Seeing someone now just make a post about artillery and Dien Bien Phu a another subreddit, I think the Warcollege one, I'm now wondering about something I frequently see. One of the pretty much unknown points about the French war in Vietnam (which is actually part of a much larger war called the Indochina War and encompassed the whole of French colonies in Southeast Asia, not just Vietnam) to people haven't taken the time to read it was the brief period when General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny was commander. One of France's greatest decorated heroes from the World Wars (yes he didn't just serve in French Resistance, he was in the trenches of 1914), de Lattre was asked to serve in Vietnam because the revolutions in Indochina was going downhill and the French government was panicking at a defeat in the area that will expel all French citizens from Indochina completely. Literally when he assumed the job of governer-general, the VietMinh was going all out in a full offensive to take the capital of the French administration Saigon and entire divisions of their infantry were marching full speed to French territory. Attacks were already taking place when he landed in Vietnam.

De Lattre shocked both the VietMin and the French by doing a fluid series of simultaneous mobile counterattacks and fortifications in the style of Dien Bien Phu that mauled the VietMinh so bad they didn't just retreat with gigantic casualties that took over a year to recover even after de Lattre's tenure ended upon his death at the end of the year of his arrival, they hesitated to do major open operations again while he was alive and even the covert and insurgent-style actions that was their MO had to be modified and at times scaled down because de Lattre was just that good at countering them.

It wasn't just his prowess as a general that impacted the situation but de Lattre was a man of charisma and the epitome of led by example. When one of the major forts was being besieged, he personally flew to the location so he can be there on the spot to command the troops and analyze the ongoing siege by himself and the demoralized French companies there recovered morale high enough they fought with commitment despite haphazard resupplies and casualties from the prolonged siege. Which should clue into you how much his charisma and leadership personality completely changed the mood of the French psychology at that point in the war.

If I were to continue writing on and on it'd be a whole book so I'll do the TLDR ersion for the rest of what he did. He was taking actions to develop a government that would grant independence to Vietnam for self-governance by Vietnamese people. He called for international meetings simultaneously where he vouched for America and the rest of the world to get involved with Vietnam in a coalition focused on SouthEast Asia so that a proposed free Vietnam could have to means of defending herself from the CCP and USSR to remain independent of not just communism but be its own real sovereign nation ruled by the Vietnamese people rather than as a lackey puppet state (despite his end goals being in France's interests as a loyal soldier).

In fact in a rather sad irony he unintentionally extended the length of the Indochina War because his tenure was so successful (and tragically futile because the French would get defeated in the end and leave and Vietnam would eventually be overtaken by communism when it finally won complete independence anyway). A lot of his intended planning like building a proper non-communist Vietnamese army consisting of locals whose allegiance are to fight for this hypothetical independent Vietnam not as a lackeys to French overlords but for the people of Vietnam were ultimately flushed down the toilet or modified so much to specifically serve the French interests solely (which is a good simplified summary of how South Vietnam got created).

So this brings up the next topic. One of the biggest what-ifs always discussed regarding the Vietnam Wars (not just the French War but the whole direction of the three wars of Independence of the Indochina region)........ If de Lattre didn't died, would Dien Bien Phu or some other disaster on the same ballpark have taken place? This is already made complicated by the fact that its believed the sickness that led to his death before the first Vietnam War concluded was caused in large part due to his grief caused by his son's death fighting in the fields of Vietnam. So a lot of discussions I seen in the past often remark his son remaining alive or not will be a major factor even if he didn't get stricken with the cancer that came from grief. So

1)de Lattre survives the whole war with his son's death and he does everything that happened irl but he never gets a fatal illness

2)de Lattre not only survives up until the last year of the Indochina War in nonfiction timeline chronology but his son also avoids being killed and is there for the final evacuation of France from Vietnam

So assuming these two hypothesized scenario, does Dien Bien Phu or something like it never takes place in either case? Or if a major battle still takes place that gets in a really bad position, does De Lattre's generalship prevent the complete utter defeat of French forces in both cases? Like say he was temporarily sent Vietnam and general Navarre assumes leadership and takes the same action that leads into Dien Bien Phu but de Lattre is sent last minute to lead once again by orders of a panicking French government, does Dien Bien Phu not turn into a defeat assuming scenario 1 and 2?

Honestly among students of the French Indochina War, this is really one of the most discussed what-ifs so I'm wondering what other people think? Whats the most likely outcome regarding a Dien Bien Phu like debacle if he lived long enough until the time Dien Bien Phu was being fought?

Its pretty much a common meme mocking the arrogance of the French army for the cluster%@#! that is Dien Bien Phu in particular about the widespread belief in the military stationed in Indochina that there is no way for the VietMinh to bring up artillery over the top of the mountains of DBP. An assumption that would cost the battle and lead to the worst defeat any European colonial power has aver faced after World War 2. So much to the point the French are the only major empire that lost a major head-on conventional pitch battle in the style of Clausewitz against the colonized rebels during the downfall of colonialism.

But as I read more into the whole war, it becomes apparent the French weren't alone in believing that it'd be impossible to transport artillery to Dien Bien Phu. Bernard Fall mentions that Americans who were involved in French affairs actually believed the uphill mountains would be extremely difficult even for the US army to transport any equipment with noteworthy firepower like AA guns and tanks never mind large tall heavy cannons that made up the bulk of Vietnamese far ranged weapons in the battle. At least one American intel officer ultimately agreed with the French conclusion that there's no way the stationed division there could lose as the VietMinh wouldn't have the weapons to obliterate the flimsy trenches and bunkers built on the location esp with French counter-battery. And even if they brought big guns, American analysts sincerely believed no way would they be brought in large enough numbrs with enough shells to pose a threat.

