1. 🇸🇴 Somalia - 4,090
2. 🇲🇷 Mauritania - 3,822
3. 🇳🇬 Nigeria - 3,690
4. 🇬🇭 Ghana - 3,228
5. 🇬🇳 Guinea - 1,897
6. 🇨🇲 Cameroon - 1,736
7. 🇪🇹 Ethiopia - 1,713
8. 🇸🇳 Senegal - 1,689
9. 🇱🇷 Liberia - 1,563
10. 🇸🇱 Sierra Leone - 1,563
11. 🇪🇬 Egypt - 1,461
12. 🇰🇪 Kenya - 1,282
13. 🇨🇩 Democratic Republic of the Congo - 1,068
14. 🇬🇲 Gambia - 1,035
15. 🇪🇷 Eritrea - 973
16. 🇲🇱 Mali - 929
17. 🇨🇬 Congo - 795
18. 🇦🇴 Angola - 662
19. 🇳🇪 Niger - 642
20. 🇿🇼 Zimbabwe - 545
21. 🇲🇦 Morocco - 495
22. 🇧🇮 Burundi - 462
23. 🇹🇬 Togo - 427
24. 🇺🇬 Uganda - 393
25. 🇷🇼 Rwanda - 338
26. 🇨🇻 Cape Verde - 314
27. 🇩🇿 Algeria - 306
28. 🇧🇫 Burkina Faso - 303
29. 🇿🇲 Zambia - 174
30. 🇹🇩 Chad - 169
31. 🇹🇳 Tunisia - 160
32. 🇸🇸 South Sudan - 136
33. 🇧🇯 Benin - 102
34. 🇱🇾 Libya - 89
35. 🇨🇫 Central African Republic - 82
36. 🇩🇯 Djibouti - 29
37. 🇳🇦 Namibia - 19
38. 🇲🇺 Mauritius - 15
39. 🇧🇼 Botswana - 12
40. 🇱🇸 Lesotho - 11
41. 🇸🇿 Eswatini - 6
42. 🇸🇨 Seychelles - 4
43. 🇰🇲 Comoros - 3
44. 🇸🇹 São Tomé and Príncipe - 1

Source: U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT

https://continent.substack.com/p/m23-is-calling-the-shots?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1620194&post_id=156210803&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=e2w63&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

I know SA has a much higher budget than Rwanda, but they're a long way from home in DRC. And Kagame knows what he's doing and is in charge.

The DRC has been a theater of instability in the region for years now, with numerous armed groups, weak state institutions, and vast mineral wealth feeding the war. The two regional blocs, the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community, have tried to stabilize the country over the past years, with very different results: whereas the EAC's regional force succeeded in largely defusing the situation, the intervention by SADC has been marred by procrastination and strategic blunders.

This therefore brings out a number of questions as to why EAC was more successful than SADC in bringing peace in the DRC. The reasons for this combination relate to geopolitical interests, military strategy, political will, and logistical capacity.

Geopolitical Interests and Proximity

The EAC had a more direct stake in the DRC conflict compared to SADC. Several EAC member states, including Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, Burundi, and Tanzania, have economic and security interests related to the stability of eastern DRC. Historically, the region has seen intense involvement from Uganda and Rwanda, at times supporting different armed groups and competing for control over the regional resources. To Kenya, the DRC is seen as one of the giant economic hubs into which it ought to expand and increase trade, while Burundi shares security concerns with Sudan resulting from cross-border instability.

This proximity gave the EAC a greater sense of urgency to act swiftly and effectively. Unlike SADC, which is dominated by states like South Africa, Angola, and Zimbabwe—countries located far from the DRC—the EAC members viewed the crisis as a regional security threat that required immediate attention.

Military Deployment and Strategic Approach

The EAC was more effective and flexible in its military operation. It deployed the EACRF at the end of 2022 with troops from Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and South Sudan quickly moving into key conflict areas such as Goma, Bunagana, and Rutshuru. With that speed, EACRF attained an advantage over strategic locations, while several armed groups, such as M23, could not expand their captured territories.

One of the reasons why EACRF had been successful was that they maintained a proper balance between military presence and diplomacy: Kenyan leadership played a pivotal role in negotiating temporary ceasefires and direct contacts with rebel groups. Partial withdrawals without heavy fighting prevented unnecessary escalation. Such limited withdrawals have given way to a long-term political solution.

Serious setbacks were also suffered in deployment by the SADC Force, which relied mostly on conventional warfare. By the time the SADC forces arrived in the theatre of operations, the dynamics on the ground had changed and the rebel groups had adapted. SADC has a history of going on full military intervention, as witnessed in Lesotho (1998) and the DRC (1998-2003); hence, less emphasis is placed on the art of diplomacy, but much emphasis is given to outright combat, which hasn't largely worked in the current DRC crisis.

Political Will and Coordination

The other principal divide between the two blocs was the expression of political coordination. The EAC demonstrated coherence and commitment toward the peacekeeping mission. Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania provided a united diplomatic intervention, supported by Burundi with troop deployment for border regional stabilization. All these put together meant swift decisions with a focused direction in trying to contain the crisis.

By comparison, SADC had to grapple with internal divisions as a result of how best to handle the conflict in the DRC. South Africa, traditionally the dominant player within SADC, was reluctant to commit large resources due to domestic challenges. The presence of national strategic interests within the DRC by Angola and Zimbabwe complicated consensus on a military and diplomatic strategy for SADC. Its intervention thus proved slower, more reactive, and less effective than the EACRF mission.

Logistical and Economic Benefits

Logistics was also very instrumental in this intervention of EAC. A well-equipped Kenyan military with advanced infrastructure was strategically positioned, hence ensuring rapid deployment of its troops with sustained supply chains. Nairobi was equally important in a logistical way because it guaranteed reinforcement and resupply to EACRF forces that were involved in operations within DRC.

On the other hand, SADC lacked a coherent logistical base. Its forces had to be moved over long distances. This led to delays in reinforcements, supply deficiencies, and operational inefficiencies. Again this diminished the capacity of SADC to effectively make a timely intervention. Impact and Future Implications

The relatively successful approach of the EAC in the DRC goes to demonstrate that regional organizations with direct stakes in the conflicts are often better placed in mediating and stabilizing such crises. The EACRF, while not without limitations such as inability to completely disarm the M23 rebels, at least succeeded in preventing further escalation and in creating conditions for dialogue.

SADC needs to change its intervention strategy in the DRC if it is to be more effective. It should instead focus on diplomatic engagement, better coordination with the Congolese government, and preparedness on the part of SADC's military machinery. Otherwise, SADC risks prolonging the conflict rather than resolving it.

My opinion:

The reason the intervention of the East African Community in the DRC was somewhat more successful compared to SADC's has to do with several important reasons: stronger geopolitical interests, high speed, political coordination, and a well-balanced military-diplomatic approach. Meanwhile, SADC suffered from slow deployment, internal divisions, and reliance on conventional military tactics that prevented it from making any meaningful impact.

Regional peacekeeping operations in Africa going forward need to be characterized more by speed, adaptability, and regional cooperation rather than mere military intervention. If the objective is lasting peace in the DRC, then diplomatic engagement and well-planned interventions strategically implemented-as in this approach by EAC-will far outmatch the use of brute force.