I will set out my own thoughts on why European unity is indispensable to protect both the sovereignty of nations and the political agency of citizens. I apologise in advance for any misunderstandings related to translation and for the length. I'm a philosophy graduate and I've tried to explore areas outside my field, but I might have made a few mistakes along the way.

The first and simplest non-moral definition of freedom is 'to do what is in one's power', but it is obvious that if - in a community of people gathered together, not of people taken alone (indeed, people are almost obliged to depend on others for their survival) - everyone really did what was in their power, freedom would be very fragile and, paradoxically, no one would be free. When you are alone you can say to yourself 'I am free', but in a community it is different: here others must point to you and say 'this person is free'. If your freedom is not recognised by the community, it is nullified (you can tell yourself that you are free, but that does not stop others from enslaving you if they are stronger than you). Secondly, freedom implies the meaning of 'shaping matter' according to our instances. If I had to choose between X and non-X, and both choices had the same consequence Y (i.e. if I had no influence on the course of events), I could not consider myself truly free. Freedom, to be such, must (also) be the freedom to change the world according to one's instances.

In today's world, it is clear that to be truly free, it is not enough to have more room to manoeuvre in the local sphere. To protect one's freedom and political agency, it is necessary to be part of something larger. Mazzini (to whom we will return) had already understood this at the time of the Risorgimento, when, in trying to convince the Italian workers to join the unified project, he showed them that it would not be possible to achieve a just emancipation without first rebuilding Italy: the economic problem facing the workers of the time required, at least according to Mazzini, first and foremost an increase in capital and production, but how could they hope to achieve this as long as the country remained divided into fractions, separated by customs lines and prey to restricted markets? In Mazzini's time, any political project that wanted to make sense needed the nation: today we could say the same about European unity. Indeed, in a globalised world, the nation-state is losing its meaning, and the only body capable of countering international capitalism could be a supranational organisation: it could also serve to prevent the individual nations that make it up from being swallowed up and controlled by foreign states. In any case, any political project for the renewal of society, whether conservative or progressive, liberal or socialist, must be carried out on a European rather than a national scale if it is to be serious.

A united Europe is the only way to save our national sovereignty and thus the political agency of citizens on the world stage: without it, we would be too small and alone in such a vast world. Mazzini had already realised this: once again addressing the Italian workers, he had made it clear that no nation could live exclusively on its own products, and that if a foreign nation became impoverished, this would also mean impoverishment for Italian workers, since Italy lived on foreign exchange, on imports and exports. In Mazzini's time, credit was no longer a national but a European institution. Secondly, any attempt at national improvement and emancipation would have been suppressed by the reactionary leagues of the time. The only hope of improving the conditions of Italian workers lay in universal improvement and in "the brotherhood of all the peoples of Europe and, for Europe, of humanity".

We have two alternatives: on the one hand, we have the possibility of signing a social contract on an equal footing with other states, giving us the chance to be sovereign to the extent that we can participate in the creation of the laws that we will have to obey; On the other hand, we can choose not to cede any part of our national sovereignty, for whatever reason, to find ourselves alone in an increasingly globalised world, and to end up submitting to decisions taken unilaterally by the hegemonic powers, becoming mere pawns in the service of their interests, like the stereotypical image of the serf in the service of the nobleman who arbitrarily rules over him. I am unwavering in my belief that Cicero was right when he said that freedom does not consist in having a good master, but in having no master at all. There are, of course, counter-traditions to the republican tradition. Charles I, for example, said shortly before his execution that freedom was to be subject to a government, not to participate in it. He believed that a subject and a sovereign were two very different things. Fortunately for Europe and the Western world as a whole, the Roundheads were the first of the moderns to demonstrate with facts that even sovereigns are subject to the supreme constraint of laws. This is something that all free men born since 1649 (and anyone vaguely associated with the concept of revolution) should be grateful for!