I seen British statements to the French also saying that while they warned the place would be a death trap if a Western equipped army is able to cross over, the artillery equipment would be a gigantic pain to bring up. Even the Soviets were treating the whole thing as a side show where if the VietMinh lost, its no big deal and a minor liability and if they win, well great investment for the communist PR withe little money thrown which is why the bulk of equipment came through Chinese direct aid rather than Soviets directly doing the supply chains. Basically plenty of the goods where Chinese-purchased if not even made in China and the Soviets while hoping for a victory, where not throwing big investments because they thought it'd more likely be another typical defeat in the war.

I have to ask why did the West practically believe that the VietMinh would unlikely to have transport mass artillery into Dien Bien Phu? I mean I'm just flabbergasted reading from not just Bernard Fall but from other books of how its not just the French but the Americans equally believed as well that artillery (or at least enough of it) would be impossible to transport across the hills over the summit of the highest mountains into the valley and the Brits and Soviet pessimism in the situation for the Vietnamese side. Why was this believe so rife among first world nations? instead DBP would be the greatest single victory in a traditional Western style mass battle ever won by the anti-colonialist revolutionaries and this is due to the fact they did the impossible task of transporting howitzers and other heavy firepower into the place despite large hills and even a mountain or two alone the way!

In 1961, Pied Noirs began fleeing Algeria en masse. By 1964, nearly a million had returned to mainland France

Years ago I saw a martial arts debate which self-defense instructor Marc MacYoung (who has a degree in history) participated. Basically the debate was asking about working manual laborers beating martial artists and used a clip from a fictional TV show of a butcher who was overwhelming a trained soldier who was well-versed in martial arts (in fact he took out a bunch of bandits who held an entire train by hostage in prior episodes). to the point the soldier who was making movements to defend against the blow panicked at some point and the butcher was able to put some nasty cuts on hi arms because he fell down and was unable to continue proper defensive movements because he got overtaken by fear. Though in the end the soldier survived.

The person who asked the question said his relatives come from Algeria as a bonus point and were far more effective their cutting techniques when preparing for food (including cutting chickens heads off and preparing animal meat from the slaughterhouse) and also pointed out about the Algerian Revolution and rebels ambushing police and even a few military police with knives.

MacYoung made a point that being a soldier is different from fighting skills and a sa the debate continued it went off tangentially into military and history. From what I remembered MacYoung was telling the poster that the reality is that insurgencies never win wars and its the conventional army that wins wars and points out many examples like the Viet Cong getting demolished when they confronted a military force and made a mocking statement about multiple guerrillas like the French Resistance, Filipino bushwackers against Imperial Japan in WWII, and the FLN in Algeria not being able to beat the enemy until they get help from a conventional army like the American military battling the Japanese in Manila or the Allied forces commencing D-Day and other operations to force the Germans to retreat from France or alternetely the government decides its not worth spending money to occupy the territory (which he used for the FLN example)?

He adds with a comment asking the other person who sent the question that I remember going something along this lines.

What if the French decided to take Algeria for themselves and settle the country? They decided to start killing Algerians in every territory they send their own people from France into and rebuilt the new place for themselves with French infrastructure? You see for all the talk about all's fair in love and war, there are actual rules of engagements. You don't fight a people you seek to conquer and enslave the same way from stabilizing a country where most people don't really care about foreign occupation and just want to live their lives. In the same way an army's policies are completely different if the government's intention is to take new land for their citizens' benefits. Think the FLN will still be able to win if the French decides to goo hands offhandle Algeria as a new settler colony? While we are at it, people remember the 6 million Jew s who were killed in WWII. WHat people don't remember is the over 10 million Poles, Ukrainians, and other Slavs along with other unwanted peoples in the Eastern Front of World War 2. If the French decided to copy what the Nazis did in Eastern Europe, do you honestly believe Algeria would win? They only could operate the way they did because of French hesitancy to do genocides in the aftermath of WWII and fear of being associated with Nazi Germany's shadow.

THen he writes the other details I posted earlier about French Resistance being saved by the Allies, etc which I didn't write in this quote because I don't exactly remember how he said it. Even the quote above is just my recollection and not the exact thing he wrote but because I remembered it much better I did the best to my memory to rewrite it.

So I'm curious. What if the French became less restraint and decided to go more brutal in Algeria. If they take it to "wipe whole towns and cities level" or possibly even genocide? Would the FLN be unable to win the war? If avoiding outright genocide and preferring to avoid slaughtering whole towns and cities just not being white French and being "desert savages" as a racist French politician from the 19th century called them during the final years of complete conquest of Algeria , say they left it to Soviet style reprisals in the 70s and 80s in Afghanistan.

How would it all turn out in any of these 3 approaches? Would it lead to the complete destruction of the FLN and absolute victory for the French as Marc MacYoung claims? Or would none of this work and Algeria was bound to independence no matter what even if FLN and followers were systematically exterminated without any hesitation akin to Nazis and gassing entire populations they saw at subhumans? Is MacYoung wrong despite being so sure about his takes when he posted these resposnes in the martial arts discussion?