Kurume Castle ruins, Fukuoka, Kyushu https://rekishinihon.com/2021/07/30/kurume-castle-ruins-fukuoka-prefecture-kyushu-pictorial/

I will be teaching a course on Japanese culture in the spring that hits on a bunch of different cultural ideas: honne / tatemae, non-verbal communication, omoiyari / empathy, nemawashi, etc.

But it currently feels too simple. I want to encourage a more critical analysis reflecting modern anthropology that questions overstated ideas, like collectivism and conformism, and can add more depth.

Any ideas for where to start?

Hey everyone!

I'm just about done reading Shusaku Endo's novel 'The Samurai' and I am absolutely loving it. Honestly a massive recommendation to anyone who hasn't read it. It has gotten me interested in reading some more proper historical works on the topic of Christian missionary work in the 16th and 17th centuries, and was wondering if anyone had any particular recommendations on the topic.

Thanks in advance :)

He

I'm not exactly sure how to title what I'm after so I will give you a better description of what I mean.

I've always been interested in Japanese history and I like to read about various time periods, people, events, etc. I'm the kind of person who does a lot better when given the instructions on what to do, like being in a classroom or being tutoried. Organised and with a purpose. I have looked around my area for things like college/university classes or even night classes somewhere but nowhere within even 50 miles does anything like that.

Are there any good online places that I could have this method of learning or if not, what you would recommend for someone like who me wants to learn but finds it difficult with the vast amount of information and gets lost on where to start?

I appreciate all replies, thanks!

Interesting site for those of you interested in Japanese kirishitan. https://kirishitan.jp/en

I just got the Zatoichi boxset from Criterion, and I noticed that in the booklet, during the introduction to the original short story, it is hinted that Zatoichi was a real person. Is there any weight to this and is there any information out there about him?

I was looking at this image of a fish market from the Edo period and I noticed a lot of the men are wearing some kind of sleeveless black undershirt that I don't think I've seen anything like before. I wanted to learn more about it, like maybe find some surviving pieces or patterns, but I have no idea what it's called or how to google it (I tried to the best of my abilities in both English and Japanese). Hoping someone here can point me in the right direction

https://preview.redd.it/5zhr98o1f7wd1.jpg?width=2125&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=56b6b8555ff6ca0ea59b7e4ae35394f2f686aadb

I'm sure many people here are already semi-aware of how the reward system for samurai worked: you distinguish yourself, and then get rewarded land, gold (or other forms of currency, like silver), equipments (like weapons & armours), letters of commendation/感状, court ranks...etc. But what exactly is the act that gets rewarded? And how exactly does the process work? Well, we're here to talk a bit about that today.

As opposed to letters of commendation (which is a document rewarded to the vassal thanking their accomplishments & sacrifices), petitions for reward are exactly what they sound like: it's a document detailing the accomplishment and sacrifices by the vassal, which gets handed to the lord (or whoever assigned to verify). So to make this super simple (to avoid any potential confusion): letters of commendation = reward, petitions for reward = request.

So how exactly does that work?

Contents

The contents usually include a couple things:

1. Death (of the vassal, his family members, or his retainers)
2. Injury (to the vassal, his family members, or his retainers)
3. Taking of heads, enemy equipments (like swords and armours), or live captives
4. Spearheading (that is, first to engage the enemy in close-quartered combat [just gonna use CQB from now on])

There are of course all sorts of contents recorded in these petitions - with others including the loss of your horse, capturing of enemy flags, attacking enemy fortifications...etc.

1) & 2)

This may come as a surprise to many (certainly was to me) - but the most valued form of military contribution was not the taking of enemy heads, nor the capturing of enemy flags. Instead, it was death (of the vassal or his family). Going out on a hunch - this is probably because death was seen as the greatest form of sacrifice and display of loyalty. Death in the form of passing due to sustained injuries from battles can also count as "death in battle" - as we see in the petition by Asamachi Magotaro Nyudo/朝町孫太郎入道, where he sent a petition reporting his heir (Asamachi Mitsuyo/朝町光世)'s passing after sustaining injury in the battle of Yatsushiro/八代合戦 in Ryakuo first year (1338). Interestingly, this petition also detailed where Mitsuyo got injured (shoulder).

The petitions may sometimes include a description of how the vassal was injured: it can be from a wide range of sources, like 1) swords, 2) arrows, 3) spears, 4) stones...etc. The motivation behind these inclusion is to request for a greater amount of rewards - so if it doesn't particularly make their sacrifice sound stronger, how they got injured can (and was often) excluded. Furthermore - since death is absolute (and easily easily verifiable) - we almost never see how someone was killed if the petition was writing about death of a vassal (or his family).

There's a very famous theory that suggests earlier Japanese warfare was almost entirely based on long-ranged weapons (that is, bows and arrows) - and that theory is based on the analysis of these petitions. And indeed, this idea only came to be because there was an abundance of petitions that wrote about injuries from arrows. However, researcher Urushihara Toru pointed out that it was impossible for battles to be entirely long-ranged, for the taking of heads (which can also provide a lot of rewards) must come with CQB. Furthermore, samurai had to pay out of their own pockets when they participate in military campaigns - and they of course only agreed to do so because there was an incentive for rewards. If they didn't get injured nor took any enemy heads (aka, only doing long-ranged combat) - there is a strong chance that they will return home empty-handed. People who only participated in long-ranged combat were also laughed at as cowards, and would hurt the prestige of their clan (and their ancestors). Hence, it would probably be an incorrect assumption to think that earlier samurai battles were mostly based on long-ranged combat. The reason why we see so much petitions that included injuries sustained from arrows is probably because a large majority of the samurai who sustained injuries from CQB ended up dead (and hence didn't include how they were injured).