What is true of the freedom of individuals is also true of nations, i.e. the social groups in which the political action of each citizen takes place: a nation is only truly free when it is not subject to the arbitrary rule of a hegemonic empire, but - in order to secure its independence - it cannot hope to confront the empire alone. Unity is strength: we must have the courage to give up part of our sovereignty in order not to lose it altogether. The nation states must be overcome in favour of a united Europe, otherwise they will not only be overtaken, but will also lose their independence. Nations are destined to perish anyway, but they can decide whether they want to have strong descendants or not. Our Europe, on the other hand, must become much more united if it is to survive, but how? Institutions alone are not enough: the fact is that people can only love something if they see it as their own and, even better, as the only one they have. Indeed, we human beings need to know that the object of our (potential) care belongs to us, at least to some extent. In times of crisis, any society must be able to rely on the solidity of the values on which it is founded. To give in to emotions and leave the field open to opposing forces is to give them a great advantage in the hearts of citizens, and even to make them think that European values are boring and ineffective. All political principles need emotional support in order to be consolidated over time.

On the other hand, people often tend to reflect other people's expectations of them: this is also true of Europeans. We must rely on Europeans and give them confidence: so far, confidence has been given to the European Union (EU), but not to the people, by saying: 'The EU is wonderful, but the Italians/French/Polish are backward'. No democratic institution can flourish if the people to which it belongs do not see themselves as 'the people of that democratic institution', especially in the case of the EU, which has fewer elements of cultural cohesion than other superpowers. But how can citizens be trusted at the European level? Although Cavour was not particularly fond of Garibaldi, he had the intellectual honesty to declare that 'Garibaldi did Italy the greatest service a man could do: he gave Italians self-confidence, he proved to Europe that Italians knew how to fight and die on the battlefields to regain a homeland'. Today, Europeans, as Europeans, need a Garibaldi to give them self-confidence and to prove to the world that Europeans are capable of defending their independence and their political agency. But since it would be foolish to wait for history to produce a new European Garibaldi, the Europeans themselves must become the new Garibaldi of Europe.

Valuing the institutions without valuing the people is not a good strategy: we need European self-esteem, the self-esteem of Europeans and the self-esteem of European peoples as Europeans. A lot of work is needed to build a truly united Europe, especially at school level. Subjects such as literature, history, geography, the history of music and art should also be taught on a European scale: today many Europeans do not even know the names of the other European states, let alone their flag, their capital, how to locate them on a map or their history. How can you love Europe without knowing it? It is difficult to imagine a truly united Europe if Europe is not loved as Europe and not just as a means to obtain European funds, but for this to happen, it must be known by Europeans. We should also think about building a common European memory: Tzvetan Todorov, taking from Rousseau the notions of the "general will" (which considers only the common interest) and the "will of all" (which considers private interests and is only the sum of particular wills), introduced the concepts of "general memory" and "memory of all": a general European memory would be the sum of the differences of national and regional points of view. It does not require that specific memories be identical, but that they be able to put each other's point of view on a general level.

In this regard (speaking as an Italian), I know that during the Risorgimento, when Italy was still divided, the heroic deeds of historical figures from the various pre-unification states were brought to light: these examples served as inspiration for Italians, showing them what a united people was capable of achieving. Our national anthem, for example, celebrates historical figures and events such as the Battle of Legnano, Francesco Ferrucci, the Balilla and the Sicilian Vespers (in addition to Scipione). In other circumstances, however, the examples of Pietro Micca and Ettore Fieramosca were shown. Perhaps it would be possible to follow the same path in order to consolidate European unity and make the stories of national heroes from different European countries known to the rest of Europe, so that they become a common European heritage and a model of inspiration for today's European citizens. On the other hand, stories could be an indispensable tool for consolidating a common European identity. It is often said that European identity is based on values such as freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, respect for human rights, etc. However, this concept poses a problem. These are not just European principles, they are universal principles: to found Europe on these principles would be to the detriment of Europe (which would not be able to distinguish itself from the rest of the world and thus have its own identity) and to the detriment of these principles themselves (which would be reduced from universal to regional principles).

