I want to contrast Deleuze's interpretation of Spinoza with the orthodox interpretation of his time. Which commentaries constitute the orthodox interpretation of his time? I will read Gueroult's two volumes for now, is there any other important one?

The only hint I have is this quote from Difference and Repetition (p. 304):

All that Spinozism needed to do for the univocal to become an object of pure affirmation was to make substance turn around the modes — in other words, to realize univocity in the form of repetition in the eternal return.

1 / I find this confusing, as it's difficult to conceive of modes independently of substance. Yet, this passage seems to suggest we should view substance as dependent on the modes, reversing the typical perspective.

2 / I'm also concerned about the concept of attribute. In Spinoza and the Problem of Expression, attribute is key to establishing univocity. However, I also read:

“It is true that such a point of view is not sufficient to prevent us from considering these senses as analogues and this unity of being as an analogy. We must add that being, this common designation, insofar as it expresses itself, is said in a single and same sense of all the numerically distinct designators and expressors.” （DR, 35）

This highlights the insufficiency of Spinoza's formal distinctions between attributes, at least for univocity of being.

Hey guys, i am reading ATP(in portuguese as i am from Brazil) and i find it quite hard to understand how the "exceptional animal in te pack"(or "the demon" as they say) wich the subject must establish and alliance in order to become-animal isn't a hierarchical concept. They say such animal would trace lines that position the rest of the animals of the pack according to the multiplicity and that he would, as the leader of the pack, trace and occupy the borders of the pack. Isn't that hierarchical? i thought that one of the things they tried to do in this plateau is estabilishing a radically non-hierarchical ontology. Thanks in advance

Hi, clue is in the title. Looking specifically for any mention of evidentially grounded concepts such as those of physics and mathematics with philosophical concepts, particularly comparisons of how they differ. It seems to me that there is a difference, particularly in how rigorous we can be interpersonally. Thanks in advance.

I’ve found a good deal, particularly the chapters in what is philosophy. If there was anything substantial in the earlier, more formal stuff that would be great as it’s for an essay at an analytic uni.

I'm translating his text on Helene Cixous. This query is not directly related to Deleuze, because I actually need help with a quote by Cixous (I thought there should be people here familiar with Cixous's work):

«La règle est simple: passer d’un tronc à l’autre soit en échangeant les corps actifs soit en échangeant leurs termes suppléants, soit en échangeant les noms des termes qui fonctionnent deux à deux [...] L’effet du mouvement est tel que par stroboscopie les arbres produisent une sorte de pôle lisse ou à peine rayé de hachures verticales foncées, spectres des générations: Papier... Chacun joue l'autre: Soit l'énoncé "Aucun n'est Sans son Autre: Samson le hante"»

It's not easy to render this in my native language, especially because this passage plays with words a lot, for example "pôle lisse" phonetically is almost the same as "police", and "Sans son Autre" resembles "Samson le hante".

Do you spot any other details? How would you interpret this passage in general?

Upon learning the results of the election, I couldn’t help but wonder why so many Americans (including Latinos, black men, Arab-Americans, and young men who tend to favor Democrats historically from what I’ve seen) decided to vote for Trump, even with all the racism, January 6th, tariffs, mass deportation, abortion ban, authoritarian tendencies and threats, etc. It reminds me of the famous quote from Anti-Oedipus:

“That is why the fundamental problem of political philosophy is still precisely the one that Spinoza saw so clearly, and that Wilhelm Reich rediscovered: ‘Why do men fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?’…Reich is at his profoundest as a thinker when he refuses to accept ignorance or illusion on the part of the masses as an explanation of fascism, and demands an explanation that will take their desires into account, an explanation formulated in terms of desire: no, the masses were not innocent dupes; at a certain point, under a certain set of conditions, they wanted fascism, and it is this perversion of the desire of the masses that needs to be accounted for.”

