Syllabus: Petitioner challenges 720 ILCS 5/12-5.01, a statute criminalising the intentional spread of HIV, on the grounds that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment, First Amendment, Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act.

Held: the statute violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 USC 12132).

Read the full opinion here.

Syllabus.

1. Petitioner challenges the March executive order by the governor relocating executive offices to Lansing, claiming the constitutional requirement that “a residence at the seat of government” be maintained and the statutory requirement that “all acts shall be done which are required to be done at the seat of government” are violated.
2. The order violates statute.
3. Words are not words.
4. The order violates the constitution.

Chief Justice homofuckspace delivered the opinion for a unanimous court.

Read the opinion here.

Good Evening (or Morning, I don't know your life or where you live),

We have both enjoyed our time on the bench of the Lincoln Supreme Court (and both also refuse to acknowledge the name change, so there), but we have both decided that we wanted and needed to step down from the bench. We know that our successors will do a wonderful job moving the Court forward and that Justice Notthedarkweb will be able to help steer this crazy ship into the future.

And with that, we bid you good bye!

:)

/u/High-Priest-of-Helix

Syllabus: The following case arises from a challenge to Department of Justice Directive 002, providing for non-enforcement of numerous criminal statutes by the Department. Petitioner argues that the order violates the provision for “faithful execution of laws” in Art. VI, Sec. 8 of the Superior Constitution.

​

Held: The Attorney-General exceeded their authority provided under Art. VI Sec. 8 of the Superior Constitution by prohibiting enforcement of 720 SPCS 5/24-1(6), rendering section 2 of the order unconstitutional. The Court upholds the rest of the order as many of the constitutional issues implicated by the statutes concerned in the order remain unsettled and beyond the scope of this case.

Notthedarkweb_MNZP, J. delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by High-Priest-of-Helix, C.J., and CardWitch, J.

​

The full opinion of the court can be found here.

Applicant submits the following petition to the Supreme Court of the State of Superior.

May it please the Court,

Plaintiff the American Civil Liberties Union of Superior files the following complaint with the honorable Court challenging 720 ILCS 5/12-5.01, a penal statute criminalizing the transmission of HIV.

Plaintiff alleges that the Act violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

We seek declaratory and injunctive relief from this Court.

####The complaint is located here in Google Docs format

Respectfully submitted,

/u/hurricaneoflies

Attorney for Plaintiff

Comes petitioner /u/President_Dewey as Lieutenant Governor of Superior, requesting the Honorable Justices of this Court to grant a writ of certiorari to review the constitutionality of Section 2(vi) of R.003 - Rules of the Second Senate.

• Section 2(vi) of R.003 violates Article VI, Section 12 of the Superior State Constitution

Section 2(vi) of R.003 reads:

"Act as the Lieutenant Governor in the case of a vacancy in the Lieutenant Governorship, whereupon the Speaker shall assume all legislative responsibilities of the Lieutenant Governor as defined in Section 2 (2) until such time as the Lieutenant Governorship is filled."

Section 2(2) provides for the duty of the Lieutenant Governor enumerated in Article VI, Section 12 of the Superior State Constitution, which is to break ties that arise in the State Senate. Paraphasing the section:

"The Lieutenant Governor... shall break ties in the Senate should they arise."

In no way or manner has a law, constitutional provision, or order been instituted delegating such power to the President of the Senate in case of vacancy. Enumerated powers, such as those in the United States Constitution, preclude execution of such powers by other entities.

• Section 2(vi) of R.003 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution

Section 2(vi) of R.003 also runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Although the section enables the President to break ties occurring in the Senate, it does not preclude them from participating in the initial vote. Thus, the President is permitted in the case of ties to vote twice. This is effectively a matter of double representation, and a violation of the "one man, one vote" principle expressed in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Although Reynolds considered redistricting, the principle remains the same under the Equal Protection Clause: those in the President's district (currently Sioux) are not entitled to a greater vote than those of Chicagoland or Dakota.

• Questions for the Court

Does Section 2(vi) of R.003 violate the Article VI, Section 12 of the Superior State Constitution?

Does Section 2(vi) of R.003 violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution?

• Conclusion

In conclusion, I ask the Court to grant relief by striking Section 2(vi) of R.003 as unconstitutional. Thank you.

Applicant submits the following petition to the Supreme Court of the State of Superior.

M: I have not yet taken the bar exam on the SCOTUS sub but this state's court ROP say that there is no bar here, so I think I'm allowed to do this. Please LMK if I'm not.

May it please the Court

Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system and without prejudice to judicial independence, take measures to strengthen integrity and to prevent opportunities for corruption among members of the judiciary. *United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Article 11.

All people in the Midwest have the fundamental right to a healthy environment and efficient education spending.  This includes clean water, and preservation and protection of the environment.** Midwestern Constitution**

Plaintiff claims these sacred rights are violated by the State officers entrusted to protect them through an unconstitutional pork barrel project known as the “Grand Aquarium.”

This aquarium is not deemed by any agency as a public good, or for public enjoyment. It is guaranteed nearly unaccountable funding each year in a budget appropriation unlike any other in the State.

This project is not one of the many industry certified or Midwest-funded aquariums throughout the State intended to preserve aquatic life, subject to financial disclosure laws or with curation programs regulated by the new Board of Education.

The Chief Justice’s staff is appointed as a paid State “Grand Curator,” collecting (but not reporting) “proceeds” for self-promotion of his supervisory position over the aquarium. Yet this pet project is not even mentioned in this Court’s rules of conduct for this building.

Plaintiff asks for the Court to issue an advisory opinion permitted by the Constitution as to whether this vague and costly arrangement of no public benefit to the people of the Midwest is incongruous with the state’s guarantee of environmental protection, clean water, efficient education spending, or the right to review the Court’s spending by any member of the public (instead of the State Senate annually).

To enforce these rights, the Legislature grants plaintiffs a private right of action against the State. “Any person may enforce this right and all others enshrined in this Article against any party, governmental or private, through appropriate legal proceedings subject to reasonable limitation and regulation as the State Senate may prescribe by law.”

Plaintiff intends to do so in this action also seeking declaratory judgment against Chief Justice u/CJkhan in his capacity as judicial officer and Curator of the Aquarium pursuant to Section 1 (Civil), Court Rules, or the acting Chief Curator.