3)

As mentioned above - not just heads, but the armours, weapons, and helmets of the enemy would also be taken back to request for rewards. The rank of the enemy can be analysed through them - and then the lord will determine how much rewards is appropriate to hand out (proportional to the rank of the enemy). If the enemy is a high-ranking individual, their head would also be hung up for passersby to see, displaying to the world their crime (and the consequences of such transgression).

The taking of head was extremely important, and Urushihara actually included an interesting story about this: in the tale of Heiji/平治物語, there is a mention of Saito Sanemori/斉藤実盛 and Goto Sanemoto/後藤実基 (under Minamoto no Yoshitomo) shooting down and taking the head of a Taira mounted samurai. They were concerned about how to keep the the decapitated head (as tying it on the already tired horse would probably reduce their battle mobility) - so they handed it to a bystander for safekeeping. (rip traumatised bystander)

4)

As mentioned above - spearheading is the act of engaging the enemy in CQB when the two sides chose to only engage in long-ranged combat. The breaking of this deadlock would raise the morale of the entire army, so spearheading was also highly rewarded. By the way, Takezaki Suenaga/竹崎季長 is commonly mistaken for spearheading the Japanese CQB during the first Mongol invasion (this idea was also repeated in Linfamy's video - and don't get me wrong, I love Linfamy). However, there were two samurai both claiming to spearhead: Suenaga and Kikuchi Takefusa/菊池武房. In fact, when Suenaga disobeyed the order to hold still and attempted to engage the enemy first, he met the Kikuchi forces that was falling back after engaging the enemy. Judging by this, there's no doubt that Takefusa was the spearhead, not Suenaga. So why did Suenaga try to claim that HE was the spearhead? We (at least Urushihara) have no idea. In the end - Suenaga's claim for spearheading was actually not approved (he was still rewarded for other things), while Takefusa's was. I guess it's sorta unfortunate for Takefusa - for pop-culture seemed to have kicked him to the curb in favour of Suenaga.

Verification process

It is essential for the claims of petitions to be verified - or otherwise people can basically claim whatever they wanted. And from Suenaga's case above, it's not hard to see people did occasionally make up false claims. To verify these claims - a witness was crucial. In the aforementioned case of Asamachi Mitsuyo, his father actually included Aoki Kamon-no-suke/青木掃部助 as witness to Mitsuyo's injury in battle (which led to his subsequent death). This is to prove that Mitsuyo really did die because of his battlefield injuries, and not of other causes (which would not qualify for a reward). Takezaki Suenaga also exchanged helmets with his clan member Eda Hideie/江田秀家, both promising each other to keep a close eye and be witnesses for their respective military accomplishments. The reason why Suenaga's claim for spearheading was not approved was also because Kikuchi and Shiraishi Michiyasu/白石通泰 (who was also present at the battle) were witnesses against Suenaga's claim.

Of course, not everyone can be a witness. For example: followers of a samurai (that is, his retainers) cannot be a witness for him (due to the obvious potential biases).

Rise in popularity & gradual decline

The prominence of these petitions came to be during the Mongol invasions. Before then, requests for reward were usually made in a verbal report, and then would be decided by the head of the regime (under Kamakura shogunate - the Minamoto Shoguns, and then the Hojo regency). However, due to the Mongol invasions taking place mostly from areas distant to Kanto (where Kamakura was), it was difficult for so many samurai to leave their posts and travel to Kamakura for a verbal report (adding onto this was the tight tension and fear of further invasions). Hence, samurai were instead instructed to create a written report (that is, the petition) - and these reports would be verified by powerful local lords of the region. Only once these claims were verified, would the necessary documents be sent to Kamakura - where the Hojo regency would then decide if they wanted to grant the rewards. Due to the high casualty rate by the Japanese side during the Mongol invasions, many petitions for rewards based on sustained injuries were not granted (while those who died were still rewarded). The Kamakura Shogunate was also unable to give out too much rewards (too many requests and too little spare land), leading to many samurai being rewarded a much smaller fief than usual - likely sowing the seeds of resentment for the Kenmu rebellion.

After the fall of the Kamakura Shogunate, the petition system was maintained during the Nanboku-cho period. Along with the Nanboku-cho period, a new form of the petition procedure was created: the samurai who killed an enemy would be witnessed by the accompanying military overseer, and the samurai can then save the effort of taking heads and keeping them during the battle. This was supposedly proposed by Ko Moronao - and if that's true, we can definitely see a bit of military talents within him.

During the Sengoku period, it appeared that most requests reverted back to the verbal format - as we see a massive drop in the quantity of petition documents. Furthermore - with the introduction of guns, it became incredibly difficult to tell who killed who. So instead, rewards were handed out to the unit as a whole, and no longer to the individuals.

But as researcher Kurushima Noriko pointed out - there was a regional difference in the discovery of these petition documents. While historians are able to find very few petition documents in the Kanto region, the discovery of such documents was significantly higher in the Chugoku and Kyushu regions. Kurushima also objected to the idea that all reports were verbally made in Kanto - arguing that it was probably just that the lords in Kanto no longer handed back the petition documents to the authors (and instead, the documents were probably reappropriated or destroyed). So why did people in the Chugoku and Kyushu regions create and keep these petitions? Well, she argued that since the lords of these 2 regions were active in assisting Shogun Ashikaga Yoshiki to return to Kinai, they themselves became familiar with the "proper samurai culture/武家故実". The "proper samurai culture" can point to many things: from how you greet someone, dress etiquettes, to archery practices...etc. In other words, the samurai wanted to write these petitions and keep them not because they have any practical utility, but simply because they perceived it as the "proper" way of doing things. Kurushima also speculated that they followed these "proper culture" to show that their close relationship with Kyoto and the Shogun. Furthermore, these petitions also serve as a way of preserving the "family memory". By recording how the vassals fought side by side with their lords - this helps to pass the history down to their descendants.

