation would be intelligible only in terms of the multiplicity being imitated, my interpretation of the observations I am making which itself already requires mental contents, and the context that explains in what setting I engaged with the imitation. I may be imitating dance moves because I am at a rave and therefore dancing by jumping up and down alongside everyone else. Then, if ideas cannot be said to replicate through communication or imitation, how do ideas replicate themselves, if at all? Rather, we should see communication and imitation as particular functions that are engaged by enunciative machines that are capable of transferring ideas from one setting to another. Ideas need to assemble with these enunciative machines somehow such that they can instantiate themselves into new subjective spaces. These enunciative machines themselves require being complemented with information already pre-contained in the system of interest. That is, other ideas.

Therefore, ideas are also what helps determine enunciative machines by providing the constants for the functions of communication and imitation, such as the constants of communicated sets of visual symbols or controlled sets of sounds that make a word which denotes a particular idea and hence enunciates it. There must be information pre-existent that tells us how to interpret a particular sign, such as a word, and hence correlate that with the concept the word is denoting. Ideas are hence both components of enunciative machines and their own means of replication, meaning that it is in their nature to replicate themselves somehow by helping form these enunciative machines at once. When ideas are being replicated, they necessarily must already be undergoing a metamorphosis of form such that they no longer maintain the same substantiation that they originally transmitted themselves from. This metamorphosis of form means that ideas in action assemble themselves with other ideas in order to enable communication and imitation to be performed, they therefore create a transformation of the localized systemic network of ideas that forged the mental ecology. Therefore, ideas that are self-replicating are not replicating as copies of units but rather are territorializations of points that exist with the intensive aspects necessary to undergo a spontaneous assemblage that can create these enunciative machines to instantiate themselves in new spaces. The new incidence of an idea is therefore a transformation of components of a space such that the space becomes rearranged to formulate the particular substantiation of the idea. For instance, when I am programming a graph of a function in Python, there is a complex system of interaction between intersubjectivities at multiple layers.

Firstly, I have the idea of a function in my mind. I also have ideas about the machine I am interacting with, in this case the computer. I have a model in my head about the actions I have to take in order to input the information I want to input into the computer such that I can produce the correct information within the computer. I am informed about the information I put into the computer by the user interface of the Jupyter Notebook program I am coding inside. I also have ideas about the different possible things I can write into the notebook in order to code the function and then get the computer to show me a graph of that function. The concept I have cannot replicate itself without assembling spontaneously with my mental model of the actions I will take to communicate the information onto the computer, the computer itself must “interpret” the information in such a way as to record the communications I made to it in its own terms. Thus, though my communication is an enunciative machine, it must also result in signs that spur on a rearrangement in the information the computer contains, thus rearranging the binary 1’s and 0’s at the physical level of the computer. The idea takes on an entirely new form for the computer. In this form, it is possible for the computer to perform the raw mechanical calculations necessary to translate my idea into a visual representation of the function in my mind. Hence the idea has replicated itself by metamorphosing into having a radically new form. Its first form is an abstract image in my head of a function I wanted to represent, and for the computer, it is in the form of a visual representation of the mathematical function such that the function in all reality is given a physical substantiation due to the particular arrangement of colors on the screen. The idea has new functions. For me, the idea of a function, functions as an internal image of a concept I want to territorialize into reality, it differenciates itself from other functions due to my understanding of how the function I have in mind mathematically relates to other functions. For the computer, the idea functions as a set of instructions that are appropriately stored in the binary-code with a unique organization which enables that set of codes to be differenciated from other codes. This enables the computer to “read” those instructions and then perform the actions required to provide me with a visual representation of the function in Python. As I now have the idea translated in radically new form, its representation of a function on the computer, it enables me for the first time to see the function itself, allowing me to view new aspects about the function.