#FACTS

A rational Midwesterner could select any aquarium worthy of of constitutionally-entrenched state spending. The Chicago Zoological Society, certified by the [Humane Society(http://humaneconservation.org/certified-parks/); or the Scovill Zoo, winner of the aquarium industry group’s annual award ensuring “the 196 million visitors that visit AZA-accredited facilities each year can be certain they are supporting facilities dedicated to superior animal care, meaningful guest education, and impactful wildlife conservation.”

The rational man could look to neighbors in Eastern at the National Aquarium, a 501(c)3 charitable organization dedicated to preservation, or the United States National Aquarium in the Commerce Department, the first free aquarium in the nation. [NOAA](https://response.restoration.noaa.gov/national-aquarium-helping-reduce-plastic-pollution).

Today, Midwesterns must instead settle for their state environmental and educational revenue earmarked to a private aquarium below our feet in this courthouse.

Its purpose cannot be explained without further discovery. Is it free? Is it accessible to the public? Are marine animals kept there safely? Is the Chief Justice capable of the task? What of the proceeds from sales of goods or services currently without description? And how may Midwesterners seek spending information, when the Senate skips the Governor to fund the Chief Justice’s project with a mere memo?

The public can’t be certain this aquarium is a public good, or offers a return on their investment. Each judicial budget session that skips the Governor, funding judicial mandates for its own benefit, presents irreconcilable and irrecoverable harm to the taxpayer.

##Educational Harm

According to the University of Midwestern-Illinois, Midwesterners understand what an aquarium is:

Most of us think of zoos and aquariums as family destinations: educational but fun diversions for our animal-loving kids. But modern zoos and aquariums are much more than menageries. According to a new study, the institutions are increasingly contributing to our knowledge base on biodiversity conservation and other scientific topics... The study’s authors determined that researchers at zoos and aquariums have contributed at least 5,175 peer-reviewed articles to conservation, zoology, and veterinary journals over the past 20 years... [o]f the 228 institutions in their sample... age, size, and **the inclusion of research in mission statements were most important.**”**

This Grand Aquarium has no mission statement except to be grandly apportioned. In fact, the Legislative record and Judicial public affairs demonstrate not one statement in support of the environmental or educational value of this undertaking.

Confusingly, the Legislature ordered in its own section that this Court and all agencies in open our institutions of learning to anyone willing to seek them out:

> The State has a responsibility to ensure high-quality education for all who wish to seek it.  

Explicitly, education programs like aquariums must be accessible and cost-efficient:

> The State Senate shall provide the financing for the educational system, and shall fund it **reasonably and efficiently.**

Plaintiff asks the Court whether the State can now determine a reasonable and rational education plan is to create an unclear curation office in a section of the Judiciary?

Legislators went to great extents to prohibit unwise spending. They completely prohibits sectarian spending in education. They created a 10-seat independent Board of Education to advise the Senate and Governor on the budget. This arrangements can either be described as wholly unique in our government, or unconstitutionally vague, forcing this Court to violate the many clauses prohibiting the one outlier assigned to it.

##Taxpayer Harm

The aquarium is funded annually by the Senate, guaranteed upon receipt of a judicial memo. The Legislature lets us know this isn’t the only revenue, because it protects the aquarium’s “proceeds:”

> All proceeds from the Grand Aquarium shall be **used** solely for the **promotion and maintenance** of the Aquarium itself.

> At such time as the State Senate is preparing to distribute appropriations, the Chief Curator shall provide **to the State Senate a memorandum** detailing the funding the Grand Aquarium shall require for the coming fiscal year.

> These funds shall be **used** solely for the **promotion and maintenance** of the Aquarium itself.

The Legislature twice attempts to limit spending by the Court. Then, it reverses itself: announcing that proceeds from unclear judicial activity shall be used for self-promotion and maintenance of the aquarium.

Is the Chief Justice not officially in the exclusive control of the aquarium? As written, the Chief Justice’s own interest in maintaining and promoting his office and staff conflicts with his obligations as a state employee. It also does not comport with the constitutional guarantee imposed in “Finance:”

> Public funds, property, or credit shall only be used for public purposes.

What is clear is that I’m not a single instance is the aquarium created for public access or use, being itself in the judiciary clause. Furthermore, a memorandum sent between the the Chief Justice and Senate appropriators to unlock funding fails the standard the Legislature made to review all other State funding:

> All reports, records, and receipts regarding the use of public funds by the State shall be public record, and shall be available for viewing by the public in a manner prescribed by law.

There is an extraordinary leap in logic to assume the Legislature prescribed by constitutional law that any funding other than for this Court’s fish tank must be presented by the Governor to the State Senate, and separately to the public upon request. Is this unique clause self-sustaining in light of the general duties on the Court?

Midwestern has academic, non-academic, public and private aquariums. Taxpayers know because of their incorporation, or because we may ask our Board of Education and Senators to justify education appropriations, or the governor may add an item to the budget. We can donate to supportive institutions or fund educational purposes. Without any clarity by the state as to what this funding is to accomplish, or how promotions and proceeds are used (and who may enter or pay for access or promotion), this fundamental fiscal protection is violated.

##Environmental Harm

> The State’s natural resources are the common property of all people.

> The State has a responsibility to protect, preserve, and maintain the environment for all the people of the State.

> The State, therefore, may not cause unreasonable degradation to the State’s natural resources or the environment as a whole, whether through action or inaction.

This Court by las provides a “general and supervisory” administration of a private fish tank. Neither the Court nor the Senate have described in any binding form the environmental impact or benefit of a facility that could hold anything from clown fish to killer whales. We know nothing of how the aquarium fulfills the educational mission of any other State aquarium. [NOAA](https://response.restoration.noaa.gov/national-aquarium-helping-reduce-plastic-pollution).

The Legislature has seen it fit to grant the people a direct, private course of legal action to ensure our environmental rights are not infringed by the State or its agencies even if an individuals smaller claim to clean water, preserved sea creatures, and climate education, is threatened, as in the spirit of *Massachusetts v. EPA*:

>The case has been argued largely as if it were one between two private parties; but it is not. The very elements that would be relied upon in a suit between fellow-citizens as a ground for equitable relief are wanting here. The State owns very little of the territory alleged to be affected, and the damage to it capable of estimate in money, possibly, at least, is small. This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.

Midwesterners have the last word as to whether this outlier project protects or undermines our environmental rights provided by the Constitution. ##STANDING

While the legislature found it necessary that the judiciary is the only branch immunized from criminal law in the Constitution, they did see it fit to explicitly allow suit against judges and other state actors violating state laws by prohibiting qualified immunity.

The Chief Justice in his capacity as the administrator and fiscal supervisor of this curated aquarium is the appropriate defendant in this action where there is a conflict of laws including those intended to protect the plaintiff.