Changes in format

The formatting of these petitions changed over the years, depending on the circumstances and the needs of the authors. We can roughly divide them into 3 categories:

1. Mongol invasions to Sengoku period, and battle of Sekigahara (Mori)
2. Korean invasions
3. Osaka campaign & after

1)

Usually records the specific important details: who was killed or injured, which enemies' heads were taken (an by whom), act of spearheading...etc. This format continued to the Sengoku period (as we see from petition documents by Ise Sadanori/伊勢貞順 and Masuda Munekane/益田宗兼. This practice skipped the Korean invasions (and we'll get to why soon), but was seen in the Mori documents during Sekigahara (siege of Tsu castle in Ise). Of course, the Mori clan was based in Chugoku, and continued the practice of creating & keeping petition documents (as mentioned before). This is in no way indicative that the rest of Japan also did so. The Ise & Masuda documents are included in Kurushima's paper, but I can't find a way to get the Mori document's link, so here's a picture of it (thanks to u/ParallelPain for the source):

https://preview.redd.it/jbkl0vnlv2wd1.png?width=2772&format=png&auto=webp&s=043c80b5aaf006117030f697f8711b5385e601c7

2)

During the Korean invasions - the petition documents did not include the identity of the heads (nor who took them specifically). Instead, Japanese commanders would send reports of the amount of ears (and later nose) taken back to Japan, alongside these decapitated body parts. This is likely because the Japanese side generally were unable to tell the rank of the enemy, so there was little point in trying to record the enemy's rank.

Perhaps somewhat politically insensitive, but Urushihara also pointed out that the practice of taking ears and noses was something the Koreans also did (at least during the Korean invasion), and the Japanese practice of doing so was likely inspired by the Korean side (for easier transportation back to Japan). He referenced 壬申辰状草 and 李忠武公全書巻二 - and I'm only able to find the second source. Here's a Chinese translation of it - and we can see what he was talking about: "倭头八十八级。割左耳沈盐。(88 Wa [Japanese] heads. Cut off their left ears and place them in salt.)". However, he also noted that the Japanese practice was slightly different from the Korean one.

3)

During the Osaka campaign and afterwards, petition documents became a lot more detail-orientated, almost like a narrative. The format includes a description of how the samurai encountered and fought with the enemy, how they killed the enemy, and how/where they themselves were injured. This practice continued to the Shimabara rebellion, as we see in the document by Miike Chikaie/三池親家.

These petitions would be preserved by the daimyo and then presented to the Tokugawa, who would then reward the daimyo. After receiving the rewards, the daimyo would then give out parts of their rewards to the samurai proportionally (to their military accomplishments and sacrifices).

Sources:

軍功の認定に関する若干の考察 by Urushihara Toru/漆原徹

戦功の記録 -中世から近世へ- by Kurushima Noriko/久留島典子

Why didn't Japan have a collective guilt just like Germany after ww2?

After having seen episode 20 called "Ripple" of the Japanese anime "X" that featured bánh tráng cuốn (fresh Vietnamese spring rolls) that were prepared by the Japanese school girl Nekoi Yuzuriha in modern-day Japan that aired on 27 February 2002, I was curious to know since when do Japanese people began eating bánh tráng cuốn (fresh Vietnamese spring rolls wrapped in rice paper) and eating sushi wrapped in rice paper ?

I was reading the Book of the Five Rings today and some things called the Ten Abilities and the Seven Arts were mentioned. A quick Google isn't yielding any answers. Does anyone have any ideas what they could be?

They look so delicate. Can they really be used for parrying? Are they forged with the blade or are they an accessory? Also, is this a scale issue or are these poles and blades really so narrow? Wouldn't they flex a lot?

Disclaimer: A part of Fujita's critique/response to Oshita is actually for another one of Oshita's paper (that also critiqued Fujita). I don't have access to this other paper, so I'm only basing Oshita's argument on what Fujita has described in his paper.

Hideyoshi's road to independence

This is where the major disagreement between the two researchers came in.

After the Kiyosu conference, matters of fief guarantee & rewarding fell into the hands of the 4 council members (Hideyoshi, Nagahide, Tsuneoki and Katsuie). We can see examples such as their documents rewarding Gamo Ujisato 10,000 koku in Omi, and rewarding Takayama Shigetomo 4,000 koku in Settsu & Omi. So - did this change once Nobukatsu had become the head of the Oda? Oshita disagreed with researcher Kato Masumiki/加藤益幹 on this topic. While Kato argued that the council members lost their right to fief decision once Nobukatsu came to power (as shown by Nobukatsu's letters of fief decision to lords & temples of Owari and Ise), Oshita argued that the council members still retained this right (as shown by Hideyoshi & Nagahide returning 180 koku in Sakai of Izumi to Honganji).

Furthermore, Oshita argued that Hideyoshi's own personal influence actually increased (surpassing his fellow council members). Hideyoshi issued the following fief decisions:

Not only did Hideyoshi control much of the fief decisions under the Nobukatsu regime - he also directly removed Oda vassals (like Yoritaka & Nobuharu) and replaced them with his own people (Kazuuji). In the words of Fujita, this was Hideyoshi's provocation against Nobukatsu, and the first step into taking Japan for himself.

As Oshita noted, there are a few key problems with Nobukatsu's rule that indirectly enabled Hideyoshi's gradual rise to power:

• Nobukatsu wasn't able to issue a lot of land decisions (which was issued by Hideyoshi instead). Fief reward & guarantee is an important element in securing a strong lord-vassal relationship. Even though Hideyoshi was issuing these decision under Nobukatsu (and hence Nobukatsu was technically issuing them via Hideyoshi) - this greatly hurt Nobukatsu's control over the vassals. Think to how Ieyasu issued land rewards after Sekigahara in name of Hideyori.
• Hideyoshi had already collected hostages from many powerful lords in Omi, Yamato, and Kawachi in Tensho 10th year, before the battle of Shizugatake (check part 1). Nobukatsu, on the other hand, did not seem to have collected hostages for some reason.
• Nobukatsu didn't have a strong relationship with the Oda vassals. Compared to Nobutada, who fought side by side with Oda vassals in numerous battles (against Matsunaga Hisahide, Araki Murashige and later Takeda Katsuyori) - Nobukatsu really only fought alongside Oda vassals in the 1581 Iga campaign.

