Question about the critique. My thought is as follows:

There are no knowable elements about the noumena— we can never know anything about the world of things in themselves. The judgments we make about the world make use of appearance and the 12 categories. Among our categories, is quantity. Now, if that is so, for Kant to assert the existence of a noumenal realm is to make a judgment regarding quantity— there exists a noumenal realm ( I.e. ONE noumenal realm). How can he possibly make this claim if we (1) cannot know anything about the noumenal realm; and (2) cannot apply quantity to anything but the world of appearances?

Does anyone have an answer or an A/B citation of a passage from the critique they can cite that answers this? It just seems so obvious it’s hard to believe Kant wouldn’t answer it, but scanning the entirety of the critique to get an answer to this is a needle in a haystack.

As I am reflecting on Kant’s conceptual approach towards experience, I am seeking clarification due to its holistic nature. For Kant, he expressed this idea as not just something that occurs or happens within our simple receptive faculties — the senses (taste, touch, hearing, seeing) — but is something based on the intimate relationship of reason and simple receptive faculties.

For example, let’s say I am drinking a hot cup of coffee with no sugar or cream. As I begin to sip on it, I immediately taste the bitterness of that black liquid. However, just because I think (key term) I have tasted coffee does not, indeed, mean I have experienced coffee itself. In fact, it is the combination of my deductive logic and those faculties which made me realize the coffee I have tasted is, in fact, coffee.

With that in mind, could anyone explain and provide examples of this deductive logic I am referencing?

I'm currently working on a project about Kant and I'm looking for some of the most well-known schemas or diagrams that illustrate his concepts. I've come across several in books, but I'm having trouble finding many online. Any tips or resources would be greatly appreciated. Thanks!

Why couldn't analytic a posteriori exist? I understand it's generally considered that a posteriori cannot be analytic so analytic a posteriori is self-contradictory.

But why couldn't't some of the cosmological constants be analytic a posteriori? They are not really constant, as the universe is changing and would affect their values. So one has to analyse the empirical universe and only such a universe(since nowhere else could provide the answer) in order to obtain some of the fundamental cosmological constant. Wouldn't that be analytic a posteriori?

I have recently been assigned the task of teaching my history class a fifteen minute lesson on Immanuel Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment" - everybody in the class will have read the source already so it's more about explaining what the source means and how it connects to the greater societal atmosphere of the time. I am wondering if you guys have any unique and engaging ideas for lessons I could teach. Thanks.

Since I started reading his biography, I am curious about Kant’s political influences. Moreover, concerning his rejection of both empiricism and rationalism due to their exclusivity of each other, I am curious about the events and/or philosophers that led him to those positions.

I enjoy listening while I read but all of the audio books I've found either don't list the translation or are not Guyer/Wood (my book). Before spending money on a book, I'd like to know beforehand if it's the correct translation! Anyone have info on this?

Have a look at my understanding of the terms : “ empirical apperception is basically inner sense , this consciousness is consciousness of an object (empirical object / experiential) while transcendental apperception is pure , it is thinking not so much object of experience but of the thinking in itself as ( as it has no empirical content it is pure ) it manifests itself in “ I think “ where I distinguish “ think” from the “I” as following : “ thinking is a necessary condition without it there is no “I” yet something more is required as it is not a sufficient condition , it requires also that there is a composite of such thinking in one consciousness therefore leading to the “ I”, which is then that thinking itself does when it’s thinking about something “, Now at the start of paralogism and usually other commentators say that this “ I think is even before self conciousness or inner sense “ that “ I “ exist even before any thought is done . Because if Kant thinks that we have an intellectual conciousness of ourselves as existing and as this existence is necessary then “ I” must also exist and necessarily exist “ It’s just all mixed up The section before the first paralogism where Kant deduces them is very ambiguous . Kindly explain and help me make my concepts distinct !!

Just started reading some Kant (GM mainly). I'm struggling with what/how if at all desire and inclination can be congruent with freedom. Is Kantian freedom simply knowing duty through the CI and letting that direct your action? How is the will split?

No kempsmith please , something like Paton

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZCobPpLgAws&ab_channel=LatestSightings

This essay on hagioptasia offers a profound exploration of the psychological mechanism that imbues certain experiences, objects, and memories with an ineffable sense of specialness. By examining how nostalgia reflects this universal trait, this work aligns closely with Kant’s theories of perception, cognition, and aesthetics.

Kant argued that our experience of the world is shaped by the mind’s active structuring of reality. Hagioptasia similarly reveals how subjective processes transform everyday experiences into deeply meaningful phenomena, bridging Kant’s insights into the limits of objective knowledge and the interplay between reason, imagination, and judgment.

Readers with an interest in Kant will find this article an intriguing extension of his ideas into the modern psychological and cultural realm, offering fresh perspectives on the nature of meaning, desire, and human experience.

Kant says ( KpV) that ''Imperatives hold objectively and are entirely distinct from maxims, which are subjetive'' and then he introduces the concept of an imperative that is conditioned, that does not determine only the will, so a hypothetical imperative. He says that only the categorical imperative would be a *practical law* and that maxims cannot be imperatives at all

My question is, when Kant mentions that imperatives hold objectively is he talking only about the categorical imperative or do both have an objective core to them? and why does a subjective practical rule (maxim) differs from a hypothetical imperative given that a categorical imperative is an objective practical rule (law) ?

Danke

"contents of consciousness has two way relation displayed as such; Transcendental Subject <----- Ideas/Contents -----> Transcendental Object though i can see how there cannot be any synthesis of manifold according to a rule without positing the manifold in a single consciousness my problem is that i think that transcendental object may be conscious of its ideas without positing of rules of synthesis for example my idea of red my idea of sweetness though they are not referring to some other object they are stills objects of transcendental subject completely isolated and have no relationship other than being my ideas. this would imply that i don't have experience but this doesn't imply that i am not conscious of ideas "To summarise my query is how is consciousness of unity of consciousness is dependent on transcendental object and rules of joining them

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