I’m sure most of us had heard misinformation and disinformation thrown around so much as one of the evils that Trump spreads, but can we only say that so much when we also take into consideration the possibility that Americans wanted to hear the lies that Trump had to say. It’s an interesting question that I’ve been pondering over, and I wonder what a schizoanalysis of the situation would reveal and open the door to in terms of future possibilities to explore as we navigate our way out of this, but I guess that only time will tell.

I'm a philosophy MA graduate from China, planning to apply for a Deleuze PhD (or a funded MA) for Fall 2025. Do you have any recommendations for English-speaking programs with funding, not only in US, but also Canada, Australia, or Europe,etc?

My interests are his metaphysics and ontology (univocity of being, grounding, material composition, immanence), as well as his relationship to Spinoza.

Of course, non-philosophy humanities programs are also great—as long as there's funding, preferably for a PhD. Switching fields would be challenging for me, though.

In part 3 of Spinoza's Ethics, the ninth proposition looks like this:

Prop. IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this endeavour it is conscious.

He proves it as follows:

Proof.—The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and inadequate ideas (III. iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so far as it possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the latter, it endeavours to persist in its own being, and that for an indefinite time (III. viii.). Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the modifications of the body, the mind is therefore (III. vii.) conscious of its own endeavour.

Then he goes on to distinguish will from appetite, relating will to the mind and appetite to both the mind and body:

Note.—This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is called will, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it is called appetite ; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's essence, from the nature of which necessarily follow all those results which tend to its preservation ; and which man has thus been determined to perform.

Then he goes on to define desire as an appetite that is conscious:

Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly be thus defined : Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof. It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it.

Is this compatible with Deleuze's notion of desire? I would assume mostly yes, since Spinoza is one of his main influences. To sum it up, for Spinoza desire would be the conscious act of the mind and body to preserve in their own being. This is compatible with Deleuze's notion of desire as a positive thing. However, I'm not sure if desire is a conscious thing for Deleuze. Can't desire also be unconscious for Deleuze, as per his psychoanalytic influences?

Does anyone else get a "trippy" or even dizzying feeling when you try to view the world through his ontological lens? The idea that I, and everything else in existence, consists of multiplicities and intensities completely dismantles any notions of reality consisting of substances and makes me feel like the floor is being pulled from beneath me.

I'm also a big music guy, so trying to think of music as an aggregate of affects has been really eye-opening.

I've read D's book on Nietzsche and AO, but haven't got to the other works yet.

That being said, what I've read in some articles/SEP for example, got me a bit confused.

Some quotes from SEP:

For Deleuze, the task of art is to produce “signs” that will push us out of our habits of perception into the conditions of creation

Rather than a “common sense” in which all the faculties agree in recognizing the “same” object, we find in this communicated violence a “discordant harmony”

How does this position fit into AO for example? It seems as if the social context is kind of dropped absolutely.

Here's an imaginary example. What could Deleuze say on this?

1. Let's say there's some guy. He draws, do some performances and whatnot. Has some recognition and is pretty much involved in social life.

Now one day he eats a soup and thinks "hmm, is there something interesting in this?" He then goes every day on stage and eats soup while his mate is playing synthesizers or something. And if enough people are buying into this for whatever reasons, it becomes a normal thing in current social setting (this thing does become "reterritorialized" Deleuze would maybe say?). In some time it won't seem any stranger than any "modern art". 2) And the counter example, some other guy sits at home all day long, makes absolutely bizzare machines, invents things, pushing the boundaries of known science, etc, then goes outside, shows it to people and nobody cares and considers him a weirdo, despite the fact that what he does is unprecedented and can't be done / have not been done by anyone.

My inference from AO is this is how what people nowadays call art might happen. That it's not really about some thing in particular, but about social production.

What would Deleuze say on both examples?

What's the difference between them?