As we can see, ideas therefore must be a force unto themselves, capable of energizing movements in subjective space such that there can be such a spontaneous assembling of themselves to enable new territories to emerge, especially from the perspective of the mental ecology taken holistically. The capacity for ideas to generate motions must be in a multiplicitous sense, as how ideas are causing motions cannot be broken down into units of forces. Instead of as units of forces as though they were point-like substances that did not have any principles of organization, we realize that the differential rates of changes are inherently multidimensional. These multidimensional rates of changes must go beyond unit forces and recognize ideas as containing a multiplicity of vectors which must be contained within the tensorial form. This tensorial form must take on a metaphysical understanding that goes beyond ideas as unitary forces, and instead, ideas as fields that provide the mediums for unit forces and affects to emerge. That is to say that intensities, as forces and rates of change, are already organized within these fields that arrange these rates of change within a multidimensional “tensorial” format. Differentiations in forces and affects will cause differentiations in the nature of the subjectivity being dealt with because the tensorial field will be transformed, a change in the mental ecology. Due to the tensorial fields that different sets of ideas substantiate, they substantiate different sub-ecologies within the mental ecology which causes variable interactions of the mental ecology overall. We cannot take the mental ecology as an isolated subjectivity here but must see the subjectivity as part of broader systems due to the way a subjectivity further determines itself in the context of its interactions and relationships with other subjectivities and bodies. As we can see when we consider a field like memetics, we are dealing with deeply fuzzy boundaries between what constitutes the realm of ideas and what is outside the realm of ideas. This is because they are intensities without systemes which delineate between specific instances of intensities under an organizational scheme set over and above the point-like virtualities. A systeme necessarily covers the intensities being considered by creating these continuous forms which act to translate various point virtualities into a schema. For instance, if we take different temperatures as unique intensities, then a systeming extension would be to have temperatures as a measurement in different degrees, a continuous schema that conceptualizes points of temperatures embedded on a certain category of vector. In other words, extensions are like categories (types) that pick apart the tensorial field.

With this understanding, we have the appropriate metaphysical basis to properly investigate ideas as self-propagating entities. We can see that by their nature, ideas instantiate themselves in new contexts in a transformative sense, they propagate by generating particular types of variations. Ideas can never be said to evolve. Rather we say that ideas determine, diffuse, and transmute. They are already the genesis of new ideas. We have thus paved away for a new paradigm for memetics that will enable us a much stronger framework for studying self-propagating ideas. In schizomemetics, we will study systems of self-propagating ideas through combining theoretical instruments developed from a diverse array of fields. Schizomemetics itself is not semiotics, since it concerns itself with everything to do with self-propagating ideas, hence it concerns itself also with how ideas assemble themselves into these machines that enable modes of propagation, as well as looking at different mediums of propagation. It also concerns itself with the ideas themselves, not the signs that designate those ideas. Due to the metaphysical component of schizomemetics that we discussed thus far, the nature of the self-propagation of ideas must understand the nature of the tensorial fields that ideas organize themselves under.

SOURCES

References

Memetics Articles

1. The misunderstanding of memes: Biography of an unscientific object, 1976–1999 | Perspectives on Science | MIT Press
2. Memetics - Wikipedia
3. An Evolutionary View of Science: Imitation and Memetics - PhilSci-Archive
4. On Selfish Memes Culture as complex adaptive system: HOKKY SITUNGKIR
5. Can We Measure Memes? - PMC
6. Memetics and neural models of conspiracy: PMC
7. Redalyc.Memetics: a dangerous idea
8. View of Internet memes as internet signs: A semiotic view of digital culture
9. Semiotics vs Memetics

Youtube Video Essays

1. YouTube, Jonas Čeika - CCK Philosophy: A Critique of Sam Harris' "The Moral Landscape"
2. Youtube, PunishedFelix: Did Richard Dawkins REALLY Disrobe Postmodernism?
3. Youtube, PunishedFelix: An Introduction to Using Guattari in the Philosophy Metagame

Books

1. Understanding Complex Systems: George E. Mobus and Michael C. Kalton
2. Cybernetic Ontology and Transjunctional Operations: Gotthard Gunther
3. Introduction to Cybernetics: W. Ross Ashby
4. Critique of Pure Reason: Immanuel Kant
5. A Thousand Plateaus: Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari
6. What Is Philosophy?: Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari
7. Helgoland: Carlos Rovelli
8. The Three Ecologies: Felix Guattari
9. Schizoanalytic Cartographies: Felix Guattari

Other Articles

1. Living the intensive order: Common sense and schizophrenia in Deleuze and Guattari - PMC
2. 1 DELEUZE'S TRANSCENDENTAL EMPIRICISM There are a number of ways one could enter into Deleuze's philosophical project. One could
3. Difference in itself | Larval Subjects
4. The Hallucinatory Walk Through Paris that Inspired Deleuze and Guattari | The New Yorker
5. Why three ecologies? « immanence
6. Plane of immanence - Wikipedia