In this sense, I would like to make a new proposal. First, neuroscience has shown that the impressions we form of our environment are not the direct result of stimuli, but of neural representations endowed with meaning derived from them (our mind does not respond to all aspects of the reality that surrounds us, but only to those that it considers useful), and that our mind has learned, through a long evolutionary process, to anticipate sensory stimuli before they are even perceived. Second, our body's experience is not, as we might think, direct, but rather the result of a simulative model generated by our mind through the multisensory integration of different bodily signals, since the mind - when it has a certain intention - generates a prediction about the information it should receive from the sensory regions, which is then used to guide action. Thirdly, in situations of uncertainty, our mind integrates the information received from the senses with two different memory systems, the declarative memory and the procedural memory: the simplest form of the former is the chunk, which can be formed either by the name of the object in question or by its characteristics, while the latter is organised according to production rules (which follow the if-then formula). In case of difficulty, the hypothetical conditions of these rules are compared with the perceptual content processed by the declarative memory. The implementation of the chosen strategy can take place via two cognitive processing systems: system 1 - which operates automatically and of which the subject is often unaware - and system 2, which requires attention and commitment. The latter is activated when there is no suitable strategy in memory.

This type of learning is called perceptual-motor learning and is capable of progressively improving the motor schemas used to plan and guide future actions by creating new schemas that are formatted through continuous training. Our mind is a biological system designed to simulate opportunities and threats, and so are our emotions, which can be understood as a series of intuitive and recurrent bodily responses that the human mind has developed to survive in a complex environment: when making decisions, the mental system is able to make us relive past emotions by subjecting our bodily states to changes already experienced in similar situations. On the other hand, the ability of habit to change our values has also been studied from other angles. The psychologist Robert Cialdini tells of a technique used by the Chinese Communists in the Korean concentration camps which enabled them to obtain an impressive degree of cooperation from American prisoners without the use of force. The trick was to get an initial form of cooperation and then gradually raise the bar by using their previous statements. The guards would begin by asking the detainee to sign seemingly uncompromising statements such as 'The United States is not perfect'. At this point, it was easy to get a list of America's problems, have him sign it, and finally have him read it in public: "These are your ideas, why don't you express them?" In the end, the prisoner identified with the image of a potential collaborator that emerged from the statements and acted accordingly. This technique is not only peculiar to totalitarian regimes, it is also used in not too dissimilar forms by some companies to ensure a stable clientele.

In contemporary history, one of the fictional works that influenced American and global public opinion was undoubtedly Uncle Tom's Cabin, which fuelled abolitionist sympathies in the United States and helped convince the British (whose economic interests were more aligned with the South) to remain neutral abroad. In the century that followed, other works such as Invisible Man, To Kill a Mockingbird and Roots helped change racial attitudes around the world. Other examples of the transformative power of narrative include Darkness at Noon and 1984, which armed several generations against the nightmare of totalitarianism, and, on a more negative note, The Birth of a Nation, which led to the resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan. Other notable works include A Christmas Carol, which helped shape the modern view of the holiday, and Jaws, which damaged the economies of several coastal resorts. To these we can add The Sorrows of Young Werther, which led to a wave of copycat suicides to the point where the book was banned in several countries. The 'Werther effect' has attracted academic interest, and studies have shown that after a suicide makes the headlines, the incidence of suicide rises dramatically in regions where it has received significant coverage.