The Chief Justice is the master to the aquarium, explicitly in a supervisory capacity. He is the principal of his Court, itself a constitutional duty he has accepted. He is guaranteed a clerk and staff, as employees at his pleasure. See, e.g., MW Tort Immunity Act, 2-202 ("[a] public employee is not liable for his act or omission in the execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission constitutes willful and wanton conduct." 745 ILCS 10/2-202). Through private action, the Chief Justice can stop committing these egregious harms against the public immediately, where every moment of permanent harm against taxpayers and our climate is at risk of permanent injury.

***

*Therefore*, plaintiff the capacity authorized by the Constitution of the Midwest respectfully requests that the Court refrain from further violations of the people’s rights to clean water, environmental preservation, efficient educational spending, and freedom of information regarding revenues pursuant to the document and the right to due process in the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff asks for declaratory relief necessary to protect the plaintiff’s rights, if necessary by enjoining the curation program.

***

##The Grand Aquarium of the Supreme Court

> **Section 10. Grand Aquarium of the Supreme Court**

> The State Senate shall, through the budgetary process, appropriately budget for an aquarium, of which the most senior Justice of the State’s Supreme Court shall be the Chief Curator.

> All proceeds from the Grand Aquarium shall be used solely for the promotion and maintenance of the Aquarium itself.

> At such time as the State Senate is preparing to distribute appropriations, the Chief Curator shall provide to the State Senate a memorandum detailing the funding the Grand Aquarium shall require for the coming fiscal year.

> These funds shall be used solely for the promotion and maintenance of the Aquarium itself.

> Judges shall receive salaries provided by law which shall not be diminished to take effect during their terms of office.  These salaries shall be paid by the State.

INTRODUCTION

Eohn and Eames Emith were twins. They looked remarkably like John and James Smith of In re: 720 ILCS 5/11-11, Case No. 20-12 (Lincoln, July 12, 2020), Bohn and Bames Bmith of In re: 720 ILCS 5/11-11 II, Case No. 20-14 (Lincoln, August 26, 2020), and Cohn and Cames Cmith of In re 720 ILCS 5/12-35, Case No. 20-19 (Lincoln, December 11, 2020) but wore clown makeup everywhere they go.

Though identical, Eohn and Eames now differ in one regard: Eames is dead and has been since 2011. When Eames died, he left his corpse to his beloved brother Eohn to use "for whatever purpose gives him the most pleasure." To fulfill his brother's wishes, Eohn has since that time used Eames's preserved corpse as a glorified fleshlight.

However, in 2012, the then-state of Illinois enacted 720 ILCS 5/12-20.6, prohibiting "necrophilia"--"engag[ing] in sexual conduct with a corpse or involving a corpse." Nonetheless, Eohn continued take pleasure in his deceased twin's flesh until one day in June 2020 he was discovered by a hacker who observed him through his webcam and reported him to the police. Eohn was prosecuted pursuant to the aforementioned 2012 law and convicted.

Eohn now appeals asserting that the statute under which he was convicted, and therefore his conviction, is unconstitutional as a violation of the Ninth Amendment.

ARGUMENT

I. The Statute Violates the Ninth Amendment

"At the very least, the 9th Amendment protects individual rights to engage in wholly private conduct without fear of government reprisal." In re: 720 ILCS 5/11-11 II, Case No. 20-14 at 3 (Lincoln, August 26, 2020); see also Joyner v. United States, No. 20-21 at 44 (Dec. 24, 2020) (Cheatem, J., concurring) (observing that “the Ninth Amendment is not a nullity and, in particular, protects a right to privacy”). Here, that is precisely what Petitioner has done: sought to engage in wholly private conduct. Yet, nonetheless, they have been subject to "government reprisal," in violation of the Ninth Amendment.

Specifically, the Ninth Amendment's right to privacy protects a right to engage in private sexual conduct provided that conduct does not harm others (i.e., is consensual). In In re 720 ILCS 5/11-11 II, for example, this Court struck down as unconstitutional violations of, inter alia, the Ninth Amendment a prohibition on incestuous sexual conduct. In doing so, the Court repeatedly emphasized that the criminalized conduct involved "consensual sexual acts." Likewise, in In re 720 ILCS 5/12-35, No. 20-19 (Linc. 2020), this Court rejected a Ninth Amendment challenge to a statute banning sexual intercourse with animals on the grounds that "what differentiates this case from standard case [sic] of two individuals having sex - is consent." Id. at 2.

In the instant case, the conduct in question is both private and consensual in all relevant respects. Like Bohn and Bames Bmith in In re 720 ILCS 5/11-11 II, who are definitely not the same people as Eohn and Eames Emith in the instant case, Petitioner here engaged in sex acts wholly within the privacy of their own home.

Furthermore, like Bohn and Bames Bmith, Petitioner has engaged in these acts consensually for two independent reasons. First, Eames is dead and Eohn is legally in possession of Eames' corpse; the only person whose consent is required for the sex acts in question is therefore Eohn's, not Eames'. Second, even if this Court were to recognize some sort of posthumous interest in bodily autonomy, the requirement of consent is met here regardless because Eames willed his body to Eohn to use in whatever manner brought him the most "pleasure." Eohn has acted within the scope of that bequest.

Because the sex acts criminalized here took place both privately and consensually, they must be subjected to strict scrutiny, which they cannot survive, as explained below.

II. The Statute Violates Article I, section 24 of the Lincoln Constitution

Section 24 of the Lincoln Constitution protects a "positive right to freedom of conscience." Accordingly, "any law that invades the domain of private conduct of individuals must survive a level of heightened scrutiny not required of laws that are public in nature." In re 720 ILCS 5/11-11 II, No. 20-14 at 5. In contrast to the Ninth Amendment right to privacy, this Court has not imposed any additional requirement of "consent": while in In re 720 ILCS 5/11-11 II the Court repeatedly emphasized the significance of consent in the context of its Ninth Amendment analysis, it made no such mention as to its section 24 analysis. Instead, all that is required to trigger heightened scrutiny is a demonstration that a statute has "invade[d] the domain of private conduct."

The Court was wise to make this distinction because there are many instances in which an inquiry as to "consent" is completely nonsensical when a law invades the private realm. Requiring such laws to meet a heightened level of scrutiny ensures that there will be no "backslid[ing] into fascism lite (TM)." In re 720 ILCS 5/11-11 II, No. 20-14 at 4. Nor are there any instances in which omitting such a requirement would wreak havoc. For example, statutes that criminalize nonconsensual intercourse--sexual assault--would be upheld under this standard because they are narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest, preventing harm to humans.