I'm reading nomadology (and loving its metaphors examples and writing style) and im curious if we know which fields guattari contributed more in and where deleuze contributed more? What was the dynamic bw them? And why is deleuze consistently celebrated more eg this subreddit name or the name "deleuzean philosophy" where ive not heard "guattarian thought" used anywhere yet? Did they have a seperate editor? How much control did publishers hold on their works and which of d and g had the final say on what was and wasnt in the books and how it was delivered?

Thanks loads for any insights and skate or die 😵

I was really wondering about this, there's tons of talk about how Gentrification lowers crime, but I was wondering if the reverse is true, to ask a Deleuzian question does crime ward off gentrification?

I'm actually asking this purely empirically as I don't actually know.

But it seems like a really relevant question to Deleuze. A lot of political discussion and difference seems to be centered around Violence and where Violence should resign. No one actually wants there to be no violence, the pro Capitalist people believe violence should reside in the hands of the police, Communists believe Violence should reside in the hands of a revolutionary force.

It's certainly worth asking if Crime is not a regrettable alternative to the violence of Gentrification, but instead the warding off of gentrification in advance?

Here is a passage from the fourth series of Deleuze's "Logic of Sense":

"The Mouse recounts that when the lords proposed to offer the crown to William the Conqueror,

"the archbishop of Canterbury found it advisable—."—"Found what?" asked the Duck.—"Found it," the Mouse replied rather crossly: "of course you know what 'it' means."—"I know what 'it' means well enough, when I find a thing," said the Duck: "it's generally a frog, or a worm. The question is, what did the archbishop find?"

It is clear that the Duck employs and understands "it" as a denoting term for all things, state of affairs and possible qualities (an indicator). It specifies even that the denoted thing is essentially something which is (or may be) eaten. Everything denoted or capable of denotation is, in principle, consumable and penetrable; Alice remarks elsewhere that she is only able to "imagine" food. But the Mouse made use of "it" in an entirely different manner: as the sense of an earlier proposition, as the event expressed by the proposition (to go and offer the crown to William). The equivocation of "it" is therefore distributed in accordance with the duality of denotation and expression. The two dimensions of the proposition are organized in two series which converge asymptotically, in a term as ambiguous as "it," since they meet one another only at the frontier which they continuously stretch. One series resumes "eating" in its own way, while the other extracts the essence of "speaking."

Deleuze gives this example to showcase the meaning of denotation versus expression (ignoring the other two: manifestation and signification). Denotation is how the duck uses the word "it" while expression of sense is how the mouse uses it. For the Duck, "it" refers to specific, tangible objects that can be eaten—like frogs or worms. This represents a denotative use of "it," where it points to a concrete item in the world.

However, I don't understand why the mouse uses it in order to refer to the sense of a proposition ("expression"). From what I've read, sense is for Deleuze the event of a proposition, something that does not exist but that "subsists" or "insists" in a proposition, with an event being something that does not exist in reality but that 'happens' whenever we speak. What does this have to do with how the mouse used the word "it"?

In the Logic of sense, in the third series, Deleuze is explaining the difference between denotation, manifestation and signification. While explaining manifestation, Deleuze suggests that it is the operation which reveals the subject's desires or beliefs in a statement. Then he goes on to define 'desire' as follows:

"Desire is the internal causality of an image in relation to the existence of the corresponding object or state of affairs"

Can someone explain that sentence in simple terms to me? I don't understand Deleuze's definition of desire in this context.

I’ve just read D&G and am now struck with the question: what’s next? In your guys’ opinion, which thinkers have best expanded on the Deleuzoguattarian project? By this, I mean which theorists seem to be writing the most potent work in the same vein as these two? How do you guys embody libidinal politics on a personal level?

While admonishing Derrida (who I also find patchy, tedious in his textual performativity), Jameson consistently speaks very highly of Deleuze (as "one of the great thinking machines"), and although he obviously speaks at length about Deleuze's "dualisms" (namely of the molar/molecular, the schizo/paranoid), he's also enamoured by Deleuze's rhizomorphic mode and his epochal(?) containment of a time when "axiomatics become infinitely multiple".