Novels also contributed to the formation of national communities. The English historian Benedict Anderson coined the term "imagined communities" to define the communities (specifically, nations) that emerged as a result of the spread of printed capitalism. Indeed, publishing helped readers to become aware of the hundreds of thousands of people who belonged to their own linguistic field and, at the same time, of the fact that only those hundreds of thousands belonged to it, to discover the existence of people they had never met but who shared with them common customs and beliefs, thus forming the embryo of the imagined national community. In this vision, novels (along with newspapers) could provide the tools to represent this kind of imagined community. Looking back at Italy's own national history, we can see that it was no coincidence that Libro Cuore sold two million copies in a short time, and that Metternich, a few decades earlier, had been able to see far ahead when he claimed that Pellico's 'Le mie prigioni' had done more damage to Austria than a lost battle.

It can be imagined, then, that showing the public a certain kind of story over and over again can direct those who enjoy it to elaborate a certain image of the world, the problems it contains and the skills needed to deal with them: if politics bets on the fact that the behaviour that is foreshadowed can, because it is shown as preferable or better than the current one, be imitated to such an extent that it becomes the dominant one, then it can certainly be assumed that there are various methods of conveying the message to the public. In this case, the action to be taken consists of propaganda, understood as the organised and systematic effort to spread a particular belief or doctrine. After the theoretical premises, we come to the case of Europe: is it possible to use this kind of narrative propaganda to make the mental image of its users change to the point where they become de facto European citizens and not just de jure? Can Europe become a de facto imagined community? That the literature of the various European nations should become effectively European is not a new idea: Mazzini already stated that, in this sense, there was 'a concordance of needs and desires, a common thought, a universal soul, which sets the nations on paths conforming to the same goal' and that there was, therefore, 'a European tendency'. It would be the poets' task to sing the 'eternal truths' contained in the books of the different nations.

One can imagine, then, that showing the public a certain kind of story over and over again can lead those who enjoy it to elaborate a certain image of the world, of the problems it contains, and of the skills needed to deal with them: if an interpretation of politics is based on the fact that the behaviour that is foreshadowed, because it is presented as preferable or better than the current one, can be imitated to such an extent that it becomes the dominant one, then one can certainly assume that there are different methods of getting the message across to the public. In this case, the action to be taken is propaganda, understood as the organised and systematic effort to spread a particular belief or doctrine. After the theoretical premises, we come to the case of Europe: is it possible to use this kind of narrative propaganda to change the mental image of its users to the point where they become de facto European citizens and not just de jure? Can Europe become a de facto imagined community? That the literature of the various European nations should become de facto European is not a new idea: Mazzini already noted that in this sense there is 'a concordance of needs and desires, a common thought, a universal soul, which sets the nations on paths that conform to the same goal', and that there is therefore 'a European tendency'. It was up to the poets to sing the 'eternal truths' contained in the books of the various nations.

This might work on a literary level (we would have to extend the school literature programme so as not to limit it to national literature, but it would not be impossible), but what about the real stories that have crossed Europe? Let us take a step back. We have already cited the example of the heroes of the pre-unitary Italian states that were brought to light during the Risorgimento, but could we do the same to cement a European unity and identity? Let us remember that this process would not be an end in itself, but could actively support the institutions. In fact, as much as the political institutions could act to implement and strengthen pre-political foundations, this same pre-political bond could unite European citizens and - in turn - have a significant impact on the institutions: it would be a virtuous circle. In fact, the institutions need a sense of unity and virtue among the people, which enables the citizens, to use words borrowed from Calamandrei, to make the institutions work. Without a sense of virtue and unity among the people, the institutions run the risk of not being able to bear the full weight of their task. In this sense, it is necessary for the people to think of themselves as a single "we"; otherwise, how can we believe that we will succeed in building Europe if we believe that the Poles cannot feel a sense of European belonging when they study the French Revolution, or the Irish when they study the Italian Risorgimento (to take just one example)? How can institutions stand on their own if people cannot see themselves as a 'we'?