Nobukatsu gained the ability to assign an overseer for Kyoto as the head of the Oda, and he chose Maeda Geni/前田玄以. However, Geni seemed to have favoured Hideyoshi, and even assisted in the construction of Hideyoshi's personal castle (Myokenji castle/妙顕寺城) in Kyoto. By this time - Nobukatsu didn't have a residential castle in Kyoto, yet Hideyoshi was building one. Oshita interpreted this as a symbol of Hideyoshi's increasingly stronger influence over Kyoto.

Oshita also noted that in Frois' record for the 12th of the 1st month, Tensho 13th year - Hideyoshi gave Ise, Iga and Owari to Nobukatsu. Nobukatsu can ask for anything else and Hideyoshi would give it to him - but he must not step into "Tenka" (as in, the Kinai region) again. 柴田退治記 corresponds some parts of Frois' records: it stated that 1) Ise, Iga and Owari are Nobukatsu's territories, 2) Nobukatsu is "worshipped", and 3) Nobukatsu's residence is Nagashima castle (in Ise). However, Fujita held suspicions towards Oshita's theory that Hideyoshi's actions were forcing Nobukatsu out of Azuchi and rendering him a mere daimyo in the Oda regime: he noted that Nobukatsu at the time was busy with construction work for his new residence, Nagashima castle; and also busy with land inspection in the 3 provinces. Furthermore, he also noted that Frois' claim of Hideyoshi forbad Nobukatsu from entering into Kiani region is not found in any Japanese sources.

Furthermore, Hideyoshi resumed the construction of Osaka castle that had already begun under Nobunaga. Initially meaning to expand it into a base for future military operations in the Chugoku region - Nobunaga had renovated the castle walls, as well as stored a massive amount of gold, supplies, and weapons in the castle. According to Frois, Hideyoshi intended to expand the Osaka castle and its towns to as big as that of Azuchi castle's, and planned on requesting the Emperor to move the capital (and the religious capitals of the 5 mountain temples) there. Hideyoshi's plan of moving the capital was also recorded in Honda Tadakatsu's document (dated to the 9th month), writing that Hideyoshi intended to move the capital in the following Spring (so Spring of next year). In other words, Hideyoshi's plan to become Tenkabito wasn't by directly taking Azuchi nor Kyoto, but actually simply moving the functionalities of the capital to Osaka. He also planned on recalling the Shogun Yoshiaki back to Kinai, and making himself an adoptee of Yoshiaki - hence, granting him the legitimacy to become the new Shogun. To Fujita, this is Hideyoshi's process to obtain the status of Tenkabito.

The disagreement between Oshita and Fujita is quite apparent here. Whereas Oshita believed that Hideyoshi had already become Tenkabito by forcing Nobukatsu out of Azuchi and making him just a regular daimyo, Fujita believed that Hideyoshi had, in fact, not replaced Nobukatsu as Tenkabito. This is why Hideyoshi felt the need to move the capital and become adopted by Ashikaga Yoshiaki.

Hideyoshi & Nobukatsu: friendly or not?

A key disagreement between the two lies in Oshita's reading of a document regarding Hideyoshi's plan to launch a military campaign into Kii. The document was sent from Nobukatsu to his two vassals - Mizuno Katsunari/水野勝成 and Yoshimura Ujiyoshi/吉村氏吉. The letter was dated to the 12th of the 2nd month, Tensho 13th year - but Oshita argued that it should actually be from the 12th year, because...

1. Nobukatsu referred to Hideyoshi as "Chikuzen-no-kami/筑前守". By Tensho 13th year Hideyoshi was Nobukatsu's lord, so this way of referring to him would be very rude
2. The letter said the date of campaign was the 27th of the 3rd month, whereas historically the campaign date was the 21st of the same month
3. Mizuno and Yoshimura didn't attend the Tensho 13th year campaign

Because of this, Oshita believed that Hideyoshi maintained friendly relations with Nobukatsu, and was surprised by Nobukatsu's attack (which started the Kamaki-Nagakute campaign).

However, Fujita disagreed with this assessment:

1. Nobukatsu was initially Hideyoshi's lord, and Hideyoshi still respected Nobukatsu as the head of the Oda. So there's nothing unnatural about the usage of "Chikuzen-no-kami"
2. The Shikoku campaign's date was also changed a few times, so we can explain this as the date of the campaign had simply been changed
3. Because the Kii campaign went so smoothly and swiftly, there was no need for Nobukatsu's army to join the battle (hence explaining why Mizuno and Yoshimura didn't attend it)

And indeed, as Fujita pointed out:

• Hideyoshi's Kii campaign began on the 21st of the 3rd month, and was able to take down Sengokubori castle/千石堀城 in Izumi on the same day
• On the next day (22nd), Hideyoshi's army took down Shakuzenji castle/積善寺城 in Izumi
• On the 23rd, various other castles in Izumi (like Sawa castle/沢城) had been taken down
• On the 24th, Hideyoshi burnt down Kokawa temple/粉河寺 and quelled the main base of the uprising, Saika
• After that, the remnants of the resistance in Ota castle/太田城 (in Kii) surrendered. The 53 leaders of the uprising were put to death on the 25th of the 4th month.
• While Nobukatsu did mobilise and arrive at the battlefield, this was 3 days before the campaign ended (on the 17th of the 4th month, so campaign probably ended on the 20th).