I've always been aware of Jameson's interest in Sartre and Baudrillard, but considering the Deleuzean dimension is new for me, as it might be for others, and is making me contemplate the possibility of a non-dialectical rhizomorphic substratum running through Jameson's thought (the labyrinthine complexities of hyperspace, which he borrows from Baudrillard, come to mind). 🤔

I can’t think of any.

I am looking for some articles, book chapters, etc.

I've been thinking of this passage from Nomadology:

Finally, speaking like Kant, we would say that the relation between war and the war machine is necessary but "synthetic".

I'm sorry if D&G have explicitly said this and I just forgot or missed it, but would it be fair to say that Capital (dead labor) and necessary human living labor are in a synthetic a priori link?

In the sense that insofar as we say that Capital = Labor, is a true statement, and it is true a priori, which is to say necessarily, but it is a synthetic truth, and not a self evident definitional truth.

I'm thinking about it in light of this idea that Human Labor is somehow surpassed as necessary to Capital or that it makes no sense that our accounting procedures concerning Capital should involve the idea of human labor at all.

In the Labor theory of Value, human living labor remains the stubborn counterpart to Capital. Capital is not actually operational if it does not perform the procedure of the allocation of human Labor, which inevitably recasts Capitalist assets themselves as pre-allocated Human labor.

It is my third time reading D&R and I want to read back on some of the sources, and I'm looking for some literature on (or by) Péguy that could help me place him in the context of Deleuze's book. As far as I know his book Clio is not translated to English, and that's the one that Deleuze references the most.

Does D&G use the expression “and then…and then…and then…” as synonymous with interconnectivity (one machine connects to another and then to another) or does it also have another meaning/use?

sorry, i'm really bad at using reddit, and i didn't figure out a way i could reply with the following as a comment to the initial post! also wrote enough that this could just stand alone as a post lmao. i ended up reviewing this document generated through an LLM and attached sources, referred to from this post because i was feeling bored and also in the mood to write philosophy tonight, and also because the document itself bothered something in me, and i wanted to try and write what was bothering me about the document. i'll stick to comments on the portion of the document on comparing the "image of thought" between WiP and DR, since that's what i'm most familiar with.

overview!

it seems like if the goal of this LLM is to sum up important points under a particular theme, it tends to erase differences and details to such a point as to be no longer very useful to me (not unique to LLMs given that this happens with many many attempts that try to summarize philosophical systems, but it is an issue that does show up with LLMs very often in my experience). this also makes sense to me given my understanding of what an LLM does in relation to language: unless we consider the frequency of words as a reliable proxy for meaning, LLMs cannot work with the meanings of things and mostly works with words syntactically, which seems like it'd create notable issues with Deleuze, who often writes about different concepts while christening them with the same name so that they resonate. (because of this, i reckon an LLM cannot really do justice to the ontologies of problems/intensive curves/pre-philosophical planes of immanence in Deleuze, all of which try to think something beyond the notion of a proposition, or the common-sense notion of a sentence. but this is tangential) (also, if anyone either knows more about how LLMs work or is a Searle-head and really into the semantics-syntactics arguments about phil of mind, feel free to jump in and reeducate me : p )

take that theme-phrase that this LLM generates (on p. 16 of the initial document), "From Negative Critique to Positive Affirmation". actually, let's take the whole passage that comes after it:

Initially, Deleuze used the "image of thought" to criticize traditional philosophy's tendency to limit thought to representation, restricting its engagement with difference and becoming [1-5]. This critique saw the "image of thought" as a restrictive force hindering creativity. However, in "What is Philosophy?", Deleuze and Guattari shift towards a more affirmative perspective, acknowledging that thought itself, despite its potential limitations, is a creative force [6-9].

comments!

many comments at this point:

1. the thought that thought, despite its potential limitations, is a creative force, is both (a) not a thought that seems to me to appear in WiP, and (b) a too-surface-level reading of the text that leads toward what i'd consider a not-very-strong interpretation of the material, given the claims D&G are making about philosophy in that book.
   1. since language of limit and unlimited seem to hold privileged positions in the text that are tied to claims D&G are making about the "ontology", if i may, of philosophical problems (and scientific/artistic problems), keeping a phrase like "despite its potential limitations" does quite a big disservice to me when i imagine something like the past me who was trying to understand how D&G are using concepts of the limit and of the unlimited--both because that framing doesn't really appear to me in the book, and because this summary would not tip me off to the fact that those are privileged concepts in the book.
   2. (think, too, of a sentence like this in WiP: "Artaud said that the 'plane of consciousness' or limitless plane of immanence [...] also engenders hallucinations, erroneous perceptions, bad feelings" (p. 49). sure, i think we can colloquially say that D&G are talking about "the limitations of thought" here, but that, again, doesn't rly do useful service to this thought to me, given that the kind of thing D&G are talking about is something limitless, and the fact that i don't think they're thinking of hallucinations, erroneous perceptions, and bad feelings as limitations of thought--they are thinking of them as regions and movements that populate a limitless plane).
2. the phrasing of "here, Deleuze does this negative valuing of this concept, while there, D&G do this positive valuing of the same concept", seems to bury a notably important lede that both DR and WiP actually end up making very parallel moves here, despite responding to different problems altogether. (moreover, although the concepts resonate across either book, the "image of thought" in DR is not like an Aristotelian substantial that just undergoes an inessential modification in WiP; due to the difference in problem between the two books, they end up becoming different substantials altogether).
   1. in the image of thought chapter in DR, Deleuze ends up distinguishing between the image of thought (which is connected to representation, among other concepts) and a thought without image (something like an alternative for thought he is offering--this move itself resonates quite a bit with Bergson's style of presenting different tendencies in a mixture, then using something like intuition to help notice one of the mixed-in tendencies). this same move doesn't appear in the same way in WiP, but it resonates quite strongly: though philosophical thought retains an image of thought, a plane of immanence, as one of its components or events, this image of thought, the plane of immanence, can always be coopted by movements or figures of transcendence (some of the transcendent figures include discussion or communication).
   2. in either case, D (or D&G) present (a) two moves present, and (b) a valuing of one move in relation to the contrasted other move. since the LLM marks the difference not internally between the two separate mixtures of DR and WiP, but instead marks it between two presentations of two concepts that happen to share a name across two different problems, the kind of reader who may find a summary like this useful is far more likely to miss a resonance in moves across the two books. it's not obvious to a novice reader of D that the concept of "transcendence" in WiP resonates in important ways with the concept of "the image of thought" in DR.

concluding thoughts!

1. this all leads to the summary of this "reframing" of the image of thought continuing to present thoughts that i feel would do a disservice to a reader trying to track the different usages of terms in Deleuze and trying to keep their head above water in what is already an often irritatingly labyrinthine corpus of work (i say this lovingly). in a line like "In summary, 'What is Philosophy?' reframes the 'image of thought' from a limiting factor to a generative force":
   1. the image of thought in WiP is, imo, unfairly characterized as a generative force, when instead it is being presented as one of the components of philosophy (including a philosophy like Descartes', which to my understanding Deleuze is also engaging a bit more with in the image of thought chapter in DR). it is a component that contains both positive and negative movements.
   2. WiP makes claims that philosophy, art, science, are all creative activities taken on against and in relation to chaos, which is to say activities where you are constructing something in relation to a particular problem (and often coordinating different somethings according to a taste befitting of the particular activity you take on). to say that (a) these activities are constructed-constructing, and that (b) they create and take on certain relations to chaos in a way where they are generating concepts, or percepts-affects, or precepts, is very different from saying that the image of thought, or the plane of immanence, which is characterized as a component of philosophical thought (despite its interfacings with the other activities), is a generative force.