Here, there is no question the statute has invaded the private realm--Petitioner's conduct took place wholly within the confines of his own home, behind closed doors. He was caught only because he fell victim to internet crime, not because he broadcast his behavior to the rest of the world. For this reason alone, heightened scrutiny must be applied.

III. The Statute Cannot Survive Heightened Scrutiny

The statute cannot survive heightened scrutiny because its intent is merely to "criminaliz[e] taboo sexual relationships." In re 720 ILCS 5/11-11 II, No. 20-14 at 4. Such an aim is not a legitimate government interest, let alone an important or compelling one, as demanded by heightened scrutiny. "A bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest." Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). Accordingly, "[m]oral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003).

Opinion in this matter can be found here.

Syllabus. The following case arises from a challenge to B. 360, an Act creating an executive investigatory commission regarding impeachment of judges. Petitioner suggests that the Act is an unconstitutional delegation of power, and that its requirement that the Assembly take up impeachment proceedings is an unconstitutional commandeering of the Assembly.

Held. The existence of the commission is executive in nature, not legislative, so it is not an unconstitutional delegation of power. However, its requirement that the Assembly take up impeachment proceedings is unconstitutional.

Homofuckspace, J., delivered the opinion of the court as to parts I-IV, joined by High-Priest-of-Helix, C.J., and CardWitch, J., and an opinion as to part V.

historical physical puzzled screw vast apparatus station hard-to-find homeless sloppy

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LINCOLN

/u/darthholo, petitioner

v.

/u/nmtts-, in their official capacity as Governor of the State of Lincoln, respondent

in the matter of B.328: Abolition of Housing Overreach Act.

###I. QUESTIONS

1. Was /u/CooIey0’s recorded vote in favor of B. 328: Abolition of Housing Overreach Act valid?

2. Was B.328: Abolition of Housing Overreach Act legally passed by the General Assembly of the State of Lincoln?

3. Was Governor /u/nmtts-’s signature of B.328: Abolition of Housing Overreach Act valid?

###II. ARGUMENT

A. /u/CooIey0’s vote on B.328 was invalid.

On October 18, 2020, /u/CooIey0 is recorded as having voted in favor of B.328. Fifteen days earlier, on October 3, 2020, /u/CooIey0 had sworn in as a member of the United States House of Representatives. Upon taking their oath of office, /u/CooIey0 became entitled to the compensation due to all members of Congress. 2 U.S. Code § 5302.

The state constitution specifies that “No member of the General Assembly shall receive compensation as a public officer or employee from any other governmental entity for time during which he is in attendance as a member of the General Assembly.” Linc. Const., art. 4, § 2(b). Furthermore, “No person may hold a federal position and a major state position or state legislator position concurrently.” Meta Const., art. II, § 9(a).

Thus, upon taking their oath of office as a member of the United States House of Representatives, /u/CooIey0 ceased to be a member of the General Assembly of the State of Lincoln and subsequently forfeited their power as a member of the General Assembly, in which “legislative power is solely vested.” Linc. Const., art. 4, § 1. Therefore, he no longer possessed the authority to vote on legislation under consideration by the General Assembly and his vote on B.328 was invalid.

B. B.328 was not legally passed by the General Assembly of the State of Lincoln.

Generally, legislative bodies require a majority of membership present to constitute a quorum. U.S. Const., art. I, § 5. In particular, “[f]or the purposes of the Lincoln Assembly, a quorum shall be defined as a majority of Assemblypeople being present and voting on a particular item placed before them.” R. 57: Rules of the Eighth Lincoln Assembly, § 8(1), see also Univ. By Laws, § 4(4)(a). Discounting the vote incorrectly recorded by /u/CooIey0, a total of three members of the General Assembly voted on B.328. Three members, /u/RealQsMxRecon, /u/Murpple, and /u/NotBestofBest were not present and voting.

As only three members of the General Assembly, which constitutes half but not a majority of the total membership of six, voted on B.328, the vote was not binding. R. 57, § 8(1)(b), USB, § 4(4). Therefore, B.328 was not duly passed by the General Assembly.

C. Governor /u/nmtts-’s signing of B.328 was invalid.

“Every bill passed by the General Assembly shall be presented to the Governor after its passage. The foregoing requirement shall be judicially enforceable. If the Governor approves the bill, they shall sign it and it shall become law.” Linc. Const., art. 4, § 4(a).

Thus, B.328 should not have been presented to the Governor for his signature nor should it have become law upon such signing. However, it was sent to the Governor on October 19, 2020 and subsequently signed on October 21, 2020. These actions on behalf of the State Clerk and Governor were invalid for the aforementioned reasons and should not have allowed for the passage of B.328.

###III. CONCLUSION

B.328: Abolition of Housing Overreach Act should be stricken as not having constitutionally been enacted.

May it please the Court,

Petitioners, the Lincoln General Assembly and its presiding officer, Speaker /u/Samigot, file the following complaint with the honorable Court challenging the constitutionality of the Court Investigation Act (Public Law B.360).

Petitioners allege that the Act violates the separation of powers enshrined at Lin. Const, art. II, § 2, and that the Act being inseverable, it should be invalidated in its entirety.

We seek declaratory and injunctive relief from this Court.

####The complaint is located here in Google Docs format

Respectfully submitted,

/u/hurricaneoflies

Attorney for Petitioners

The court has reached a decision in this case. The opinion can be found here.

Syllabus. The following case arises from a challenge to Article IV, Section 9 of the State Constitution and B. 194, alleging that these laws are unconstitutional bills of attainder since they impose a punishment on persons who are noncompliant to legislative subpoenas.

Held. The Article and the Act are not automatic findings of guilt, and are thus not unconstitutional bills of attainder.

Homofuckspace, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by High-Priest-of-Helix, C.J., and Cardwitch, J.

Please note that the Court Clerk forced the author to remove innumerable references to urine, circumcision, homosexuality, young love, and all that which feeds into the Platte River, biotic and abiotic alike.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Cohn and Cames Cmith are twins. They look remarkably like John and James Smith of In re: 720 ILCS 5/11-11, Case No. 20-12 (Lincoln, July 12, 2020) and Bohn and Bames Bmith of In re: 720 ILCS 5/11-11 II, Case No. 20-14 (Lincoln, August 26, 2020), but have giant noses and unibrows.