As previously mentioned, Hideyoshi's plan to become Shogun and move the capital to Osaka was undoubtedly a provocation against Nobukatsu. Hence, Fujita disagrees with the idea that Hideyoshi was careful in maintaining relations with Nobukatsu, as well as the idea that Nobukatsu's attack was a surprise to Hideyoshi. In fact, Fujita asserted that Hideyoshi had maintain control over the situation: he was both ready for war, and had actually declared war on Nobukatsu (instead of the other way around) - which we'll get to soon.

Battle of Komaki-Nagakute

On the 6th day of the 3rd month, Tensho 12th year, Nobukatsu killed his 3 senior retainers who had given Hideyoshi hostages (Okada Shigetaka/岡田重孝, Tsugawa Yoshifuyu/津川義冬, and Azai Nagatoki/浅井長時). By the 12th, Hideyoshi had already finished mobilisation and marched into Northern Ise. In this view, Fujita argued that it is impossible for Hideyoshi to be unprepared for war and then attack into Ise so quickly. Hence, he likely had been preparing for a while.

Nobukatsu's important vassal Takigawa Katsutoshi/滝川雄利 also participated in Nobukatsu's attack on his 3 vassals (Katsutoshi led troops to attack Matsugashima/松ヶ島城 castle (residence of Tsugawa Yoshifuyu). However, Nobukatsu's reign over Iga was in no way stable during this time. As many of you already knew, Nobukatsu led 2 campaigns into Iga before the Honnoji incident, finally pacifying it in the 2nd one. The mass destruction of the province sowed the seed of long-lasting resentment against their new ruler. Utilising this instability, Hideyoshi ordered Wakisaka Yasuharu/脇坂安治 to lead the dissidents of Iga to launch a surprise attack at night, capturing the Ueno castle/上野城 in the morning. Here's another point of argument between the two researchers:

• Since Oshita believed that Hideyoshi and Nobukatsu maintained good relations before the Komaki-Nagakute campaign, he argued that this attack on Ueno castle must have taken place in the 3rd month (after the 3 senior Nobukatsu vassals have been killed). Oshita also based his speculation on the letter from Satake Yoshishige to Hideyoshi about the attack in Iga, written on the 26th of the 3rd month.
• Fujita, however, argued that the attack on Ueno castle likely came before the killing of the 3 senior vassals - as Tamonin diary/多聞院日記 recorded it on the 2nd day of the 2nd month. He also noted that Oshita's argument is entirely based on the idea that Hideyoshi and Nobukatsu retained good relations during the 2nd month (per Oshita's reading of the document on the Kii campaign). But as he discussed before, there's no reason to believe that this document came from this year (but should instead be from the year after). Since there's no reason to believe that Hideyoshi & Nobukatsu retained good relations in the 2nd month, there's no need to doubt Tamonin diary's date for the attack on Ueno castle.

Hence, Oshita believed that Nobukatsu declared war on Hideyoshi with the act of killing his 3 important vassals (in the 3rd month), while Fujita argued that it was actually Hideyoshi himself who declared war on Nobukatsu (with the attack on Ueno castle in the 2nd month, which predated the killing of the 3 Nobukatsu vassals).

In the later part of the 3rd month, Ikeda Tsuneoki, Mori Nagayoshi and Oda Nobukane/織田信包 joined Hideyoshi's operation. Hideyoshi had shifted his strategy from attacking Nobukatsu's Ise to attacking Ieyasu's Mikawa via Northern Owari. On the 9th day of the 4th month, Ieyasu defeated Hideyoshi's forced at the battle of Nagakute (killing many Hideyoshi side warriors like Ikeda Tsuneoki, his son Motosuke, and Mori Nagayoshi). Hideyoshi did not give up, for he then launched an attack on Kaganoi castle/加賀野井城 in the 5th month, and then subsequently attempted to flood Takegahana castle/竹ヶ鼻城.

Hideyoshi planned to relaunch an attack into Mikawa and Totomi on the 15th of the 7th month, but the initial battle of the campaign (battle of Kanie castle/蟹江城) ended in a defeat on the Toyotomi side - forcing him to delay the campaign until the 8th month. Hideyoshi himself left Osaka on the 11th of the 8th month, before arriving in Owari in the later part of the month. In response to this, Ieyasu moved his forces from Kiyosu to Iwakura castle and began working on improving on castle defenses. However, the 2 sides ultimately did not end up with a fateful clash, for peace negotiations began on the 2nd day of the 9th month.

So why was Hideyoshi willing to enter into peace negotiations with Nobukatsu and Ieyasu? Well, Fujita pointed to the alliance between between the Tokugawa and Hojo as a likely cause. The two clans had both an offensive and defensive alliance, so there was an increasingly real possibility of the Hojo entering into the conflict (which would only make it more difficult).

Aftermath of the battle

In the same month (9th month), Nobukatsu gave up his territories in Southern Ise to Hideyoshi. This fief (125,000 koku) was given to Gamo Ujisato, and various lords of the nearby region (Seki/関 & Tamaru/田丸 of Ise, Kuki/九鬼 of Shima, Sawa/澤, Akiyama/秋山 and Yoshino/芳野 of Yamato were also placed under the command of Ujisato.

However, the negotiations broke off on the 7th day of the same month, and hostility resumed (despite Nobukatsu giving up Southern Ise). In the later part of the 10th month (same year), Hideyoshi attacked Nobukatsu's residence, Nagashima castle directly. Important Nobukatsu vassal Kozukuri Nagamasa/木造長政 (at Togi castle/戸木城) surrendered, and Takigawa Katsutoshi's Hamada castle/浜田城 was surrounded by multiple fortifications. Hideyoshi also began building fortifications around Kuwana castle/桑名城 to place more pressure on Nobukatsu. In the end, Nobukatsu surrendered. He and his important vassals all gave hostages to Hideyoshi, and his fief of Northern Ise was stripped away - leaving him with only Owari. While Ieyasu didn't submit to Hideyoshi at this time, he also gave his son (who is later known as Yuki Hideyasu) as a hostage to Hideyoshi.