counterarguments?

i think someone may fairly argue, about the above points, that in the case of someone already embedded and more familiar with Deleuze's concepts and claims, a summary like the one in the initial document may not be very useful--i would agree with that characterization. i think someone may also refuse to consider my lines of thought because i ruined my own discursive authority when i said that i feel that most summaries are somewhere between useless to actively harmful in philosophy (teehee (ﾉ≧ڡ≦)). to someone like that, i'll try and say this:

1. if i were to grant that a summary is useful for something like gaining the lay of the land with a philosophy, or useful as a study guide, it seems like i'd much rather entrust that task to someone who is already deeply embedded in those texts, in the histories of those texts, in the problematics that they are invoking, in an awareness of the conditions under which those texts were generated--all things that an LLM cannot really do. i think you could say at this point that "that's why you include well-researched primary and secondary sources, in order to provide that additional context", but at this point we're in a "It's all turtles all the way down" situation, because 1) can the LLM access utterances in the new secondary sources that you have added that are a reliable proxy for the histories, problematics, conditions of creation of those very same added texts? and 2) if it could "perceive" this in the first place, then how would it make decisions in relation to those conditions? would it even bring attention to them? one could put something like my writing here into the notebook with all the initial sources inputted for the above document, and perhaps NotebookLM would then be able to say, "oh, transcendence in WiP is connected to the image of thought in DR", but it would not be able to say anything about the plane of immanence i'm already traveling on, or why i would make a connection between the two in that way via Bergson.
2. if i were to grant that a summary is useful for something like gaining the lay of the land with a philosophy, the bare minimum i would want it to be able to do is to not suggest meanings of privileged terms in a philosophy that seem to take argumentative power away from the critical and affirmative moves being made by those concepts themselves. ultimately, i'm not that worried about an LLM using some colloquial language that "happens to mean something different" in the philosophy itself, as if philosophy is just an endeavor of explicating the meanings of words in the correct way; what i'm worried about is, rather, even thinking of the matter as whether an LLM is getting the meanings of words right or wrong, rather than acknowledging that concepts in philosophy very often, in their affirmative presenting, are critiques of certain movements on a plane of immanence, or critiques of certain transcendent figures--and i think it sucks for me if i'm trying to understand what Deleuze is trying to critique or why and then end up with a shitty understanding of it that risks reproducing the object of critique itself because an LLM is not smart enough to point out privileged terms in a problem to me.

concluding thoughts p. 2!

i think the reason that the initial document was bothering me was because, along a somewhat parallel line as u/TheTrueTrust in the initial thread, i had subjectively felt the post to be a bit lazy (not trying to stir shit or go after you u/basedandcoolpilled, mostly just trying to perceive and interpret my own feelings about what you posted, my contexts and your contexts are bound to be very different! also not trying to start shit in the subreddit anyway, just trying to think a difficult-to-me philosophy problem!). that i felt that way about the initial post is perhaps neither here nor there--or at the very least, i found it useful to then trust some obscure Socratic daimon in me and ask myself questions like, "why does it feel lazy to me?" and "if I were going to engage seriously and earnestly with something I initially perceived to be lazy, how would I engage in it, and why?"

i am of Socrates' ilk (Plato's ilk?) in believing/finding useful that any space, any encounter, can be made more philosophical, which is why i ended up spending way too much time trying to think about this all. either way, i'm happy to have an incidental excuse to write about Deleuze more and gain a better sense of my own use of his concepts and problems, and i hope this is useful to anyone on this subreddit trying to think the relations between or cautionary tales about LLMs and Deleuze (and perhaps philosophical systems in general). if it wasn't useful to you but you still read it all the way through: hi there! thanks for wasting your time with my words ^_^ ok post over yadda yadda paraphrase quote something something if LLMs could kill philosophy by being woefully inadequate to its metaphysical realities then philosophy would only die choking on its own laughter etc et al nge instrumentality 2024 lines of flight baybee bottom text

Sharing Notebook LLM has caused quite a stir. I just read the discussion thread on it and I found it very interesting but I see a lot of people worrying about the AI hallucinating and not getting concepts

And this is valid, there's no way for an AI to just know what Deleuze means by the Virtual and Desire.