One evening, they were discovered together engaged in sexual acts with a horse at Cames' farm, after Cohn's bitter ex-girlfriend called in a tip to the police. They were arrested and convicted pursuant to 720 I.L.C.S. 5/12-35, which criminalizes sexual relations with animals.

This statute violates both the federal and state constitution. Specifically, the statute violates the right to privacy enshrined in the 14th and Ninth amendments to the federal constitution and Article I, § 24 and Article XII of the state constitution, by infringing upon Petitioners' reproductive autonomy to engage in private sexual conduct with non-humans.

II. ARGUMENT

A. The Statute Violates the Federal Constitution's Ninth Amendment

"At the very least, the 9th Amendment protects individual rights to engage in wholly private conduct without fear of government reprisal." In re: 720 ILCS 5/11-11 II, Case No. 20-14 at *3 (Lincoln, August 26, 2020). Here, that is precisely what Petitioners have done: sought to engage in wholly private conduct. Yet, nonetheless, they have been subject to "government reprisal," in violation of the Ninth Amendment.

There can be little doubt that the rights guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment apply here. The Ninth Amendment provides constitutional protection for a variety of unenumerated rights including, as here, the right to privacy. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479. As recognized in Griswold, the right to privacy emanates from, inter alia, the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 484. The right to privacy cannot be exclusively located in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because Griswold "expressly disclaimed any reliance on the doctrine of 'substantive due process' . . . ." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 594 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

The right to privacy is also rightly protected by the Ninth Amendment because it was one of those unenumerated rights the Founders intended to accord constitutional protection by enacting the Ninth Amendment. For example, in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Supreme Court considered a customs statute which allowed government agents to obtain a court order compelling individuals to produce private documents and papers (there, customs invoices). In considering the case, the Court first held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendment apply to "invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and privacies of life." Id. at 630. The Court also pointed out that the drafters of the Constitution intended the protection of a privacy right in light of their experience with the English "writs of assistance," by which, during the colonial era, government officers could search the homes of colonists' under suspicion of tax evasion. Id. at 625.

Likewise, in 1890, future Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis published a law review article titled The Right to Privacy, in which he argued for the existence of this unenumerated right. He explained that the right of the individual to "full protection in person and property . . . is a principle as old as the common law." Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).

The right to privacy in turn protects the Petitioners' conduct. In Lawrence, the Supreme Court held that "criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in [one's] home violate[s] . . . vital interests in liberty and privacy." 539 U.S. at 563. As Justice Scalia, in dissent, recognized, this holding is fundamentally incompatible with criminal prohibitions on adult incest:

State laws against . . . adult incest. . . are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into question by today's decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding.

539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

Though in Lawrence the Court located that privacy interest in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is no less powerfully protected by the Ninth Amendment.

B. The Statute Violates the Fourteenth Amendment

"The United States Supreme Court has held that individuals have rights to privacy and bodily autonomy and that criminal law that would touch on consensual sexual acts must establish that the challenged law is narrowly tailored to address a compelling state interest." In re: 720 ILCS 5/11-11 II, Case No. 20-14 at *3 (Lincoln, August 26, 2020). Petitioners here have engaged in "consensual sexual acts" within the meaning of In re: 720 ILCS 5/11-11 II--all humans involved in the sexual acts consented to the acts to be performed. The consent of the animals involved is immaterial and is, at best, a fig leaf to cover the state's interest in enshrining in criminal law the moral revulsion of a political majority at the act in which Petitioners have chosen to engage. After all, the State is utterly unconcerned with the consent of the animals whose eggs Lincolnians fry every morning, and whose meat Lincolnians eat for dinner every evening.

C. The Statute Violates Article I, § 24 of the Lincoln Constitution

"[A]ny law that invades the domain of private conduct of individuals must survive a level of heightened scrutiny not required of laws that are public in nature." In re: 720 ILCS 5/11-11 II, Case No. 20-14 at *5 (Lincoln, August 26, 2020). Here, Petitioners have engaged in wholly private conduct: the conduct in question took place entirely on their own property, indoors, and not visible to any person outside of the place of occurrence. Accordingly, it must survive heightened scrutiny which, as set forth below, it cannot.

D. The Statute Violates Article XII of the Lincoln Constitution

Article XII of the state constitution provides:

Every person has a right to reproductive autonomy over their own body. As such, a person’s liberty to determine their own life course shall not be denied or infringed, unless justified by a compelling State interest which shall be achieved by the least restrictive means.

The right to "reproductive autonomy" must necessarily include the right to engage in consensual sexual behavior in private.

First, the text of the Article demands a broad reading. If the Assembly wished to enshrine only the right to an abortion in the constitution, it knew how to do so. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1994). But instead of guaranteeing "a right to abortion" the Assembly wisely guaranteed every person the "right to reproductive autonomy over their own body." Moreover, the Assembly emphasized the broad rights it intended to guarantee by adding an additional sentence, stating that "a person's liberty to determine their own life course shall not be denied or infringed" unless the action can meet strict scrutiny. After all, among the most basic principles of statutory interpretation is that a court should "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed." Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883); see also Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) ("A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant...."(quoted in Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009))). If the words assuring guarantee of the right to "determine [one's] own life course" does not mean an actual right to "determine [one's] own life course," see In re 720 ILCS 5/11-11, and it also does not mean that the right to "reproductive autonomy" should be construed broadly then it means nothing at all. This, simply, cannot be.

Second, whether construed broadly or narrowly, the term "reproductive autonomy" encompasses sexual acts. Black's Law Dictionary, for example, defines the term "reproductive rights," as "[a] person's constitutionally protected rights relating to the control of his or her procreative activities." REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Procreative activity, of course, refers to sexual intercourse.

Third, should this Court consider the Assembly's intent, that intent requires a broad interpretation of the Amendment. It is true that the legislature partially conceived of this amendment as relating to "reproductive autonomy." But it is clear that it was also intended to be far more than that. Assemblyperson /u/Kyle_Pheonix beautifully expounded on the significance of the Amendment, beginning by saying: "History has shown us tyrannies that took it upon themselves to treat people's homes, their letters, their speech, their thoughts and feelings as the domain of a coercive state." The Amendment was intended as a backstop against tyranny--not solely to allow a woman to receive an abortion.

Nor does the statute advance a compelling government interest by means narrowly tailored toward that end. Where the government violates the rights guaranteed by Article XII it must do so by the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling government interest. This is the same language of "strict scrutiny" as applied in both state and federal jurisprudence. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990) (in context of freedom of speech); Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 514 (2005) (in context of Equal Protection Clause); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969) (in context of fundamental right to vote); Shapiro v. Thomson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (in context of fundamental right to travel). Such is the test that this State has commanded to be applied where the government has interfered in a person's "life course."