Conclusion: when did Hideyoshi become Tenkabito

I want to bring our spotlight back to the "Tenkabito" topic I opened with in the first part of this series. Whereas Oshita argued that Hideyoshi had already become Tenkabito by the 9th month of the Tensho 11th year, Fujita argued that Hideyoshi only really became a Tenkabito when he became Kampaku in the 7th month of the Tensho 13th year. The key difference in the two theories lies in when Hideyoshi acquired the political legitimacy:

• Oshita believed that Hideyoshi had already made Nobukatsu into a normal daimyo by the 9th month of the Tensho 11th year, when Frois recorded that Nobukatsu was forbidden from entering into (really meaning "ruling") the Kinai region. This is when Hideyoshi replaced Nobukatsu as the Tenkabito
• Fujita, on the other hand, argued that Nobukatsu was still recognised as the Tenkabito, and that he likely wasn't actually kicked out of Azuchi castle (but just wanted to work on his fief in Iga, Ise, and Owari during that period). This is why Hideyoshi never actually acquired control over Kyoto and Azuchi (locations that would legitimise his rule as the Tenkabito), and instead tried to make Osaka into the new capital (to acquire the political legitimacy Kyoto and Azuchi offered). Up until Nobukatsu's submission after Komaki-Nagakute, he retained control over Azuchi and Kyoto.
  • Hideyoshi was given a Tachi by Ogimachi on the 1st of the 3rd month, Tensho 13th year - granting him the same privileges & recognition as the Shogun. This recognition granted him the right to conquer against Choteki/朝敵 (enemy of the Emperor), a historic right of the Shogun. Fujita also pointed out that Hideyoshi chose this exact date for his Kyushu campaign, Odawara campaign, and the Korean invasion. This was no doubt a very important date for him.
  • On the 10th day of the same month, Hideyoshi was appointed upper 2nd rank/正二位, Nai-daijin/内大臣. He appointed Maeda Geni as the overseer of Kyoto in the same day. Hence, we can infer that the 3rd month of Tensho 13th year is when the Toyotomi system actually began.
  • As mentioned above, Hideyoshi was appointed Kampaku and began ruling from Kyoto in the 7th month of Tensho 13th year. This is the time Fujita believed Hideyoshi became a real "Tenkabito".

References:

清須会議後の政治過程 豊臣政権の始期をめぐって by Oshita Shigetoshi/尾下成敏

小牧・長久手の戦いと羽柴政権 by Fujita Tatsuo/藤田達生

The "coup"

On the 1st of the 11th month - Hideyoshi sent a letter to Ieyasu. The letter said that the Oda council (Hideyoshi, Nagahide and Tsuneoki) had all agreed to abolish Sanboshi as the head of the clan, and will instead serve Nobukatsu. This act was described by Oshita as a coup d'état by the trio. They also wrote to various lords within the Oda regime (including those within the realm of Nobutaka) to come and pay their respect to Nobukatsu - as we can see by the letter to Osato Mitsuaki/小里光明. Sanboshi of course wasn't entirely out of the picture - for Nobukatsu agreed that once Sanboshi came of age, he would step down as return the throne. But before then, Nobukatsu wasn't just a guardian to the ruler (Sanboshi) - he was the actual head of the Oda.

Nobukatsu was unable to make his way to Kyoto nor Azuchi, likely because he must cross over Mino, Omi, and Northern Ise in order to get there (these lands are controlled by the Nobutaka faction). Hence, the newly formed Nobukatsu regime immediately began a military campaign.

Battle of Shizugatake

Hideyoshi immediately sent troops to Nagahama castle (controlled by Katsuie's adopted son Katsutoyo). Katsuie wanted to make peace with the Nobukatsu regime, so he asked Katsutoyo to surrender and give Hideyoshi hostages. Hideyoshi also enticed Mino lords like Inaba/稲葉, Ujiie/氏家, and Mori/森 - and asked them to betray Nobutaka. Takigawa Kazumasu of Northern Ise only fortified his own castles and had no interest in actually fighting Nobukatsu - so Nobutaka quickly became isolated. By the 12th month, Nobukatsu's forces marched into Mino and surrounded Gifu castle, and many lords (like the Osato from before) came to pay their respect. The last straw for Nobutaka was probably Ieyasu's response on the 22nd of the same month - where he acknowledged Nobukatsu as the new leader and expressing willingness to send troops to Mino for Nobukatsu's campaign. Nobutaka agreed to surrender and gave up his mother, his daughter and Sanboshi. On the 27th of the same month, Nobukatsu's forces left Mino.

In the 2nd month of Tensho 11th year, Hideyoshi led a massive army against Kazumasu of Northern Ise. On the 17th of the 3rd month (same year), Katsuie marched his forces from Echizen to Northern Omi in order to assist Kazumasu. The two sides (Katsuie & Hideyoshi) began building fortifications, and was staring each other off for a whole month. On the 16th of the 5th month, Nobutaka rose up again in Gifu against Hideyoshi. 4 days later (20th), Hideyoshi's forces began attacking Katsuie's army. The battle lasted only one day, for by the 21st - Katsuie had suffered a crushing defeat.

Before Katsuie's defeat, he had rallied various daimyos from around Japan (outside of the Oda regime) to his aid. A rough table of 2 sides is shown below:

To attract potential allies, Katsuie turned to previous enemies of the Oda (Mori, Chosokabe, Ashikaga, Negoro-shu and Saika-shu). To ensure that Terumoto would provide assistance, he also agreed to reinstall Yoshiaki back to Kyoto as Shogun. However, Terumoto also received letters from Hideyoshi and decided to stay out of it, while people like Toshiie was troubled due to his closeness to two sides.

This was undoubtedly a war to decide who the next Tenkabito would be. It sucked in people outside of the Oda regime, as those who choosing be to neutral may very well be seen as a potential enemy by either side. In the end, Nobutaka was forced to commit suicide, while Nobukatsu inherited Nobunaga's kingdom - and potentially the entirety of Japan.