Psychological Mania and Bipolar Disorder

1. ResearchGate; The passion of will in mania: Towards a philosophy of mental disorders
2. ResearchGate; Chronic Mania: Diagnostic Dilemma and the Need for Addition in Nosology
3. Maximus as a philosophical interpreter of Dionysius: the case of Christ as manic lover
4. Madness into Memory: Mania and Mnēmēin Greek Culture: Yulia Ustinova
5. HISTORY OF MENTAL CONCEPTS, On mania: BENJAMIN RUSH
6. Black Bile, Manic Depression and Melancholy: Two Pillars of Our Understanding: Jason Tipton
7. EDITORIAL - PMC
8. PhilPapers; Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences
9. Cognitive Benefits in Manic Depressive Illness: Magdalena Antrobus
10. Mental Illness, the Medical Model, and Psychiatry: Gerald L. Klerman
11. PhilPapers; Language, prejudice, and the aims of hermeneutic phenomenology: terminological reflections on “mania”: A.V. Fernandez
12. Phenomenological psychopathology and an embodied interpretation of manic bipolar experience: University of Copenhagen, Daniel Bird
13. On philosophy and schizophrenia: the case of thought insertion, byJasper Feyaerts & Wouter Kusters
14. Schizophrenia, Consciousness, and the Self by Louis A. Sass and Josef Parnas

Idk,worsening lives of people to bring one's goals is nasty af.

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From my viewpoint, Soulism is an incoherent ideology due to two contradictory sides. One side is filled with pretentious hippies, while the other side is an emo cult. The emo cult is the side that Nietzsche would call passive nihilism, which he defines as life-denying and looks away from this world for some utopia that cannot exist. They want to be obliterated. They're just as bad as Christians with their anti-environmentalism, devotion to a (literally for the Soulists) hivemind, and sense that everything is wrong. Christians believe in the fall of man, depressive Soulists believe that life is inherently suffering. The anti-environmentalism and sense of conquering is strong in both of them, despite saying the opposite of conquering. The hippie Soulism is just a bunch of incoherent nonsense, so it's mostly harmless, I think. It's antirealist, but that's okay, I guess. Some of the leaders are assholes. Do you guys think Soulism is valid, or should meta-anarchists reject Soulism as totalizing human desire?

I know I can read Deleuze or whatever, but are there any books that are specifically written from an explicitly meta anarchist viewpoint? Is the movement losing steam? (seems like posts on this sub go down in frequency over the last two years).

Hello, I'm new to Meta-Anarchism and I'm having trouble understanding it, Can someone explain to me in a simplified way please?, thank you

Nick Land's theory reads like the schizolarping boomer shit it does because it's in fact genuinely about schizophrenia and Capitalism but it's done so in an inverted way. Whereas the interest for Guattari was the transformation of the psychotic to reveal expressive capabilities previously unseen at all and a new way of being in the world, Land's work has always had the acceleration of Capital and the expansion of its subjectivity as the core theme. It makes Land's far-right developments inevitable. The deeply insidious aspect to it I find is that really, the acceleration of technocapitalism to its end-state entails also the acceleration of the alienation from the schizophrenization process by which the schizophrenic as an alienated, clinically controlled entity itself is also accelerated. I suspect there's a way in which Nick Land is actually trying to find ways of further encoding Capitalist machineries into areas where attempting to reintegrate the extreme cases of autism and schizophrenia are otherwise impossible by constructing a metaphysical structure that allows that encoding. Rather then prance around in a fool's errand trying to integrate them directly into indentured servitude for profit-making, it's reintegrating the schizophrenic indirectly to be a force for Capitalist production by effectively utterly stripping away their entire ownership over their own experiences as it gets rearticulated purely in terms of how they represent manifestations of the effects of technocapitalism. That way, you can efficiently use those experiences and the aggressively antiproductive semiotics of schizophrenia in a way that forces it to be productive by producing all controlled forms of antiproduction, which ironically, stops forces that are producing countereffects to Capitalism.