E. The Act Fails to Advance any Conceivable Government Interest, Failing Both Rational Basis and Strict Scrutiny

Regardless of which constitutional provision the Act violates, the government has no legitimate government interest in prohibiting Petitioners' sexual practices with animals. "A bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest." Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). Accordingly, "[m]oral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003).

In the instant case, there is no justification for the statute beyond bare moral disapproval. Assuming, arguendo, that there is a compelling government interest in preventing harm to animals, that interest is belied by the fact the state not only allows but encourages the wholesale slaughter of tens of thousands of animals every day.

The government's actions in arbitrarily depriving Petitioners of their liberty obviously fall far short of this standard and, accordingly, are unconstitutional.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the challenged statute should be stricken as unconstitutional.

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Comes petitioner /u/President_Dewey, requesting the Honorable Justices of this Court to grant a writ of certiorari to review the constitutionality of Article IV, Section 9 of the Lincoln State Constitution.

1. Article IV, Section 9 of the Lincoln State Constitution violates the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution

On November 5, 2019, the Lincoln Assembly passed Amendment 30 and amended the Lincoln State Constitution to include Article IV, Section 9. It reads,

"[t]he Lincoln State Assembly shall have the power to subpoena individuals suspected of wrongdoing within the State of Lincoln. The method of doing so shall be prescribed by law."

The Section, allowing the Assembly to issue legislative subpoenas, oversteps the boundaries afforded to the Assembly. Of course, the power of legislatures to issue subpoenas for the purposes of legitimate legislative investigation is not questioned by any legitimate authority, such that

"[t]here can be no doubt as to the power of Congress, by itself or through its committees, to investigate matters and conditions relating to contemplated legislation. This power, deeply rooted in American and English institutions, is indeed coextensive with the power to legislate." Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).

However, Article IV, Section 9 is not intended as investigation related to existing legislation. Instead, it is intended as compelling those "suspected of wrongdoing" to testify. As with Congress, the subpoena power of the Assembly is limited by a few factors, such that "the power to investigate must not be confused with any of the powers of law enforcement." Id. Indeed, to rule against an exercise of the investigatory power of the legislature, it need be found that the "investigation... was [an] usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive." Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). By pursuing cases of "wrongdoing," rather than any particular legislative purpose, the Assembly has attempted to usurp the powers of the judiciary by performing a pseudo-grand jury act.

And as with any other violation of law, penalties are levied for violation. Public Law B.194, the prescription of law enabled by Article IV, Section 9, charges that failure to comply with a legislative subpoena shall be a Class A Misdemeanor. Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, known as the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution, states that "No State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder." In related terms,

"[L]egislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution." United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (citations omitted).

Through Article IV, Section 9, the Assembly has attempted to usurp the judiciary's power by utilizing the subpoena power to name individuals to testify for suspected wrongdoing, and charging them with a crime for failing to do so. This is not their power, and a bill of attainder as prohibited by the U.S. Constitution.

2. Questions for the Court

1. Does Article IV, Section 9 of the Lincoln State Constitution violate the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution?

3. Conclusion

In conclusion, I ask the Court to grant relief by striking Article IV, Section 9 from the Lincoln State Constitution. Thank you.

I. INTRODUCTION

Bohn and Bames Bmith are twins who look remarkably like John and James Smith of In re: 720 ILCS 5/11-11, Case No. 20-12 (Lincon, July 12, 2020), but with prodigious mustaches--and in love. One evening, they were discovered together after Bohn's bitter ex-boyfriend called in a tip to the police. They were arrested and convicted pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/11-11, which criminalizes sexual relations with immediate family members.

This statute violates Article XII of the state constitution by infringing upon Petitioners' reproductive autonomy to engage in private, consensual sexual contact of persons of their own choosing.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

In In re: 720 ILCS 5/11-11, Case No. 20-12 (Lincoln, July 12, 2020) this Court upheld the anti-incest statute against challenge under a purported right of the petitioners to "determine their own life course" under Article XII of the Lincoln Constitution. Instead, In re: 720 ILCS 5/11-11 held, Article XII applies "only to issues of 'reproductive autonomy.'" Id. at *1. However, the Court was not asked to decide, and did not decide, whether "reproductive autonomy" encompasses the right to engage in consensual sexual behavior in private.

III. ARGUMENT

Article XII of the state constitution provides:

Every person has a right to reproductive autonomy over their own body. As such, a person’s liberty to determine their own life course shall not be denied or infringed, unless justified by a compelling State interest which shall be achieved by the least restrictive means.

The right to "reproductive autonomy" must necessarily include the right to engage in consensual sexual behavior in private.

First, the text of the Article demands a broad reading. If the Assembly wished to enshrine only the right to an abortion in the constitution, it knew how to do so. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1994). But instead of guaranteeing "a right to abortion" the Assembly wisely guaranteed every person the "right to reproductive autonomy over their own body." Moreover, the Assembly emphasized the broad rights it intended to guarantee by adding an additional sentence, stating that "a person's liberty to determine their own life course shall not be denied or infringed" unless the action can meet strict scrutiny. After all, among the most basic principles of statutory interpretation is that a court should "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed." Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883); see also Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) ("A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant...."(quoted in Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009))). If the words assuring guarantee of the right to "determine [one's] own life course" does not mean an actual right to "determine [one's] own life course," see In re 720 ILCS 5/11-11, and it also does not mean that the right to "reproductive autonomy" should be construed broadly then it means nothing at all. This, simply, cannot be.

Second, whether construed broadly or narrowly, the term "reproductive autonomy" encompasses sexual acts. Black's Law Dictionary, for example, defines the term "reproductive rights," as "[a] person's constitutionally protected rights relating to the control of his or her procreative activities." REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Procreative activity, of course, refers to sexual intercourse.

Third, should this Court consider the Assembly's intent, that intent requires a broad interpretation of the Amendment. It is true that the legislature partially conceived of this amendment as relating to "reproductive autonomy." But it is clear that it was also intended to be far more than that. Assemblyperson /u/Kyle_Pheonix beautifully expounded on the significance of the Amendment, beginning by saying: "History has shown us tyrannies that took it upon themselves to treat people's homes, their letters, their speech, their thoughts and feelings as the domain of a coercive state." The Amendment was intended as a backstop against tyranny--not solely to allow a woman to receive an abortion.