To be continued...

References:

清須会議後の政治過程 豊臣政権の始期をめぐって by Oshita Shigetoshi/尾下成敏

小牧・長久手の戦いと羽柴政権 by Fujita Tatsuo/藤田達生

Today I want to have a quick (you already know it's not gonna be that quick) chat about a more popular topic - that is, regarding Hideyoshi's rise to power as a Tenkabito/天下人. Tenkabito is sorta a loaded term, so you can think of it as essentially who rules at the top of the samurai world (Shoguns are a good example of a Tenkabito). For this post, I'll be referencing two researchers who disagree with each other: Oshita Shigetoshi/尾下成敏 and Fujita Tatsuo/藤田達生.

Kiyosu conference and after:

I won't go through the details of the Honnoji incident and the subsequent battle of Yamazaki - for I'm sure most people are already familiar with it. Instead, let's jump straight to the Kiyosu conference. Kiyosu conference took place in the 27th of the 6th month, Tensho 10th year. Oda Sanboshi (son of Oda Nobutada), a 3 years old child supported by Hideyoshi, was agreed by all parties to be the new head of the Oda clan. Sanboshi's 2 uncles (Oda Nobukatsu and Nobutaka) would become his guardians until he came of age, and the 4 important Oda vassals (Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Shibata Katsuie, Niwa Nagahide, and Ikeda Tsuneoki) would form a council to support the young lord. These are the agreed upon facts (at least between the 2 researchers).

However, the Oda regime was by no means peaceful at this point. As a result of the conference, Nobukatsu was given Owari and Southern Ise (Northern Ise kept by Takigawa Kazumasu, who missed the conference), while Nobutaka was given Mino. The two brothers immediately entered into conflict over the borders between Mino and Owari - and during this time Sanboshi was kept in Gifu by Nobutaka. Hideyoshi attempted to negotiate an end to this conflict by suggesting the two draw their borders at Kiso river (1st of the 8th month), but this suggestion was not accepted by the two.

On the 15th of the 10th month (same year), Nobunaga's funeral procession was held in Kyoto. It was attended by Hideyoshi, his adopted son Hidekatsu (actual son of Nobunaga), Nagaoka (Hosokawa) Fujitaka, Ikeda Tsuneoki & his son, and representative of Niwa Nagahide (Aoyama Munekatsu/青山宗勝). Nobukatsu, Nobutaka, Shibata Katsuie, and Sanboshi were all absent from the procession.

Hideyoshi holding Nobunaga's funeral without the two Oda brothers was obviously a huge shock to them. After hearing of this, they sent a letter to Tokugawa Ieyasu and Hojo Ujinao (who were at the time fighting each other in Kai) and asked them to make peace. The two agreed, and Ieyasu's daughter was married to Ujinao. Yoda Nobushige/依田信蕃's letter to Ieyasu (27th of 10th month) and Mizunoya/水谷's letter to Ieyasu in the 18th of the same month - we can see that the reason why Ieyasu and Ujinao made peace was because of "the chaos in Kyoto/上方忩劇".

On the 14th of the same month, there were rumours of the two brothers coming to Kyoto for the funeral, and the procession on the 15th would be cancelled. After the procession began, Hideyoshi wrote a letter to Nobutaka's vassals - Saito Toshitaka/斎藤利堯 and Okamoto Yoshikatsu/岡本良勝, on the 18th of the same month. It's recorded that he asked the two brothers to stop fighting via Hidekatsu (who was also Nobukatsu and Nobutaka's brother), but the two ignored it. In the same letter, Hideyoshi also refused Nobutaka's attempt to improve relations between Hideyoshi and Katsuie. So we can also infer that Hideyoshi and Katsuie's relations worsened around this time.

Hideyoshi and Katsuie's bad relations likely originated from Hideyoshi's decision to build Yamazaki castle in Kyoto, which began construction on the 7th of the 10th month, Tensho 10th year. On the 16th of the same month, Katsuie wrote a letter to Hori Hidemasa, condemning Hideyoshi's action as his own personal decision (and wasn't agreed upon by the council). Judging by the fact that Hideyoshi continued building Yamazaki castle, this condemnation likely had very little effect.

So why did Hideyoshi begin the construction of Yamazaki castle? Well, if we looked at other military actions taking place around this time (and the great political change happening next month), it could be easily understood. On the 21th of the same month, Niwa Nagahide gave orders to his vassals (Awaya Katsuhisa/粟谷勝久, Awaya Katsuie/粟谷勝家, Kumatani Naoyuki/熊谷直之, Yamagata Hidemasa/山縣秀政, Mizoguchi Hidekatsu/溝口秀勝, and Yamasho Kizaemon/山庄喜左衛門) to collect as many guns as possible, and immediately begin improving castle defenses. By this point, Hideyoshi had already enticed Nagahide by making Nagahide's 3rd son an adoptee of Hidenaga (Hideyoshi's brother). Ikeda Tsuneoki, Nakagawa Kiyohide/中川清秀, and Takayama Shigetomo/高山重友 had already decided to side with Hideyoshi. Hideyoshi also took hostages from the lords of Yamato (like Tsutsui Junkei/筒井順慶) and Kawachi (Miyoshi Yasunaga/三好康長 and the Wakae trio/若江三人衆). It's also recorded that Hasegawa Hidekazu/長谷川秀一, Yamazaki Kataie/山崎賢家, Ikeda Kagekatsu/池田景雄, and Yamaoka Kagetaka/山岡景隆 are all ready in their castles.

On the 27th of the same month, Katsuie's vasal - Kanamori Nagachika arrived in Kyoto. It's recorded in 柴田退治記 that Katsuie sent Maeda Toshiie, Fuwa Naomitsu/不破直光 and Kanamori Nagachika/金森長近 to negotiate peace with Hideyoshi. So Nagachika's arrival at Kyoto on the 27th was undoubtedly a part of this negotiation. However, this talk ultimately did not ease the tension between the two. By this point, Hideyoshi had consolidated control over Kinai - and that's because he was about to do something that would change the political landscape of the Oda regime forever.