Perhaps the only historical moment when Europeans can define themselves - positively - as a 'we' is 1848, but even that did not involve the whole of Europe. So what is to be done? Even if there has never been a historical event that has had such an impact on the whole of Europe (with the exception of the two world wars, which had a - negative - impact), it is true that there have been cases of "international and intra-European solidarity": they could form a network in which a certain kind of European identity could find a place, in which each European nation is linked to another by one of those stories gathered from the folds of time. This would be a kind of "family resemblance" between the different nations of Europe, which, although not all linked by the same historical event, find in their similarity the reason for their union: this feeling, in addition to preserving the unity in diversity so dear to Europe, could develop and lead the European citizen to appreciate acts of intra-European solidarity that have taken place between European countries that are not the same as his own, simply because they have taken place between Europeans, because he himself is European.

To be clear, such an operation is not intended to create some kind of hero cult on a European scale: the idea that history is the biography of great men (à la Carlyle, to be clear) has already been largely overcome. History is a cooperative enterprise because, like it or not, man is a cooperative animal. However, we have a tendency to oversimplify complex histories, which often leads us to idolise individuals and fail to appreciate the role of the communities they represented: an example of this is the fact that Martin Luther King, although he certainly played a decisive role within the civil rights movement of the African-American community in the United States, is often seen as the sole face of the entire movement, ignoring the rest of the community members who fought for the same goal. In this sense, we tend to summarise the enormous complexity of the events of a particular historical period and associate them with a single individual. But this is history, not stories: the fact that European unification took place without the need for martyrdom (fortunately, of course) has deprived Europe of a necessary glue for the nations. Europe desperately needs heroes, but they will inevitably be 'adopted heroes'.

Having said that, let us try to understand which stories might be suitable for this purpose. First, it might be interesting to consider Cromwell's intervention on behalf of the persecuted Waldensians during the Easter Massacres (the first humanitarian intervention in history, according to some historians). A few years earlier, John Milton, in his "Tenure of Kings and Magistrates", had said that there was a bond of friendship and mutual brotherhood between man and man throughout the world, and that not even the English sea could separate them from this duty and this relationship: Of course there is a still closer bond between comrades, neighbours, and friends, but, Milton asserted, he who keeps the peace, of whatever nation he may be, is an Englishman and a neighbour; but if an Englishman dared to violate life and liberty, he would be no better than a Turk, a Saracen, or a heathen, for it is not the distance of place that creates enmity, but enmity that creates distance.

In the next century, it is worth remembering that Robespierre had proposed that the French constitution should recognise that different peoples should help each other as citizens of the same state, and that those who oppressed one nation should be declared enemies of all the others. The duty of international solidarity was recognised by Giuseppe Mazzini, who declared in the Act of Fraternity of the Young Europe: "Every unjust domination, every violence, every act of selfishness exercised to the detriment of a people is a violation of freedom, of equality, of the fraternity of peoples. All peoples must help each other to eradicate it", and that "humanity will not be truly constituted until all the peoples that compose it, having conquered the free exercise of their sovereignty, are united in a republican federation to direct themselves, under the empire of a declaration of principles and a common pact, towards the same end: the discovery and application of the universal moral law".

Intra-European and international solidarity also manifested itself in individuals: think of Byron and Santarosa, who died for Greek independence. Another example is Captain Aleksander Podulak, probably a member of the Polish Legion led by Aleksander Izenschmid de Milbitz, who defended the Roman Republic against Louis Napoleon's attack in 1849 and died in June of that year, refusing to surrender to the invaders. Similarly, the Garibaldian Francesco Nullo lost his life defending Poland during the Polish uprising of 1863. These are just a few examples of figures who could inspire a European vision: in fact, another notable example, dating back to the Roman Republic, is Gabriel Laviron, a French Garibaldine who, after calling on 'foreign' citizens to form a foreign legion to defend the Roman Republic, died in battle between 25 and 26 June 1849, fighting against his own countrymen. We can also remember the English, Irish and Hungarian volunteers who joined Garibaldi, or the fact that French soldiers also died on the battlefields of the Second War of Italian Independence. Or those English workers who threw manure and beat up an Austrian general who had hanged Italian patriots in Brescia, an action for which they won Garibaldi's praise. Garibaldi himself could undoubtedly be included in this list, as he joined the defence of France during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 (at the end of the war, his army was the only one left largely intact, with minimal losses). Perhaps it was his example that inspired his nephews Bruno and Costante to join the Garibaldian Legion at the start of the Great War, a unit sent to the Argonne front to carry out extremely risky missions and bayonet attacks. Bruno and Costante lost their lives fighting for France.