• In effect making accelerationist praxis, schizolarping, "schizoposting" but in a lame ass way, and idealization of mental illness all part of the package
• either I'm onto something or this is utterly off the rails anyway, whomsoever dares read this can decide for themselves

But yeah, it's all like a directed antiproduction of resisting forces against Capital's insane expansion which enables absolute accelerationism

Summary: I integrate perspectives from collective agreement theory, joint-action theory, and systems-science

This is my edited second-draft based on antigony_trieste's feedback!

Molecular-institutionalization can be described as the process of the generation of the molecular forms that can potentially construct an institution if aggregated together into a comprehensive, more permanent form. This process involves any instance where multiple agents produce internal agreements as to how to behave within any defined moment which does not occur with regularity but rather emerges stochastically. In this way, these customs or small-scale agreements are encoded as a potential, it has the potential to generate itself within the stochastic moment, non-localisable in spatial or temporal coordinates as the spatial and temporal coordinates the moment occurs in are temporary. Examples of molecular-institutionalization that themselves cannot be deemed institutions would be a custom of waving and greeting other people as you see them passing by. Another example would be manners, the use of polite gestures in certain situations. Institutions are constructed out of these non-localised agreements such that they actualize an agreement to being beyond simply that of internal or cultural agreement, which must be able to generate itself in specifiable coordinates, and it performs a function as a part of the overall assembled social-machine.

Institutions cannot be found in simple collective agreements because every member of an institution may have a unique perspective on what the institution is and what the nature of agreement is. Collective agreements for molecular-institutionalization are not a problem because the coordinates of the structure are never specifiable and therefore the exact nature of what emerges from the real potentials that bring themselves into actuality are non-problematic. An institution when viewed as a combined machine, a machine constructed out of a multiplicity of assemblages that have linked themselves together, will find its origins in molecular-institutionalization, as the agreements from multiple agents actualize themselves to create a more specific, permanent structure. An example of how this process may work is the institution of the rules of the road, such as the agreement to always drive on the right hand-side of the road. Multiple agents must come together and agree on this rule themselves, so it is something which must be capable of generating itself within the situations it is applicable to. Furthermore, there must be a collective channel of communication of some variety which enables the coordination of a combined action, for instance, the combined action of all road-users remaining on the right hand-side of the road, so the institution must be organized.

The organization of the institution, as it requires a channel of open communication which enables the sharing of information about a collective agreement, and enables the coordination of the specific actions that the institution will engage in. This coordination of specific actions enables the institution to produce various outcomes that emerge organically from the different interactions and communications between the agents that work within the institution and those that interact with the institution from the outside. The various outcomes of the institution will determine its interactions with other institutions within broader society. We can therefore conclude from this understanding that the inter-institutions of society will naturally form a broader set of meta-institutions upwards until the complete institutional systems running society are constructed. We can conclude then, that all institutions need to be analyzed with an understanding of causality from the perspective of systems-science, and view institutions as sets of components that can be broken down into smaller subcomponents until we get the molecular units that make up the greater system. This systematic approach to the theory of institutions enables the grounding of institutions on a material footing.

Hi all ! I signed up on Reddit to join this group :)

I discovered you because I thought I had created the concept of "anarchization" but when I googled the word to see if it existed, I found that it was already explored here!

Originally, I thought of "anarchization" as a process that transforms a concept into an anarcho-compatible form (I explain this later).

If a concept is an action to singularize a multi sensorial perception from reality, a concept is collections of perceptions and other concepts useful to singularize it. So, a concept is a construction from all our known concepts, perceptions and feelings, etc.

In this case, at individual or society level, we can create concepts, perceptions, feelings to change a concept into an anarcho-compatible form.

And to me, "anarchization" is to remove all essentialist properties for a concept. With your words, remove all impositionary properties from a concept :)

I am very surprised to find this meta-anarchic thinking, which fits well with my thoughts. For me it is very similar to my point of view, but it is expressed differently with different language, words or concepts.

For you, the word "imposition" corresponds to my word "essentialist". But maybe your term is clearer :)

Maybe I'll animate this community with some questions (strategic questions) I have in mind. In any case I will continue to discover your productions quietly.

Feel free if you want to talk about my thoughts (quickly sketched)

There were some good posts in the past that were actually about meta-anarchism. Now it's being treated as a catch-all anarchy sub? A shame. To any active mods: will this be fixed?