To be continued...

References:

清須会議後の政治過程 豊臣政権の始期をめぐって by Oshita Shigetoshi/尾下成敏

小牧・長久手の戦いと羽柴政権 by Fujita Tatsuo/藤田達生

Might be of interest to those of you interested in Japan and tattoos. Long thought to be taboo yet the origins of tattoos in Japan goes back longer than you think.

https://rekishinihon.com/2013/12/05/ainu-tattooing/?wref=tp

For the bakumatsu folks, I just found this really amazing resource. This site shows a map of all of the 国 and all of the 藩 at around 1862. He also explains his methodology and give a very simple, crisp definition of 国、藩、城, and other things. I love this sort of thing that takes a lot of complex knowledge and boils it down in a very accessible way.

https://tonbiwing.com/map/jpn00-zenkoku/

The site looks really amazing but I haven't poked around much. Just came across this one page and wanted to share it.

With all the rage about Alain Delon's death in the media and how every major website in the Sino world from Hong Kong newspapers' official websites to Taiwanese blogs and even Chinese diaspora living in other non-Western countries had written stuff in other languages such as Malay under web domains for their own languages (which would happen to include a couple of people of Chinese descent who don't know any Sino language such as Indonesian Chinese)....... Delon's passing was basically given focused everywhere in among Sino netizens and diaspora who forgotten to speak any Chinese language.

So it makes me want to ask...... I just watched Manhunt and Sandakan No. 8 two movies which are the top 3 highest grossing of all time in ticket admissions from Japan......... With over 80% of the sales coming from Chinese audiences! To the point that Manhunt is still the highest grossing foreign movie ever released in China and Sandakan 8 also still remains the runner up or 3rd place depending on the source you read. How much did they profit to be precise? Manhunt made over 300 million tickets sold in China (with some sources saying total market life time is close to a billion at over 800 million admissions!) while Sandakan is the 100 million sold tickets range.

And thus it should be obvious the leads of both movies Ken Takakura and Komaki Kurihara were catapulted to the top of the AAA list giants name within China with both stars getting a lot of their famous works from Japan dubbed into Chinese theatrical releases and later on Kurihara and Takakura would star as among the leads of their own Chinese-language productions. Up until his death Takakura would continiously receive media coverage from China and visit Beijing several times near the end of his life. The same happened to Kurhara except she visited China with more frequency since the late 80s coming back every now and then an to this day she still gets honorary visits from the Chinese industry and media, even a few politicians. Takakura was so beloved in China that when he died, the Chinese foreign ministry at the time praised him in an obituary for improving the relations between China and Japan.

For Komaki Kurhara, Sandakan No. 8 sped up in how the comfort women and other touchy topics regarding sexual assault esp rape by the Japanese army within China was approached by the general populace. As Wikipedia sums up, the struggles the movie's co-protagonist goes through was something the general mainland Chinese populace identified with in light of how an entire generation of the country suffered through the horrific Comfort Woman system Esp the human trafficking issue depicted in the movie.

So I'm wondering were Ken Takakura and Komaki Kurihara also household names in Taiwan and Hong Kong and the rest of the Sinosphere like Alain Delon was? I can't seem to find much info on them in Cantonese and Hokkien nor in the languages of places the Chinese diaspora frequently moves to across Asia such as Indonesian and Malaysia. So I'm wondering how well received where they in the rests of the Chinese-speaking world?

I think these women were from the red light district. I don’t really remember much except some women acted controlling so the men would want to divorce them.

On April 6, 1945, Corporal Tsugihiko Adachi took off from Chiran Air Base and died in a special (suicide) attack west of Okinawa at the age of 19. He was a member of the 44th Shinbu Special Attack Squadron and piloted an Army Hayabusa Type 1 Fighter (Allied code name of Oscar). After his death in a special attack, he received a promotion to Second Lieutenant. He was from Ōita Prefecture and was a member of the 12th Class of the Army's Youth Pilot (Shōhi) Program.

He wrote the following final diary entries on the day before and on the day of his assignment to a special attack unit:

February 6, Tuesday

I read Japanese Army history. I learned about the Imperial Army's heroic traditions and great spirit during the country's founding. I was filled anew with deep emotion. When I think about it, the current Greater East Asia War is the realization of that great ideal. Thus, the war situation now is at its most perilous point. It is a heavy and great responsibility for us. We must strenuously exert ourselves. We must strive with a fighting spirit overflowing with fervour.

Corporal Tabuchi departed to Kanamaru for exercises. Depending on future changes, we will be assigned to the OO (censored place) battle that we have desired for several years. When I think that in the near future will be the day when I am on the front line, I am filled with a feeling where my blood tingles with excitement. I absolutely will display always a man's spirit. And now, I will live in the great spirit of the Imperial Army's traditions, and I offer my life for those traditions. An ancient person said, "If there are hardships, there will be pleasure." At the present time in the Empire, we are in the midst of those hardships. We are in great distress. There may even be grumbling that arises. It is fine to grumble. If there is grumbling, it will not be as one hopes. The more one grumbles, the harder it will be. There will be great distress. In the midst of that, certainly spring will come when flowers will bloom. That day will be the realization of the great ideal of the country's founding. What we enjoy today are those days of hardship. Those hardships will not disappear during my lifetime. They will continue for untold ages.

Based on great ideal of universal brotherhood

I will go smiling to southern seas

February 7, Wednesday

Ordinary days have ended.

Today I received an order to participate in the Army Special Attack Corps. I am greatly moved by passion in my life. There is nothing that surpasses this as a young man's long-cherished desire that he is zealous to achieve. After this I will stop my entries.