But Notebook LM lets you add 50 sources. Load it up with quality scholarship from people like Claire Colebrook, Brian Massumi, Ian Buchannan, Elizabeth Grosz and whoever else you like. Then the AI will answer using their analysis and not have to invent and interpret what "Desire" *could* mean

There's nothing to be ashamed of about not reading secondary texts. I literally have 84 in my digital library rn on D+G. I'd rather read the 25+ book D+G wrote themselves. If getting a condensed and rephrased analysis from a scholar as presented by a LLM helps you understand the primaries then obviously you should do that. These things are just study tools, but you have to understand your tools to use them effectively.

There is actually no way you could read all the philosophy you should in this lifetime. These are just language tools that will help us parse through and find the texts worth actually sitting down and spending our time on.

So yea if Notebook LM is hallucinating, you haven't fed it enough scholarship

If there was a flare for 'Discussion' I'd use that one, because I don't have a precise question.

I just find the way D&G talk about history to be rather specific and want to hear if anyone has thoughts in it.

Unlike a lot of others it really doesn't seem like D&G like talking about historical breaks, nor do they like speaking about history in an overly narratives fashion where there's clear and distinct eras spanning history.

In certain instances it almost feels like they're not even happy with history at all, suggesting for example that rather than the State model supplanting the primitive model in a historical sense, it's actually as old as the primitive model, as far back as you go there have been States.

But on the other hand there's obviously History in D&G, Capitalism for one is something that happened comparatively recently, but also other technological inventions are historical breaks too, and if we go further still obviously the emergence of humanity and the emergence of life itself are historical breaks

Idk I'm rambling but I was just wondering if anyone has any thoughts on how they view History

I've seen quite a few posts in this sub on how people use LLMs for Deleuze texts to get an "overview", I thought I'd make a post to talk about it. Tbh, it got me pretty anxious. I've seen what people reply and that's not what I would expect from people reading Deleuze. I would imagine LLM is usable for fields with some kind of utility. Engineering, applied math, etc. where something either works or not. But I see absolutely no point in using it for philosophy. Wouldn't LLM produce a kind of "average" interpretation for everyone using it? Doesn't really matter what exactly that would be. It literally would push it's interpretation on people and it would become a "standard view", a norm since there will be shitload of people reading exactly this interpretation. It's the same as to read some guy's blogpost on Deleuze but on a different scale, considering it's treated by people not as some biased bullshit by a random guy on the internet that you might read or not, but as "unbiased, disstilled by pure math, essence of Deleuze/[insert any philosopher]" that will be shared by majory. Instead of endless variations, you get a "society approved" version of whatever you wanted to read. If such LLM reading becomes popular and a lot of people do it, I imagine things will become pretty fascist where even reading Deleuze and interpreting it however you can instead of following machine generated "correct interpretation" will make you a weird guy discriminated even by such new LLM driven "Deleuzians". It's very strange, as if people were treating philosophy in general as some kind of secret knowledge or weapon to gain upperhand over other people or something. I mean, like on one hand you have Deleuze/Guatarri, just some guys writing their thoughts, thousands of pages on the things around them, society, problems they see, etc., just literally some guys trying to figure out things, people who are kind of in the same situation as you are. And you can read them or not, relate to some things or not, agree with some things or not. Make whatever you want of it. And on the other hand you have some weird "extraction" by machine learning that looks like a fucking guide on what you have to think. And some people pick the latter. Why?