Nor does the statute advance a compelling government interest by means narrowly tailored toward that end. Where the government violates the rights guaranteed by Article XII it must do so by the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling government interest. This is the same language of "strict scrutiny" as applied in both state and federal jurisprudence. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990) (in context of freedom of speech); Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 514 (2005) (in context of Equal Protection Clause); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969) (in context of fundamental right to vote); Shapiro v. Thomson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (in context of fundamental right to travel). Such is the test that this State has commanded to be applied where the government has interfered in a person's "life course."

In the alternative, the Act violates the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."

Regardless of which constitutional provision the Act violates, the government has no legitimate government interest in prohibiting Petitioners' sexual relationship. In fact, "[m]oral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003). If it cannot survive rational basis review, it cannot survive strict scrutiny review.

The government's actions in arbitrarily depriving Petitioners of their liberty obviously fall far short of this standard and, accordingly, are unconstitutional.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the challenged statute should be stricken as unconstitutional.

###IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF LINCOLN

##In re Ban on Federal Prisons in Lincoln Act | JacobInAustin v. State of Lincoln

##PETITION FOR AN WRIT OF CERTIORARI

###QUESTION PRESENTED Whether the Ban on Federal Private Prisons in Lincoln Act, B.252 violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.

###TABLE OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

###REQUEST FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JacobInAustin, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby, pursuant to Rule 1 of the Rules of this Court, respectfully requests a writ of certiorari to review the Ban on Federal Private Prisons in Lincoln Act, B.252.

###JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Rule 1(c) of the Rules of this Court.

###STATEMENT

On July 5th, 2020, Governor cubascastrodistrict signed the Ban on Federal Private Prisons in Lincoln Act, B.252 into law, stating that:

“Private prisons completely corrupt what tiny amount of justice there is left in the American justice system. They profit off of human suffering, and encourage punishment and re-incarceration instead of humanizing prisoners and rehabilitating them. There is no reason for the state of Lincoln to allow private prisons to exist within our borders any longer, and so I must sign this bill into law. It is the first step in allowing all Lincoln residents, even those serving time, to rebuild their lives and live up to the founding values of liberty and justice for all.”

Even so, the State cannot be permitted to triumph over the Federal Government.

###ARGUMENT

####1. Federal law preempts contrary state law

“Put simply, federal law preempts contrary state law.” Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 578 U.S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 11) under the Supremacy Clause. See U.S. Const. Art. VI, § 2. In this case, the State has prohibited the Federal Government from “contract[ing] with a private contractor or private vendor for the provision of services relating to the operation of a correctional facility or the incarceration of persons within the State of Lincoln.” Ban on Federal Private Prisons in Lincoln Act, B.252(3)(a).

####2. A state cannot regulate the Federal Government If “the law may regulate the Government directly or discriminate against it,” it violates the Supremacy Clause. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 434 (1990) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 425-437 (1819)). “A state regulation is invalid only if it regulates the United States directly or discriminates against the Federal Government or those with whom it deals.” Id., at 435 (citations omitted).

####3. Conflicting state laws are without legal effect “The Supremacy Clause provides the constitutional basis for the pre-emption of state laws. Because the Constitution and federal laws are supreme, conflicting state laws are without legal effect.” Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 569 U.S. 641, 656 (2013) (citing generally Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000)).

###CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

DATED: July 13th, 2020

JacobInAustin | Counsel of Record | JIA Law Office, 401 Congress Avenue, Austin, Dixie 78701 | Counsel for Petitioner

Syllabus. The following case arises from a challenge to 720 ILCS 5/11-11, a statute prohibiting sexual contact between family members. According to the Petitioner, the Act violates the XII Amendment of the Lincoln Constitution by depriving persons of the right to determine their own life course by denying them the ability to freely and consensually enter into loving relationships.

Held. Article XII is limited in scope to reproductive autonomy, and the Act does not violate the Article.

Homofuckspace, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by High-Priest-of-Helix, C.J., and CardWitch, J.

The full opinion can be viewed here.

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On May 29, this court ordered Spacedude2169 to provide briefing within one week regarding the Nationalist Rebuke Act. They did not. After a week passed, in the interests of fairness in light of elections, we once again requested briefing on June 7 at 12:24 PM. They again filed nothing. And on June 9 at 9:50 AM, we once again requested briefing, warning that the matter would be dismissed if none was received. It has since been dismissed.

Our Rules prohibit parties from disregarding a valid order. After all, an "order issued by the Court ... shall be construed to be effective on the following day," G.L. Sup. Ct. R. Proc. Rule 2(f), suggesting our orders have rule-binding power. A party disinterested in continuing litigation has any number of options available to them, including moving to withdraw, requesting an extension, begining settlement proceedings, or requesting substitution; none of these occurred. This discourtesy by Spacedude2169 -- in effect, wasting the court's and the government's time due to lack of prosecution -- happened on three instances, allowing review under Rule 7(b).

THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 7, Spacedude2169 is hereby ORDERED to appear before this court by Sunday, June 14, 2020, at 11:59 PM Central Time, to show cause, if any, why they should not be sanctioned under Rule 7 for repeated violations of our Rules.

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Comes now Dewey Cheatem on behalf of Petitioners John and James Smith, appealing their convictions under 720 ILCS 5/11-11 and sentence of two years imprisonment.

I. Introduction

Petitioners John and James Smith are twins--and in love. One evening, they were discovered together after John's bitter ex-boyfriend called in a tip to the police. They were arrested and convicted pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/11-11, which criminalizes sexual relations with immediate family members. This statute violates Article XII of the state constitution.

Article XII of the state constitution provides:

Every person has a right to reproductive autonomy over their own body. As such, a person’s liberty to determine their own life course shall not be denied or infringed, unless justified by a compelling State interest which shall be achieved by the least restrictive means.

Self-evidently, the Article has two separate clauses: the first sets forth a "right to reproductive autonomy over their own body"; the second provides that "a person’s liberty to determine their own life course shall not be denied or infringed." As Justice Homofuckspace noted in his dissent in In re B.145: Acceptance Day Act, "the legislative intent of the article is to provide two related but distinct rights," one of which is "freedom of one to determine their own life course."

That the statute provides these two distinct grants of rights finds support in the basic principles of statutory interpretation and in the jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, which this Court recently affirmed in its decision, In re B.137. Petitioner discusses each in turn.

Here, 720 ILCS 5/11-11 violates Petitioners' rights to "pursue [their] own life course" by imposing criminal punishment on their ability to choose their own sexual partners.