Not that the intellectual contribution was any less interesting. Carlo Cattaneo not only dreamed of a federal Italy, but also believed that it should be an integral part of a future United States of Europe in order to guarantee and preserve peace. Victor Hugo, at the opening of the International Peace Conference in Paris in August 1849, over which he presided, delivered an impassioned speech in which he anticipated the day when the "United States of Europe" would inevitably come into being and universal peace would finally be achieved. The creator of Esperanto, Ludwik Lejzer Zamenhof, in his political testament written in 1915, argued that it was not enough to redefine European borders after the First World War, as this would only have prepared the ground for future conflicts: the solution, according to him, was the creation of the United States of Europe, with Esperanto as a co-official language of all member states, thus promoting a non-ethnic naming of places while - at the same time - respecting local multilingualism.

Let us also remember Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi: the authors of the famous 'Ventotene Manifesto', written in August 1941, argued that after the defeat of fascism it was essential to begin the construction of a European federation in order to avoid the otherwise inevitable return to conflict between nation-states. Other virtuous examples include Carlo Rosselli, who was not only explicitly pro-European but had also joined the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War. Or the Mazzinian partisan Duccio Galimberti, who, in addition to writing the "Project for a European and internal confederal constitution" with Antonino Repaci (the two authors imagined a Europe in which the concept of the independence of national states would be replaced by autonomy within a possible European federation), signed a pact of collaboration and friendship with the "maquisards", the French partisans, in Barcelonnette on 22 May 1944. And how can we forget that during the Second World War, some German Wehrmacht soldiers deserted to join the local resistance? And if we look back to more recent times and resistance to another tyranny, what was the Baltic Chain if not a wonderful demonstration of intra-European and international solidarity? Or, again, one may recall that in both 1832 and 1989, Germans took to the streets against tyranny, carrying not only their revolutionary tricolour but also the Polish flag, in a show of solidarity and brotherhood with their fellow sufferers.

The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre is unequivocal in his argument that depriving children of stories would turn them into anxious, unscripted stutterers. I am certain that depriving European citizens of stories about lords protectors defending religious minorities far from home, about revolutionary patriots concerned not only with the fate of their own nation but also with the fate of others, about partisans writing European constitutions in the midst of battles, and about peoples joining hands to resist tyrants, will have exactly the same effect. This would be a terrible blow to our Europe. On the other hand, Mazzini himself had understood the power of storytelling: indeed, he had urged Italian workers to tell their children 'the great deeds of the peoples of our ancient republics' and to show them 'the names of the good men who loved Italy and its people and tried to improve its destiny through a path of misfortune, slander and persecution'. What Mazzini demanded for Italy, we must now do for Europe.

Only through these stories could we find a uniquely European embodiment of those universal principles of freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights that Europe is called upon to defend. And for that to happen, it is not enough for them to be known by the mind: they must be understood by the heart, and that is what stories are for. Moreover, the fact that there is a plurality of different ways of being European is a good thing: on the one hand, not all citizens and not all peoples are the same, and it is not possible to force everyone to follow a single virtuous model, since that would turn Europe into a dystopia; on the other hand, it is always possible that a certain aspect of one set of examples is better than another aspect of another set, but we need a plurality of examples in order to be able to find out, through reasoned comparison, what is the best way to be European in a given context. We did not choose to be Europeans, so we cannot choose not to be Europeans: but we have the opportunity and the duty to choose which Europeans we want to be!