II. The Principles of Statutory Interpretation Require a Broad Reading of Article XII

The principles of statutory interpretation command a broad interpretation. First, among the most basic principles of statutory interpretation is that a court should "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed." Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883); see also Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) ("A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant...."(quoted in Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009))). Here, only one reading avoids rendering the entire second clause as "surplusage"--the one in which it confers rights not already provided in the first clause. Any other reading renders the second clause meaningless.

Second, the structure of the amendment itself requires a broad reading. It first guarantees the "right to reproductive autonomy." Then, it provides "as such, a person's liberty to determine their own life course shall not be denied or infringed." In the absence of a definition, a term must be construed in "accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning." FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). The ordinary usage of "as such" has come to be roughly equivalent to "therefore.".

Upon understanding that "as such" means "therefore," the second clause is easily understood as establishing additional rights above and beyond those created by the first clause. The first clause creates a right to reproductive autonomy--the second clause recognizes that right and confers further rights based upon the recognition of the right to reproductive autonomy.

Third, the Assembly knew how to make the amendment more limited and chose not to. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1994). See also Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 378 (1954) (finding "no indication that Congress intended to make this phase of national banking subject to local restrictions, as it has done by express language in several other instances"); Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996) ("Congress ... demonstrated in CERCLA that it knew how to provide for the recovery of cleanup costs, and ... the language used to define the remedies under RCRA does not provide that remedy."); FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 302 (2003) (when Congress has intended to create exceptions to bankruptcy law requirements, "it has done so clearly and expressly"). Under this familiar canon of interpretation, this Court must give full effect to the entirety of the Amendment. Limiting the rights provided under this Amendment would fail to do so; accordingly, this Court must abide by the plain text of the amendment.

III. Precedent Clarifies that Prefatory Clauses do not Limit Rights in Subsequent Clauses

The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, like Article XII, is "naturally divided into two parts: its prefatory clause and its operative clause." District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008). In Heller, the United States Supreme Court held that the prefatory clause "does not limit the latter grammatically, but rather announces a purpose." Id. The same is true of Article XII: rather than limiting the rights enunciated in the second clause, the first clause ("reproductive rights clause") "announces" the origin of the decision to create the broad rights in the operative clause. So, just as the Second Amendment "could be rephrased, 'Because a well regulated Militia is necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed,' Heller, 554 U.S. at 577, so too could Article XII be rephrased, "Because every person has a right to reproductive autonomy over their own body, a person’s liberty to determine their own life course shall not be denied or infringed, unless justified by a compelling State interest which shall be achieved by the least restrictive means."

Accordingly, just as the Second Amendment confers an individual right to bear arms based upon the operational clause of "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed," Article XII confers a general right against interference by the state with their liberty to determine their course of life.

IV. The Only Legislative Intent That Matters is Expressed in the Text of the Article

The Assembly's "intent" in enacting the Amendment, to the extent it can be discerned at all, is irrelevant.

The Assembly's "intent is found in the words it has chosen to use." Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 198 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring); West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991) (“The best evidence of [Congress'] purpose is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the President”). The entirety of the Assembly considered the text of the Amendment, had the opportunity to contemplate and pass amendments to the text of the Amendment, and voted and passed the text of the Amendment. The Assembly did not vote upon the floor statements made in support or opposition, some of which were not even made by members of the Assembly! The text of the Amendment is the clearest and most certain expression of the Assembly's intent. To override the legislative intent as expressed by the plain text of the Amendment by use of cherry-picked statements from persons who were not even elected to the Assembly, the Court would set a dangerous and undemocratic precedent.

Courts generally turn to legislative deliberations only when the plain meaning of the text is unclear. The legislature's "intent is found in the words it has chosen to use." Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 198 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring). As explained above, the text here is clear and the canons of interpretation require this Court to give effect to the second clause of Article XII.

Regardless, the text takes precedence over legislative history even when the two are in conflict. For example, in Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), for example, the Supreme Court held that the plain meaning of the Mann Act--which prohibits transportation of women across state lines for purposes of "prostitution, debauchery, or any other immoral purpose"--allied to noncommercial immorality, even though extensive legislative history showed that the purpose of the Act was to prohibit commercial sex trafficking. Accordingly, even if it were correct that the legislative history of the Article did evince an intent to limit the amendment to reproductive autonomy, the text the Assembly adopted does not so limit the Article.

The Assembly chose to enact the wording of the Article as it stands. This Court should not disregard that plain text and instead allow participants in the debate to reach out from history and contradict the legislative consensus reached as to the wording of the statute.

Furthermore, had the Assembly wanted to limit the Article only to reproductive rights, it knew how to do so: it could have simply chosen not to include a second clause conferring additional rights. Yet the Assembly chose not to so limit the Article. Under these circumstances, precedent requires this Court to give effect to the rights conferred in the second clause and not artificially limit the rights provided under the state's constitution. See *Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1994).

Because Article XII by its plain text provides the right of persons to "determine their own life course"--which perforce must include the right to choose what to carry upon their person when they walk in public--and because Article XII by its plain text requires any restrictions upon such right, strict scrutiny must apply.

V. To the Extent the Assembly's Intent is Relevant, its Intent was for a Broad Interpretation

If this court considers the Assembly's intent, that intent requires a broad interpretation of the Amendment. It is true that the legislature partially conceived of this amendment as relating to "reproductive autonomy." But it is clear that it was also intended to be far more than that. Assemblyperson /u/Kyle_Pheonix beautifully expounded on the significance of the Amendment, beginning by saying: "History has shown us tyrannies that took it upon themselves to treat people's homes, their letters, their speech, their thoughts and feelings as the domain of a coercive state." The Amendment was intended as a backstop against tyranny--not solely to allow a woman to receive an abortion.

VI. Strict Scrutiny Applies, Which the Act Fails

Where the government violates the rights guaranteed by Article XII it must do so by the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling government interest. This is the same language of "strict scrutiny" as applied in both state and federal jurisprudence. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990) (in context of freedom of speech); Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 514 (2005) (in context of Equal Protection Clause); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969) (in context of fundamental right to vote); Shapiro v. Thomson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (in context of fundamental right to travel). Such is the test that this State has commanded to be applied where the government has interfered in a person's "life course."

The government has no legitimate government interest in prohibiting Petitioners' sexual relationship. In fact, "[m]oral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003). If it cannot survive rational basis review, it cannot survive strict scrutiny review.

The government's actions in arbitrarily depriving Petitioners of their liberty obviously fall far short of this standard and, accordingly, are unconstitutional.

VII. Conclusion

For the above reasons, 720 ILCS 5/11-11 should be declared unconstitutional and unenforceable.